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For my parents
Virtually all our disciplines have relied on conceptions 
which are now incompatible with the Cartesian axiom, and 
with the static world view we once derived from it. For 
underlying the new ideas, including those of modern 
physics, is a unifying order, but it is not causality; it 
is purpose, and not the purpose of the universe and of 
man, but the purpose in the universe and in man. In 
other words, we seem to inhabit a world of dynamic 
process and structure. Therefore we need a calculus of 
potentiality rather than one of probability, a dialectic 
of polarity, one in which unity and diversity are 
redefined as simultaneous and necessary poles of the same 
essence1.
World Perspectives. Ruth Nanda Anshen (1971, p.250: 
original emphasis).
ABSTRACT
CURRICULAR PHILOSOPHY AND STUDENTS1 PERSONAL 
EPISTEMOLQGIES OF SCIENCE
In this thesis I employ a constructivist epistemological stance 
(principally influenced by that due to George Kelly) to critically examine 
the curricular response to contemporary notions of truth, objectivity and 
knowledge.
I take science education (at both Secondary and Tertiary levels) as ray 
special reference within the education system.
An important part of my work explores students’ and teachers' personal 
meanings of science and scientific method, i.e. alternative conceptions 
of science, and I see it as contributing to the growing body of research 
concerned with alternative conceptions jn science: the 'Alternative 
Conceptions Movement' (ACM) in educational research.
To help articulate ray views on these matters I use an augmented version of 
a framework or model, developed by my immediate colleagues, for 
conceptualising cognitive aspects of science education and the 
transformation of scientific knowledge. My version of this framework 
features components under the following main headings:
'Scientists'-Science', 'Philosophers'-Science', 'Curricular-Science', 
'Teachers'-Science1, 1 Students'-Science1, and 'Childrens'-Science'.
I argue that, suitably augmented and interpreted, Kelly's theory is 
capable of rationally integrating existing ACM research, together with my
own.
U)
My classroom research uses a number of complementary investigative 
methods, some of them novel. These may be grouped under the following 
three headings:
- interviews
- lesson observations
- written exercises
I present an outline of a theory of teaching which is compatible with ACM 
research and make recommendations for future science teaching and 
research.
N*.B. To avoid an insidious (male) sexism and 'his/her' formulations which 
I find tedious, I shall use plural forms throughout this thesis, 
e.g. their, themself.
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Chapter 1. Origins and Aims of this Study.
'The wind blew to me through the keyhole and said:
'Come!'. The door sprang cunningly open and said:
' Go!"
Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche.
1.1 Introduction
A review of the recent literature of science education is likely to lead 
the reader to conclude that the ideas about psychology of Jean Piaget 
dominate that field. His work, and that of his immediate co-workers, 
apparently constitute the "received view" for most teachers-educators and, 
consequently, student-teachers. A high point of acceptance was reached, 
for the U.K., in the mid-1960s. It was then possible to open respected 
textbooks on educational psychology (e.g, Stones, 1960) and find the 
Piagetian "stages" listed, apparently as "facts" without authorship being 
attributed in the index.
More recently, some books on classroom practice (e.g, UNESCO, 1980) have 
still presented Piagetian psychology without question or alternative. We 
suggest that such practices tend more towards indoctrination than towards 
education. Moreover, as Piagetian tests are turned into a technology 
(e.g. Shayer and Adey, 1981), the likelihood of their being used in 
classrooms increases enormously. These technologies are easy to apply. 
Their use can be so interpreted as to seem to promise the production of 
simple prescriptive answers to complex problems in teaching and learning. 
Apparently derived from Piagetian theory, and in keeping with its ethos, 
their ready use sidesteps the burgeoning academic criticism of Piagetian
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doctrines, which I shall discuss later.
Discussing one of Piaget's central ideas, that of equilibrium, Richmond 
has pointed out that
'[ 3 the equilibrium principle is closely related to the 
concept of readiness for learning. Readiness for this or 
that educational experience is another way of saying that 
the equilibrated structures can accommodate to a given 
experience. However, if intellectual activity is not 
best described by means of an equilibrium model then this 
view of readiness will not stand.*
(Richmond. 1970. p.110)
The uncritical use of Piagetian technologies may thus supply a scientistic 
rationale for a policy of restricted access to science education on the 
basis of "readiness". In times of resource scarcity, such as now, this 
possibility moves Piagetian technologies from the academic into the 
general political arena.
Now, the work of Piaget and his school (PS) may be said to embrace a 
constructivist theory of knowledge and, indeed, most educationalists would 
similarly claim so to do: a constructivist epistemology is assumed on the 
part of both teacher and learner, researcher and researched.
The basic constructivist stance may be summarised by the now familiar 
slogan "All observations are theory-laden". This commitment has the 
immediate pedagogic consequence that pupils are active construers of 
knowledge and their environment and, hence, they cannot be held to enter 
the classroom - or the research interview - with a 'tabula rasa' or 
"blank mind". Clearly, however, the basic constructivist stance
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constitutes neither a theory of knowledge nor a theory of learning on its 
own. Any elaboration of the basic stance reveal's that many different 
versions of constructivist epistemology are possible: the PS represents
just one amongst many constructivist traditions in educational research, 
albeit, still the most influential one. Over the last several years, 
however, there has been created another body of constructivist research 
concerned with students1 'pre-conceptions1, 1 mini-theories1, 'alternative 
frameworks', 'alternative conceptions' and the like. This sort of 
research has been named variously. Using an expression favoured by myself 
and my immediate colleagues, however, I shall refer to it as the 
'Alternative Conceptions Movement' (ACM) (Gilbert and Swift, 1985). It 
was under the aegis of this latter tradition that I began my own research.
Whilst the ACM may be said to contribute to constructivist approaches to 
teaching and research, it does not yet seem to have made any existing 
constructivist tradition. Members of the department which I joined were 
already actively investigating students' alternative conceptions in 
science and were just beginning to explore the utility of the ideas of 
George Kelly as a methodology for their research. Kelly's theory, namely, 
'Personal Construct Theory*, or 'Personal Construct Psychology' (POP) as 
it is now generally known (Fransella, 1977), was originally developed for 
use in clinical psychotherapy. After considerable initial scepticism, I 
came to see the utility of applying and extending Kelly's ideas in formal 
educational settings myself.
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1.2 Development of the Focus of my Research
When I joined my colleagues at Surrey, their work was focussed upon 
students1 learning in physics. Influenced both by that and by the 
interests and academic expertise that I already had, I chose to seek and 
explore students1 personal understandings of ideas in biology.
During my preliminary investigations of students1 understandings of 
concepts in biology, I noticed in interviews that they often appealed to 
'scientific method', 'experimental proof and the like, apparently as a 
justification for their expressed views (whether 'orthodox' or 
'alternative'). As a result of these and many other varieties of 
experience in my early research, I became convinced that students' 
personal meanings of scientific methods and meta-theoretical terms were 
worthy of investigation in their own right and, further, that they might 
contribute to our understanding of the origin and maintenance of students' 
alternative conceptions in science. I judged this latter notion to be 
supported by certain of the arguments presented by Kelly and Feyerabend, 
whose ideas were progressively informing my research approach:
'Men not only construe their alternatives, but they 
construe also criteria for choosing between them*.
(Kelly, 1969, p.85)
'We concede that our epistemic activities may have a 
decisive influence even upon the most solid piece of 
cosmological furniture - they may make gods disappear and 
replace them by heaps of atoms in empty space'.
(Feyerabend, 1978, p.70)
At about the same time as I was drawing these conclusions, I began
studying stated objectives of"science curricula (beginning with those 
which I was observing at the time, viz, SCISP and Nuffield 'A* level 
biology). I did this out of a conviction that every person who considers 
himself to be concerned with education must supply at least a provisional, 
personal answer to the question "What is education for?" in order to be 
able to proceed effectively, indeed, to proceed at all. By examining 
existing curricula objectives, then, I hoped to inform and develop my own 
ideas on what they should be.
I found that the development by students of skills in "scientific 
reasoning" and "scientific method" featured amongst the objectives of all 
the curricula I examined. This inference is corroborated and amplified by 
Fensham (1983) who proposes that current objectives of science curricula 
fall into the following five broad categories of concerns:
(1) Concerns for the factual and theoretical (conceptual) knowledge of
science.
(2) Concerns for the process of scientific investigation and reasoning.
(3) Concerns for practical (laboratory) investigations in science.
(4-) Concerns for attitudes towards science and attitudes associated with
science.
(5) Concerns for the relation of science to society.
This constituted a second reason for my eventual decision to change the 
subject of my research, viz, I resolved to investigate students1 personal 
meanings of (rather than in) science and of scientific-method.
Now, for me to be able to make judgements in this respect, I needed to 
make clear in my own mind my views as to what 'science1 and 'scientific- 
method' are - a task which necessitated an appraisal of existing 
philosophies of science.
Whilst I saw my research being focussed upon students1 personal 
understandings, if the curricular objective in question was to be 
implemented, then teachers' personal understandings would have to be 
explored also. Finally, since teachers would be operating under 
constraints of a curriculum and examinations, an analysis of teaching and 
curricular materials was indicated.
Now, at the same time as I was deliberating over the focus of my intended 
field-research it was apparent to all concerned that there was a certain 
degree of confusion amongst members of the ACM as to the detailed nature 
of an 'alternative conception' and the role it should play within a theory 
of teaching and learning. I contend that this is generally the case 
today. Moreover, the work of the Movement has become sufficiently well 
known to have attracted something of a "critical backlash". Whilst no 
critic has questioned the basic constructivist stance, some have argued 
that the comprehensive application of the alternative conceptual framework 
in classroom research has exaggerated both the level and the prevalence of 
childrens' ability to theorise spontaneously. Other critics complain that
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the idea "lacks precision" and "means all things to all persons". 
Recently, in a review of a book by some influential members of the ACM, 
Black argued that
'It is clear that teaching strategies have to be 
radically reconstructed in face of the new evidence of 
the varied, often seemingly bizarre, and - to children - 
sensible explanations that already meet any needs that 
their holders might have. However, it is not possible to 
confront this problem - in particular to bridge the gap 
between empirical evidence and pedagogical guidance - 
without some theoretical model of learning married to a 
reconsideration of the concepts to be learned.
In both these aspects, the book reflects the weakness of 
the field. Analysis of the underlying scientific 
concepts involved is attempted in some of the chapters, 
but those attempts are rarely adequate and sometimes 
flawed. This matters, because a reconsideration of the 
pedagogical targets in relation to new insights into 
childrens' own ideas requires radical rethinking to 
construct new, elementary yet valid approaches to the 
conceptual world of science.
The lack of models for learning shows in two ways. Some 
authors offer programmes to challenge and change existing 
ideas; some propose that effort must concentrate on 
helping children express and exchange their ideas and 
state that overt challenge is not appropriate; and some 
offer no prescriptions. Such inconsistencies are nowhere 
analysed. More subtly, the theoretical assumptions that 
must guide the reported investigations are largely 
unexarained.'
(Black, 1986, p.18)
The need for me to articulate a meta-theory clearly and in some detail 
was, perhaps, rendered more urgent than to most members of the ACM due to 
my decision to research students' alternative conceptions of 'science' 
and 'scientific-method'. I hope that the results of ray attempt to do so 
shall have general utility to the ACM and shall go some way to countering 
and transcending criticisms of its work.
5.3 Summary of Aims of this Research
In this thesis I have three overarching and complementary aims:
(1) To explore students’ and teachers' personal epistemologies of 
science;
(2) To elucidate the epistemological image of science projected overall 
by the existing education system;
(3) To re-construe Kelly's 1955 articulation of 'Man-the-Scientist' in 
light of both influential traditions in epistemology and the 
interests and commitments informing the ACM with a view to outlining 
principles for a compatible 'Personal Construct Pedagogy', applicable 
in the first instance to science education.
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Chapter 2. Philosophy and Education
'Epistemology and the philosophy of education are closely 
connected. When the sense of this connection gets lost 
the result is a period of stunted epistemology and no 
philosophy of education worth mentioning. We are 
emerging from such a period.'
Against Empiricism : Holland (1980, p.10)
2.1. Introduction
My purpose in this chapter is to present arguments which shall 
establish an initial plausibility to the view that epistemology is 
both necessary and important for education in general, and for 
science education in particular.
2.2. Illustrations in Use of Some Key Terms used in this Thesis
The term 'education* has long enjoyed a widespread currency within 
societies. Its meanings, however, have varied considerably 
according to purpose and context. Here, Passmore provides a useful 
elaboration:
*A systematic book on the philosophy of education would 
need [] to distinguish between education^ (upbringing), 
education (schooling), education (producing educated
-  2.1 -
men) - to say nothing of education - the study of these 
processes1
(Passmore, 1980, p.22: original emphasis).
My ideas on this subject complement those of Passmore in many 
ways. In particular, I like the suggestion, implicit in the above 
quotations, that 'philosophy of education1 somehow "entails" or 
informs all other meanings of 'education*.
For my part, I should like to begin by adopting a broader 
distinction that is sometimes made between 'philosophy of 
education' and 'pedagogy' and to outline my personal meanings for 
these expressions.
(1).Philosophy of Education. Philosophers of education are 
primarily concerned with the aims and purposes of education 
("educational values"). Their endeavours may be elucidated by 
considering the sorts of questions that they ask (and attempt to
rn
answer): e.g. "What should education be for?", "Who^should we 
teach?", "What should we teach?"*
(2).Pedagogy* Pedagogues, by contrast, are more concerned with the 
means and results of education* Their efforts may be said to fall 
into two categories:
(2a).Theory of Teaching. Theorists of teaching attempt to answer 
such questions as "How should we achieve what we want to achieve 
through teaching?"
-  2.2 -
(2b). Theory of Educational Research. Theorists of educational 
research attempt to answer questions such as "How should we know 
when we have achieved what we want to achieve through education?"
Now, as I have already intimated, I do not lay claim to any great 
originality in making these basic distinctions and in proposing 
these meanings. Nor, however, do I wish to imply that they are 
uncontroversial and without need of justificatory argument. My 
earlier stated views adumbrate a departure from the allegedly 
"value free", ‘analytic*, approach to philosophy of education which 
has been of pre-eminent influence in recent decades (though it is 
now showing signs of a general withering), in favour of a return to 
a more traditional, *normative* (I prefer ‘value-explicit*), one.
It is partly for thts*reasons th&t I have refrained from giving 
formal ‘definitions* of the key terms of this section, (i describe 
and argue against analytic philosophy of education in Chapter 10).
I would like to stress that, so far, I have characterised only the 
approach to (or type of) philosophy about education that I intend 
to take)for I believe that many, even most, of the specific 
educational values and pedagogic recommendations that I shall 
propose and endorse within my philosophy of education cannot be 
described as "traditional" in a way which I would accept.
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My distinctions and meanings may be related back to those of 
Passmore in the following way:
- ‘Philosophy of Education* has principal (though not 
exclusive) reference to Passmore's 'education!,3*; similarly,
- 'Theory of Teaching* to 'education',
- 'Theory of Educational Research* to 'education/^ *.
I should mention that by 'schooling* ('education*) I mean any 
formal, institutionalised, education sanctioned by the (British) 
State. It is ultimately this sense of 'education' for which I 
intend this thesis to have principal pertinence.
I shall use 'educationalist' as a generic term to refer to 
educational researchers and philosophers of education, and 
'educator' to refer to professional teachers.
I shall use 'educand' as a generic term to refer to any person 
engaged in formal education (i.e. 'schooling'). Sometimes, 
however, I shall distinguish between 'pupils' for persons engaged 
in Primary or Secondary education, i.e. in schools, and 'students* 
for persons engaged in Tertiary education, i.e. in Universities, 
Polytechnics, and rely upon the context to make clear any further 
details of these meanings.
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Turning now to my personal meaning of the term 'epistemology*, it 
may be useful to first place it within its broad context of 
philosophy.
Engler provides a concise description of the five main divisions of 
philosophy:
'Traditionally, philosophy has encompassed five types of 
language and study: logic, aesthetics, ethics, politics,
and metaphysics. Logic is the study of correct or 
normative reasoning; it describes the ideal method of 
making inferences and drawing conclusions. Aesthetics is 
the study of ideal forms and beauty; it deals with the 
nature of the beautiful and with judgements about 
beauty. Ethics is the study of ideal conduct; it deals 
with the knowledge of good and evil. Politics is the 
study of ideal social organization and describes those 
forms of social and political structures that are most 
appropriate for human-beings. Metaphysics is the study 
of ultimate reality and attempts to coordinate what is 
real in the light of what is ideal.'
(Engler, 1979, p. 6: my emphasis).
Following Artistotie, however, we may further divide metaphysics 
into 'ontology' and 'epistemology*. Roughly speaking, the first 
half of Engler's description of metaphysics ('the study of ultimate 
reality') applies mainly to ontology; the second half ('attempts to 
coordinate what is real in the light of what is ideal') mainly to 
epistemology. Since the importance of epistemology in educational 
settings is the main subject of both this chapter and this thesis,
I should like to elaborate further upon what I consider to be the 
basic nature and worth of epistemology as an area of human 
endeavour.
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I contend that from a present day point of view - especially a 
Western one - it seems reasonable to suppose that to early 
Personkind the world must have seemed to be a terrifying and 
large^ly chaotic place, full of phenomena beyond both their control 
and their comprehension. If this view is accepted, then it may 
seem plausible further to suppose that as social organisation and 
language (spoken and written) gradually developed so persons came 
to desire and to strive not only 'to know* things about the world, 
e.g. sources of food and of shelter, but also * to know how they 
know' such things. From contemporaneous manuscripts we can be sure 
that this was an important concern from at least the time of early 
Greek civilization and it is this second sense of knowing which 
evokes issues of 'epistemology* or 'theory of knowledge'.
Epistemology would seem to derive its enduring pertinence and 
importance from such everyday experiences as the personal, 
subjective, one of having made a "mistake" about some state of 
affairs in the world, or in settling disputes over such matters 
with other persons. 'Epistemology', then, is not knowledge itself; 
it is - or is purported to be - "knowledge-about-knowledge" 
('meta-knowledge').
Many of us make implicit, unrecognized, appeals to epistemology 
when we claim, for example, that "seeing is believing". We are 
always making claims of this sort, though for most of us, most
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of the time, such claims and issues are of only secondary 
interest. Epistemologists, by contrast, are philosophers who 
deliberately devote themselves to the sustained critical 
contemplation of just such claims and to the development of what 
they argue to be ever more sophisticated alternatives. Trite and 
pointless though many of the classical examples used by 
epistemologists for discussion initially may seem, e.g. the 
existence of tables and chairs, the importance and work of 
epistemology may be anticipated more compellingly as soon as we 
extend our epistemological attention to notions such as 'atom*, 
'gene* or 'chemical bond'.
2.3. Epistemology and Education
Much confusion has surrounded the possible relevance of 
epistemology for education. This notwithstanding, I contend that 
it may be argued that many epistemologists have systematically (and 
some not so systematically) attributed either too much or too 
little importance to epistemology in an educational context and 
that this cannot be sufficiently explained solely by examination of 
their detailed, personal, epistemological commitments and 
educational values. Hence, in this chapter, I shall attempt to 
present my views on only the general "nature and limits" of the 
importance of epistemology for education. That is to say, I hold 
the arguments that I shall advance in this chapter to have force 
with respect to any elaborated, delineable, theory of knowledge and 
to any such
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set of educational values endorsed. By doing this, I hope to 
provide a clearer basis from whihh to develop my own detailed, 
personal, views in later chapters.
I shall undertake this task by arguing for two propositions. It 
shall help my later exposition if I present my views on the 
"limits" of the importance of epistemology for education first.
2.3.1. Proposition 1: 'Epistemology is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for philosophy of 
education1
a
Some philosophers of education have argued thjt endorsement of a 
particular theory of knowledge (metaphysics, ontology) implies a 
direct or rigojrously specifiable (e.g. formally deducible) 
commitment to a particular set of educational values or policies; 
and conversely, that epistemological commitments must appear 
amongst the basic premises of any philosophy of education.
Other philosophers of education, however, have argued strongly 
against such views. Thus, for example, Frankena (1970) argues 
againts the sufficiency of epistemology for determining solutions 
to educational problems by considering the views of an author who 
seems to imply this:
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*Phenix writes,
fThe view one takes of the subjective-objective aspects 
of knowledge has significant bearing on the learning 
process. If knowledge is completely objective, learning 
consists in becoming conformed to what is outwardly 
true. The mind must then be repeatedly impressed with 
the nature of external things. Drill, memorization of 
well-established information, careful observation, and 
constant checking of facts would be some of the means of 
molding the understanding to agree with what is 
objectively so.*
This sounds plausible. But the conclusion about methods of 
learning and teaching does not actually follow. Even if 
knowledge is objective, it does not follow that repetition, 
drill, raeraorizations, etc., are necessary. Whether such 
methods are necessary or not depends on whether such methods 
are in fact needed to bring the mind to the point of 
conformity with outward fact, whatever that is, and this is 
an empirical, psychological question, not an epistemological 
one.
In fact, no epistemological theory can suffice, by itself, to 
provide a basis for drawing a conclusion about what ought to 
be taught or studied. Such a conclusion requires a normative 
or value premise as well as an epistemological one. Suppose 
we hold that music is not knowledge. Does it follow that it 
should not be taught? Not unless we also accept the 
normative premise that only knowledge should be taught. Or 
suppose we believe that mathematics is tautological. Does it 
follow that it should or should not be taught? That depends 
on what we take to be the value of such tautological 
k n o w l e d g e . '
(Frankena, 1970, p. 19: original emphasis).
And then against the necessity in this respect:
'Thus epistemological theories are not sufficient to establish 
a conclusion about education. Are they necessary for doing 
so? Do we, for example, need an epistemological theory to 
help establish that mathematics should be offered in a 
liberal arts college? I cannot see that we do. All we need 
is some nonvocational line of argument to show that an 
offering in mathematics is desirable, and it is not hard
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to imagine one which involves no epistemology. For example:
Knowledge of mathematics is intrinsically good.
Intrinsically good kinds of knowledge ought to be
taught. Therefore, mathematics ought to be taught.
This argument is, no doubt, oversimplified, but it does show 
that while a normative or value premise is necessary, an 
epistemological one is not.
Hence, as Aristotle said, it is ethics and politics that 
determine what is to be studied, by whom, and to what extent 
- not epistemology.
If epistemological theories are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to determine answers to questions about education, 
two things follow. First, there may be disagreement about 
education between people who agree In epistemology. Even if 
their theory of knowledge is the same, they may use different 
factual or value premises and so come to different 
educational conclusions. Second, there may be agreement 
about education between people who disagree in epistemology. 
For instance, people may agree about the place of mathematics 
in the curriculum even though they have different views about 
its nature.
What has been said may suggest that epistemology has no 
relevance to questions about education. But this does not 
follow. Even though epistemological theories are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to determine the answers to 
questions about education, they may still constitute good 
reasons, or at least relevant considerations, for or against 
such conclusions. It may still even be that given certain 
value premises and certain factual assumptions, they are 
decisive in determining what to teach. For example, if one 
believes that religious doctrines constitute knowledge (an 
epistemological theory), then given that all kinds of 
knowledge should be taught, at least on the elective plan, 
and that religious knowledge can be acquired by teaching and 
only by teaching, one may and presumably will conclude that 
theology should be taught.1
(Frankena, 1970, p. 20: original emphasis).
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Whilst I find Frankena*s arguments, above, to be both compelling 
and exemplary in their clarity, I do not also share his sympathies 
(which he propounds elsewhere in his article) for analytical 
philosophy of education. In Chapter 5, I shall argue that such 
logical independence of epistemology of science and education 
policy cannot be held to imply independence in a broader or "total" 
sense and that this latter view results from a commitment to 
objectivist epistemology which I reject as a general meta-theory.
Once a commitment to a value premise that something ought to be 
taught has been made, however, the relevance of epistemology to 
education may then be rather different as I shall now try to show 
by arguing for my second proposition:
2.3.2. Proposition 2: epistemology is a necessary, though not a
sufficient, condition for pedagogy*
In my formulation of Proposition 2, I consciously echo the Platonic 
insight that the only thing that can be taught is knowledge; and, 
conversely, that if something is held to be knowledge, then it is 
teachable. Whilst I consider this insight to be basically sound, I 
should mention that I perceive this to be the only point of contact 
or agreement between Plato’s system of thought and the views that I 
shall attempt to develop in this thesis. This is because Plato’s 
elaborated epistemological views and eductional values differ 
markedly from my own (see Chapter 10).
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In light of Proposition 1, I believe that a compelling and 
generally applicable case for Proposition 2 may be made by arguing 
for three relationships between epistemology and pedagogy which are 
themselves intimately Interrelated:
2.3.2.1. The Triadic Relationship Implied by ’Teaching1.
It has often been pointed out (e.g. Smart, 1972; Passmore, 1980) 
that the verb * to teach* has two direct objects: logically, if not
grammatically, all ’teaching' implies a triadic relation which, in 
its least formalised version, is of the form ’A teaches B to C', 
where *A* = somebody who teaches, 'B* » something that is taught, 
and 'C' **. somebody who is taught.
This logical relation does not constitute a formal definition of 
’teaching’ - attempts at which I believe to be pointless in 
principle and to fail in practice. Nevertheless, its utility does 
seem to lie in drawing our attention to otherwise implicit 
assumptions concerning the prerequisites for, and perhaps even the 
dynamics of, ’teaching*. These would seem to be at work In all but 
the most rare or idosyncratic meanings of the term.
The familiar inference made from the triadic relation in ’teaching’ 
is that two types or dimensions of ’knowledge' are essential for 
'teaching', viz. for somebody - ’A', to teach, or try to teach,
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something - *6*, to somebody - *C*; ’A* must 1know’ (in some way) 
both *B* and *C*. A teacher must ’know* both what they are 
teaching and who^they are teaching.
I contend, however, that for any theory of teaching the triadic 
relation implies a requirement for something more than ’knowledge* 
in each sense, viz. ’meta-knowledge*. This shall inform, as a 
proper part, what Tomlinson (1981) has identified as a fourth 
element to the relation which, I contend, is essential in formal 
educational settings, namely, a ’learning/teaching process* (p.4, 
original emphasis).
With respect to ’knowledge* in the first sense, i.e. knowing 
something (*B*), the usual pedagqgic inference may be restated as 
the view that before one can teach something to somebody it is 
necessary to know something, e.g. a subject or discipline (i.e. 
’knowledge’). I point out, however, that before one can know that 
one is teaching something to somebody (or can attribute this, with 
reasons, to somebody else) it is necessary to know what it is to 
know something (i.e. ’epistemology’) - for how else is one to 
judge? Thus epistemology is a necessary condition for pedagogy.
It is not, however, a sufficient condition for pedagogy - this for 
reasons discussed in section 2.3.2, above. The "knowledge-hood" of 
knowledge' in this first sense has traditionally been the 
pre-eminent, though not exclusive, concern of philosophers (or more 
specifically, epistemologists). But as Smart reminds 
educationalists
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’It is essential [] that we try to understand something of 
the nature of knowledge, for to some extent what we are 
teaching must influence how we teach.*
(Smart, 1972, p.11: original emphasis).
Knowledge in the second sense, i.e. knowing somebody (*C*), is not 
devoid of epistemological import - quite the contrary (cf. chapters 
3, 4, 5). It has, however, traditionally been the pre-eminent, 
through not exclusive, concern of psychologists.
Now, I do not deny that one can teach with "only" ’knowledge* in 
each of the two senses. But for one ever to teach by intention or 
’to know* (claim with reasons) this of ourselves, or of somebody 
else, one must have criteria for ’knowledge* in each sense. Such 
criteria are, at least partially,derivative of epistemology and 
their articulation is essential if one wishes ever to improve (or 
appraise) one’s teaching efforts in the light of experience or to 
suggest guidelines and hints for good teaching practice for the 
benefit of others. All these things are precisely what pedagogues 
take as their main concerns.
Now, in the course of this thesis I shall argue that each dimension 
of knowledge (and meta-knowledge) cannot fruitfully be considered 
in complete isolation from the other, though they may sometimes 
usefully be distinguished. I contend that it is only in recent 
years that educationalists have returned to a recognition and 
exploration of the interdependence of each sense of knowledge and 
that this return has been by a different route to that of Plato.
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Prior to this, many theorists of teaching tended to emphasise the 
importance of one type of knowledge - to the exclusion, or virtual 
exclusion, of the other. I believe that there are many reasons for 
this and that some are profound, others are trivial; some are 
complicated, others are straightforward (cf. sections 2.3.2.2,
2.3.2.3, below; Chapters 3, 4, 5, 10).
One reason for this divergence which may, however, be considered 
relatively straightforwardly (but which may not, as. a consequence, 
be held to be necessarily without profound Implications concerning 
the relationship between language and reason) is a fact to which I 
have already alluded, namely, the triadic relation in teaching is 
not immediately apparent in the grammar of our language.
#
Passmore (1980, p. 22) lucidly discusses this point by suggesting 
that ’teaching* is a (grammatically) ’covert’ triadic relation as 
opposed to an ’overt* triadic relation. By way of illustration, he 
argues that the statements ’he teaches*, ’he teaches arithmetic* 
and’he teaches backward children* are all intelligible just as they 
stand, whereas the same cannot be said for the verb ’to give’ and 
its derivations.
What I am suggesting here is simply that the grammatical covertness 
of the triadic relation in ’teaching' has resulted in a linguistic 
ambiguity which has, in turn, facilitated a delay in the critical 
recognition of the essential incompleteness of traditions which 
have emphasised (or may be argued to have been exclusively
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concerned with) only one half of the relation, viz. either 'A 
teaches Bf or ’A teaches C*. I suspect, however, that more than a 
mere "grammatical accident" has been at work on this issue and that 
this divergence may more fully be explained by reference to 
educational values and complementary epistemological commitments 
(see Chapters 5 and 10).
2.3.2.2. The Link between Epistemology and Theories of Learning
However it be understood, 'teaching' is concerned with the 
"achievement of learning", however that be understood. (Where 
teaching is unsuccessful this may at least be accepted to have been 
its principal aim).
Now, the popular meanings of 'to learn' and 'to know* would seem to 
be Intimately related - and rightly so. Hilgard and Bower (1975) 
provide one demonstration of this bij quoting meanings for each of 
these verbs from an influential dictionary (viz. the American 
Heritage Dictionary) and then speculating upon similarities and 
other relationships between them:
'Dictionaries help systematize the way concepts are used in 
everyday life, and such definitions illustrate that learn and 
know are closely related in their primary senses. To learn 
means "to gain knowledge through experience" but one of the 
meanings of "experience" is "to perceive directly with the 
senses" which, of course, appears initially in the definition
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of know. So we complete one side of the chain. But 
knowledge Is defined, among other things, as learning 
(erudition) and as familiarity or understanding gained 
through experience, and learning is defined as acquired 
knowledge. So we come full circle.'
(Hilgard and Bower, 1975, p.2: original emphasis).
The popular meanings of 'to learn* and 'to know* would thus seem to 
be intimately related or even inter-dependent. Yet there would 
seem to have been little recognition of this in "formal",
"academic" theories of learning and theories of knowledge. As 
Holland complains, in most formal considerations of epistemology,
'You would be hard put to find [J any investigation of the 
concepts of education, teaching, learning and enquiry; and if 
you had been trained as a student of philosophy in the most 
famous of British universities, it might not have occurred to 
you to expect such a thing or deem its absence any loss.'
(Holland, 1980, p. 11)
So, once again, the issue arises: why and how have theories of
teaching, generally speaking, become separated? Having introduced 
the idea of 'learning' into the discussion, I believe that I can 
now be a little more specific in my answer to this.
The epistemologists* contribution to 'knowing* has been In the 
first sense, i.e. knowing something, and this has been primarily 
construed in terms of the epistemic appraisal of mental "products" 
rather than "processes".
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The psychologists' contribution to 'knowing', by contrast, has been 
mainly in the second sense, i.e. knowing somebody, and this has 
been construed mainly in terms of investigation of mental 
"processes" rather than "products". In an educational context, 
"knowing somebody" has tended to be interpreted as "knowing how 
somebody learns".
The divergence between the study of the two senses of knowing may 
have been amplified by, on the one hand, the long-standing 
infatuation by epistemologists with linguistic analysis and 
* Correct Me thod', and, on the other hand, the psychologists’ 
traditional interest In the philosophy of mind and with the 
understandable (though In some traditions, I contend, excessive)
- c
concern with maturational factors in learning since teaching has 
traditionally been mainly concerned with the achievement of 
learning in children rather than in adults.
I suggest that these differences between epistemologists and 
psychologists - their historical origins, their methods and 
traditional foci of interest - have tended to obscure their very 
considerable common ground, viz. for all their real and apparent 
differences, theorists of knowledge and theorists of learning share 
a fundamental concern with the growth of knowledge. Consequently, 
an elaboration of one is always at least a partial elaboration of 
the other.
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"Learning’V  as we have seen, implies achieving knowledge (whether 
"created" or "acquired") and this must, In turn, imply some kind of 
growth in the knowledge of the learner. Similarly, 'teaching* 
Implies at least some prior learning on the part of the teacher 
for, as Smart puts it
*[] we have to learn something Jto teach before we are in a
position to be able to teach it.*
(Smart, 1972, p.7: original emphasis).
Every epistemologist is committed to the possibility of the growth 
of our knowledge and so, one way or another, is also committed to 
the possibility of learning. To explain the first part: no
epistemologist questions whether knowledge (knowledge of some kind) 
is possible. That is to say, no epistemologist assumes that we 
know, or could know, nothing in the course of our individual or 
collective lifetimes. Equally, however, no epistemologist assumes 
that we know, or could know, everything at the moment of our 
personal birth or conception. Each epistemologist may therefore be 
said to propose, further articulate or criticise an explanations) 
for the fact of the growth of our knowledge.
The prime question for any epistemologist is 'How is knowledge 
possible?' (not 'Is knowledge possible?'). In their attempts to 
answer this question, however, epistemologists have somehow to 
avoid simply begging it ('knowledge is possible: the world is as
it seems and seems as it is'). For the epistemologist, it is not
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what you know but how you know it: epistemology is 'theory of
(how growth In) knowledge (in possible)'.
2.3.2.3. The Link between Epistemology and Methodology
I contend that any epistemology has a methodological component. By 
this I wish to claim more than that epistemology and methodology 
overlap (although I suspect that, strictly speaking, this is their 
class relation), viz. that in a crucial sense, epistemology may be 
said to include methodology.
To explain, the epistemologist's central concern with the growth of 
knowledge has the consequence that any theory of knowledge that is 
worthy of the name must include a "mechanism" (rationale) by which 
knowledge claims may be appraised. Any description of such a 
mechanism, however, constitutes the most important part of any 
method.
In so far as a distinction between epistemology and methodology is 
valid, the former may be said to furnish us mainly with premises 
and arguments to do with the ultimate nature of reality (ontology) 
and for the possibility of knowledge; the latter mainly with 
complementary proposals and criticisms of rules and procedures for 
the achievement of knowledge, i.e. method(s).
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Methodology "operationalises" epistemology: It renders
epistemology usable. The utility of a particular methodology has, 
in turn, come to be seen as amongst the most important causes for 
credibility of a particular epistemology. No method, even those 
judged to be lowly or routine, can be said to be fully understood 
or can even be gainfully applied (albeit, the latter sometimes only 
in the very long terra) without recourse to, and endorsement of, its 
intrinsic epistemological commitments (cf. ray distinction between 
"strong" and "weak" senses of method, methodology, in Chapter 5).
Now, I am aware that my characterization of methodology - its role 
and relation with(in) epistemology - is most adequate with respect 
to epistemological traditions of the general sort which I prefer 
and of which I have yet to elaborate in detail my preferred 
version, viz 'constructivist' traditions (see Chapter 3). This 
notwithstanding, I judge my general point still to be reasonable, 
viz., any epistemology is, in some crucial sense, "methodology 
incorporating". (For traditional 'rationalists', methodology is 
epistemology in formation; for traditional 'empiricists', 
methodology is epistemology; for modern 'constructivists', 
methodology is epistemology in application.)
The relevance of my preceding argujments for pedagogy may be seen 
if one accepts that an important part of all influential theories 
of teaching (past and present) has been methodology of teaching and 
an important part of all such theories of educational research has 
been methodology of educational research.
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Why should an epistemological understanding of methodology be 
desirable, even necessary? After all (it might be argued), It is 
surely possible successfully and consistently to implement a 
teaching or educational research method without any such 
understanding? Not so: to implement or develop a method without
appreciating its epistemological commitments is to beg the basic 
epistemological question 'How is knowledge possible?' because It 
merely assumes the presupposition of both a reality to be known and
the organism's possibility of knowing it - and this leads to
confusion as to the fruits of such implementation or development.
As von Glaserfeld puts it
'It does not help [], to present the problem [of knowledge] 
in crisp terms and then to say, as Attneave [] recently did, 
that its solution is the business of epistemologists and that 
he, the psychologist, prefers to go on believing that 
knowledge does reflect on "existing” reality. Such an act of
faith is a rationally unfounded assumption and will sooner or
later Interfere with the investigator's logic of theory 
construction and, hence, also with his interpretation of 
"data".
(von Glaserfeld, 1979, p. 11.4 : original emphasis).
Nor, I contend, could one implement or develop a method whilst 
remaining epistemologically "agnostic" - not without also remaining 
"agnostic" with respect to the results (whether achieved or 
anticipated) of implementing or developing that method. In summary 
of these arguments, I concur with Lamb's complementary conclusion
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that
‘Important research requires both adequate conceptualization 
and soundness of methodology; neither is, in itself, 
sufficient*.
(Lamb, 1976, p. 415 : original emphasis),
and with Cawthron and Rowell who comment that it is a
*[] conceptual fallacy [to] try [] to separate epistemology 
and methodology. It is a mistake, for example, to try and 
adopt the Piagetian distinction between ’concrete’ and 
’formal* thinkers for methodological purposes without 
realising Piaget’s underlying epistemological 
pre-suppositions; or to adopt the Popperian or Kuhnian views 
of scientific progress at their face value without thinking 
about their implications for science teaching methodology’.
(Cawthron and Rowell, 1978, p. 51 : my emphasis).
The illustrations that these last authors employ, however, direct
attention not only to the pedagogic significance of epistemological
commitments but also an issue which until now I have introduced
somewhat covertly into my discussion, viz. the plurality of
epistemological traditions. This is a subject which I shall
t
examine more directly within my next section.
2.4. Philosophy of Science and Science Education
I have so far referred to both ’knowledge' and ’epistemology' in 
only a "global" sense. When one considers specifically 
‘scientific* knowledge In the light of epistemology, however, this
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introduces special qualities and difficulties to the task. These 
have mainly to do with the traditionally and pre-eminently high 
valuation placed by scholars and general public alike upon the 
(perceived) achievements and activities of 'science1 and which I 
briefly discussed in Chapter 1.
Having recently drawn attention to the epistemologist's prime 
concern with the growth of knowledge, however, I can now identify 
this as the judgement underlying the high valuation of 'science'. 
This is often discussed in terms of 'progress' in knowledge.
For example, George Sarton, one of the most celebrated historians 
of science this century claims that
'The history of science is the only history which can 
illustrate the progress of mankind. In fact, progress has no 
definite and unquestionable meaning in other fields than the 
field of science.'
(Sarton [1936] 1965)
A similar view is propounded by Karl Popper who**(like many others)
I judge to have been the most influential philosopher of science so 
far this century. In his preface to the first English edition 
(1959) of his now classical work The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
(1934), Popper argues that one of the principal these*which he 
proposes and shall explore in the remaining text is that
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'The central problem of epistemology has always been and 
still is the problem of the growth of knowledge. And the 
growth of knowledge can be studied best by studying the 
growth of scientific knowledge.'
(Popper [1934: Eng. trans., Preface, 1959] 1980, p.15 : 
original emphasis).
And elsewhere he claims
'[I]n science [] we can speak clearly and sensibly about 
making progress there. In most other fields of human 
endeavour there is change, but rarely progress (unless we 
adopt a very narrow view of our possible aims in life); for 
almost every gain is balanced, or more than balanced, by some 
loss. And in most fields we do not even know how to evaluate 
change.
Within the field of science we have, however, a criterion of 
progress: even before a theory has ever undergone an
empirical test we may be able to say whether, provided it 
passes certain specified tests, it would be an improvement on 
other theories with which we are acquainted.'
(Popper [1963] 1972, p.^16-217: original emphasis).
Popper likewise identifies this view as a 'thesis', additional but 
complementary to that concerning the growth of knowledge, which he 
proposes to develop arid defend.
Now, Mary Waring relates such judgements to science education in 
the following way:
'The idea of science as a 'magnificent human achievement' 
motivated by a disinterested search for truth and requiring 
bold use of the imagination and, subsequently, of severely 
critical testing, has given science a strong claim to be 
recognised as a humane study. If, however, the claim is to
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be used as a justification for science education, then 
science teaching must reflect it i some way.'
(Waring, 1979; p.45 : original emphasis).
There would seem, then, to be a good reason for supposing that our 
judgements as to the nature and worth of science - our 'idea of 
science1 -should or must influence our (theory and methodology of) 
science teaching. Such judgements, however, presage or adumbrate a 
commitment to a particular 'philosophy of science'.
Klerake et al offer a useful and, I believe, fair 'preliminary 
characterization' (as they describe it) of the way in which 
philosophy of science has broadly been conceived and pursued in the 
20th century:
'By one widely held conception, philosophy of science is the 
attempt to understand the meaning, method and logical 
structure of science by means of a logical and methodological 
analysis of the aims, methods, criteria, concepts, laws, and 
theories of science.'
(Klemke, Hollinger and Kline, 1980, p.2)
These authors later go on to compare and contrast philosophy of 
science to science itself:
'Whereas science is largely empirical, synthetic, and 
experimental, philosophy of science is largely verbal, 
analytic, and reflective. To be sure, in the works of some 
scientists - especially those who are in the more 
"theoretical" sciences - verbal, analytic and reflective 
features may be found. But the converse is not generally 
true. The activities of philosophers of science are, for
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the most part not empirical or experimental, and they do not 
add to our store of factual knowledge of the actual world.
And even in those cases where the more “philosophical" 
activities are found in science, they are usually not pursued 
with the same rigour or toward the same ends as they are by 
philosophers of science.'
(Klemke, Hollinger and Kline, 1980, p.5-6).
The 'ends' toward which philosophers of science direct their 
efforts, alluded by Klemke et al in the last quotation, are both 
various and the subject of an intense ongoing debate. In the 
broadest societal terms, however, the importance and usefulness of 
philosophy of science may be said to reside in the fact that it 
provides us with the only means by which we can 'know' (i.e. know 
with reasons) the activities of 'science* indeed to be such, 
albeit, in an otherwise undifferentiated sense. That is to say, 
philosophy of science furnishes us with a set of principles or 
criteria by which we can judge an activity, a line of research or a 
knowledge claim to be scientific. Those who seek to legitimize, 
demarcate or identify a knowledge claim or an investigative 
activity as scientific must explicitly elaborate and/or tacitly 
invoke philosophy of science.
Given my earlier arguments in this chapter, the pedagogic 
significance of philosophy of science is, perhaps, most apparent in 
the epistemological component or dimension of philosophy of 
science. At this point, however, I should mention my departure 
from 'PosVivistic' traditions in philosophy of science and their
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heirs. Although I shall present my detailed reasons for this 
departure in Chapters 3 and 4, a summary of them may be helpful 
now. I contend that until very recent times the historical 
development of philosophy of science has been dominated by 
Positivistic traditions. Such traditions, however, have drawn from 
only two of;the main divisions and sub-divisions of philosophy 
which I mentioned earlier, viz. logic ('analysis*) and epistemology 
- with the former in the service of the latter. Moreover, 
throughout the development of their tradition, Positivists have 
made strenuous attempts systematically to exclude all remaining 
areas of philosophy. Viewed historically (i.e. as a whole), 
therefore, 'philosophy of science* might better be called 
'epistemology of science': the other title seems overgenerous. I
et
shall argue th^ t the Positivists attempts so to reduce and confine 
philosophy of science cannot be sustained and are, given also my 
endorsement of the traditional meaning of 'philosophy* (viz., 'Love 
of wisdom'), profoundly unwise. This notwithstanding, I shall 
continue to use generically. the expression 'philosophy of science* 
both as a courtesy title and out of a sense of personal commitment 
and intent.
Returning to my theme, I agree with Elkana who argues that
'It is well known that there is a strong interaction between 
the philosophy of science and the science of each 
generation. It is less often stated clearly that there is 
also an interaction between these two and the teaching
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of science in so far as it is the philosophy of science which 
moulds the general attitudes which form the foundations of 
the various theories of science teaching.1
(Elkana, 1970, p.15 : my emphasis)
and that
’By philosophy of science, I mean not only the conscious 
formal philosophy which deals with science but also the 
scientist’s views on the structure of the world, and his 
informal opinions about science.'
(Elkana, 1970, p.15. : my emphasis).
Elkana's second, 'informal*, sense of philosophy of science might 
be said to shift emphasis to the principles and criteria by which a 
particular person effects science.
Now the context surrounding Elkana's remarks which I have recently 
quoted makes it clear to me that he sees no necessary antagonism 
between these two meanings of 'philosophy of science', indeed, 
quite the contrary. Nor do I. Yet, over the last 25 years or so, 
there has been a marked proliferation of substantial, rival, 
traditions in 'conscious, formal' philosophy of science and I would 
suggest that the differences and disagreements between protagonists 
have been primarily over the roles of, and relations between, 
these two meanings and the actual conduct of science. There is now 
no semblance of an orthodoxy within 'philosophy of science', 
construed as a discipline. Outstanding and, to greater and lesser 
extents, mutually incompatible traditions making a direct 
contribution to contemporary philosophy of science inlude those due
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to Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. (I shall discuss in some 
detail the ideas of the last of •fchcae Jour philosophers in Chapters 
3 and 4).
If, as I have suggested, many of the traditional, basic, 
assumptions and judgements as to the nature and worth of science 
are in dispute within philosophy of science, then how - recalling 
Waring*s comment, quoted above - should (theories of) science 
teaching ’reflect* science? Indeed, how may we defend the view 
that 'science* ought to be taught at all?
To take the second point first, if it if accepted that, however we 
each may know 'science*, 'science as a whole has been integrated 
into the system of human needs, their administration, and 
satisfaction ' (Weiland, 1981, p.618); and if it is accepted that 
education has amongst its principal aims the enablement through 
teaching of persons to satisfy their personal needs within a social 
context, then 'science' must continue to be taught.
With respect to the first point, it would perhaps be wiser to start 
with a more modest valuation of science. Here, I endorse a view 
expressed by Paul Feyerabeiid:
'To start with I assume that my readers agree about progress 
and good science and that they do so independently of 
whatever rules or standards they adopt. For example,
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I assume that they applaud the gradual acceptance of the idea 
of the motion of the earth or of the atomic constitution of 
matter in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
independently of what rules and standards they think it 
obeys.*
(Feyerabend, 1978, p.13);
and, thence, another suggestion by Elkana:
'As all of us, scientists, teachers, philosophers, educators 
share the fundamental belief that science is 'good' and aims 
at maximum scientific knowledge for a maximum number of 
students, we should also aim at grounding our theories of 
science teaching in that philosophy of science which at 
present seems to us the most advanced.1
(Elkana, 1970, p.17 : my emphasis).
In this chapter I shall begin my personal defence of, and 
elaboration upon, such views as have recently been expressed by 
myself and others within my articulation of the model or framework 
which informs my entire investigation:
2.4.1. A Model for the Transformation of Scientific Knowledge in 
Formal Educational Settings.
Before I describe my specific model I shall consider the general 
case for using models in educational research.
Doran (1978) has argued strongly in favour of the use of such 
models, seeing each one as ’a conceptual framework describing the 
relationships amongst key variables present in the field of 
enquiry* (p. 423). He makes 4 main points. First, the use of
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explicit models helpsclarify the initial planning of research 
efforts. Second, models help organize data collection and assist 
in the formulation of variables and hypotheses. Third, a model may 
help to clarify the nature of individual research efforts. Fourth, 
lack of models limits the impact of educational research on 
classroom practice and may allow the implementation of incoherent 
(internally contradictory) teaching programmes by default.
My model represents an augmented version of one presented in a 
seminar by Zylbersztajn (1980; described in written form in his 
Ph.D thesis of 1983). Zylbersztajn*s model, in turn, incorporates 
certain terms and ideas developed by other*of our colleagues. For 
clarity of exposition, and to make clear my considerable 
intellectual debt to all these persons, I shall first describe 
Zylbersztajn's model, beginning with its components.
The expressions and their specified meanings with which 
Zylbersztajn began to construct his model were created in light of 
a (then) broadly construed constructivist epistemolbgical 
perspective and the pedagogic judgement that students represent the 
chief protagonists in any formal teaching and learning event 
(Zylbersztajn, 1983, Chapter 1).
Osborne (1980) suggested the expression 'Children's Science*
(SCh) to describe those views of the world (composed of beliefs, 
expectations and meanings for words) held by pupils prior to
encountering their scientific counterparts, namely, ’Scientists*
Science * (Sg), in formal science education.
In a paper written later in 1980, Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham 
(1982) argue that the notion of ’Children's Science' represents a 
rejection of the 'Blank Minded' or 'Tabula Rasa' assumption which
~ droj-fc ei‘rcufn.h:o^ (180
may be inferred still to underly modern curricula (Fensham, 1983 JJ)
A
and which 'assumes th^t the learner has ho knowledge of a topic 
before being formally taught it' (Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham,
1982; p.623).
Out of similar constructivist considerations, these authors propose 
the expression * Teachers * Science' (Sx) to connote the teacher's 
viewpoint or perspective in specific science topics as presented to 
a group of pupils in a formal educational setting.
Starting from these three notions, i.e. Sch> Sg, Sx,
Zylbersztajn attempts to provide 'a more complete picture of the 
transformations and interactions between different forms of 
knowledge in the context of secondary science education,
(Zylbersztajn, 1983; Chapter 1, p.7) by introducing two additional 
expressions, viz. 'Curricular Science' (Scr) and 'Students'
Science* (Sgt)* These he articulates within a generalised 
sequence of transformations for all five expressions and which he 
depicts by means of a diagram:
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activities
Figure 2.1. 'The conceptual Framework* (after Zylbersztajn,
The nub of Zylbersztajn's written description of this sequence is 
as follows:
'In a first stage, “scientists" science (Sg) is transformed 
into "curricular science" (S r^), in a process mediated by 
the action of curriculum planners (e.g. textbook writers; 
members of curricula development projects). Science 
curricula, either in their simplest forms (e.g. a textbook) 
or in their more refined versions (e.g. as an integration of 
printed material, AVA [Audio Visual Aids], and laboratory 
materials, plus teacher’s guides] are here conceived of as 
structures representing versions of scientific knowledge.
The second stage of transformation occurs when a curriculum 
is implemented by a particular teacher, concerned with a 
particular group of pupils, in a particular school.
1983, Chapter 1, p.7)
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One of the assumptions of this study is that teachers 
interpret the structure of a curriculum in the light of their 
own conceptual structures and their perception of situations 
they are involved in. Therefore, what is conveyed by them to 
their pupils - "teacher’s science"(Sf) - can be seen as a 
result of the interaction between teachers and "curricular 
science", in a specific context.
The third stage of transformation takes place in science 
courses, when pupils perceive, interpret and process what is 
presented to them, constructing their own personal meanings 
from the activities they are asked to perform. It is in that 
process that their previous knowledge - "children's science" 
(SCh) -seem to play an important role. Those activities 
are conceptualized in the framework as the interaction 
between "children's science" and "teacher's science", the 
result of which is named "students' science" (Sgt)*’
(Zylbersztajn, 1983, Chapter 1, P.8. : my emphasis).
Zylbersztajn is careful to stress that his conceptual framework 
represents only 'a simplified picture of the complex reality it is 
intended to represent' (1983, Chapter 1, p.9): he points out that,
for example, teachers may complement the curricular materials they 
have selected for their lessons with information extracted from 
other sources. Similarly, pupils may interact directly with 
curricular and other sources of information and this is especially 
likely in the case of individualised learning schemes. These 
caveats notwithstanding, he contends in conclusion that his model 
provides a useful and distinctive first approximation of a means by 
which major transformations of knowledge occurring in the context of 
secondary school science education may be conceptualised (ibid.).
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My additions to Zylbersztajn's model are, in turn, made in a dual 
attempt, on the one hand, to take better account of my focus of 
research interest and personal brand of constructivist perspective 
which are slightly different to his, and, on the other hand, to 
identify the broad continuity between his earlier investigation 
(and those of other colleagues) and mine. To explain, 
Zylbersztajn's investigation, as with most so far conducted within 
the Alternative Conceptions Movement (ACM), is primarily concerned 
with students’ alternative conceptions in science (or, perhaps more 
accurately, in 'curricular science*) - in Zylbersztajn's study, 
specifically, light and colour, force and movement. My 
investigation, by contrast, is primarily concerned with curricular 
philosophy and students' alternative conceptions _of science - their 
"personal epistemologies of science".
I have tried to reflect these differences of interest and emphasis 
in my additions to both the components and dynamics of 
Zylbersztajn's model, as depicted in the following diagram:
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: Where
—   > = strong influence
— .--- = weak influence
S-C-P
Q
= Scientists'-Constructive-Principles 
= Scientists’ Science
P-C-P = Philosophers’-Constructive-Principles
Sp = Philosophers' Science
C-C-P = Curricular-Constructive-Principles
S„ = Curricular Science
T-C-P = Teachers'-Constructive-Principles
Sm = Teachers’ Science
St-C-P
SSt
= Students'-Constructive-Principles 
= Students' Science
Ch-C-P
SCh
= Children1s-Constructive-Principles 
= Children's Science
Figure 2.2 A Model for the Transformation of Scientific Knowledge 
in Formal Educational Settings
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My first modification to Zylbersztajn's model is to add another 
'stage of transformation', identified by my expression 
'Philosophers' Science' (Swift, 1981). I intend this term to 
represent the corpus of results oj- the efforts of 'philosophers of 
science' to identify and understand, by philosophical means, the 
aims, method(s) and defining characteristic(s) (if any) of 
scientific enquiry and of growth in scientific knowledge (cf. my 
description of 'philosophy of science' earlier in this chapter).
By 'philosophers of science' I mean not only professional 
philosophers of science but also scientists who speculate 
philosophically about the nature of science, often beyond (but 
including) their own area of specialisation. Amongst the latter, 
however, there are not only those working or retired scientists who 
write overtly philosophical works about science (e.g. Einstein, 
1934; Medawar, 1969; Eccles, 1970; Capra, 1983), but also those 
scientists who are seconded from science in order to contribute to 
the development of a particular curriculum project (e.g. Profesor 
Frank Halliwell for Nuffield '0* level Chemistry, see Waring, 1979) 
or who turn their attention to issues of science pedagogy, however 
broadly they may be construed (e.g. Ziman, 1980).
Now I recognise that my addition of this extra stage of 
transformation to Zylbersztajn's sequence shall be judged by many 
to be either mistaken or extravagant, that I have articulated
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the situation that I anticipate (and would like to see) 
developing. Yet I believe Philosophers' Science to be a prior and 
necessary condition for Curricular Science and not merely a 
desirable addition informing curriculum planners decisions - which 
latter I judge to be the more widely held view.
Now, I cannot attempt to present a compelling case for this view 
until later in this thesis for it first requires close reference 
to my detailed epistemological convictions (q.v. Chapters 3, 4, 5). 
Briefly, however, I do not believe that a science curriculum could 
ever be planned or implemented without recourse to (or implicit 
adoption of) criteria for the content of Scientists' Science - this 
prior to any selection from it (which might require different 
criteria) - and such criteria,are at least partially constituted of 
what might be identified (if necessary by others) as 'epistemology 
of science', however broadly that be understood. Furthermore, if 
ray earlier arguments for the link between theories of learning and 
theories of knowledge are recalled (q.v. section 2.3.2.2, above), 
then a case may be made for the view that Philosophers' Science 
functions (either in whole or in part) as a 'theory of science 
learning' in formal educational settings.
I contend that part of the problem of creating an "appropriate" 
curricular response to contemporary philosophy of science, i.e. 
along the lines suggested by Elkana (q.v. quotation, section 2.4, 
above) is achieving a general recognition by science
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educationalists that plurality of traditions in philosophy of 
science does Indeed create a problem for (theories of) science 
teaching. In later chapters I shall pursue my case that, rightly 
understood, the present situation in philosophy of science has 
both brought into sharp relief and rendered more problematic the 
necessary importance of philosophical assumptions and commitments, 
mainly of an epistemological kind, in mediating all teaching and 
learning in science. The present absence of orthodoxy in 
philosophy of science poses many novel problems for educationalists 
who are keen to respond. Such problems, which also herald many new 
and desirable possibilities, have mainly to do with issues of 
choice and emphasis. The pertinence and influence in the classroom 
of all these philosophical issues may be illustrated with an 
example described by S.P. Kanagy:
'In fact, philosophical assumptions and their implications 
permeate cosmology. In the area of quantum mechanics, it is 
difficult for students to comprehend why the indeterminancy 
principle is believed by many physicists without 
understanding at least the elementary ideas of such 
philosophical views on logical positivism. Should we teach 
only the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics?
What about the "many worlds" interpretation? The "Hidden 
Variables" interpretation? In the discussion between Planck 
and Einstein concerning the reality of quanta, the two 
disagreed on what should be regarded as the "best" 
interpretation of statistical mechanics.’
(Kanagy, unpublished manuscript, 1981a, p.13 : original 
emphasis)
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It: is, I think, sadly corroboratory of my recently expressed views 
that Kanagy has yet to succeed In getting this and other, similar, 
manuscripts, written in the early 1980’s, accepted for publication 
(personal communication: letter dated 30th July 1986; see,
however, Kanagy, 1981, for a tantalizingly brief published abstract 
of a paper in similar vein).
The need for conscious and conscientious consideration of 
epistemological issues in curriculum planning and in the classroom 
has been rendered all the more urgent by the fact, mentioned in 
Chapter 1, that the majority of the science curricula developed 
this century have included with increasing priority ’the process of 
scientific investigation and reasoning' (Fensham, 1983, p.5) 
amongst major teaching and learning objectives.
Kanagy's example of teaching quantum mechanics, however, does cast 
additional light upon the problem of formulating and implementing 
an appropriate curricular response to the present absence of 
orthodoxy in philosophy of science that I have claimed to exist.
To explain, whilst few physicists would now endorse the fundamental 
tenets of Logical Positivism (q.v. Chapter 4), still less its 
details, most would still subscribe to a highly related, albeit, 
usually more vaguely construed, instrumentalist interpretation of 
quantum theory. To make the same point another way, the many 
attempted micro-realistic interpretations of the quantum theory,
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including construetivist ones (notably, Popper's, e.g. 1967, 
"propensity" interpretation) still only enjoy a sporadic and 
contr versial acceptance amongst philosophers of science and 
scientists alike. The problem here is that notwithstanding the 
lack of orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of science there jLs a
prevailing rejection of Logical Positivism (or, more generally, of
instrumentalism) within the community of philosophers of science.
I shall argue, then, in support of what I shall term a "strong"
thesis of philosophy of science in science education which is only
partially complementary to a "weak" thesis.
To clarify, by the "stjong" thesis I hold not only that if science 
is considered to be a branch of knowledge, in at least one of its 
aspects, and if we choose to teach it, then epistemology of science 
is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for any theory 
of science teaching, but also that no learning of science, at 
least in the manner intended, can occur unless or until the 
learner's personal epistemology of science is compatible 
(congruentj commensurable) with that expressed, whether tacitly or 
explicitly, by the theory of science teaching and the science 
curriculum. Different epistemological commitments do have 
consequences for pedagogy and for learning, albeit not in any 
strict deterministic or formal deductive sense.
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Supporters of the "weak" thesis of philosophy of science in science 
education, by contrast , hold that whilst philosophy of science 
ought to be taught explicitly within the science curriculum (e.g. 
by virtue of increasing science educands* interest in, and 
perceived relevance of, science), it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a theory of science teaching and for science 
learning to occur.
I support the view that philosophy of science ought to be taught 
explicitly but I reject the second clause of the "weak" thesis. In 
Chapter 4 I shall argue that any apparent plausibility of 
Zylbersztajn's exclusion of what I have termed 'philosophers' 
science* from his sequential model stems from, and is disguised by, 
his explicitly proclaimed sympathies «*ithKuhn's doctrines.
My second modification to Zylberstajn*s model is to add 'weak 
influences' in order to bring out the interactive, or two-way, 
character that I consider these transformations to have and to 
distinguish these from 'strong influences' (a modification which, 
incidentally, destroys the implicit left-to-right time line in 
Zylbersztajn's diagram).
Thus, for example, in a strong (influence or direction of) 
interaction, certain individual philosophers of science may be 
argued (or themselves claim) to draw particular inspiration from 
certain individual scientists, e.g. Popper from Einstein (e.g. 
Popper, 1978), Feyerabend from Galileo (e.g. Feyerabend, 1975).
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Conversely, in a weak interaction, certain individual scientists 
may be argued (or themselves claim) to draw particular inspiration 
from individual philosophers of science, e.g. Darwin from Bacon 
(Darwin, 1887: quoted and discussed by Medawar, 1969, p.11), Eccles 
from Popper (Eccles, 1970).
Similarly, in a strong interaction, certain individual science 
educationalists may be argued (or themselves claim) to draw 
particular inspiration from certain individual philosophers of 
science, e.g. Zylberstajn from Kuhn (Zylberstajn, 1983), myself 
from Feyerabend (e.g. this thesis). Conversely, in a weak 
interaction certain individual philosophers of science may be 
argued (or themselves claim) to draw critical inspiration and/or 
corroboration from certain individual psychologists who are 
influential in curricular contexts, e.g. Capek, 1971, Feyerabend, 
1975, p.227 re. Piaget; Maxwell, 1984, p.143 re. Kelly. It is also 
worth mentioning that some philosophers of science from amongst 
those who reject (or who equivocate as to) the 'objectivity' of 
their epistemology reorganise its pedagogic aspect, e.g.
'Sophisticated falsificationism adumbrates a new theory of 
learning.*
(Lakatos, 1970, p.l21n.l : original emphasis).
I contend that the remaining 'weak interactions' are a presently 
un(der) recognised consequence of a constructivist perspective on 
education and I shall discuss them in later chapters.
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My third modification to Zylbersztajn’s model is to add 
'constructive principles’ to each component of the model.
By 'constructive principles' I mean basic and often implicit 
organizing ideas underlying and enabling the more specific, 
detailed and explicit ones characteristic of each component. Such 
principles might also (in various contexts) be called 'values', 
'absolute postulates', 'fundamental assumptions' or 'metaphysics'.
Given the common interest of the components (science) and the 
interactive relations between them, it would seem reasonable to 
suggest that there is a corresponding sequence of overlapping 
clusters of constructive principles. Clearly some constructive 
principles shall reflect the specific interests and purposes of the 
group of persons comprising a component. The common interest in 
science, however, may be expected to result in constructive 
principles concerning the nature of the physical world to be of 
importance and interest to each and every component, albeit, 
perhaps to different extents. Appropriate expressions for such 
constructive principles might be Agassi's (e.g. 1964) 'scientific 
metaphysics * or Feyerabend's (e.g. 1978) 'cosmological 
assumptions'. Cosmological assumptions include such qualities or 
principles as 'symmetry', 'orderliness*, 'simplicity' and 
'non-randomness*. These inform more elaborated ontologies such as 
'finite universe* (Aristotle), 'world consisting of a continuum of 
forces, all of them contact forces between parts of matter*
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(Leibniz) and 'world consisting of separate particles, all with 
central forces acting at a distance between them' (Newton). (I 
shall discuss some possible roles for contructive principles in 
epistemology in Chapter 4).
Finally, notwithstanding the modification I have made to 
Zylbersztajn's model, I likewise urge that it still provides only a 
simplified picture of the complex reality it is intended to 
represent. I also assume that my modified version of this model 
may be held to apply more-or-less directly to the tertiary as well 
as to the secondary science education system. I shall use 
Osborne's (1980) expression 'School Science* to refer to the 
combination of Philosophers' Science, Curricular Science and 
Teachers' Science expressed in formal educational settings.
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Chapter 3. Personal Construct Psychology as a Constructivist Theory
of Knowledge.
'There are two ways of losing oneself: through 
fragmentation in the particular or dilution in the 
'universal*.*
Lettre a Maurice Thorez, Aime Cesaire. (1956)
3.1. Introduction.
My over-arching purpose in this chapter, and the two following it, 
is to argue for two main views: (1) that the Alternative Conceptions 
Movement (ACM) is a qualitatively different (and desirable) new 
approach within educational research; (2) that the ethos, research 
methods and constructivist epistemology of the ACM are both 
compatible with, and may best be developed by reference to, those of 
Personal Construct Psychology (PCP).
My broad strategy in this cause shall be to identify and articulate 
a number of fundamental similarities between PCP, ACM and recent 
trends and developments in philosophy of science and to contrast 
them with influential alternatives. With my remarks of Chapters 1 
and 2 in mind, I shall concentrate in this chapter upon drawing 
similarities and contrasts between espistemological commitments.
3.2. A Taxonomy for Theories of Knowledge (Lakatos).
As a central framework for my arguments I have taken a
classificatory scheme for epistemological traditions developed by
Lakatosi:
'There is an important demarcation betw€*en 
'paBslvi8t' and 'activist' theories of knowledge* 
'Passivists' hold that true knowledge is Nature's 
imprint on a perfectly inert mind: mental activity 
can only result in bias and distortion. The most 
influential passivist school is classical 
empiricism. 'Activists' hold that we cannot read the 
book of Nature without mental activity, without 
interpreting them in the light of our theories. Now 
conservative 'activists' hold that we are born with 
our basic expectations;with them we turn the world 
into 'our world' but must then live forever in the 
prison of our world. The idea that we live and die 
in the prison of our 'conceptual framework* was 
developed primarily by Kant; pessimistic Kantians 
thought that the real world is for ever unknowable 
because of this prison, while optimistic Kantians 
thought that God created our conceptual framework to 
fit the world. But revolutionary activists believe 
that conceptual frameworks can be developed and also 
replaced by new, better ones; it is we who create our 
'prisons' and we can also, critically, demolish 
them*. ^
(Lakatos, 1970, p.104: original emphasis).
Now, Lakatos does not develop meanings for the components of his 
taxonomy abstractly; rather, he concentrates upon articulating his 
'Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (q.v. Appendix 1) 
apparently as an illustration of a 'revolutionary activist' theory 
of knowledge. Although I shall later argue that this classification 
is incompatible with Lakatos' (admittedly equivocable) 
epistemological claim to provide objective criteria for the growth 
of knowledge, there is, I think, something discernable in his brief 
explication of 'revolutionary activism*, above, that suggests that 
an exhaustive, or even an extended, abstract formalisation of this 
particular meta-meta knowledge claim would somehow fail to refer to 
the class of epistemological traditions which it purports to 
elucidate. Accordingly, I shall follow Lakatos* example by 
providing illustrations-in-application of his taxonomy and shall 
only propose further abstract refinements to his meta-meta criteria 
in their contexts of application.
- 3.2 -
The constraints imposed by linear exposition mean that I shall have 
to advance details of my argumentative strategy in a "saltatory" 
manner, sometimes presenting material which may not appear to be 
strictly relevant or necessary at any given stage of the chapter. 
This should particularly be borne in mind during my account of the 
Kantian origins of constructivist epistemology which follows.
3.3. The Origin of Constructivist Theories of Knowledge (Kant).
Immanuel Kant may be said to have originated constructivist 
epistemology and introduced it to a large audience upon publication 
of the two editions of his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) in 1781 and 
1787. Where I quote from this work I shall refer only to 
Kemp-Smith's (1929) translation and without indicating from which 
edition I have drawn text (both are included in Kemp-Smith's 
rendering).
The Critique of Pure Reason is the first of a series of four 
Critiques through which Kant developed his ideas (the remaining 
three being of Practical Reason, of Aesthetic Judgement, and of 
Teleological Judgement). The resultant system of thought continues 
to draw the highest praise from eminent scholars: Medawar, for 
example, claims it to be '[] the greatest intellectual exploit in 
the history of philosophy []' (1969, p. 35). Popper similarly pays 
hom^age to the impact of Kant's ideas and to the nature of his 
achievement:
'By emphasizing the role played by the observer, the 
investigator, the theorist, Kant made an indelible 
impression not only upon philosophy but also upon 
physics and cosmology.'
(Popper, 1972, p. 181).
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The first, epistemological, Critique, is generally regarded as 
Kant's masterpiece. Whilst I have already drawn some links between 
epistemology and pedagogy in Chapter 2, let it not be thought that 
Kant lacked either involvement or respect for educational matters 
for, as Haack (1976, p. 159) points out, Kant interrupted his work 
on the Critique of Pure Reason in order to support Basedow's 
progressive school, the Philanthropin. In a work devoted to the 
subject, Kant declared that
'[] the greatest and most difficult problem to which 
man can devote himself is the problem of education.*
(Kant, Education. Ghurton trans. 1960, p. 11: quoted 
by Haack, 1976, p. 159).
I contend that at a time such as now when there is intense debate -
and not a little confusion - amongst "constructivist" 
educationalists over fundamentals, an appraisal of the origins of 
constructivist epistemology cannot fail to be of use: indeed, many 
of Kant's ideas - and the controversies associated with them - may 
be seen, upon examination, to underlie or resemble those presently 
discussed, thereby helping to clarify them. My account of Kant's 
epistemology shall also serve both to justify and to develop 
I.akatos' 'conservetive-activist' classification of it. This shall
contribute an important point of reference In the broad strategy of
my argument throughout this chapter.
Notwithstanding its acknowledged brilliance, the Critique of Pure 
Reason is complex, often subtle and riddled with ambiguities “ or, 
as modern scholarship tends to have it, with confusions. In 
conscious and useful simplification, therefore, Brittan applies a 
well known framework for rationally reconstructing the genesis of 
constructivist epistemology and for discussing Kant's ideas:
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'Almost everyone follows Hegel in thinking that the 
history of modern philosophy has a nice symmetry 
about it. Rationalist thesis ("knowledge is based on 
reason") gives way to empiricist antithesis 
("knowledge is based on sense experience"), which in 
turn gives way to Kantian synthesis ("knowledge is a 
product jointly of understanding and sensibility")'. 
(Brittan, 1978, p. 3).
Even Kant himself summarises his "synthesis" fairly 
straightforwardly:
'Without sensibility no object would be given to us, 
without understanding no object would be thought. 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind. []. The understanding 
can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. 
Only through their union can knowledge arise.' 
(Kant, CPR, p. 93).
Now, the longstanding prevalence of the empiricist influenced
"commonsense" theory of knowledge (q.v. Appendix I) means that, even
nowadays, it is easy to mistake Kant's "knowledge thesis" for
something less radical than it actually is when it is stated thus
*
baldly. To help reduce this risk and to help me later to distinguish 
Kant*8 epistemology from other constructivist traditions, I shall 
elaborate considerably upon the basic points I have already made.
Central to Kant's purpose in elaborating his epistemology was a 
determination to present a viable alternative to each of the rival 
solutions offer^ed by Leibnizian rationalists and Humean empiricists 
to the "problem of objectivity", viz. whether one can have knowledge 
of the world which is not just knowledge of one's own point of 
view. The Leibnizians argued for the attainability of objective 
knowledge by invoking dogmatically an extravagent and obscure 
metaphysics. As Beck comments
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'[] the Leibnizian epistemology [J proceeded to solve 
even the simplest problems by an argument obscurum 
per obscurlus. It was an epistemology which 
explained the simplest facts learned through sense 
experience by an appeal to preestablished harmony, 
and the theorems of physics by appeal to theodicy.*
(Beck*"*1978, p. 6 : original emphasis).
With respect to the problem of objectivity, this did not seem 
helpful. As sceptical empiricists, the Humeans were in opposition 
to this tradition: they denied not only all metaphysics but also the 
attainability of objective knowledge, appealing Instead to the 
pragmatic utilities to be gleaned from the habit of *custora*. In 
the face of Newtonian physics, which was at once profoundly 
metaphysical and outstandingly empirically successful, this seemed 
tantamount to blasphemy2.
Kant*s response to this philosophical state of affairs was to 
propose as fundamental an epistemological problem (echoed in the 
previous Kant quotation) which was shocking, even nonsensical, to 
rationalists and empiricists alike for it seemed to juxtapose terms 
associated with each tradition and which had long been regarded as 
mutually exclusive, viz. *How is synthe tic a priori knowledge 
possible?*. To appreciate the radical nature of this proposition it 
may be useful to consider some meanings for the terms 'analytic* and 
'synthetic', on the one hand, and 'a priori' and *a posteriori' on 
the other.
The terms 'analytic* and 'synthetic' were coined by Kant to 
distinguish between kinds of proposition based upon the nature of 
the evidence required to establish their truth. An analytic truth 
is essentially a tautology: its truth is guaranteed by the meaning, 
discovered by analysis, of the terms used to express it. In Kant's
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idiom, a proposition is analytic if, and only if, the concept of the 
'predicate' is included in the concept of the 'subject'. For 
example, the proposition "All men are biologically male" is an 
analytic truth: the predicate- "biologically male" - is already 
contained within the subject - "men". A synthetic truth, by 
contrast, is one whose truth is not derived by analysis but by other 
means and which affirms something in the predicate which is not 
already contained in the subject. For example, were the proposition 
"All men enjoy killing" to be true, then the predicate - "enjoy 
killing”- would tell us something non-trivial about the subject - 
"men". It would be a synthetic truth because it would not merely 
reiterate the definition of the term used to refer to men. (See 
Scruton, 1982, p. 18-19; Flew, 1979, p. 11).
The terms 1a priori * (from the Latin: "what comes before") and 'a. 
posteriori' (from the Latin: "what comes after") are similarly used 
to refer to propositions upon the basis of how one may acquire 
knowledge of their truth. An a priori truth is a proposition that 
can be known to be true, or false, by exercise of reason (mind) 
alone, i.e. without reference to experience except in so far as 
experience is necessary for understanding its terms. An 
a posteriori truth is an empirical proposition whose truth or 
falsity can only be known by reference to how, as a matter of 
contingent fact, things have been, are, or will be. (See Scruton, 
1982, p. 18-19; Flew, 1979, p. 15).
Thus the prima facie similarity between analytic and a priori 
truths, on the one hand, and synthetic and a posteriori truths, on 
the other, asserted by empiricists to be synonyms, explains the
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paradoxical, quality of Kant's proposal for certain 'a priori 
synthetic1 propositions.
Kant attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction by means of an 
ingenious argument (which he calls the 'Transcendental Deduction*) 
for what must be presupposed in experience for experience to be 
possible at all. The synthetic aspect of what would otherwise be "a 
priori construction" may be discerned within Piaget's commentary 
upon this subject:
'[In Kant’s view, intellect exhibits] priority in 
relation to experience: logical priority Insofar as 
it is a necessary condition, as well as priority in 
part chronological (the a priori can only manifest 
itself at the moment of experience, and not’before, 
but in all cases not afterward), and above all 
priority of level, insofar as the subject who 
experiences already possesses an underlying structure 
that determines his activities.*
(Piaget, 1965; Eng. trans. 1971, p. 57: original 
emphasis).
Thus Kant is suggesting neither that reason merely "organises" sense 
"data" after they have been "received" (which would be a version of 
empiricist knowledge thesis), nor that sense experience is merely 
"illustrative" in objective knowledge (which would be a version of 
rationalist knowledge thesis): his proposal is for a genuine 
synthesis from reason and experience in which both are necessary for 
(and constitutive of) objective knowledge. Here, however, much 
depends upon Kant's personal meaning of 'objective knowledge' 
('objective truth') which differs from many modern uses - a point to 
which I shall return. In ad interim summary, then, for Kant the 
intellect alone (i.e. 'pure reason') cannot give content to 
knowledge; however, with (and only with) reference to sense 
experience it can supply form.
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The themes of the Transcendental Deduction are developed and 
complemented throughout Kant's epistemology, which latter he named 
'Transcendental Idealism'* The place of this argument within Kant's 
overall theory of knowledge, and the remainder of my description of 
it, may be assisted by reference to Losee's admirable schematlzatlon 
of Transcendental Idealism which he presents in both words and a 
diagram:
'[Kant] specified three stages in the cognitive 
organisation of experience. First, unstructured 
"sensations1* are ordered with respect to Space and 
Time (the "Forms of the Sensibility"). Second, the 
"perceptions" thus ordered are related by means of 
such concepts as Unity, Substantiality, Causality, 
and Contingency (four of the twelve "Categories of 
the Understanding"). Third, the "judgements of 
experience" thus formed are organised into a single 
system of knowledge through application of 
"Regulative Principles of Reason".'
(Losee, 1980, p. 107).
Reason
Principles
perceptions 'sensations >
Understanding
Substance
Causality
etc.
Sensibility "Thlngs-ln-
Space Themselves*
Timo
Figure 3.1. 'Kant's View of Cognitive Experience* (after Losee, 
1980, p. 107).
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Reading I.osee's diagram from right to left (which does not imply a 
time line)* when objects of the real world, described in Kant's 
phrase as 'Things-in-Themselves' ('Ding-an-Sich') and in his 
technical term as 'noumena', come within the purview of the sense 
organs of the knowing subject they are unstructured sensations which 
the 'forms of intuition*, namely, space and time (sensibility), 
allow to be intuited as perceptions - 'phenonema*.
Now, understanding (as opposed to intuition) requires judgements as 
to the objective character and relatedness of perceptions. Such 
judgements are effected by a set of innate 'forms of thought* to 
which Kant also gave the title 'The Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding, or Categories *. Kant's doctrines of both sensibility 
and of understanding are essential c6mponents of his Transcendental 
Deduction. In distinguishing their origins he also alludes to their 
complementary functions and limits (cf. my first Kant quotation, 
above):
'The categories are hot, as regards their origin, 
grounded in sensibility, like the forms of intuition, 
space and time; and they seem, therefore, to allow of 
an application extending beyond all objects of the 
senses. As a matter of fact they are nothing but 
forms of thought, which contain the merely logical 
faculty of uniting a priori in one consciousness the 
manifold given in intuition; and apart, therefore, 
from the only intuition that is possible to us, they 
have even less meaning than the pure sensible forms. 
Through these forms an object is at least given, 
whereas a mpde of combining the manifold - a mode 
peculiar to our understanding - by itself, in the 
absence of that intuition wherein the manifold can 
alone be given, signifies nothing at all. At the 
same time, if we entitle certain objects, as 
appearances, sensible entities (phenomena), then 
since we thus distinguish the mode in which we intuit 
them from the nature that belongs to them in 
themselves, it is implied in this distinction that we 
place the latter, considered in their own nature, 
although we do not so intuit them, or that we place
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other possible things, which are not objects of our 
senses but are thought as objects merely through the 
understanding, in opposition to the former, and that 
in so doing we entitle them intelligible entities 
(novmena). The question then arises, whether our 
pure concepts of understanding have meaning in 
respect of these latter, and so can be a way of 
knowing them.*
(Kant, CPR, p^  266-267: original emphasis).
Notwithstanding Kant's misleading use of the term 'idealism* in the 
title of his episteraology (about which, more later), I contend that 
his distinction between noamena and phenomena demonstrates fairly 
clearly that he is a realist* That is to say, Kant subscribes to 
the commonsense belief that there is an independently existing "real 
world", a world which may meaningfully be distinguished from our 
personal and subjective thoughts about it. As Kant's final question 
in the last quotation suggests, however, he does not let the matter 
rest there: Transcendental Idealism purports to be a theory of 
objective knowledge (objective truth).
For Kant, objective knowledge requires both that there be a world 
and that it be intelligible. A critical examination of experience 
reveals the limits of possible experience and, by so doing, 
establishes the general form of any objectively possible world.
This is enough to guarantee the reality (real existence) of the 
latter since a putative world which is beyond even the possibility 
of experience could not meaningfully be said to be real for it could 
never be known (be intelligible). The 'possibility of experience* 
is delineated by Kant's list of 12 categories (substance, causality 
etc.) - these prescribe what sort of a world the world must bfe in 
order that we might ever experience it. Categories are universal : 
they are innate, fundamental, forms of judgement to be found in all 
'subjects of experience' (e.g. persons). Categories mediate,
- 3.11 -
indeed, are necessary for all 'possible experience' and, hence, for 
all possible knowledge. In Kant's words
'The possibility of experience is [] what gives 
objective reality to all our a priori modes of 
knowledge. []. Experience depends [] upon a priori 
principles of its form, that is, upon universal rules 
of unity in the synthesis of appearances. Their 
objective reality, as necessary conditions of 
experience, and indeed of its very possibility, can 
always be shown in experience.'
(Kant, CPR, p. 193: original emphasis).
Kant thought that his set of categories was sufficient to solve all 
disputes of traditional metaphysics (or, at least* to supply the key 
to their solution) and hence to guarantee objective knowledge (or, 
at least, its eventual achievability).
Brittan (1978) expounds Kant's understanding of 'objectivity' by 
first discerning two rather different meanings of the term which 
enjoy currency in epistemology, viz. (1) the requirement of 
'objects*; (2) the requirement of 'epistemological security' 
achieved by appeal to 'a certain kind of evidence' (p.12, 12n.) He 
then argues that Kant's epistemology can only be identified with the 
first of these meanings (Brittan, 1978, p. 12n. Ch. 5). Isuggest 
that this "Kantian*’ brand of 'objectivity' - which henceforth I 
shall call 'realism' - contrasts with, on the one hand, 
instrumentalists (who confine themselves to the second meaning), 
and, on the other hand, classical empiricists and 'objectivist 
methodological constructivists'3 (who, I shall later argue, confound 
both these meanings by attempting to conflate them). I shall.refer 
to Brittan's second meaning of 'objectivity' as 'objectivism*.
It is, no doubt, with something very like Brittan's first meaning of
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'objectivity* in mind when Scruton comments that
'If valid, the transcendental deduction achieves a 
result of immense significance. It establishes the 
objectivity of my world while assuming no more than 
my point of view on it.'
(Scruton, 1982, p. 35).
The 'point of view' assumed denotes indifferently any being who can 
use the term 'I', any being who can identify itself as the "subject 
of experience". This single, subjective, premise of 
self-consciousness is the starting point for all of Kant's 
philosophy (Scruton, 1982, p. 24). The 'objectivity' established, 
however, transcends the point of view of any individual "subject of 
experience" for it is the point of view of 'possible experience* and 
denotes indifferently the "existence of objects’^  • What Kant is 
claiming about objects and selves alike is thus both universal and 
necessary, not specific and idiosyncratic. His concern might be 
said to be jointly with elucidating the "universally knowable" 
features of the real world and with the "universal knowing 
subject". Finally, Kant's Transcendental Deduction purports to be a 
demonstration that neither the concept of 'objectivity' nor that of 
'self* can be properly understood or upheld in isolation from the 
other.
Kant distinguishes 'reason' from understanding and sensibility (cf.
Losee's remarks and diagram, above). The need for this distinction
a
is because Kant considers reason to have a natural and irrepres^ Lble 
tendency to transgress the limits of possible experience set by the 
categories. Where this happens, however, we risk mistaking an 
'idea', created by 'pure', 'speculative', reason (and which is 
outlawed from Kant's epistemology), for a concept corresponding to a
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real, object. 'If only* Kant says 'we can guard against [this] 
misunderstanding and so can discover the proper direction of these 
powers',
(Kant, CPR, p. 532).
Kant's proposal involves a rather different meaning of 'reason':
'[[Reason has [] as its sole object, the
understanding and its effective application. Just as 
the understanding unifies the manifold in the object 
by means of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold 
of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain
collective unity as the goal of the activities of the
understanding, which otherwise are concerned solely 
with distributive unity.'
(Kant, CPR, p. 533).
For Kant, '[Reason] does not [] create concepts (of objects) but 
only orders them' (CPR, p. 532: original emphasis); the 
transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason 
consists 'not as constitutive principles for the extension of our 
knowledge to more objects than experience can give, but as 
regulative principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of 
empirical knowledge in general,[]' (CPR, p. 550: original emphasis).
The presence of an underlying regulative principle, such as 'order' 
or 'totality', provides the criterion with which we may discern 
'systematic unity* in 'ordinary knowledge' and so raise it to the 
rank of 'science' - a task which Kant calls 'architectonic'. Kant's 
notion of architectonic, and even the terras which he creates to 
discuss it with, bear a striking similarity to those of 
'structuralist' epistemologists in more recent times (especially 
those of Piaget, cf. section 3.4.1., below):
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'By an architectonic I understand the art of 
constructing systems. As systematic unity is what 
first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of 
science, that is, makes a system out of a mere 
aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine 
of the scientific in our knowledge, and therefore 
necessarily forms part of the doctrine of method.
[]. By a system I understand the unity Of the 
manifold modes of knowledge under one idea* []. The 
whole is [] an organised unity (articulatio), and not 
an aggregate (coacervatio). It may grow from within 
(per intussusceptionem), but not by external addition 
(per appositionem). []. The idea requires for its 
realisation a schema, that is, a constituent manifold 
and an order of its parts, both of which must be 
determined a priori from the principle defined by its 
end. The schema, which is not devised in accordance 
with an idea, that is, in terras of the ultimate aim 
of reason, but empirically in accordance with 
purposes that are contingently occasioned (the number 
of which cannot be foreseen) yields technical unity; 
whereas the schema which originates from an idea (in 
which reason propounds the ends a priori, and does 
not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as 
the basis of architectonic unity.'
(Kant, CPR, p. 653-654: original emphasis).
The last part of this quotation indicates that Kant has two meanings 
for the word 'idea* ('idea of pure reason'): the first is an ad 
interim creation of the mind arid effects 'technical unity'; the 
second is synonymous with 'regulative principle' and effects 
'architectonic unity*.
The Identification of a regulative principle provides both the 
criterion by which we differentiate one scientific discipline from 
another and the guarantee that we can relate each to every other: 
all sciences can be unified by virtue of having a definite place 
within a single, comprehensive, classification:
'Every science is a system on its own right; [] we 
must [] set to work architectonically with it as a 
separate and independent building. We must treat it 
as a self-subsisting whole, and not as a wing or 
section of another building - although we may 
subsequently make a passage to or from one part to 
another.'
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(Kant, Critique of Teleologlcal Argument, Meredith 
trans. 1928, p. 31).
The 'regulative employment' of the ideas of pure reason allows for 
the systematic relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of 
human reason. Whilst there is a sense in which the architectonic is
incorrigible, it should not be forgotten that the systematic unity 
of knowledge is of a qualitatively different sort to the knowledge 
of the understanding (i.e. the categories). This is precisely 
because reason transgresses the limits of possible experience set by 
the categories with the result that
*[] I may have sufficient ground to assume something, 
in a relative sense (suppositio relatlva), and yet 
have no right to assume it absolutely (suppositio 
absoluta). This distinction has to be reckoned 
within the case of a merely regulative principle. We 
recognise the necessity of the principle, but have no 
knowledge of the source of its necessity; and in 
assuming that it has a supreme ground, we do so 
solely in order to think its universality more 
determinately.'
(Kant, CPR, p. 553-4; original emphasis within 
brackets, mine thereafter).
I contend that this last quotation shows that regulative principles 
cannot be used to justify (in an absolute or objective sense) any 
particular system of empirical judgements such as Euclidian geometry 
or Newtonian physics - notwithstanding the immense admiration and 
respect Kant had for both of these systems (he contributed to the 
development of the latter: the so-called 'KantHLaplace 
Hypothesis'). This high regard would seem to have had less to do 
with their long continued and wide ranging empirical verification 
(invoked by empiricists as evidence for inductive reasoning) than 
with their deductive structure as disciplines (i.e. comprised of a 
set of laws incorporated within an axiomatised hierarchy) - a
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quality very much In harmony with Kant'a criteria of the 
architectonic (see Losee, 1980, p. 108).
Construing Transcendental Idealism In light of Lakatos' taxonomy, I 
believe that I have now shown that, for Kant, "to know is to 
construct" - hence his proposal is, indeed, for an 'activist* theory 
of knowledge. We must, however, live and die within the limits that 
the categories (themselves held to be God-given/Kant-discovered) 
impose upon construction, so Kant's epistemology is, as Lakatos 
claims, 'conservative' in its-activist^ . •
3.3.1. The Legacy of Kant.
There exists a consensus amongst epistemologists today that whilst 
Kant's theory of knowledge repays close study it has been shown to 
be sufficiently flawed to have been overthrown and superseded (to 
greater and lesser extents) by other versions of constructivist 
epistemology. I suggest that Popper expresses lucidly the 
prevailing critical appraisal of Kant's epistemological legacy:
'When Kant said, 'Our intellect does not draw its laws 
from nature.but imposes its laws upon nature', he was 
right. But in thinking that these laws are 
necessarily true, or that we necessarily succeed 
in imposing them upon nature, he was wrong*.
(Popper, 1972, p. 48).
I, too, have no quarrel with this appraisal as stated above.
Popper, however, then elaborates upon his second clause:
'Kant believed that Newton's dynamics was a priori 
valid. (See his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science, published between the first and the second 
editions of the Critique of Pure Reason.) But if, as 
he thought, we can explain the validity of Newton's
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theory by the fact that our intellect imposes its 
laws upon nature, it follows, I think, that our 
intellect must succeed in this; which makes it hard 
to understand why a priori knowledge such as Newton's 
should be so hard to come by. [] Nature very often 
resists quite successfully, forcing us to discard our 
laws as refuted; but if we live we may try again.'
(Popper, 1972, p. 48 and n. 15 - I have combined part 
of the footnote and text; original emphasis).
I contend that Popper construes Kant's intention to 'explain the 
validity of Newton's theory* in terms of a demonstration or proof of 
validity due to his (Popper's) later conclusion that 'it follows, I 
think, that our intellect must succeed in this'. My inference is 
further strengthened by Popper's claim, made elsewhere in the same 
text, that 'Kant [] gives an a priori deduction of Newton's theory* 
(1972, p. 94: original emphasis).
Now, Brittan (1978, Ch. 5), although not citing Popper, provides 
ample documentatary evidence to show that something very like this 
view is also held by most philosophers, viz. that (a) Kant intended 
Newtonian physics to follow as a natural and valid consequence of 
Transcendental Idealism and, hence, that (b) the "overthrow" of 
Newton's theory by that of Einstein represents a considerable cause 
for critical doubt over Kant's epistemology5 (this second part is 
implicit in Popper's last sentence in the previous quotation).
Against this "consensual interpretation" of Kant's intention, 
however, Brittan argues that Kant himself never explicitly 
characterises his purpose in that way (1978, p. 119) and that it 
would be more plausible to infer that he was not interested in 
defending the validity of Newton's theory but rather its 
possibility, viz. '[] that Newtonian physics applies to the world 
(i.e., that the subject terms of its propositions denote really
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possible objects).' (1972, p. 123, n.12). Such a defence would 
allow for more than a 'minimal' (I.e. phenomenallstic) 
interpretation of Newton's results, viz. a realistic interpretation, 
but this should not be mistaken for the intention of Kant's argument 
which Brittan summarises in the following way:
'[P]ut in its simplest terms, [the Transcendental 
Deduction] comes down to this: unless we assume that 
those a priori principles that make a world of 
independent objects possible have application, from 
which follows the possibility of a realist 
interpretation of physics, then we will not have an 
adequate concept of the self.'
(Brittan, 1978, p. 126; my emphasis under 'assume', 
elsewhere as per original).
Some of my earlier interpretations of Kant's ideas may now be seen 
to be sympathetic to those of Brittan. By way of a further gloss 
upon them, I suggest that Newton's theory is best thought of as 
playing an illustrative, rather than a constitutive, role in Kant's 
argument. There is, I think, overwhelming evidence that Kant 
believed Newton's theory to be a priori valid as suggested by Popper 
and the "consensualistsM - but not for the(ir) further inference 
that Kant demonstrated it to be so. Kant, no doubt, Intended his 
epistemology to complement Newton's theory and so it does. This is 
especially clear from Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science of 1783 in which we find one 'Category' after another 
transformed via an 'Analogy of Experience' into a 'Principle of 
[Newtonian] Mechanics', e.g. (respectively), 'substance': 
'conservation of substance': 'conservation of matter' (see Losee, 
1980, p. 179). But close though this complementary relation may be, 
it stops short of an 'a priori deduction of Newton's theory* as 
Pbpper and the consensualists claim it to be. Both parts of the 
consensual interpretation reflect an empiricist emphasis within
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constructivist traditions of epistemology that has significantly 
lost Influence in recent years (due to the rise of 'Post-empiricist 
philosophy of science', see Ch. 4). From a 'post-empiricist* point 
of view (and also, I believe, from that of Brittan), however, the 
attempt of Popper and the consensualists to construe Newtonian 
physics as an empirical enquiry into the adequacy of Kant's 
epistemology doubly misses the point for, as Hughes puts it in a 
general discussion,
'It is important to emphasise that ontological and 
epistemological questions are not to be answered by 
empirical enquiry since they are concerned with, 
among other things, the nature and significance of 
empirical inquiry. They are questions requiring 
philosophical argument and debate in which the very 
presuppositions of knowledge, as a general issue, are 
of concern.'
(Hughes, 1980, p. 7: my emphasis).
Now, there has, indeed, been considerable philosophical argument and
debate over the presuppositions of Transcendental Idealism and from
which Kant has not escaped unscathed. Certain of these discussions
point the way to perennial controversies of constructivism which, if 
bft
one claims to^ a constructivist at all, must be considered.
Cherry (1981), for example, argues that Kant's claims to 
'objectivity' and 'objective knowledge* (in the senses discussed 
above) are undermined by his metaphysical doctrine of noumena by
virtue of the fact that he elaborates it in such a way as to deny
all intellectual or experiential access to them, thereby rendering 
them 'vacuous* concepts. Thu6 Kant (quoted by Cherry) argues that 
the noumenon is an 'entirely indeterminate concept of an
intelligible entity [; it is] a thing so far as it is not an object
of our sensible intuition []' (CPR, p. 268: original emphasis). For 
Kant,
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'The concept of a noumenon is [] a merely 1imltlng 
concept, the function of which is to curb the 
pretensions of sensibility, and it is therefore only 
of negative employment.'
(Kant, CPR, p. 272: original emphasis; quoted by 
Cherry, 1981, p. 182).
Against this, Cherry argues that the set of noumena comprising an 
intelligible world ('Reality') behind the empirical world 
('Appearance') can aspire to intelligibility only if an 'access 
condition' (Cherry, 1981, p. 183: my emphasis) is satisfied, viz.
*[I]t must be possible in principle for some subject 
to experience in some mode or. another the 
intelligible world and its population. Unless this 
condition is satisfied the expression 'intelligible 
world' makes no conceivable reference; for it can 
make no sense to posit entities such that any and 
every form of access to them is logically barred.* 
(Cherry, 1981, p. 183: original emphasis).
Cherry claims this access condition to be necessary for discussions 
of noumena to be 'intelligible speculations* (1981, p. 183). He 
goes on to ask a rhetorical question:
'Whether or not [an access condition] is ever 
forthcoming, what form would knowledge of the 
intelligible world take?'
(Cherry, 1981, p. 183).
In response he proposes two answers or interpretations of Kant which 
he develops with closely supporting references to the Critique of 
Pure Reason and which he later demolishes even^handedly, thereby 
demonstrating the insufficiency of an access condition.
I find Cherry's arguments convincing but further details of them are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For reasons that shall become 
clear later in this chapter, however, I cannot accept Cherry's final
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conclusion that the example of Kantfs failure to allow access to the 
one ultimate or real world renders all talk about such a world 
'seductive nonsense’.
As a parting shot at this issue, I would like briefly to suggest a 
reason for Kant’s long winded obscurantism concerning access to the 
real world. This shall serve to point to precisely the sort of 
Issues which cannot be tackled adequately within the tenets of 
empiricist traditions of epistemology (including objectivist 
methodological constructivist traditions). I believe that the key 
to Kant's obfuscation over the issue of an access conditon resides 
in his famous statement that
'I have [] denied knowledge in order to make room for
faith’.
(Kant, CPR, p. 29: original emphasis).
This sentence has been held by eminent Kant scholars (e.g. Beck, 
1978, p. 16) to be the foundation of Kant’s ethical theory, later to 
be elaborated in his second Critique. What I am suggesting, 
however, is that Kant's prevarication over articulating an access 
condition - a general theory of reference - is highly corseted with, 
if not identical to, his refusal to provide a proof of the a priori 
validity of Newton’s physics. To have done either, I believe, would 
have seemed to Kant to be a form of idolatory: he revered, even 
worshipped, the objects of Newtonian mechanics but, in his personal 
religiosity, could not allow that he (or any one else) was actually 
perceiving them directly for this would have amounted to staring God 
in the face. I contend then, that for Kant in his time, Newton's 
theory effects preeminent 'technical unity' amongst extant 
conceptual systems, it illustrates unsurpassed and perhaps
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unsurpassable ’architectonic unity’ of reason, but it cannot be held 
to be 'objective knowledge' per se for this is entirely prescribed 
by the forms of intuition and the categories. Whilst the overthrow 
of Newton's theory cannot be held to be a refutation of Kant's 
epistemology, Kant's refusal or inability clearly to articulate a 
theory of reference does undermine his claim to provide a realist 
epistemology.
What, then, remains? I contend that there are two, and only two, 
features of Kant's epistemology which remain common to all 
constructivist theories of knowledge and which consequently may be 
used as defining characteristics:
(1). The 'Assumption of Epistemological Realism' (AER):
“Reality is mind independent".
All constructivist epistemologies purport to be realist 
epistemologies in a sense whibh invokes something like Kant's 
doctrine of noumena. That is to say, all constructivists hold that 
however real the worlds of our ideas may seem, there is in fact only 
one ultimate, really existing, reality behind them all. Implicit in 
AER in the notion that whether or not reality itself is changing it 
remains unchanged by whatever we say or think about it. Our ideas 
about reality may come, go, even come back again (this has often 
happened), but reality itself is held to exist entirely 
independently from all such activities. Thus what AER assumes is 
that reality is."mind-independent". Of course, Kant was neither the 
first nor the last to assume epistemological realism and the 
assumption remains a necessary feature of all realist
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epistemologies.
Whilst I propose AER to be only a necessary, not a sufficient, 
condition for a realist epistemology, I clearly intend something 
more than a mere 'assumption of realism' (AR) - for which AER might 
reasonably be mistaken as I have characterized it so far. That 
something more is the further assumption, implicit to AER but not to 
AR, that not only is there a mind-independent reality but also that 
it may be known. Hence AER. This, in turn, carries with it the 
promise or responsibility to satisfy an access conditon, or 'theory 
of reference', for failure to do so undermin^es any claim to 
demonstrate a requirement for objects, i.e. to propose a realist 
philosophy, leaving 'no more than art assertion of dogmatic faith 
belied by all the facts.' (Trigg, 1980, p. 36). This I consider to 
be the ultimate fate of Kant's epistemology, albeit unintended by 
him (cf. my account of Cherry's argument, above). But when the 
realism of a putative realist epistemology is cast in doubt the 
charge of 'idealism' is usually made and, indeed, was made against 
Kant even in his own time. This was no doubt facilitated by the 
doubly misleading name of 'Transcendental Idealism' which Kant gave 
to his epistemology and which he soon regretted (Popper, 1972, p. 
179). Kant tried to make the emphasis on objectivity more 
compelling by not only entirely rewriting the Transcendental 
Deduction for the 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason but 
also including a further passage specifically entitled 'The 
Refutation of Idealism* (CPR. p. 244) - all to no avail. Kant's 
theory is now widely regarded as being dogmatic in exactly the 
manner of those metaphysical tractitions which he strove to 
transcend, viz. he ultimately presupposed the very doctrines which
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he sought to demonstrate.
Idealist theories of knowledge are founded upon the counter-part 
assumption to AER, namely, the 'Assumption of Epistemological 
Idealism' (AEI), viz. "Reality is mind-dependent". The most 
illustrious proponent of idealist epistemology was the early 18th 
century philosopher Bishop Berkeley and whose dictum was 'To be is 
to be perceived.' He argued (most now accept without success) that 
his system was saved from the charge of anthropocentric subjectivism 
by his postulate of an all(ways) seeing God. Such is not the case 
with solipsist epistemology and which may be regarded as the most 
extreme form of idealism. Amongst its few advocates is Bradley who, 
in 1897, characterized the view as follows:
*1 cannot transcend experience, and experience is my 
experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond 
myself exists: for what J.s experience is its (the 
self's) states.'
(Bradley, quoted in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 
[15th Edn.], Micropaedia, Vol. IX, p.336: 
original emphasis).
Nowadays, hardly anyone explicitly embraces idealism, still less 
solipsistic idealism. They are, nevertheless, worth mentioning 
since all forms of constructivism are susceptible to some degree to 
the charge of idealism, or at least to the suspicion of it, and this 
is particularly true of the version which I wish to endorse. Yet I 
believe that a requirement for objects, i.e. objectivity or realism 
in the Kantian sense, is a requirement well worth defending and I 
shall later do so, albeit, by considerably less elaborate means than 
those of Kant. I state my commitment to realism unequivocably to 
delimit my otherwise considerable sympathy for a loose alliance of 
approaches going under the rubric of 'sociology of knowledge' and
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including hermeneutics, phenomenology and systems theory.
Hesse comments
’The sociology of knowledge is a notorious black spot 
for fatal accidents both sociological and 
philosophical.*
(Hesse, 1980, p. 30).
There is a prima facie case for the view that one of the 
'philosophical' accidents afflicting at least some sociological 
traditions is idealism, viz. by restricting all talk about reality 
to "social ■reality*'; and to our "social construction" of it, some 
sociological traditions risk (amongst other things) becoming 
idealist-by-default in manner analogous to the Logical Positivists 
who attempted to remain "agnostic" with respect to ultimate reality.
Now, I have earlier suggested that the locus of epistemological 
realism resides in the critical fullfillment of an access condition, 
a theory of reference. Lest this imply sympathies to 
"foundatlonalist'V fobjectivist' (in Brittan's second sense, cf. 
discussion, above), epistemology which I do not hold, let me say now 
that if, as I have argued, the fatal flaw in Kant's system was its 
crucial vagueness with respect to access to reality, then I consider 
(and shall later argue) that the theories of reference proposed by 
the majority of post-Kantian traditions of constructivism have been 
intenably restrictive, viz. correspondence theories of truth linked 
inseparably to a requirement for "convergence" with reality. I 
shall argue, to the contrary, that realism and 'relativism* (or 
'subjectivism') are not inimicablc positions within an epistemology 
as is commonly supposed,
- 3.26 -
and in particular that complementary 'realist-relativist' construals 
of science and of science pedagogy are both possible and desirable.
Finally, whilst I accept that it may be useful to talk of the social 
construction of knowledge within a variety of traditions (possibly 
Including the one I endorse - see Ch.10), I hope to have shown that 
it was Kant's Intention (if not his achievement) to provide a 
realist epistemology and I suggest that since Kant also originated 
constructivism this establishes a historical precedent which should 
continue to be honoured within any approach claiming itself to be 
constructivist. Thus all constructivists are realists, though not 
all realists are constructivists.
(2). The 'Constructivist Knowledge Thesis' (CKT): "All observations 
are theory-laden".
Kant, as we have seen, was responsible for introducing the notion 
that experience is partially constituted by theoretical categories. 
This much, following the demise of positivistic theories of 
knowledge, is now generally accepted amongst epistemologists. What 
has not fared so well is Kant's view that certain theoretical 
categories are valid a priori (or, more accurately, that certain a 
priori synthetic propositions are valid). Instead, theoretical 
categories are now generally accepted to be conjectured by the 
creative Imagination and that the mere act of creating them may, for 
any intent that matters in epistemology, be considered to be 
independent of experience. This acceptance is itself; however, 
independent or prior to any discussion of the validity, utility, 
etc. of conjectured theoretical categories and ^ ^  does require
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reference to experience. Thus, what remains from Kant's original 
synthesis of reason and experience that is common to all 
constructivists, besides AER, is a weakened (because more vague) 
version of his original thesis that all knowledge is construction. 
This is summarised by the now familiar slogan: "All observations are 
theory-laden".
3.A. Personal Construct Psychology is 'Revolutionary Activist* 
(Kelly).
To assist my further construal of Lakatos' notion of 'revolutionary 
activism', as instanced by the epistemological aspect of PCP, I 
shall both augment and systematically summarize some of the 
appraisative dimensions of epistemological traditions alluded to in 
the previous section.
e
For this I have modified and extended a framework originally of three 
dichotomous dimensions proposed by Kant7 *n Critique of Pure 
Reason for construing the scope and function of reason, viz.
(1) The Object of Knowledge : Realism - Idealism
(2) The Origin of Knowledge : Reason - Experience
(3) The Method of Knowledge : Rationalism - Empiricism
To these I add a fourth:
(4) The Claim of Knowledge : Objectivism - Relativism
My choice of the terms comprising this dichotomy was, in turn, 
partially inspired by Bernstein, with whose preliminary explication 
of them my own also coincides:
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'By "objectivism", I mean the basic conviction that there is or 
must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to 
which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or 
rightness. An objectivist claims that there is (or must be) 
ouch a matrix and that the primary task of the philsopher is to 
discover what it is and to support his or her claims to have 
discovered such a matrix with the strongest possible reasons. 
Objectivism is closely related to foundationalism and the 
search for an Archimedean point. The objectivist maintains 
that unless we can ground philosophy, knowledge, or language in 
a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism.
The relativist not only denies the positive claims of the 
objectivist but goes further. In its strongest form, 
relativism is the basic conviction that when we turn to the 
examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to 
be the most fundamental - whether it is the concept of 
rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms - we are 
forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such 
concepts must be understood as relative to a specific 
conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of 
life, society, or culture. Since the relativist believes that 
there is (or can be) a nonreducible plurality of such 
conceptual schemes, he or she challenges the claim that these 
concepts can have a determinate and univocal significance. For 
the relativist, there is no substantive overarching framework 
or single metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or 
univocally evaluate competing claims of alternative paradigms. 
Thus, for example, when ve turn to something as fundamental as 
the issue of criteria or standards of rationality, the 
relatLvist claims that we can never escape from the predicament 
of speaking.of "our" and "their" standards of rationality - 
standards that may be "radically incommensurable". It is an 
illusion to think that there is something that might properly 
be labeled "the standards of rationality", standards that are 
genuinely universal and that are not subject to historical or 
temporal change.'
(Bernstein, 1983, p.8 : original emphasis).
In due course, I shall develop in detail my personal meanings for 
these terms and which depart from Bernstein's further elaborations 
of them.
For now, I wish only to make two points in preliminary explication 
of this framework. Firstly, in discussing Kant's three dimensions, 
Beck argues that:
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'These three ways of dividing possible philosophies are 
logically independent of one another, but in fact we find 
certain family affiliations among some of them.1
L.W. ,
(Beck ,1978, p.4)
JL
I contend that both parts of this view hold good with respect not 
only to my modified verson of Kant's three dimensions but also to 
the framework as augmented by my fourth dimension. The four 
dimensions may be represented diagramraatically by means of three 
orthogonal axes:
Realism
RationalismRelativism
ExperienceReason
IdealismEmpiricism Objectivism
Figure 3.2 Diagram Showing Four Dichotomous Dimensions for 
Construing Theories of Knowledge.
- 3.30 -
Secondly, I draw attention to what might be called the 
"subjectivist" elements alluded to in Bernstein's definition of 
relativism, above. That is to say, what T shall term the 
"Relativistic Knowledge Thesis" (RKT) that all conceptual frameworks 
express and contain, albeit, to greater and lesser extents, person 
(or persons') specific commitments, i.e. "values".
In pursuit of this second point, and to relate it back to Lakatos' 
distinction between conservative activism and revolutionary 
activism, I recall ray summary of tbe prevailing reading of the fatal 
flaw to Kant's epistemology, namely, that it was dogmatic, viz. it 
ultimately presupposed just those doctrines which it sought to 
demonstrate as objective (section 3.3.1., above).
I contend that most modern constructivist traditions have responded 
to this criticism of Kant by seeking to develop (and certainly 
claiming to have developed) epistemologies which yield objective 
knowledge but which a.re "critically fallibilistic". I shall argue, 
however, that such traditions cannot sustain these claims. 
Specifically, and for reasons which shall become clear later, I cite 
'structuralist* traditions (e.g. that due to Piaget) by virtue of 
their claim to universal necessity, and so-called 'critical 
rationalist' traditions (e.g. that due to Popper) by virtue of their 
commitment to objectivism. These traditions, each of them 
'constructivist' in the minimal sense defined in section 3.3.1., 
above, might both be classified as 'objectivist* - 
'objectivist-constructivist' - epistemologies since I shall later 
argue that universal necessity and objectivism amount to the same 
thing.
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Briefly stated, my argument against such objectivist constructivist 
traditions is that they retain certain features of traditional 
rationalism which are incompatible with revolutionary activism: 
notwithstanding theirclaims to the contrary, they are conservative 
activist.
To elaborate slightly upon the rationalist elements retained, I 
shall refer to Flew*s characterization of 17th and 18th century 
rationalism as propounded by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz:
*The characteristics of this kind of rationalism are: (a) the 
belief that it is possible to obtain by reason alone a 
knowledge of the nature of what exists; (b) the view that 
knowledge forms a single system, which (c) is deductive in 
character; (d) the belief that everything is explicable, that 
is, that everything can in principle be brought under the 
single system.*
(Flew, 1979, p.278)
I contend, and shall later demonstrate in the cases of Piaget and 
Popper, that objectivist constructivist traditions retain *(b)* and 
*(c)* but yet this contradicts the demand for reflexivity (self­
reference) of theories of knowledge required by Lakatos* 
characterization of revolutionary activism, viz. *it is we who 
create our ’prisons* and we can also* critically, demolish them’g* 
And, further, that whilst reflexivity of a theory of knowledge is a 
minimal condition for both responsibility and relevance to be 
achieved, where a theory of knowledge is successfully self-applied, 
i.e. it meets its own criteria for (growth of) knowledge, this 
cannot be held to constitute a demonstration of its objectivity as 
some have tried to claim for this is ultimately to beg the question 
via an infinite regress (ironically, I shall argue that this is what 
Lakatos himself does, see section 3.4.2., below).
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No, the case which T wish to make, and to exemplify with PCP, is 
that Lakatos' articulation of revolutionary activism requires and 
embodies a commitment to a "comprehensive" form of rationality 
similar to that propounded by Feyerabend and which objectivist 
constructivists reject:
'Science, cbmmonsense, and even the refined commonsense of 
critical rationalism use certain fixed categories ('subject'; 
'object'; 'reality'), in addition to the many changing views 
they contain* They are therefore not fully rational* Full 
rationality can be obtained by extending criticism to the
stable parts also. This presupposes the invention of
alternative categories and their application to the whole rich 
material at our disposal. The categories, and all other stable
elements of our Knowledge, must be set in motion.*
(Feyerabend, 1981b, p.74 : my emphasis)9
In an earlier elaboration of similar views made with respect to the 
conduct of science, Feyerabend urges that
'A scientist who wishes tQ maximize the empirical content of the 
views he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as 
he possibly can must therefore introduce other views; that is, 
he must adopt a pluralistic methodology. He must compare ideas 
with other ideas rather than with 'experience' and he must try 
to improve rather than discard the views that have failed in 
the competi tion.'
(Feyerabend, 1975, p.30 : original emphasis)
Such comparison of ideas, however, may be carried out at different 
"levels". Hence, in Swift, Watts and Pope (1983) we distinguish 
between, on the one hand *(M)ethodological pluralism* (and which I 
shall here argue also entails a commitment to a 'pluralistic 
(M)ethodology*) to indicate critical comparison of rival meta- 
theories, i.e. epistemologies, and, on the other hand,
'(m)ethodological pluralism' (and which I shall here argue also 
entails a commitment to a 'pluralistic (m)ethodology') to refer to 
such comparison of theories. Viewed epistemologically, the former 
affords "inter-systemic" criticism, the latter "intra-systemic" 
criticism.
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Now, comparison at the epistemological "level" - (M)ethodological 
pluralism - is precisely what is denied by objectivists due to their 
retention of the traditional rationalist commitment to 
epistemological monism (objectivism). For objectivists, criticism 
of their own "objective" standards and criteria can only be carried 
out by application of their own standards and criteria - assuming 
that they take up the option to do so, which is rare. Criticism by 
the alternative, incompatible, standards and criteria would 
necessarily be seen as introducing an element of subjectivism into 
the debate. Yet this, I contend, is exactly what a revolutionary 
activist theory of knowledge must allow.
In the remainder of this sub-section (prior to its further 
subdivisions), then, I shall concentrate upon advancing an initial 
case that Kelly's original articulation of PCP is revolutionary 
activist in its epistemological aspect by demonstrating that 
(M)ethodological pluralism - a pluralistic (M)ethodology - is 
consistent with, indeed, consequential of, the formal content of the 
theory and that this was anticipated and endorsed by Kelly. (I 
shall defer my consideration of the less radical (m)ethodological 
pluralism until section 3.4.4.).
To reiterate, (M)ethodological-pluralism implies the rejection of 
"Methodological-monism" - the view that everything is explicable and 
can in principle be brought under a single system. Kelly himself 
greatly enjoyed raising the ambiguity of categorical systems which 
sought to place his viewpoint within one framework or another. Thus 
he stated:
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'Personal Construct Theory has also been categorised by 
responsible scholars as an emotional theory, a learning a 
psycho-analytic theory (Freudian, Adlerian, and Jungian - all 
three), a typically American theory, a Marxist theory, a 
Humanistic theory, a logical positivisitic theory, a Zen 
Buddhistic theory, a Thomistic theory, a Behaviouristic theory, 
an Apollonian theory, a pragmatiswtic theory, a reflective 
theory, and no theory at all. It has also been classified as 
nonsense, which indeed, by its own admission it will likely 
some day turn out to be.*
(Kelly, 1970, p.10)
From reading this quotation it would be wrong to think, however, 
that Kelly was merely rejecting these interpretations of his theory 
as "mistakes". On the contrary he was celebrating them as a 
vindication of his view that persons can be industrious inventors of 
ideas and of links between them. This interpretation of Kelly's
comment is not at all inconsistent with his stated desire to explore
a new analogy for man, namely, 'Man-the-Scientist* and that this
desire was born of a dissatisfaction with many of those in his►
Ust. For Kelly, Methodological-monism would be unduly restrictive, 
indeed, pre-emptive.
Kelly explains the initial appeal to him of exploring his metaphor 
"person-as-scientis t":
'To a large degree - though not entirely - the blueprint of 
human progress has been given the label of "science". Let us 
then, instead of occupying ourselves with man-the-biological 
organism or man-the-lucky guy, have a look at man-the- 
scientist.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.4 : original emphasis)
Now, as I shall later show, there is a good deal more of Kelly's 
personal thought behind this somewhat jocular summary of his 
reasons for choosing this metaphor than this quotation alone might 
suggest. For my immediate purposes, however, it is enough to point 
out that this remark, made early in his book, makes it clear that
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Kelly regards his metaphor as one of many creative Images of the 
person, in his view a potentially fruitful one to explore but which, 
at the time he was writing, had tended to be ignored by 
psychologists. He goes on, however, to add the first of many 
cautions and caveats:
'When we speak of man-the-scientist we are speaking of all 
mankind and not merely a particular class of men who have 
publicly attained the stature of "scientists". We are speaking 
of all mankind in its biological aspects or all mankind in its 
appetitive aspects.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.4 : original emphasis)
Kelly*8 metaphor is clearly intended to explore only an aspect of 
Man's personality. In a later comment he alerts us to his suspicion 
of 'complete' explanations of man, i.e. his wariness of 
Methodological-monism:
'No one has yet provedjiimself wise enough to propound a 
universal system of constructs. We can safely assume that it 
will be a long time before a satisfactorily unified system will 
be proposed. For the time being we shall have to content 
ourselves with a series of miniature systems, each with its own 
realm or limited range of convenience.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.10 : my emphasis)
and the temptation to over extend a locally useful system, such as 
his own:
'It is also important that we Continue to recognize the limited 
ranges of convenience of our miniature systems. It is always 
tempting, once a miniature system has proved itself useful . 
within a limited range of convenience, to try to extend its 
range of convenience.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.11)
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Finally, Kelly Identifies the range of convenience within which his 
exploration of the metaphor haa provided a personal demonstration of 
utility, i.e. that of human personality and the problems of 
inter-personal relationships - a reflection of his concerns in his 
employment as a clinical psychologist - and then adds yet another 
caveat:
'Not only do systems, psychological and otherwise, tend to have 
limited ranges of convenience, but they also have foci of 
convenience. There are points within its realm of events where 
a system of a theory tends to work best. Usually these are the 
points which the author had in mind when he devised the 
system. For example, our own theory, we believe, tends to have 
its focus of Convenience in the area of human readjustment to 
stress.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.11-12 : my emphasis)
It is this caution which has prompted me, as an educational 
researcher, to attempt to modify and extend his theory to render it 
(more) 'convenient' for use in formal educational settings.
Thus far, I hope only to have demonstrated Kelly's modesty in his 
proposals for PCP and his tolerance of (M)ethodological pluralism. 
Elsewhere, however, he makes the stronger claim that 'our theory is 
frankly designed to contribute effectively to its own eventual 
over-throw and displacement* (Kelly, 1969, p.66 : my emphasis).
This, I suggest, alludes to Kelly's commitment to (M)ethodological 
pluralism in its investigative aspect i.e. a pluralistic 
(M)ethodology. Demonstrating that this commitment is more than mere 
rhetoric, however, requires a selective consideration of the 
'assumptive structure* (Kelly, 1955, p.58), or formal content, of 
PGP. This shall also serve to render meaningful later contrasts and 
comparisons that I shall make between PCP and alternative theories.
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In a preliminary statement of his commitment to constructivism,
Kelly proposes that
1 Man .looks at his world through transparent patterns or 
templates which he creates and then attempts to fit over the 
realities of which the world is composed. (). Let us give the 
name constructs to these patterns that are tentatively tried on
for size. They are ways of construing the world.*
(Kelly, 1955, p.8-9 : original emphasis)
Now, Kelly gave a rather specific meaning to the term 'construct', 
viz.
'In its minimum context a construct is a way in which at least
two elements are similar and contrast with a third.*
(Kelly, 1955, p.61)
Subsumed by this definition is Kelly's meaning of the term 
'element':
'The things or events which are abstracted by 
a person's use of construct are called elements. In some 
systems they are called objects.*
(Kelly, 1955, p.562)
The construct represents Kelly's most important technical innovation 
and its influence is felt throughout his theory. The construct both 
initiates a qualitatively different and prefer able mode of enquiryw
from that implied by the more familiar (though, I contend, poorly 
understood) "classical" notion of the 'concept* and, complementing 
this, adumbrates a radical new meaning for the notion of 
'explanation'. I shall consider in detail these particular 
potentialities which the construct has to offer later in the thesis 
(section 3.4.2.;and Chapters 4 and 10, respectively). Meanwhile I 
shall discuss further the characteristic features and qualities of 
the construct in vitro as it were.
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The quality of contrast, intrinsic to Kelly's meaning of the 
construct, has been discussed by Fransella and Bannister:
'When we say that Bill Bloggs is honest, we are not saying that 
Bill Bloggs is honest, he is not a chrysanthemum or a 
battle-ship or the square root of minus one. We are saying 
that Bill Blog$t is honest, he is not a crook.'
(Fransella and Bannister, 1977, p.5)
In the example, above, it should be clear that the contrast 
('crook') is not any contrast, it is a relevant contrast and the 
relevancy is achieved through the dimensionality of the construct 
('honest' vs 'crook').
Every construct has a relevant contrast as a proper part and Kelly 
terms the two ends of the dimension 'poles' (1955, p.137). The 
focus of the contrast, i.e. the contrast pole, is always, and in an 
Important sense, the opposite .of the other pole: it is relevant 
because it is opposite and, if construed as opposite, then it is 
relevant.
Now, exactly what this quality of "oppositeness", of relevancy in 
contrast, is cannot be universally formalised or specifically 
determined in advance for its meaning will depend upon, and vary 
according to, the particular purpose for which each construct has 
been created. (This is not to say, however, that Kelly's notion of 
opposite contrast cannot be developed beyond his original proposal. 
Cf• Chapter 4).
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Constructs, then, are 1bi-polar* dimensions but the quality of 
oppositeness in each pole relative to the other renders the 
dimension they prescribe discontinuous or 'dichotomous'» As Kelly 
also, and less formally, puts it ’a construct is at heart a black 
and white affair, rather than a scale of greys* (Kelly, 1969, p.10; 
my emphasis). For Kelly, dichotomous dimensionality represents 'an 
essential feature of thinking itself' (Kelly, 1955, p.62) and 
affords 'universal utility' (Kelly, 1969, p.10) in the life of the 
person.
It is important now to stress, as Kelly does, that it is our 
constructs that are dichotomous, not the objects (elements) for 
which they provide an ad interim 'reference axis* (Kelly, 1969, 
p.10). This is because our constructs are, and can only be, our 
ideas about the world, of which the meta-theoretical notion of the 
construct is itself also one. With this accepted, then "greys" 
between the "absolute", "black and white", poles of a construct may 
be admitted:
'[A construct] may not be accurate, and it may not be stable 
from time to time, but as a construct, it has to be absolute. 
Still, by its successive application to events one may create a 
scale with a great number of points differentiated along its 
length. Now a person who likes greys can have them - as many as 
he likesT*
(Kelly, 1966, p.14: my emphasis)
Whilst it is true that any construct implies a kind of "conceptual 
closure" and is thus "absolute" or "deterministic" in some sensem* 
we are always free to re-construe. Kelly claimed that events are 
subject to 'as great a variety of constructions as our wits would 
enable us to contrive* (Kelly, 1970, p.l), indeed, he urged that
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'we must continually and adventurously hold all matters open to the 
possibility of fresh reconstruction.* (Kelly, 1966, p.5: my 
emphasis). In keeping with these sentiments, Kelly named the 
epistemological stance intrinsic to PCP as 'Constructive 
Alternatlvlsm' (Kelly, 1955, p.3: my emphasis).
Now, in Kelly's view, constructs do not exist in isolation:
'Each person characteristically evolves, for his convenience in 
anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal 
relationships between constructs.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.56: my emphasis)
This statement constitutes one of 11 corollaries, namely, the 
'Organization Corollary*, which serve to articulate parameters and 
dynamics of the "constructive structure" of construction systems in 
augmentation of Kelly's 'Fundamental Postulate' of PCP, viz.
'A person's processes are psychologically channelized by the way 
in which he anticipates events.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.46)
The Organization Corollary implies that constructs are linked with 
each other in a 'more or less coherent and hierarchical manner'
(Pope and Keen, 1981, p.36). (I have already discussed unannounced
aspects of several of Kelly's corollaries, however, for a summary of
the formal content of PCP, see Appendix 3).
4
Now, Kelly was both aware^and approved of his theory being 
characterized as a 'meta-theory':
'Some have suggested that personal construct theory not be 
called a psychological theory at all, but a meta-theory. That 
is all right by me. It suggests that it is a theory about 
theories, and that is pretty much what I have in mind.'
(Kelly, 1966, p.9: my emphasis)
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T t may be useful to explore .this view by considering the construct 
in light of Brodbeck's (1968) distinction between the 'content' and 
the 'form' of a theory:
- the 'content' (or in Kelly's idiom, 'range of 
convenience*) of a theory comprises its 'descriptive 
terras' (or in Kelly's idiom, 'elements'), i.e. the names 
and characteristics of individual things abstracted by the 
theory, e.g. 'cool', 'spanner', 'manager'.
- The 'form' of a theory comprises its 'logical terras', 
i.e. the terms which specify connections and relations 
between the descriptive terms of the content, e.g. 'and',
'implies', 'or'.
When construed by means of this distinction, Kelly's formal 
definition of the construct may be seen as a radical proposal for 
the general form of theories (concepts, ideas etc.) since he held 
persons' construction systems to be 'composed entirely of 
constructs* (Kelly, 1955, p.6l). As such it applies to Kelly's 
theory itself and if one is to remain true to the reflexivity 
implied by his exhortation to 'continually and adventurously hold 
all matters open to the possibility of fresh reconstruction' (quoted 
above), then one must attempt, at least periodically, to construe 
lh terms of a personal construct. The construct thus 
outlines a transcendental dialectic which is applicable to 
meta-theoretical elements, it constitutes a general meta-theory 
embodying a pluralistic (M)ethodology.
At this point I should like to consider Kelly's views on the 
’utility', or worth, of constructs and construction systems since 
this also qualifies claims and recommendations I shall make in the 
remainder of this thesis.
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Some comments by Bannister are pertinent to this subject:
'Construct theory accepts the notion of difference, but not the 
notion of superiority. Every construct system (which is to say 
every person) is valid in its own right. To argue that one 
construct system is superior to another is to accept the terms, 
purposes and criteria of one system as valid and to deny the 
validity and point of the "inferior" system.'
(Bannister, 1979, p.31) .
This should not be understood as an endorsement of capricious 
solipsism (and nor does Bannister intend it as such), however, for 
Kelly does not dispute that
'Some of the alternative ways of construing are better than 
others.*
(Kelly, 1955, p.45 : my emphasis)
Rather, what is at issue in such comparisons is the relative 
personal utility of the constructs under consideration:
'Constructive Alternativlsrti holds that man understands himself, 
his surroundings and his potentialities by devising 
constructions to place upon them and then testing the tentative 
utility [my emphasis] of these constructions against such 
ad interim criteria as the successful prediction and control of 
events.'
(Kelly, 1966, p.l : original emphasis).
The caveats 'such* and 'ad interim* stem from Kelly's view that
'Men not only construe their alternatives, but they construe 
also criteria for choosing between them*
(Kelly, 1969, p.85)
- a view of vital pertinence to the subject of this thesis.
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The personal utility of a construct may be understood to mean the 
degree of satisfaction of personally pre-established criteria by 
experience as mediated by that construct. Constructs are always 
created, used and appraised according to personal purposes and 
criteria for them with the consequence that constructs! 'have no 
existence independent of the particular person whose thinking it 
characterizes' (Kelly, 1969, p.87).
There may thus be no "absolute" judgements of the utility of a 
construct or construction system made either within or between 
persons.
I return, at last, to Kelly's provocative statement that his theory 
is 'designed to contribute effectively to its own eventual 
over-throw and displacement* (qupted above). I hope by now to have 
demonstrated that Kelly's formal theory does, indeed, possess the 
technical ability to achieve this. I would, however, also like to 
argue for the urgent need that this "pluralistic (H)ethodological 
imperative" be fulfilled by appealing to a cultural aspect of the 
time we live in. This shall augment my already stated intention to 
extend the original range of convenience of Kelly's theory to 
encompass pedagogy.
Kelly argued that
'All thinking is based, in past, on prior convictions. A 
complete philosophical or scientific system attempts to make 
all these prior convictions explicit.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.6)
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Consistent with his own advice, Kelly states that
'This theory of personality actually started with the 
combination of two simple notions: first, that man might be 
better understood if he were viewed in the perspective of the 
centuries rather than in the flicker of passing moments; and 
second, that each man contemplates in his own personal way the 
stream of events upon which he finds himself so swiftly borne. 
Perhaps within this interplay of the durable and the ephemeral 
we may discover ever more hopeful ways in which the individual 
man can restructure his life. The idea seems worth pursuing.'
(Kelly, 1955, p.3 : my emphasis).
Now, the formal content of Kelly's theory might be described as an 
elaboration Of his "root" metaphor, namely, 'man-the-scientist*. 
Whilst I have already shown by means of a Kelly quotation that the 
consistently high, even pre-eminent status of science as a 
'blueprint of human progress' afforded by Western societies 
constituted one aspect of the appeal to Kelly of his metaphor, his 
choice may be further understood, by construing it to be based on his
A
judgement that persons engaged in the conduct of science 
consistently achieve the most fruitful, dynamic, compromise between 
the 'durable' and the 'ephemeral*. Here we may also suppose that 
Kelly was influenced by his experience of his initial degree which 
was in physics and mathematics.
Now, "having a look" at the person-as-scientist requires developing 
an idea about what it is to be a scientist. This Kelly surely did 
by means of his Fundamental Postulate and its 11 corollaries - a 
remarkably complete and self-consistent theory, especially when 
compared with those of most other psychologists. Kelly, however, 
urged that
'One does not escape from his cultural controls (assuming that 
there is any reason to escape) simply by ingnoring them - he 
must construe his way out*.
(Kelly, 1955, p.182 : original emphasis)
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The point 1 am making is that Personal Construct Psychology became, 
in a sense, a 'cultural control' the Instant Kelly publicly 
announced it. But having created PCP, Kelly himself did not fully 
respond to his own advocacy of pluralistic-(M)ethodology, indeed, he 
was not above a little pre-emptive construction of his own when it 
came to appraising the merits of rival psychological theories 
(Holland, 1970). We should not, however, let this overshadow the 
overall "spirit" of Kelly's proposal which was rigovrously 
underscored by its formal content. Kelly, after all, was human and 
may be supposed to have had his hands full defending and promoting 
his own theory! Without offering more than a mild apology for 
Kelly, then, I suggest that there are two further reasons as to why 
Kelly did not fully implement a pluralistic-(M)ethodology and why it 
is increasingly urgent that this be done.
My first reason is that at the time Kelly was writing his seminal 
work, in the two decades prior to 1955, a unified view of science 
was widely held. As Vander Goot puts it
'Although nearly everyone acknowledged disciplinary differences, 
many scientists believed that their efforts were part of a 
unified enterprise held together by the necessities, limits, 
and possibilities of common reason which in turn were reflected 
in 'The Scientific Method*.*
(Vander Goot, 1981, p.3 : my emphasis)
She goes on to explain how this view changed:
'It is interesting that one of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying the view from which Kelly drew his inspiration in 
the study of human personality is now, two decades later, 
widely questioned. Within the ranks of respected scientists 
there are many who claim that it is inaccurate to speak of 
"science" and prefer instead to refer only to various schools 
of scientific thought.'
(Vander Goot, 1981, p.3 : my emphasis)
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Exploring the metaphor "person-as-scientist" was thus less 
problematic In this sense for Kelly In the mid-1950s than it is for 
us today.
My second reason, highly related to the first, concerns developments 
in the philosophy of science. In the 1950s, the shortcomings of the 
traditional orthodoxy of Baconian erapirical-inductivism were being 
voiced by philosphers of science and scientists alike.
Now, as Fransella has pointed out
'() Kelly is unusually reticent on the subject of the nature of 
science. He says such things as "It is customary to say that 
the scientist's ultimate aim is to predict and control" (1955, 
p.3) but little else. Later he talks particularly of the two 
divisions he sees within science, accumulative fragmentallsm 
and constructive alternativism (Kelly, 1969)V
(Fransella, 1981, p.l : ray emphasis)
- notwithstanding his detailed elaboration of "person-as- 
sclentlst”.
The nub of Kelly's principal characterization of 'accumulative 
fragmentalism* may be construed to be synonymous' with Baconian 
empirical-inductivism:
'The [accumulative fragmentalist] view [is] that science makes 
its progress step by step. This is usually taken to mean that 
we discover nature a fragment at a time, that as each fragment 
is verified it is fitted into place - much like a piece in a 
jigsaw puzzle. Some day we'll get it all put together. [].
The man who has verified his hypothesis has, he supposes, a 
little chunk of 24-carat truth to add to his inventory.
[Such a] man thinks he has captured an essence; []. Now what 
happens? []• To the accumulative fragmentalist the next step 
is to find another nugget of truth []. [F]or the accumulative 
fragmentalist the only grounds for entertaining further 
questions about the matter Is evidence that he was wrong.
Since this kind of nuisance may pop up at any time he is 
careful to replicate his experiments and make sure the answer 
to his question is absolutely, positively, and irrevocably 
right!'
(Kelly, 1969, p.125-6)
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Now, the Assumption of Epistemological Realism (AER), intrinsic to 
both Baconian empirical inductivism and Kelly’s notion if 
accumulative fragmentalism ('we discover nature*, 'a little chunk of 
24-carat truth') conflicts with the Assumption of Epistemological 
Idealism which is at the core of the doctrines of Logical Positivism 
and which, at the time Kelly was formulating his theory, had come to 
replace Bacon's epistemology as the new orthodoxy in philosophy of 
science* The Logical Positivists claimed corroboration for their 
epistemological idealism from the then new Quantum Theory and from 
epistemological views expressed by its leading exponents^.
PCP is almost as diametrically opposed to Logical Positivism as it 
is to Baconian empirical inductivism (accumulative fragmentalism) - 
with respect to the former, not least because of Kelly's commitment 
quo constructivist epistemologist to AER. In 1955, however,
Popper's constructivist critique of, and alternative to, Logical 
Positivism had still to make its, monumental impact]^* Since Popper, 
however, there has been a gradually accelerating proliferation in 
rival constructivist traditions so that there is now no semblance of 
orthodoxy in philosophy of science, as I mentioned in Chapter 2.
Personal constructivists such as myself, who are anxious to develop
and extend Kelly's theory and its range of convenience may,
therefore, fruitfully tackle an even larger and more urgent question
"Man-the-Scientist - but which?" by referring to contemporary
philosophy of science. Explorations have already been made, for
s
example, Kelly's personal scientist has been construed as a Kuhnian 
(e.g. Vander-Goot, 1981; Candy, 1982) and as a Lakatosian (e.g.
Watts and Pope, 1982) and as Popperian, Kuhnian, Lakatosian and 
Feyerabendian respectively in Swift et al, 1982.
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In light of my preceding views I shall now attempt critically to 
further explore and to develop the epistemological aspect of PCP by 
employing a pluralist (M)ethodology as embodied by the construct 
applied to meta-theoretical elements, viz. having argued that the 
constructivist tradition due to Kelly is revolutionary-activist, in 
the remaining two sub-sections of this chapter, I shall argue that 
those due to Piaget and Popper both differ from Kelly's by virtue of 
their conserva tive-ac tivism.
3.4.1. Relevant Contrast (1) : Structuralist Theories of Learning 
are 'Conservative-Activist' (e.g. Piaget)
In my discussion of Piaget's theory, which soon follows, I have made 
extensive use of two references, viz.
(i) Piatelli-Palmarini (ed.) (1980). Language and Learning : 
The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky.
(ii) Gruber and Voneche (eds.) (1982). The Essential Piaget : 
An Interpretative Reference and Guide.
I justify my choice of both this tactic and these texts as follows:
Reasons common to my choice of these books include the fact that 
they were both compiled/written near the end of Piaget's life so I 
believe that they can be taken to provide an insight into his theory 
at, or at least near, its latest point of development. Also, each 
book has been widely read.
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With respect to Piatelli-Palraarini's book, my choice was further 
influenced by the fact that it contains transcripts of Piaget (and 
Piagetians) actively arguing for his theory and defending it against 
alternatives : the book has been one fruitful source for arguments 
that I use in this paper. Where I quote Piaget (or another person) 
from this text, I shall indicate who, and reference the overall text 
'P-P*, e.g. (Piaget, in P-P, p.150).
Gruber and Voneche's book was highly thought of by Piaget himself : 
e
in his forward to it, he explicitly approved of both the selection 
of his works reprinted/excerpted within it, and the interpretative 
commentary supplied by the editors. I also hope that by using this 
book I shall make it easier for a reader to "check up” on, or to 
explore, the context from which I have quoted. Where I quote Piaget 
from this text I shall supply the date of the relevant work and 
reference the overall text as 'G.V.', e.g. (Piaget, 1952; in G.V., 
p.446).
To assist my later critique of Piaget*s theory, which he termed 
* Genetic Epistemology*, I shall first articulate the relationship 
between Kant's theory and that of Piaget, as perceived by Piaget 
himself.
Thus, Piaget)frequently, and explicitly, proclaims the influence of 
Kant's ideas on those of his own, e.g.
*I consider myself to be profoundly Kantian.*
(Piaget, in P-P, p.150)
Htmielp
The principal affinity that Piaget sees between ^  and Kant is that
both employ concepts - 'structures' and 'Categories', respectively -
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which purport to universality and necessity. Piaget sometimes 
presents a concise approbation of these qualities of the other's 
theory, e.g.
'Kant [*s theory] comprises, as it should, universality 
and necessity ...*
(Piaget, 1971a, p.57)
Piaget alludes to universality and necessity in a characterisation 
of structuralist approaches:
'[There are] at least two aspects that are common to all 
varieties of structuralism : first, an ideal (perhaps a 
hope) of intrinsic intelligibility supported by the 
postulate that structures are self-sufficient and that, to 
grasp them, we do not need to make reference to all sorts 
of extraneous elements; second, certain insights - to the 
extent that one has succeeded in actually making out 
certain structures, their theoretical employment has shown 
that structures in general have, despite their diversity, 
certain common and perhaps necessary properties'.
(Piaget, 1971b, pp.4-6)
These qualities are, again, implicit when he goes on to give a 
sketch of his personal meaning of a structure!^:
'As a first approximation, we may say that a structure is 
a system of transformations. Inasmuch as it is a system 
and not a mere collection of elements and their 
properties, these transformations involve laws : the 
structure is preserved or enriched by the interplay of its 
transformation laws, which never yield results external to 
the system nor employ elements that are external to it.
In short, the notion of structure is comprised of three 
key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of 
transformation, and the idea of self-regulation.'
(Piaget, 1971b; p.5).
•ikwj
But/are explicit when, for example, he claims that
'The notion of law presents in the child, as indeed in the 
whole history of thought up to modern times, two 
complementary features - universality and necessity.
Law is a constant and necessary relation*.
(Piaget 1927; in G.V., p.146 : my emphasis).
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From the foregoing I hope to have demonstrated that Kant and Piaget 
share at least the intention of building universality and necessity 
into their respective theories. I also hope that these quotations 
provide an insight into Piaget's personal meaning of 'structure' and 
some of his anticipations and purposes for it.
It would be misleading to proceed further, however, without pointing
out that where Piaget makes remarks about Kant, such as those I 
quoted earlier, he invariably does so as a prelude to elaborating 
upon the profound differences he perceives exist between their 
respective ideas.
Piaget's principal complaint is that Kant provides the neonate with 
too much:
*[ ], the construction characteristic of the 
epistemological subject, however rich it is in the Kantian
perspective, is still too poor, since it is given
completely at the start*'
(Piaget, 1971a; p.57)
Piaget considers himself to be
'[ ] of a Kantianism that is not static, that is, the 
categories are not there at the outset : it is rather a 
Kantianism that is dynamic, that is, with each category 
raising new possibilities, which is completely different.'
(Piaget, in P-P; p.150.)
Piaget himself denies that there are any innate cognitive 
structures:
'Nor do any a priori or innate cognitive structures exist 
in man; ....'
(Piaget, in P-P; p.23.)
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For Piaget
'[ ] the functioning of intelligence alone is hereditary ...' 
(Piaget, in P-P; p.23: my emphasis.)
By this Piaget means that a person inherits an ability to adapt to 
their environment: 'Intelligence is an adaptation' (Piaget, 1966a; 
p.3), indeed, '... intelligence .. is an extension and perfection of 
all adaptive processes' (Piaget, 1967; p.9). The functioning of 
intelligence consists of the process of 'equilibration' (or 
'self-regulation'). Equilibration is comprised of the two 
complementary processes of 'assimilation' and 'accommodation':
'Intelligence is assimilation to the extent that it 
incorporates all the given data of experience within its 
framework. [ ]. There can be no doubt either that mental 
life is also accommodation to the environment.
Assimilation can never be pare because by incorporating 
new elements into its earlier schemata the intelligence 
constantly modifies the latter in order to adjust them to 
new elements.'
(Piaget, 1966a, p.6-7 : my emphasis)
During an interaction with the environment, temporary dynamic 
balances, or equilibrium states, are found as a result of the 
operation of assimilation and accommodation. These equilibria are 
characterized by varying degrees of application to objects or 
events, their mobility of extent of transferability across data 
types, and stability or inclination to cope with presented demands 
without change.
Equilibration, then, is the mainstay of Piaget's general theory of 
cognitive function. This may be distinguished from his theory of 
the development of intelligence which is linked to his notion of 
stages.
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The distinction I have just identified, however, is not a 
separation. This is because Piaget claims that equilibration not 
only provides the means by which we move through his postulated 
sequence of stages, but that it also
*[ ] creates structures through an organisation of 
successive actions performed on objects.*
(Piaget, in P-P; p.23 : my emphasis).
Thus, in Piaget's view, although the individual is not born with 
structures, they are born with the ability to create them (or 
rather, re-create them, as we shall see). The process of creating 
structures is begun by means of 'reflexes', a term which, on 
Piaget's idiosyncratic meaning, refers to the hereditary ability to 
perform certain unsophisticated motor-actions. Among the most 
important of these are sucking, eye-raovements and grasping. 
Piagetian reflexes may be thought, of as being only precursor 
'operations' (N.B. For Piaget's definition of operation, discussion 
later).
Piaget argues that
'There is no structure apart from construction, either 
abstract or genetic.'
(Piaget, 1971b; p.140 : original emphasis).
The need for Piaget to defend this position - to argue that his 
postulated structures are created (constructed) - is precisely 
because his brand of structuralism would otherwise
*[ ] lapse into a theory of Husserlian essences, Platonic forms 
or Kantian apriori forms of synthesis.'
(Piaget, 1971b; p.9 : ray emphasis).
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In light of all the ideas so far expressed, it would seem that 
Piaget is committed to universality and necessity on the one hand, 
and to ’activism1 (i.e. autonomous construction) on the other; He 
apparently perceives himself to be some sort of "dynamic Kantian", 
and thus it is quite clear to me that Piaget (were he alive) and 
Piagetians would claim their theory to be revolutionary-activist.
But could they justify such a claim? I shall argue that they could 
not : their theory is not "dynamic" enough, it is 
conserva tive-ac tivis t!
Before I attempt this, however, I consider it necessary to provide
relevant context by elaborating upon two further aspects of Piaget’s
meta-theory, viz., his notion of ’epistemic subject* and the
andi
relationship between his structuralist metaphysics^his developmental 
theory of stages. I shall consider them in order.
Piaget made a distinction between the "whole person", or 
’psychological subject', and that aspect of the whole person - 
common to all people - which he considered to be the subject (or 
perhaps more accurately, object) of his attention, the ’epistemic 
subject'. Piaget explains the distinction:
’There is the 'psychological subject’ centred in the 
conscious ego whose functional role is incontestable but 
which is not the origin of any structure of general 
knowledge but there is also the 'epistemic subject' or 
that which is common to all subjects at the same level of 
development, whose cognitive structures derive from the 
most general mechanisms for the co-ordination of actions.'
(Piaget, 1966b, p.308)
The psychological subject is the whole person and it therefore 
cannot be studied without reference to the activities of the 
particular, individuated and embodied person. The epistemic
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subject, by contrast, represents an ’analytical abstraction' 
(Duveen, 1983; p.231) to enable study of human cognitive process 
purged of affect and individuation. As Mischel puts it:
’Talk about the "activities of the epistemic subject" does 
not refer to real activities performed by a subject : it 
is a way of talking about timeless, logico-raathematical 
relationships.*
(Mischel, 1979, p.101)
And Duveen characterizes Genetic-Epistemology as being a theory 
which is ’concerned with the development of forms of knowledge 
common to all individuals* (1983, p.231). He later identifies an 
important qualification to the theory:
'[the epistemic subject] does not deny the reality of 
other, non-cognitive processes. Piaget himself frequently 
stressed that every psychological action was both a 
cognitive and an affective action. In the individual, 
psychological subject, both aspects appear fused 
together. In seeking to deal with the former genetic 
epistemology has necessarily recognised its lack of 
comprehension of the latter. From this perspective indeed 
a recognition of the reality of affective processes is 
almost as far as its comprehension of them extends*.
(Duveen, 1983 ; p.238 : original emphasis).
Piaget's notion of epistemic subject, although itself remaining a 
metaphysical or purely formal entity, identifies the "universe of 
discourse" of Piaget's structuralist metaphysics, viz., the problem 
of knowledge. Piaget’s structuralism can be considered to be a 
metaphysical articulation of his commitment to universality and 
necessity, it underlies and informs development of all areas of his 
theory.
Piaget’s theory of developmental stages is the most famous part of 
his theory. Stage-theory represents a formalisation of his
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structuralist metaphysics and it is principally stage-theory that 
has import for activities in the real world : it purports to be 
theoretical*
Stage-theory has also been the most heavily criticised part of 
Genetic Epfstemology• Criticisms of stage-theory have tended to be 
mainly empirical - I suspect for no better reason than that Piaget’s 
empirical claims are somewhat less esoteric than their counterpart 
in his formalisms* Powerful and important though many of the 
empirical criticisms are I shall largely ignore them in this 
thesis. Instead I shall concentrate on advancing formal criticisms 
of stage-theory which complement certain of the empirical ones and 
which shall demonstrate the poverty of Piaget's approach, viz, his 
conservative-activism•
In its minimal context, a Piagetian stage could be defined as a 
systematised integration of 'operations*. As Piaget elaborates:
’Psychologically, operations are actions which are 
internalizable, reversible, and co-ordinated into systems 
characterized by laws which apply to the system as a whole 
*•• since operations do not exist in isolation they are 
connected in the form of structured wholes*.
(Piaget, 1952, in G.V., p.456)
A ’structured whole' (*strueture d’ensemble’), however, is not to be 
understood as a mere aggregation of operations. This is because the 
term refers to a system of elements defined by a general set of 
laws : these laws define the system as a whole. Thus, a structure 
d’ensemble is to be distinguished from the individual operations 
themselves (translator's note, Piaget, 1952, in G.V.; p.456). For 
Piaget, a structure is a system of operations. Operations refer to 
the psychological comprehension of transformations underlying 
phenomena and, thereby, the recognition of invariances.
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A Piagetian stage can be thought of as a level in cognitive 
development in two senses:
*[ J A Stage consists of a level of preparation on the one 
hand, and a level of completion on the other.'
(Piaget, 1955, in G.V.; p.816 : original emphasis).
The 'level of preparation* consists of 'processes of formation or 
the genesis' (ibid.), whilst the 'level of completion' consists of 
'forms of final equilibrium (in a relative sense)* (ibid.)
Piaget's first meaning of 'level*, above, introduces an aspect of 
stage-theory that Piaget progressively emphasised during his 
academic life, viz.,
If we are to speak of stages, the order of succession of 
acquisitions must be constant. Not the timing but the 
order of succession.*
(Piaget, 1955, in G.V. p.815 :original emphasis).
Piaget's use of the auxiliary verb '‘must", in the last quotation, 
signals that his idea of an invariant order of succession is much 
more than an empirical generalisation : it is necessarily 
invariant. For Piaget, operationally emerges in an invariant 
sequence as a matter of ' logical "necessity”* (Piaget, 1971c; 
p.316 : my emphasis). (Piaget's "neutralisation" of the term 
'necessity*, effected by his placing it within inverted commas 
wherever he uses the expression 'logical necessity', shall later 
turn out to be important.)
Now Piaget's logic, what he calls 'psycho-logic', differs from 
"standard" forms of propositional logic and for this he has been 
heavily criticised as I shall later discuss. Furthermore, the 
differences and difficulties are to some extent masked by his
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selective use of standard notation. With this in mind we can 
nevertheless say that Piaget sees the logical relationship obtaining 
between a higher and a lower stage or structure to be that of 
inclusion. Logically speaking, the sequence of stages is one of 
"successive inclusion", or, as Piaget put it
1 .. each structure becomes a subset of a richer structure ..
(Piaget, in P-P, p.150)
The attainments of an earlier stage are retained (included) within a 
later stage. Attainment of an earlier stage is a pre-condition 
(necessary, but not sufficient) for the construction of a later 
stage - whence the idea that any stage may be partially construed as 
a level of preparation for the next.
Now, Piaget (e.g. 1965, in G-V; 1971b) views intellectual 
development as analogous to the biological notion of 'epigenesis1 : 
equilibration is mediated by a sequential unfolding of "organs" of 
regulation. Epigenesis has been construed to have four essential 
features (Kitchener, 1978). First, the process of psychological 
development involves a causal sequence of events, with successive 
steps being dependent on those preceding. Second, the sequence 
involves increased organization, differentiation and complexity, 
these being a transformation from homogeneous to heterogeneous 
status and from general to specific functions. Third, in the 
process towards complexity, something new emerges at each step: 
qualitatively different structures appear. Fourth, there is a 
stepwise growth through a series of stages, each stage being marked 
by qualitatively different emergent structures. In short, Piaget 
sees intellectual development as proceeding through a series of 
stages, each qualitatively different, in an invariant order.
Piaget's psycho-logic and his theory of stages serve to formalise
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and to operationalize this analogy (cf. Gilbert and Swift, 1985, 
included in this thesis as Appendix 1).
In my critique of Piaget's theory, which soon follows, I shall refer 
to those researchers who claim some kind of allegiance to Piaget's 
ideas as "Piagetians" and members of the "Piagetian School". 1  
shall refer to those Piagetians who consciously and/or 
conscientiously conduct their research in a manner which is 
strietl^onsistent with Piaget's structuralist meta-theory 
"strict-Piagetians". Amongst these latter, however, I include 
'Piagetian technologists* (Gilbert and Swift, 1985)* i.e. those who 
claim to maintain a "sceptical attitude" towards Piaget's 
strucuralist meta-theory by virtue of their "empiricism" in applying 
Piaget's doctrines in formal educational settings (e.g. by 
deverbalizing elicitation techniques), and, thence, deriving 
recommendations for education policy. My contention is that such 
researchers end up as 'strict Piagetians* by default: their studies 
reflect 'logical "necessity"* as a built-in assumption of their 
research design. Piaget's structuralist meta-theory is largely 
immune to empirical criticism and development. Put another way, in 
a recent critical survey, White concluded that
'[ ] the bulk of Piagetian work has ossified into mass 
studies in which, ironically when one considers Piaget's 
concern for the individual, children are forced into 
labelled groups. Nearly all of the Piagetian work falls 
into four categories : development of group tests to 
replace Piaget's clinical interview techniques; assessment 
of the proportions of a population in each of Piaget's 
stages; measurement of the relation between stage 
membership and another variable, such as school 
performance; and attempts to promote attainment of 
stages.*
(White, 1983, p.5)
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I shall argue that such concerns are all that the work of strict 
Piagetians has reference and relevance to : such work tells us 
nothing of substance for improving pedagogy and this is an 
inevitable consequence of Piaget's structuralist meta-theory. It 
needs hardly be said that it is against strict Piagetians (and 
Piagetian technologists) that my arguments are principally directed: 
I have nothing against Piagetian research conducted and confined 
within an ivory tower.
Accordingly, my critique shall consist primarily of formal 
arguments directed against those key aspects of Piaget's meta-theory 
that I have already discussed. Although many of these criticisms 
(the majority of which I have appropriated from others) complement 
the burgeoning empirical criticisms of Piaget's stage theory I shall 
refer to these latter only incidentally since they are already well 
known. I shall begin justifying my contention that Piaget's theory 
is conservative-activist by appealing to arguments due to Jerry 
Fodor in (P-P).
Fodor argues that Piaget's demand for invariance of the sequence of 
stage acquisition as a matter of logical necessity is incompatible 
with his declared rejection of innateness, which, in this context, 
may be understood to imply a priori construction.
Fodor's argument is a meta-logical, or more generally, a 
meta-conceptual, critique of Piaget's psycho-logical underpinning of 
his theory of stages. That is to say, Fodor does not advance 
specific criticisms of Piaget's formalisation of stages. Rather, 
he advances general arguments for the impossibility of acquiring 
'more powerful' structures with only the basis of 'weaker' ones to 
work from.
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Fodor (in P-P) introduces the example he will employ:
'Suppose we have hypothetical organism for which, at the 
first stage, the form of logic instantiated is 
prepositional logic. Suppose that at stage 2 the form of 
logic instantiated is first-order quantificational logic. 
The particular example does not matter in any respect, 
except that I want it to be clearly a case of a weaker 
system at stage 1 followed by a stronger system at stage 
2. And, of course, every theorem of a propositional logic 
is a theorem of first-order quantificational logic, but 
not vice versa*.
(Fodor, in P-P, p.148 : my emphasis).
And then the crux of his argument :
'Now we are going to try to get from stage 1 to stage 2 by 
a process of learning, that is, by a process of hypothesis 
formation and confirmation. Patently,- it can't be done. 
Why? Because to learn quantificational logic we are going 
to have to learn the truth conditions on such expressions 
as "(X)Fx." And, to learn those truth conditions, we are 
going to have to formulate, with the conceptual apparatus 
available at stage 1, some such hypotheses as "(X)Fx" is 
true if and only if ... But of course, such a hypothesis 
can't be formulated with the conceptual apparatus 
available at stage 1, that is precisely the respect in 
which propositional logic is weaker than quantificational 
logic. Since there isn* t any way of giving truth 
conditions on formulas such as all ,,(X)Fx" in 
propositional logic, all you can do is say: they include 
Fa and F^ and Fc, and so on.*
(Fodor, in P-P, p.148 : original emphasis).
Since there can be no rule governed symbol manipulation - no 
"computational procedure" - for a person at 'Stage 1' to acquire 
'Stage 2*, the whole system collapses upon itself.
Genetic-Epistemology does not allow that transition between stages 
can be effected by learning. Fodor concludes that in point of 
logical (though not empirical) necessity, Piaget must endorse a
theory of stage transition which is the same as, or similar to, one
of three that he proposes :
'[ ] God does it for you on Tuesdays, or you do it by
falling on your head, or it is innate [ ]'
(Fodor in P-P; p.155)
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For Fodor, innateness seems the most appropriate consequence from 
his reductio ad absurdum of Piagetian logical necessity since this 
is closest to his own views. I personally think that Piaget adopts 
a course most similar to the middle one, as I shall now try to show.
Piaget, as we have seen, claims the order of stage acquisition to be 
invariant as a matter of logical necesssity.
Now, for logicians to seriously entertain any claim to logicial 
necessity there must also be a demonstration (i.e. accompanying 
proof). Piaget has never advanced one : as Gruber and Voneche 
put it
*[ J the demonstration that this sequence is logically 
necessary remains to be done*.
(Gruber and Voneche, 1980, p.xxiv)
Piaget's defence for his non-demonstration of logical necessity 
would appear to start with a distinction he has often claimed to 
exist between his meaning of a structure and its formalisation:
e.g. 'The discovery of structure may, either immediately 
or at a much later stage, give rise to 
formalisation. Such formalisation is, however, 
always the creature of the theoretician, whereas 
structure itself exists apart from him'. .
(Piaget, 1971b; p.5 : my emphasis.)
In the book from which this last quotation was taken, Piaget later 
elaborates both this distinction and defence in a section entitled 
'The Limits of Formalization':
'In 1931 Kurt Godel made a discovery which created a 
tremendous stir, because it undermined the then prevailing 
formalism, according to which mathematics was reducible to 
logic and logic could be exhaustively formalized. Godel 
established definitively that the formalist program cannot 
be executed. In the first place, he showed that no 
consistent formal system sufficiently "rich" to contain
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elementary arithmetic (for example, the system of Russell 
and Whitehead's Principia Mathematics), can, by its own 
principles of reasoning (a fortiori, by those of the 
relatively "weaker" systems) demonstrate its own 
consistency; second, that any such system allows for the 
generation of propositions which are "formally 
undecideable," or, to use yet another technical 
expression, that any logical system that might appear 
capable of serving as foundation for mathematics is 
"essentially incomplete." Though it was later discovered, 
by Gentzen, that consistency proofs of elementary 
arithmetic can be furnished by employing principles of 
reasoning "stronger" than those used within arithmetic, 
the consistency of these stronger rules of inference - ' 
roughly, those of Cantor's trattsfinite arithmetic - can 
only be demonstrated by appealing to a logical theory of 
yet a higher rank. In other words, since Godel we know 
that the axiomatic method has certain inherent 
limitations, though these limits can be "shifted" by 
shifting systems.
[ ] From Godel*s conclusions there follow certain 
important insights as to the limits of formalization in 
general; in particular, it has been possible to show that 
there are, in addition to formalized levels of knowledge, 
distinct "semi-formal" or "semi-intuitive" levels, which 
wait their turn, so to say, for formalization. The limits 
of formalization are not laid down once and for all, like 
the walls of China, but, instead, are "moveable" or 
"vicarious."*
(Piaget, 1971b, p.32-3; original emphasis)
Piaget apparently considers his invocation of Godel's Incompleteness 
Theorem to constitute some kind of justification for his incomplete 
formalisation of stages, i.e. his non-demonstration of logical 
necessity. I see a number of problems with this.
First of all, Godel devised his theorem for application to what 
might be called "standard" forms of propositional logic, where 
"standard" forms is understood for present purposes to mean that the 
axiom systems employ only general propositions, i.e. 'universal 
statements'. (The title of Godel's famous 1931 paper was *0n 
Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and 
Related Systems' - my emphasis).
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Now Piaget's idiosyncratic brand of logic, his 'psycho-logic' 
differs from "standard" forms of propositional logic in that, for 
example, it includes propositional functions (i.e., specific 
instances). Psycho-logic is thus an empirical form of logic and, as 
such, exhibits a fundamental qualitative difference from the 
"standard" forms to which Godel devised his theorem to apply.
Whether or not Godel's Theorem can be applied to psycho-logic is a 
matter which Piaget neglects to consider - he simply assumes that 
psycho-logic is a 'related system*•
I conclude that until a case for this can be made, Piaget's appeal 
to Godel*s Theorem must be regarded as illegitimate, i.e., it 
provides no justification whatsoever for Piaget's incomplete 
formalisation of stages. (For reasons that I shall not enter into 
here (but see section 3.4.2., below), I happen to think Piaget was 
quite right to eschew "standard" forms of propositional logic as a 
language for formalising human cognition. Unfortunately, the 
arguments that I advance below suggest that psycho-logic is even 
more inadequate for this purpose).
Let us now assume that Godel's Theorem does have application to 
psycho-logic as Piaget claims.
This lands Piaget in even greater trouble.
To demonstrate my contention, I shall assume that Piaget's 
description, below, of some Godelian consequences for "standard" 
propositional logics applies equally well to psycho-logic:
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'[ ] a logical system, through a closed whole with respect 
to the theorems it demonstrates, is nevertheless only a 
relative whole : it remains open at the top with respect 
to those theorems which it does not demonstrate . •*, and, 
since the primative conceptions have all sorts of implicit 
elements, the system is open at the bottom as well.’
(Piaget, 1971b; p.30)
The situation can be analogously compared to a hyperboloid which is 
open at both ends. Godel's Theorem rules out the possibility of an 
Exhaustive formalisation*, a comprehensive demonstration (the open 
ends). Piaget seems to contend, however, that someone analogous to 
Gentzen, to whom he referred in the penultimate quotation, might yet 
come along and provide a "limited" demonstration, i.e., a 
demonstration of logical necessity between at least some structures 
(the hyperboloid). Presently unformalized (and possibly 
unformalizable) precursor operations*, e.g. sucking, eye movements, 
grasping, and which are themselves probably preceded by some kind of 
"neuronal wiring", are at the bottom of the hyperboloid whilst 
presently formalized 'formal operations* are anticipated to be 
succeeded by "meta-formal operations" (cf. e.g. Arlin's, 1975, 
postulated fifth developmental stage - briefly discussed in Gilbert 
and Swift, 1985, p.688 : included in Appendix 1). My analogy may be 
represented by means of the following diagram:
Meta-formal operations
Areas where 
logical necessity
has yet to be i Demonstrated logical
demonstrated r necessity of operations
Precursor operations
Figure 3.3. Diagram Showing Areas of Demonstrated and
tin-D emonstrated Logical Necessity Within Piaget's 
Theory.
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Because of this possiblity we are apparently justified to go on 
claiming logical necessity. So be it. Now, what would happen to 
Piaget's claimed autonomy of the individual person in their act of 
(re) creating the next, 'stronger', structure? The answer is that 
it would disappear completely. Personal, individuated 
purposefulness of construction and learning would be denied a role: 
it would be sacrificed on the altar of Piaget's 'logical 
determinism* (Gruber and Voneche's, 1977, p. xxxvii, apt descriptor 
of the central characteristic they see in Piaget's brand of 
constructivism).
Wilden, a systems theorist, concludes his own trenchant criticism of 
Piaget's use of Godel's Theorem thus:
'Godel's Proof is a double bind, and so is the square root 
of minus one. We are consequently led to remark that 
Piaget - like all of those outside the poetry of 
mathematics who use 'mathematics' as a tool to avoid 
having to think about what they are actually doing — does 
not understand that most, if not all, of the paradoxes of 
mathematics are the result of making the discourse of 
mathematics into a closed system BY EXCLUDING THE 
MATHEMATICIAN.
It Is the mathematician (not the theory) who sees that the 
Godelian sentence is 'true*, and inconsistent with the 
axioms that produced it. But Piaget makes this into a 
property of the mathematical structure, not of the 
relation between the mathematician and his mathematics, 
ignoring once again his own model of the interaction 
between organism and environment.'
(Wilde„n, 1980, p.347 : my emphasis. I have combined a 
footnote with the main text).
Now is perhaps the time to recall that Piaget proposes equilibration 
to be his mechanism of construction, his process of learning. But 
what follows from arguments such as those recently discussed is that 
Piaget's claim for logical necessity is incompatible with 
equilibration : accommodation, one half of the equilibration
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process, is redundant (this also effectively undermines any claim 
that Genetic-Epistemology is a realist theory of knowledge). Brown 
and Desforges comment:
'[Piaget's] account of learning is so circumscribed as to 
define it out of a role in transition'
(Brown and Desforges, 1979, p.161)
Piaget's notion of equilibration is both vague (see e.g. Bruner's 
196S, criticisms) and limited : it contributes little to our 
understanding of transitions within stages and nothing to our 
understanding of transitions between stages. As Boden (1979) 
concludes:
'[ ] equilibration within a stage must be radically 
different from equilibration between stages, which latter 
should perhaps not be described in terms of equilibration 
at all.'
(Boden, 1979, p.139 : my emphasis)
So how does Piaget avoid drawing the same conclusion as Fodor when,
for example, he elsewhere claims that;
'[ ] all learning presupposes a logic, and .. the learning 
of logical structures is itself based on logical or 
preliminary pre-logical structures, and this is an 
endless regress'
(Piaget, 1971a; p.55 : my emphasis)
The following, not un-typical, quotation represents the nub of his 
reply to Fodor:
*[ ] the previous structure already contained something of 
the subsequent one, containing it not as a structure, but 
as a possibility. What is this possibility; what is the 
set of all possibilities? I believe that the set of all 
possibilities is as antinomic a notion as the set of all 
sets. I believe that the "possible” is a process that 
progressively enriches itself : weak structure opens up 
only a few possiblities : a stronger structure opens up a 
large number of possibilities.*
(Piaget, in P-P; p.150 : original emphasis).
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This is surely a case of obscurum per obscurius? Piaget's notion of 
what goes on in the 'levels of preparation' seems decidedly 
"semi-intuitive". As a non-Piagetian, and as a constructivist, I 
naturally welcome the individual being allowed this rare spell of 
freedom from the structuralist yoke. But this is a fatal concession 
for Piaget because he fails to present anything like a half-way 
decent theory at the very point most needed to sustain a claim to 
revolutionary-activism, viz., transition. The Piagetian individual 
is left stranded up a creek without a paddle. Piaget's allusions to 
"containment as a possibility" explain nothing : the process(es) of 
transition remain a complete mystery. We might just as well claim 
that we effect transition by falling on our heads! Piaget 
ultimately faces the ancient learning paradox of Plato:
'[ ] a man cannot try to discover either what he knows or 
what he does not know [ ]. He would not seek what he 
knows, for since he knows it there is no need for the 
inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he 
does not even know what he is to look for.'
(Plato, Meno 80E, Eng. trans. Guthrie, 1980, p.128-9)
In another sense, however, Piaget's liberal sounding talk of 
'possibility' is downright disingenuous : he protests far too much. 
This is because whatever possibilities an individual may explore in 
the mysterious 'levels of preparation', Piaget's joint commitment to 
universality and necessity, which receives partial and formal 
expression in his doctrine of logical necessity, dictates that such 
an individual must always end up re-creating the next, higher, 
structure as currently defined by Piaget(ians). Such logically 
deterministic "re-constructivism" is incompatible with 
revolutionary-activism; it is, however, of the essence of 
conservative-activism. Only when the individual has achieved formal 
operations can we take Piaget's liberal sounding remarks on 
'possibility' seriously. But why should we wait until then?
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A survey of the history of structuralism corroborates the conjecture 
that such doctrines have always been outsmarted by the collective, 
but individualated, Ingenuity of that set of persons to which they 
have each been applied. Sooner or later, structuralist doctrines 
have to start fighting rear-guard actions. Genetic Episteraology is 
no exception, as the following example shall demonstrate.
Piaget was fond of quoting a little boy, aged 5 years 9 months, who 
when questioned about his apparent ability to conserve number 
replied:
'Once you know, you know for always'
(Piaget, 1964, p.184)
This piece of evidence fits in perfectly with Piaget's structuralist 
meta-theory and its formalisation : it is exactly the sort of 
empirical consequence one would expect from it, regardless of 
whether a "subject" is helpful enough to verbalise it in this 
straightforward way.
It was therefore unfortunate for Piaget and his colleagues that a 
substantial minority of their "subjects" did not "perform" quite so 
well. With a given task, individuals knew It on this occasion but 
not on that; or, with different tasks, but each purporting to 
identify the same structure, they always seemed to know it in this 
task but never in that.
This minority of "subjects" proved sufficiently recalcitrant that 
their responses had eventually to be recognised as being due to more 
than local insensitivities of the investigative methods. To avoid 
universality and necessity slipping through his fingers, Piaget 
introduced his "theory" of decalages way back in the raid 1950's.
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Gruber and Voneche comment that Piaget tried to turn his "theory" of 
decalages to good account by using it
1[ ] as one explanatory principle for development : the 
very co-existence of the more highly developed and less 
highly developed structures generates disequilibrium or 
conflict that leads to further growth.'
(Gruber and Voneche, 1980, p.xxv)
But does it explain anything? Decalage merely brings into sharper 
focus the antagonism, which I have earlier discussed, between 
Piaget's demand for logical necessity and his notion of 
equilibration - to which latter decalage can be compared by analogy 
or extension. Co-existence of structures of different 'strengths' 
surely makes a nonsense of Piaget's formalisation of his 
structuralist metaphysic which requires a radical reconstruction of 
structures, i.e. a comprehensive re-construction of structures 
between 'levels of final equilibrium'? No amount of theoretical 
prevarication can save Piaget's "theory" of decalages from being 
identified as his most blatant ad hoc hypothesis!a .
It is tempting for me now to argue that Piaget's "theory" of 
decalages precludes the possibility of demonstrating logical 
necessity due to having swapped the logical relationship of 
'inclusion' for 'overlap'. This, however, cannot be done 
straightforwardly because Piaget does not appropriate "standard" 
propositional logic straightforwardly, a fact to which I alluded 
earlier. I contend, however, that the differences between 
psycho-logic and "standard" propositional logic only delay the 
criticisms I have already discussed and, moreover, introduce new 
ones as well. I shall demonstrate this through consideration of the 
work of Robert Ennis, an author who acknowledges a debt to the 
pioneering formal criticisms of Piaget made by Parsons (1960).
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In a paper entitled 'Children's Ability to Handle Piaget's 
Propositional Logic' (ray emphasis), Ennis (1975) argues compellingly 
that, amongst other things, psycho-logic is both seriously flawed 
and normative.
Whilst Ennis' arguments are exemplary in their clarity, they tend to 
be long and technical. With respect to the flaws that he sees in 
psycho-logic I do not feel personally competent to summarise his 
arguments without undue risk of distorting them. I shall therefore 
summarise only certain of his conclusions to such arguments.
Ennis argues that, on one interpretation - an interpretation which 
he goes to considerable lengths to justify, there are many paradoxes 
and other odd, undesirable, results in psycho-logic. He argues, for 
example, that Piaget's brand of propositional logic both prohibits 
certain inferences one is entitled to make and endorses certain 
others which one is not entitled to make (entitled on grounds of 
both commonsense and "standard" propositional logic). I shall 
consider one example of the latter that Ennis gives.
Ennis argues that Piaget's formula for implication presupposes an 
isomorphism between observed and possible events, a presupposition 
which allows one to "logically" affirm such statements as
*... 'If X is a United States president, then X. is male 
(for every X)•1 «••'
(Ennis, 1975; p.21 : original emphasis).
He concludes that
*[ ] the formula for implication ("p.q. v p.q. v p.q., 
and no cases of p.q.") appears to be an inductive guide 
for going from data to generalizations. It appears to be 
a formula for induction, yet to satisfy the formula one
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must already have performed the crucial induction [viz., 
one must already have judged, by means unspecified, that 
the examined cases are typical].*
(Ennis, 1975; p.22 : my emphasis).
V  - ' .
I point out that inductive logic is one defining characteristic of
Classical-Empiricism - which latter Lakatos regards as the most
influential school of passivist theories of knowledge (as we have
seen, section 3.2., above). Inductive logic is to be deplored less
for its formal inadequacies than for its empirically demonstrated
facility as mechanism by which persons become victims of their
biographies. This is especially likely when inductive logic is
enshrined in a system of thought purporting to be an epistemology.
I shall now turn to Ennis* contention that psycho-logic is
normative or, at least, has a normative dimension.
Ennis begins by citing evidence to suggest that Piaget is widely 
considered to be attempting to offer a descriptive rather than a
normative system of logic where the latter is understood to be *.. a
way of judging the validity of reasoning' (Ennis, 1975; p.37).
Against the descriptive interpretation, however, Ennis quotes many 
passages from Piaget's work which suggest a normative application. 
Some relevant words and phrases included within the passages Ennis 
quotes from are:
*.. inadequate for the solution of the problem we posed ..'
'.. stage III subjects struggle against the temptation to 
conclude too quickly from ...*, '(Stage III B subjects) 
know when they ... that it may be included in ...'
(Ennis, 1975; p.38 : Ennis* emphasis)
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Ennis goes on to argue that this normative dimension renders the 
flaws he and others have found in psycho-logic even more 
problematic. I cannot agree too strongly on this point.
Unfortunately, this normative use of psycho-logic by Piaget amounts 
to his equating his metaphysical notion of a structure with his 
formalisation of it : far from being *a creature of the 
theoretician* (Piaget quoted above), Piaget has "literalised" his 
formalisation. Although Piaget may plausibly be interpreted to have 
mooted his psycho-logic and theory of stages as 'architectonic', in 
Kant's sense, he does not appear to have heeded Kant's caution that 
'in assuming [that the architectonic] has a supreme ground, we do so 
solely in order to think its universality more determinately* (Kant, 
quoted in section 3.3., above). The influence of this practice 
"feeds forward", as well as "feeds backward", on both the design of 
elicitation methods and the interpretation of responses. This 
commitment to "universal necessity" ultimately denies, or 
constrains, the reflexivity of Genetic-Epistemology; it is 
conservative-activist because its 'activism* is always within limits 
pre-scribed.
I believe that these last criticisms introduce a new charge which 
can be brought against Piaget in the course of demonstrating his 
conservative-activism, viz., Piaget's historicism.
The term 'historicism' has been used to designate a variety of 
methodological views relating to history and society (Flew, 1979; 
p.138) and it is not clear which sense(s) Piaget intended when he 
claimed that '[ ] structuralism tackle[s] historicism, [ ]' (Piaget, 
1971b; p.4)
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Notwithstanding such possible ambiguities, I shall argue that, on 
the contrary, Piaget's structuralist-underwritten theory can itself 
be construed as historicist, in Popper's (1979, 1980) sense of the 
term, and that historicist doctrines can support only 
conservative-activist theories of knowledge.
Popper (1980) defines the central tenet of historicism,thus:
'the doctrine that history is controlled by specific 
historical or evolutionary laws whose discovery would 
enable us to prophesy the destiny of man.*
I contend that historicism is a species of structuralism. The 
doctrines of the former may be delineated within the latter by 
virtue of their characteristic means of formulating "structures", 
viz., by appeal to 'theoretical history* (Popper, 1979; p.39), as I 
shall now discuss.
For Popper, the historicist's method is informed by an 
anti-nominalistic theory that he calls 'essentialism' (Popper, 1979; 
p.27). Popper elaborates his meaning of this term :
'Essentialists deny that we first collect a group of single 
things and then label them 'white'; rather, they say, we 
call each single white thing 'white* on account of a 
certain intrinsic property that it shares with other white 
things, namely 'whiteness*. This property, denoted by the 
universal term, is regarded as an object which deserves 
investigation just as much as the individual things 
themselves ... *
(Popper, 1979 ; p.27-8)
The essentialist characteristically proceeds by asking "What 
is ... ?" questions, e.g. "What is force?", in the belief that it 
is only by answering such questions that the inquirer shall 
penetrate to the 'real' or 'essential* meaning of such terms and 
thereby the real or true nature of the essences denoted by them.
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Popper calls those who use this approach 'methodological 
essentiallsts' (1979; p.28). (N.B. mere use of "what is ..."
formulations is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
methodological essentialism).
The methodological essentialist accepts the Heraclitean argument 
that rational description cannot be applied to things in flux. This
has the consequence that knowledge presupposes something that does
not change, viz., an 'essence*. For the essentialist
'History, i.e. the description of change, and essence, 
i.e. that which remains unchanged during change, appear • • 
as correlative concepts.'
(Popper, 1979  ^p.33:original emphasis).
This however, is not the whole story for as Popper goes on to say
'But this correlation has yet another side : in a Certain 
sense, an essence also presupposes change, and thereby 
history. For if that principle of a thing which remains 
identical or unchanged when the thing changes is its 
essence (or idea, or form, or nature, or substance), then 
the changes which the thing undergoes bring to light 
different sides or aspects of possibilities of the thing 
and therefore of its essence. The essence, accordingly, 
can be interpreted as the sum or source of the 
potentialies inherent in the thing, and the changes (or
movements) can be interpreted as the realization or 
actualization of the hidden potentialities of its essence 
... it follows that a thing, i.e. its unchanging essence, 
can be known only through its changes ..... (for example) 
the essence of a man - his personality - can only be known 
as it unfolds itself in his biography. Applying this 
principle to sociology we are led to the conclusion that 
the essence or the real character, of a social group can 
reveal itself, and be known, only through its history
  the historicist claims that sociology is theoretical
history.*
(Popper, 1979; p.33-39 : original emphasis).
I hope that the reader has themself already gleaned from my rather 
lengthy exposition, above, something of the historicist character 
that I contend Genetic Episteraology to have. I wish, however, to 
argue for, and to elaborate, three main historicist aspects of 
Piaget's theory.
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Firstly, I accuse strict-Piagetians of ’methodological 
essentialism*, viz., I contend that when young persons articulate 
their views, strict-Piagetians ask "What is the structure at work 
here?" rather than, e.g., "Why do you believe this?" or "How is 
this view of use to you?" Of course, I do not deny that strict- 
Piagetians employ questions of the latter sort; what I am claiming, 
however, is that it is the first question that they are really 
asking and are interested in answering. As Gilbert and Swift put
'On re-reading the research literature on the [Piagetian 
School], which makes up a considerable proportion of 
published educational research, it is apparent that 
individuals* alternative conceptions have been 
sub-ordinated to their ascribed (Piagetian) stage of 
intellectual development : it is the stage level of 
intellectual development of individuals and populations 
which have been the primary focus of attention. Put 
another way, alternative-conceptions appear to have been 
used "diagnostically" - as merely a means of identifying 
or clarifying individuals' stage level of intellectual, 
development. The existence of alternative-conceptions 
have often served only to demonstrate "stage 
(un)readiness" for specific concept learning*
(Gilbert and Swift, 1985, p.693 : original emphasis)
These are issues which I shall elaborate upon later in this 
sub-section and in Chapter 5. The point I hope to have made 
however, is that Piagetian structures function as essences which 
inform the strict-Piagetian's aims and tactics in interactions with 
young persons.
Secondly, I contend that Piaget's interpretation* and subsequent 
use, of the history of mathematics represents a commitment to 
'theoretical history*.
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Piaget's structuralistic interpretation of the history of 
mathematics constitutes one of the two, central, "analogies" that 
Piaget uses to assist him develop and communicate his theory (the 
other being epigenesis, discussed later):
'What I have tried to do ... is to show that cognitive 
development in the child that is to say, the 
construction of successive structures - is analogous to 
what is found in history with the formation of 
mathematics, which is always a generalization from a 
weaker structure leading to a stronger structure, of which 
the first becomes a substructure, a subset ...'
(Piaget, in P-P.; p.150 : my emphasis)]^
Now, were Piaget actually to use the history of mathematics 
analogically, or else to appeal to it as a source of phenomena to 
which his epistemology might legitimately be asked to apply (as 
e.g. Kuhn, 1970, p.9, bade us do with history of science), then my 
charge of historicism could not t*e made. But he does not.
My case hinges on Ennis* demonstration that there is a normative 
dimension to Piaget's theory and that this implies that Piaget 
equates his notion of structure with his formalisation of it, 
discussed earlier. This inference is further strengthened by 
reference to some direct statements that Piaget has made and which 
are especially pertinent to my present claim :
e.g. '[ ] a more precise analysis of the "reading off" of 
experience and of the mechanisms of learning as a 
function of experience teaches us that this "reading 
off" is always a function of a logico-mathematical 
framework , which plays a structuring role and not one 
of simple formulation, [ ] *
(Piaget, 1971a; p.55 : my emphasis).
and
*[ ] within a few years he [the child] spontaneously 
reconstructs operations and logic structures of a
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logico-mathematical nature, without which he would 
understand nothing of what he will be taught in
school. Thus [sic ], after a lengthy pre-operative 
period during which he still lacks these cognitive 
instruments, he reinvents for himself, around his 
seventh year, the concepts of reversibility,
[etc] - in other words, all the foundations of 
logic and mathematics.1
(Piaget, in P-P.; p. 26 : my emphasis).
"Spontaneous reinvention of all the foundations of mathematics" has 
become the criterion for developmental success. Thus Piaget's 
appeal to the history of mathematics is not analogical at all, it is 
historicist.
I mention in passing that the adequacy of Piaget's structuralist 
interpretation of the history of mathematics has not gone 
unchallenged. In brief, Piaget has let his structuralist admiration 
of mathematics run away with him: he has mistaken it for the real 
thing. As Lakatos points out (and curriculum planners, particularly 
science curriculum planners, please note):
'Unfortunately there is only one single word in most 
languages to denote history^ (the set of historical 
events) and history2 (a set of historical propositions).
Any history is a theory and value-laden reconstruction of 
history]/
(Lakatos, 1974, p.218n.)
In remarks clearly directed at Piaget's history2 of mathematics, 
Boden (1979) cautions that
*[ ], Piaget's many suggestive comparisons between 
children's thinking and the history of physics and 
mathematics are inadequate in various ways. For instance, 
he ignores the influence of the social context in raising 
questions within these disciplines, and also 
misunderstands the nature and historical importance of 
mathematical proof.*
(Boden, 1979, p.100 : original emphasis).
- 3.79 -
I shall now argue for my view that historicist doctrines can only 
support conservative-activist theories of knowledge since this needs 
to be done and shall help clarify my later arguments for a third 
historicist aspect to Piaget's theory*
At first glance, historicist doctrines might appear to be 
revolutionary-activist. Such doctrines are, after all, committed to 
the notion of change and are not incompatible with political 
revolution. Moreover, historicist doctrines may 'have very marked 
tendencies toward activism' (Popper, 1979; p.49). All this 
notwithstanding, historicist doctrines can, at most, allow a 
conservative-activist theory of knowledge.
The conservative-activism of historicist doctrines is because the 
historicist individual is condemned forever to fulfill the promise 
(or threat) of the past. To explain, whilst historicism allows that 
there is, indeed must be, change, all change can be derived from 
historical laws. The historicist individual is not born with their 
"basic expectations", they are* however, born into an historical 
situation, a social context. This amounts to the same thing for 
whils t
'[Historicism] does not teach that nothing can be brought 
about; it ... predicts that neither your dreams nor what 
your reason constructs will ever be brought about 
according to plan [original emphasis]. Only such plans as 
fit in with the main current of history can be effective.'
(Popper, 1979; p.49 : my emphasis).
The 'main current of history* is, of course, that inexorable trend 
held to have been "discovered", but which has really been proposed, 
by the historicist. Historicist doctrines are thus 
conservative-activis t.
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With the above points in mind, I can now argue for my third 
historicist aspect of Piaget's theory, an aspect which has 
particular relevance for strict-Piagetian educationalists. It is 
this :
Popper identifies what he calls a 'moral law* (p.35) exhorted by 
disciples of historicist doctrines, viz., 'Help to bring about the 
inevitable!* (Popper, 1978, p.35 : original emphasis).
I suggest that something very like this slogan is taken as an 
implicit mandate by strict-Piagetians, viz., Lf the individual 
continues to develop their intellect, then this development will be 
according to the historical laws - the theoretical history - of 
Genetic Epistemology. Hence the many studies on 'cognitive 
acceleration' (or "helping to bring about the inevitable"). Whilst 
such studies often beg the question, viz., the existence of 
structures, they are nevertheless to be applauded for they do at 
least help to ameliorate the pre-emptive and restrictive aspects of 
the problem strict-Piagetians have created for themselves (and their 
"subjects"), viz., the individual recapitulation of the social 
phenomenon of history of mathematics.
I would now like to summarise my criticisms of Piaget's logical 
meta-theory.
Piaget's logic has defied understanding by many logicians and 
certain amongst them have argued that it is faulty. There is every 
reason to believe that such flaws as have been identified in 
Piaget's logic will be perennial. Those who do claim to understand
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Piaget's logic have yet to communicate their understanding in a 
generally understood and accepted way.
Now Piaget has claimed that
'.. there is a kind of intellectual dishonesty in making 
assertions in a domain concerned with facts, without a 
publicly verifiable method of testing, and in formal 
domains without a logistic one .. * ’ ~ "" •
(Piaget, 1971a, p.12 : my emphasis).
Yet "untestability" in either domain is the most common complaint 
amongst Piaget’s critics (for further arguments and a catalogue of 
references, see, e.g. Brown and Desforges, 1978).
The opaque and incoherent conflation of empiricism and logicism that 
is psycho-logic renders Piaget guilty of both kinds of intellectual 
dishonesty : psycho-logic encourages a sort of "argumentative 
opportunism" in which Piaget (illegitimately) tries to have it both 
ways, viz., "standard" logical criticism is often stalled by appeals 
to the differences between psycho-logic and "standard" logic or to 
the empirical component, yet he often uses "standard" logic to 
further his case; empirical criticism is often diverted by invoking 
the logical part, yet he often cites empirical evidence to further 
his case.
In the remainder of this sub-section I shall make explicit contrasts 
with PC^P by briefly examining the different, principal, 
consequences each approach has for exploring the ideational words 
of individual persons.
One fundamental difference between the PCP and Genetic Epistemology 
concerns the nature of that which is each their principal concern,
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viz., PCP admits the "whole person" or 'psychological subject':
'Our first consideration is the individual person rather 
than any part of the person, any group of persons, or any 
particular process manifested in the person's behaviour.'
(Kelly, 1955; p.47 : my emphasis)
This notion contrasts with strict-Piagetians who not only believe
that a persons' mental activities can be divided into 'cognitive*
and 'affective* categories and studied separately but also that the
*
cognitive category can be studied transindividually (cf. the 
epistemic subject, p. 57-8, above).
Kelly was emphatic that cognition and affect should not be separated 
within PCP:
'Particularly I hope that no one will think I am talking 
about "cognition", as contrasted with "affect". As a 
matter of fact, I can associate nothing with either of 
those terras that would justify treating it as a category 
rather than a dimension of appraisal - and one of doubtful 
utility at that'.
(Kelly, 1969 :p.9)16
This aspect of the Personal Constructivists' approach derives 
ultimately from their commitment to reflexivity, for they, 
recognising that their own experience of attempts to construe the 
world represents an 'active, creative, rational, emotional and 
pragmatic affair * (Pope, 1981; p.2), do not then pre-empt which 
experimental modalities or qualities shall be of pertinence to the 
persons whose constructive lives they investigate. As Kelly put it
*[ ] "hardening of the categories" [!], a common affliction 
amongst scientists, usually marks the end of the creative 
phase of a distinguished career.*
(Kelly, 1969, p.294)
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Bannister has commented upon the reflexivity of PCP:
'Kelly proposed, as a primary requirement for any 
psychological theory, that it be reflexive - that is to 
say that the theory account, among other things, for its 
own construction, since its construction is a 
psychological act. This demand for reflexivity has to be 
met at many levels. It needs to be met by ensuring that 
we do not use one psychological language and set of 
assumptions in talking about our "subjects" and a 
different language and set of assumptions in talking about 
ourselves, "the scientists". Further, it requires us to 
regard our personal experience not as subjective, 
anecdotal nonsense, inadmissable in scientific discourse, 
but as a source of argument and a way of exploring the 
meaningfulness of the generalisations which we make. We 
ought not to proclaim publicly that which has no personal 
meaning for us.*
(Bannister, 1979, p.27-8)
Now, I hope that my earlier discussion (section 3.4.) has 
demonstrated that there is nothing in the formal content of PCP 
which would deny reflexivity - even to the "level" of 
(M)ethodological-pluralism! Strict Piagetians, by contrast, can 
extend, at most, only a constrained or "conservative" brand of 
reflexivity due to their commitment to 'universal necessity' 
(objectivism). To explain what I mean by this, I cite some remarks 
by Fodor in which he provides a most useful "Kantian perspective" of 
Piaget1s theory:
'It seems to me that the following is at least one way of 
formulating the Piagetian view: Suppose you are Kant and 
are interested in writing the "First Critique," that is, 
you are interested in characterizing the computational 
capacities of the organism in terms of some very general 
constraints on the character of the concepts available to 
it. One way of reading the Piagetian position is to say 
that if you did that for several different time slices of 
the organism (instead of just considering the adult), what 
you would get is a fundamentally different galaxy of 
constraints on the organism's concepts.' (Foda^  t* (j-V?p.l47)
I believe that the character of Fodor*s 'fundamentally different
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galaxy of constraints’ may be further illuminated by reference to 
Bolton’s (1977) application of R.G. Collingwood's definition of 
’philosophical concepts':
*[ ], what characterises philosophical concepts is that 
differences of degree exist in combination with 
differences of kind in what Collingwood calls "a scale of 
forms". In a scale of forms there is both a difference in 
kind between the various forms which embody the essential 
element in the concept and a difference in the degree to 
which these forms embody it. The concept of intelligence 
viewed in a Piagetian perspective constitutes a scale of 
forms since intelligence is seen as existing at different 
levels which differ both in degree and in kind : thus, the 
concrete level represents a higher form of intelligence 
than the pre-operational level but it also differs in 
kind, being qualitatively different'.
(Bolton, 1977, p.39 : my emphasis)
By construing intelligence as a scale of forms, strict-Piagetians 
propose different psychologies (construction characteristics) for 
persons who have not demonstrated their "equivalence", i.e. formal 
operational status. This contrasts with Personal Constructivists 
who do not propose universal differences in kind between 
psychological processes of construction (the "construction 
characteristic" is held to be the same for all persons), 
notwithstanding possible differences in degree. This latter sort of 
difference, however, does not allow a normative reductionism for 
whilst Personal Constructivists accept the notion of difference 
between construction systems, they do not accept the notion of 
superiority of one construction system relative to another (i.e. 
on an inter-personal comparison), as we have seen (section 3.4.).
For the Personal Constructivist, the utility of another person's 
construct system is judged primarily in terms of the congruency
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between that person's perceptions and their personal, and 
voiitionally pre-established, reference value(s) or 
"test-criteria". As Kelly put it:
'If we reach an understanding of how a person behaves, we 
discover it in the manner in which he represents his 
circumstances to himself.*
(Kelly, 1955, p.16)
This has the methodological corollary that
'I am very sceptical of any piece of human research in 
which the subject's questions and contributions have not 
been elicited or have been ignored in the final analysis 
of results.*
(Kelly, 1969; p.132: my emphasis)
Personal Constructivists, then, strive not to make unidirectional 
inferences about the reasoning processes of other persons : they 
desire only negotiated inferences. In this way the meta-theory of 
PCP is not imposed on investigated persons but, rather, explored 
with them. Persons with and about whom PCP research is concerned 
are not referred to as "subjects" (a term which might just as well 
be "object" for it is usually understood in the senses of "persons 
having been subjected to" or "persons to be subjected to"...) but, 
rather, simply as "persons" (or, perhaps, "collaboratees" : see 
Chapter 5).
The strict-Piagetian has the full sanction of their doctrine to 
initially consider their "subject" as "guilty of a lower 
intellectual stage until proved innocent". Only when a "subject" 
has shown themself to be capable of formal operations are their 
questions and contributions able to be taken as seriously as 
strict-Piagetians take those of themselves : full accreditation in
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the research enterprise for a strict-Piagetian "subject" requires 
full operational competence to have been demonstrated as a prior and 
necessary condition- But it is my impression that it is precisely 
at this point that strict-Piagetians abandon their "subjects" in 
favour of discussion amongst themselves- At no level of 
intellectual development are their "subjects1" questions and 
contributions considered in the final.analysis of results-
In his main paper on stages, Piaget cautions
* [ ], if we are speaking of stages, the order of succession 
of behaviours must be considered as constant, that is to 
say, a character will not appear before another in a 
certain number of subjects and after another in another 
group of subjects- Where we find such variations, the 
characters in question are not useable in establishing 
stages-V
(Piaget, 1955; in G-V. p.81f> : my emphasis).
btttiQ
This amounts to £  a rationale for data-dumping.
Now it is possible that Piaget*s postulated mental structures do
indeed exist and that their formalisation only~has application^to
the tasks he orginally set. This in itself would be an interesting
finding worth pursuing, and, as such, I would have no objection to
it, i.e. even if it involved data-dumping (I am grateful to
Professor Jack Easley, personal communication, for pointing out this
possiblity to me - it informs my acceptance of "ivory tower
Piagetianism", mentioned earlier). There is, however, an enormous
research effort devoted to showing that Piaget's formalised
structures have predictive validity across a very much wider range
of tasks. Where there is the slightest suggestion made that such
become.
research might have educational import I very worried that many
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idiosyncratic 'behaviours' by "subjects" get regarded as 'extraneous 
elements' (cf Piaget quotation, p. 53 above) and ignored. When this 
occurs, and I believe that it occurs on a massive scale in the work 
of 'Piagetian technologists* and whose efforts constitute the bulk 
of "Piagetian" research, then I regard any inferences made with 
respect to education as intrinsically unsound. Educational 
inferences made in strict accordance with Piaget's theory risk the 
"baby" being thrown out with the "bathwater"!x7
In PCP there is no "necessity" to be had outside the individual 
person's personal, and possibly idiosyncratic, purposes and 
anticipations (though there is good reason to believe that there is 
widespread commonality of such purposes and anticipations amongst 
persons). It is these that are of prime interest and importance to 
PCP and their investigation will not optimally be achieved, and may 
be undermined completely, if persons are approached through a 'scale 
of forms'. In PCP research there is no question of "testing a whole 
class at a time" or, indeed, of "testing" an individual person. As 
Kelly points out
'It is of course, possible to restate many of the 
achievements of man in terms of the logic we have so far 
formalised. But this does not tell us much about how the 
achievements came about. Nor does it help at all in 
finding how to disengage ourselves from the logic by which 
these achievements are presently sustained so we can go on 
to greater ones.*
(Kelly, 1969, p.114 : my emphasis)
I suggest that "cognitive diagnosis" of students and curricula 
according to the canons of "cognitive health" implicit in Genetic 
Episteraology tell us very little that can be of educational use 
because persons* individuated purposes and anticipations are
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ignored. Shayer and Adey*s (1981) *CAT* (fCurriculum Analysis 
Taxonomy1), for example, has a peculiarly Carrollian quality : there 
is a "grin” (operational competence as judged by Piaget*s 
formalism), but no "body" (the individuated purposes and
characteristics of the child)ig. A comment by Kelly, made with
6 ■ ■
reference to the Law of Excluded Middle in particular (q.v. section 
3.4.2., below), and to "logicism" in general, may also be pertinent 
here:
1[ ] we find a failure to take into account a psychological 
fact, the fact that human thought is essentially 
constructive in nature and that even the thinking of 
logicians and mathematicians is no exception.1
(Kelly, 1969, p.71 : my emphasis).
The Personal Constructivist considers persons* reasoning to be 
highly context related. They exclude neither themselves nor 
teachers from their investigations (by contrast with 
strict-Piagetians who do).
Genetic Epistemology ultimately fails both formally and empirically 
- like all structuralist systems, so far proposed, it is struggling 
to survive as Per8on*s audacities multiply. But it also fails in 
the far more important humanistic sense of "diluting" the individual 
person in the "universal" to the point of losing them altogether 
(cf. Cesaire quotation at the beginning of this chapter)19• In 
response to this, however, it might be argued that Kelly*s emphasis 
on the uniqueness of the individual person loses them through 
"fragmentation in the particular". That this does not happen within 
PCP is something that I shall argue in later chapters.
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3.4.2. Relevant Contrast (2): Ob.iectivist Theories of Knowledge are
'Conservative-Activist' (e.g. Popper).
In this sub-section I shall argue against Popper in a manner analogous to 
that which I have with Piaget, viz. Popper's theory, qua objectivist 
constructivist episteraology, is ultimately 'conservative activist1 
principally by virtue of his "logicism" (I shall develop a complementary 
case against his empiricism in Ch.4)•
t shall also, and more importantly, however, first take this opportunity 
to begin to assert the complementary, positive, case for PCP, qua 
relativist constructivist episteraology, as an alternative to objectivist 
theories of knowledge iri general and to Popper's in particular. I shall 
direct my arguments principally against those of Popper because, as I 
mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, I consider him to be the most influential 
proponent of objectivist constructivism and because I consider the case 
against Baconian empirical inductivism and Logical Positivism to have been 
largely Won (within the community of philosophers of science, though not 
within that of pedagogues) and not in need of detailed rehearsal here.
This I shall do by returning to conduct a preliminary exploration of my 
contention, introduced in section 3.4*» above, that Kelly's notion of the 
'construct' initiates a qualitatively different and preferable mode of 
enquiry from that implied by the more familiar, "classical", idea of the 
'concept'. My initial assumption (which I shall later justify) is that, 
in any practical purpose or application all objectivist theories of 
knowledge endorse some notion indistinguishable from that of the
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11 classical1 concept. In this sub-section, I shall concentrate upon 
exploring the formal differences between the construct and the concept 
and shall pursue a Kellyan case that the former is preferable to the 
latter by virtue of itB entailment of 1 relevance1 and 1 responsibility1 
(understood in specialised senses) mainly in Chapter 4*
Kelly identifies the classlficatory notion of concept as the 'classical1 
one and briefly and uncontroversially characterises it as being '..a 
property attributable to two or more objects which are otherwise 
distinguished from each other..' (Kelly, 1969* P*9). This 
"concept-of-concept" has also been named by (amongst others) Bolton as the 
'traditional [ ] theory of abstraction' (1977, p.9). He argues that it 
can be traced back to Aristotle and that it has received sustained and 
influential expression through British empiricist philosophers, notably 
Locke and Hume.
Kelly's main criticism of the classical concept of concept is that it 
renders the current specified reference of any example '..indiscriminate 
and psychologically footless..' (Kelly, 1969, p.9), through '..lump[ing] 
together the contrasting and the irrelevant' (Kelly, 1955, p.63).
Underlying the classical concept-of-concept is a commitment to the 
so-called 'Law of the Excluded Middle'. Kelly summarises this law thus:
'What this law proposes is that for any proposition there 
is only one alternative. I call an object ['A'] a spade 
['B'J. There is only one alternative to calling it a spade 
- to call an object not a spade!'.
(Kelly, 1969, p.69).
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In this law, 'A* is 'B', or 'A' is not 'B': each object (1A1) either 
possesses or lacks any given property OB'), there is no third ("middle") 
possibility. (N.B. "Middle" here has no connection with the middle term 
of the syllogism).
Now Kelly does not distinguish between different formulations of this Law 
but it shall be useful to me to do so now for my case against Popper, 
later. Thus, there is a ’strong formulation1, i.e. "Every proposition is 
true or false", and a 'weaker formulation', i.e. 'Every proposition is 
true or not true' (Lacey, 1976, p.63).
Using his example of attributed "spade-hood", Kelly criticises the Law of 
the Excluded Middle by arguing that it denies alternatives - with the sole 
exception of the psychologically footless 'not a spade'. Kelly also 
suggests that the object in question may not usefully be called either a 
spade or not a spade (it is difficult, though not impossible, to imagine a 
context in which it would be useful to construe a cushion in terms of its 
spade-hood)•
Kelly's principal objection to the Law of the Excluded Middle is that 
through it we collude uncritically with the 'dogmatism of [our] 
subject-predicate language structure [and] that it is often presented 
under the guise of objectivity', (Kelly, 1969, p.72: my emphasis) and 
that this has the undesirable result (or carries with it the unacceptable 
risk) that
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11- 3we put the onus of choosing between the alternatives 
on the object Itself. We disclaim responsibility for our 
propositions and try to make the objects we talk about 
hang themselves on the horns of the dilemmas we invent for 
dealing with them!. (Kelly, 1969, p.70.:■ my. emphasis).
To be sure, if someone asserts that an object is a spade, then we shall 
usually understand what they mean (we can suppose that this is especially 
likely to be the case if it is ourself that is asserting such!). But on 
closer inspection of this example, we can see that, under appropriate 
circumstances and prior to making the contrast explicit, there may still 
be plenty of scope for ambiguity in meaning, irresponsibility (wilful or 
otherwise) and general psychological footlooseness, cf.: "spade vs. fork", 
"spade vs. club", or even "spade vs. black person" - not to mention the 
difficulties that may arise froih phonetic similarities or identities, 
e.g. "spayed vs. castrated"!
*
Any apparent triviality in Kelly's "spade" example should not obscure the 
importance of the principle at issue. Indeed, sometimes a person's life 
may depend upon a personal construct(ion of them), although we may not 
accept personal responsibility for such a consequence if we have placed it 
upon them in a psychologically footloose mnnnor as Kelly demonstrates with 
an example:
'If a woman is accused of being a witch, she has to be 
either a witch or not a witch - it is up to her. The 
speaker disclaims all responsibility for the dilemma 
he has imposed upon her'.
(Kelly, 1969, p.70: my emphasis).
Kelly argues, furthermore, that within PCP
'We consider the contrasting end of a construct to be both
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relevant and necessary to the meaning of the 
construct*.
(Kelly, 1955, p.63: my emphasis).
For Kelly, meaning, relevance and responsibility thus fuse within his 
notion of the personal construct (I shall develop this point in later 
chapters)•
Kelly claims that some persons argue against the Law of the Excluded 
Middle by proposing that an object may be appraised in terms of degrees 
of the single quality or attribute in question. For Kelly, this tactic 
misses his point: 1
'This is the notion of shades of grey that can be perceived 
between black and white. But this notion of 'reifying' the 
excluded middle by talking about grays is not what we are 
proposing. In fact we see this grey thinking as a form of 
concretism that merely equivocates and fails to get off the 
ground into the atmosphere., of abstraction'.
(Kelly, 1969, p.72: my emphasis).
In Kelly's view, "greys" should be admitted, or re-admitted, only within 
the fully abstract notion of the construct (cf. my earlier discussion of 
"greys" in constructs, section 3.4)* In this approach, for an idea to 
have 'human purpose' (Kelly, 1969, p.9: I have taken this to be his 
contrast pole for 'psychologically footless'), i.e. utility, it must 
exhibit dimensionality and relevant (which is to say, opposite) contrast 
- a "dimensionality of relevant contrast". In other words, it must be a 
construct. The dimensionality offered by the Law of the Excluded Middle 
ia a "pseudo dimensionality" since there is no requirement in it for a 
relevant contrast.
Now, psychologically footless ways of talking about the world have a long 
and multi-facetted history: Kelly points out that the Law of the Excluded 
Middle has been accepted as a basic principle of logic for the past 2,400 
years (Kelly, 1969, p.69), i.e. since the time of Aristotle.
Returning to my purpose for this sub-section, however, I suggest that such 
approaches have, if anything, received additional impetus particularly 
over the last 300 years or so and that this has been mainly due to the 
still prevailing tendency to construe the ideational fruits of certain of 
Personkind's activities, notably "science11, as an achievement of 
objectivist epistemology ("objective method").
I shall try to render this view'plausible by considering the specific case 
of Popper's objectivist constructivist theory of knowledge. In this 
cause, I shall argue that Popper's theory is psychologically footless 
through endorsing in effect, though not in logic, the Law of the Excluded 
Middle.
Turning now to Popper, I shall not labour the point that he considers 
himself to be a constructivist. Thus Popper, like Piaget, frequently 
acknowledges his intellectual debt to Kant (cf. e.g. Popper, 1972, p.48 - 
quoted in section 3*3.1.) and his commitment to constructivist 
epistemology could not be more explicit than where he entitles a section 
of one of his books 'All knowledge is Theory-Impregnated. Including Our 
Observations' (Popper, 1979, section 18: original emphasis) and then 
proceeds to argue for that proposition.
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In his most famous work, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper,
[1934-3 1980), however, Popper tells us of his opposition to the belief 
that there are propositions of science 'the analysis of [whose] relations 
compels us to introduce a special probabilistic logic which breaks the 
fetters of classical logic'• (p. 192). Popper's reference to 'a special 
probabilistic logic1 is, of course, a critical allusion to attempts made 
by the (then influential) Logical Positivists to sophisticate the 
inductive logic originally favoured in the context of philosophy of 
science by Baconian empirical inductivists and other "Classical 
Empiricists".
Armed against such inductivist approaches with "Hume's Problem" (of 
induction), which Popper regards as an 'almost flawless gem* (1979, p.88), 
and further motivated by his dislike of the attitudes he associated with 
Marxists, Freudians and Adlerians - they all vaunted their views as a 
"scientific discipline" and all betrayed sympathies to inductive reasoning 
- and the undesirable human consequences he perceived to follow from their 
doctrines (see e.g. Popper, 1978, p.31 et seq.) Popper came to believe 
that all logical relations between the propositions of science can
'[ ] be fully analysed in terms of the 'classical' logical 
relations of deducibility and contradiction'. (Popper,
1980, p.192: original emphasis).
More specifically, Popper states that
'My proposal is based upon an asymmetry between 
verifyability and falsifyability; an asymmetry which 
results from the logical form of universal statements. For 
these are never derivable from singular statements. 
Consequently it is possible by means of purely deductive
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inferences (with the help of the modus tollens of
classical logic) to argue from the truth of singular 
statements to the falsity of universal statements. Such an 
argument to the falsity of universal statements is the only 
strictly deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it 
were, in the 'inductive direction* j that is, from singular 
to universal statements'•
(Popper, 1980, p.41: original emphasis).
The substance of Popper's proposal may be further clarified through a
brief consideration of Modus Tollens.
Modus Tollens is the valid, deductive, rule of inference which has the 
form
i . '
"If p, then qj not q; therefore not p"
(where, in Popper's application, p = a universal statement or proposition 
such as a scientific law, and q = a singular statement such as 
an observation statement or an actual observation).
For Popper, application of this logical rule of inference in matters 
episteraological means that, strictly speaking, we can never say that a 
knowledge claim is true, or even probably true, but we can, strictly 
speaking, sometimes say that one is false. Furthermore, Popper proposes 
'falsIf.lability' as a 'criterion of demarcation' for science and 
pseudo-science and for science and non-science:
'[T]he falsifyability of a system is to be taken as a 
criterion of demarcation.[ ] it must be possible for an
empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience'. 
(Popper, 1980, p.40-41: original emphasis).
Popper repeatedly spells out the multiple synonymity which he extends to
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this term in an attempt to fuse his logicism with his empiricism, e.g.
'[Tjhe criterion of the scientific status of a theory is
its falsifyability, or refutability, or testability'.
(Popper, 1972, p.37: original emphasis).
For Popper, the hallmark of actual practising good science, as 
contrasted with philosophically attributing or judging it to be science, 
is to specify in advance 'potential falsifiers' (Popper, 1980, p.86: 
original emphasis) for one's own theory.
Now, as I have hitherto presented it, Popper's epistemology would be 
unworkable because it would not be able to meet even the most obvious and 
likely of problems. For example, how would we decide between two rival 
theories both of which are presently unfalsified but falsifyable? Again, 
a decisive empirical refutation - "conclusive disproof" - would seem to be 
impossible to achieve in either practice (experimental error) or principle 
(all observations are theory-laden)? Furthermore, an examination of 
history of science suggests that every non-trivial theory has had 
"anomalies" from the moment they have been proposed - what is to 
distinguish these from 'potential falsifiers' of such theories? Such an 
epistemology would be "naive" falsificationist, not least, because it 
could leave us with only falsified knowledge. Science itself would be 
falsified in the process.
Popper, however, is too astute to be a straightforward 
naive-falsificationist. He is aware of all the problems that I have 
mentioned and more besides. By means of ingenious and often complicated 
manoeuvres, Popper has sought to overcome the problems which beset
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naive-falsificationism so as to provide a "methodological" brand of 
falsificationist epistemology, an empirically 'critical rationalist' 
theory of knowledge. For my purposes, Popper's theory might usefully be 
termed a species of 'objectivist methodological constructivism', as 
contrasted with the basically Kellyan species of 'relativist methological 
constructivism' which I endorse and strive to develop.
Popper attempts to leave Modus Tollens recognisably intact within his 
epistemology, but yet, on the one hand, to weaken his methological 
requirement for (possible) 'decisive refutation', and, on the other hand, 
to provide an alternative to a falsified theory (about which Modus 
Tollens says nothing)•
Popper weakens his demand for falsifiability by allowing for degrees of 
falsifiability (i.e. methodological falsification); the more numerous, 
empirically knowable, states of affairs that a theory forbids, the more 
falsifiable it is (and the more ''scientific" it is). The more states of 
affairs which have empirically refuted a theory, the more justified we are 
to attribute to its falsehood. Clearly, such "falsification by degree", 
which allows us to attribute "approximate falsity" to a proposition, 
remains a more likely result with those theories which, prior to testing, 
forbid more states of affairs than other theories. Hence, Popper exhorts 
us to make 'bold' conjectures.
In elaborating his alternative to a falsified theory, Popper attempts to 
avoid the pitfalls of both "absolute" truth and inductive notions of 
"probable" truth by providing a means for appraising the past (and only
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the past) performance of a theory with respect to its tests and by which 
wo may be justified to attribute to it its "approximate" truth status.
This Popper does throughout his intimately related epistemological notions 
of 'corroboration1 and 'verisimilitude1 of a theory. Here it is enough to 
say Popper demands that rational theory-choice (which he understands to 
be synonymous with objective theory-choice) consists of always choosing 
that tested but unfalsified theory which has. "excess corroboration" over 
its rival, viz. the better theory is the theory which accounts for all the 
facts ('content') which its rival accounts for and more. Hence, we 
3hould demand an "increase in content" - "excess corroboration" - from our 
later or preferred theories relative to our earlier or rival theories, 
and we should avoid making 'ad hoc' hypotheses. For Popper, an ad hoc 
hypothesis is an amendment to a theory which is made in the light of 
otherwise falsifying evidence but without also increasing the 
oxplanative (empirical) content, of the theory beyond that of the 
"anomalous" evidence. To avoid ad hoc-ne3s in 3uch hypothetical 
amendments to theory, Popper demands that they also be 'independently 
testable' - as he puts it with a caution;
'For if it is admitted that a theory may bo ad hoc if it 
is not independently testable by experiments of a new kind 
but merely explains all the explicanda, including the 
experiments which refuted its predecessors, then it is 
clear that the mere fact that the theory is also 
independently testable cannot as such ensure that it is not 
ad hoc. This becomes clear if we consider that it is 
always possible, by a trivial stratagem, to make ad hoc 
theory independently testable, if we do not also require 
that it should pass the independent tests in question: We
merely have to connect it (conjunctively) in some way or 
other with any testable but not yet tested fantastic ad 
hoc prediction which may occur to us (or to some fiction 
writer)!'
(Popper, 1972, p.244s original emphasis).
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In Popper's epistemology, scientific knowledge is held to grow by an 
endless series of conjectures and refutations. The touchstone for 
progress in his prescription (which complements his demarcation criterion, 
cf. earlier quotation), is refutation, not verification as per Classical 
Empiricism and Logical Positivism:
'I can [ ] gladly admit that falsificationists like myself 
much prefer an attempt to solve an interesting problem by a 
bold conjecture, even (and especially) if it soon turns out 
to be false, to any recital of a sequence of irrelevant 
truisms. We prefer this because we believe that this is the 
way in which we can learn from our mistakes; and that in 
finding that our conjecture was false we shall have learnt 
much about the truth, and shall have got nearer to the 
truth'.
(Popper, 1972, p.231: original emphasis).
For Popper, however, methodological falsification also implies
'[ ] the urgency of replacing a falsified hypothesis by a
better one. In most cases [my emphasis] we have, before 
falsifying a hypothesis, another one up our sleeves; for the 
falsifying experiment is usually [my emphasis] a crucial 
experiment designed to decide between the two. That is to 
say, it is suggested by the fact that the two hypotheses 
differ in some respect; and it makes use of this difference 
to refute (at least) one of them'.
(Popper, 1980, p.87 n.1: original emphasis).
Now, as far as I am presently concerned, the most important thing that I 
can discern in this last quotation (and elsewhere in Popper's writings) is 
that within his epistemology there is no necessary requirement for a 
rival or an alternative theory. Nor, indeed, could there be if Popper's 
claim to "objectivity" is to be sustained. The epistemological result to 
which I understand Popper to aspire is merely
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"p is (approximately) true-or.p is (approximately) false"
(Where p = any empirical proposition)•
I judge every aspect of Popper's attempt to achieve even this 
epistemological result to have been thoroughly and devastatingly 
criticised by others - notably, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Luckily, I do not 
need to discuss such criticisms here for they provide only indirect 
support for my present main case against Popper (but cf. Chapter 4)« This 
is that even Popper's intention to provide a sophisticated 
methodological application of Modus Tollens is not worthwhile because it 
endorses a conceptualisation of knowledge claims which,is 
indistinguishable from verificationist approaches such as Classical 
Empiricism and Logical Positivism, which are based upon the Law of the 
Excluded Middle in respect that, neither require a relevant contrast.
Hence I conclude that both these traditions are 'psychologically 
footless' in Kelly's sense. (N.B. construed epistemologically, Kelly's 
requirement for a relevant contrast in any construct may be understood 
to be a requirement for a rival or alternative theory to feature in any 
knowledge claim). This conclusion may seem more compelling if the result 
to Popperian testing, as I have recently characterised it, and as I here 
re-present in the form of a general assumption:
"Every proposition is (approximately) true or (approximately) false"
is compared with the "strong formulation" of the Law of the Excluded 
Middle (cf. my earlier description):
"Every proposition is true or false"
My views expressed above will now serve as a supporting context in which 
I shall advance an initial case (to be developed and generalised beyond 
Popper in Ch. 4) for Popper's conservative activism.
I shall begin by examining the assumption of authority implicit in 
Popper's belief, quoted earlier, that all logical relations between the 
propositions of science can 'be fully analysed in terms of the 'classical' 
logical relations of deductibility and contradiction'. Some remarks made 
by Feyerabend are pertinent here:
'Speaking as participants we [ ] often use [ 3 standards 
[of criticism, rationality, science etc.] without any 
reference to their origin or to the wishes of those using 
them. We say 'theories ought to be falsifyable and 
contradiction free' and not 'I want theories to be 
falsifyable and contradiction free'. Now it is quite 
correct that the statements of the first kind (proposals, 
rules, standards) (a) contain no reference to the wishes of 
individual human beings or to the habits of a tribe and (b) 
cannot be derived from, or contmdicted by, statements 
concerning such wishes, or habits, or any other facts. But 
that does not make them 'objective' and independent of 
traditions. [ ]• There are many statements that are
formulated 'objectively' i.e. without reference to 
traditions or practices but are still meant to be 
understood in relation to a practice. Examples are dates, 
coordinates, statements concerning the value of a currency, 
statements of logic (after the discovery of alternative 
logics), statements of geometry (after the discovery of 
non-Euclidean geometries) and so on'.
(Feyerabend, 1978, p.22-23: original emphasis).
Now, hho fact that Popper does relate his use of Modus Tollens to his 
own practice or tradition, namely 'critical rationalism', and that he
does refer, as we have seen, to the origins of his ideas and his wishes
and purposes for his theory of knowledge in, for example, his 
'intellectual autobiography' (Popper, 1978), should not distract from 
Feyerabend's main point concerning objectivity - especially with respect 
to 'statements of logic' such as Modus Tollens. As Popper himself has 
ultimately to admit:
'[ ] critical rationalism [ 3 recognises the fact that the
fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least 
tentative) act of faith - from faith in reason.
Accordingly, our choice is open. We may choose some form
of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form.
But we are also free to choose a critical form of 
rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an 
irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a 
certain priority of irrationalism).
(Popper, 1966, p.231: my emphasis).
Popper does not try to justify the objectivity of his choice for (his 
brand of) objectivist episteraology (i.e. critical rationalism), for this, 
as he correctly goes on to argue, is impossible in principle. Of course 
we are free to choose between epistemological traditions. But Popper's 
admission of ' a certain priority of ii'rationnlism' does nothing to 
counter what I have termed the 'Paradox of Objectivist Constructivism' 
(Swift, 1985a), viz. from a relativist methodological constructivist 
perspective, such as Kelly's, to propose a constructivist epistemology by 
which 'objective knowledge' is an attainable result, is hubris. This is 
because it denies to others the personal, albeit, sometimes highly 
sophisticated, act of construction, or 'psychological channelizfation]' 
(Kelly, 1955, p.4-6), that created such an epistemology together with its
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standards of objectivity in the first place. The creator of an 
objectivist episteraology ends up by denying their own act of creation for 
they can hardly claim to have created that which is objective. These 
persons unwittingly cast themselves in the role of "discoverer" or 
"revealer" or even "prophet" (cf. Lakatos1 remarks about 'optimistic 
Kantians'I) and, as such, they cannot account for the creation of their 
own epistemology; at least, not in a way that is open to anyone else. As 
Feyerabend comments
'[ ] the belief that some demands are 'objective' and 
tradition-independent [ ] plays an important role in
rationalism which is a secularised belief in the power of 
the word of God'.
(Feyerabend, 1978, p.20: original emphasis).
Moreover, Popper refers to all relativist epistemologies and even rival 
objectivist ones (except, perhaps, where they are recognisable as 
sub-species of;his own) as 'irrationalist' - a  sure case of lumping 
together the contrasting with the irrelevant (a point I shall pursue in 
Chapter 4)I
The matter does not rest there, however, for the 'Paradox of Objectivist 
Constructivism' complements what I have termed the 'Tyranny of 
Objectivism' (Swift, 1985a), viz. uncritical normativism and objectivism 
are two sides of an epistemological coin. Whilst objectivist 
epistemologies cannot themselves be objectively justified they are, 
nevertheless, not "fully rational" in Feyerabend's sense, quoted in 
section 3*4 above. Nor can they be. Lakatos is quite right to criticise 
Popper in the following way:
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1 Ho does not. answer the question: 'Under what conditions 
would you give up your demarcation critorlon?'
(Lakatos, 1978, p.144-145: original emphasis).
Popper simply assumes dogmatically the objectivity of his criterion for 
objective knowledge. Unfortunately, however, Lakatos' answer to the 
same question, notwithstanding his equivocation over objectivity (see 
Gilbert and Swift, 1985), and though an improvement upon Popper's mere 
assumption, still falls short of the full rationality which I have 
interpreted revolutionary activism to require.
Basically, what Lakatos does is to repeat his criterion for objectivity 
(his 'methodology of scientific research programmes') e.g. Lakatos, 1974> 
within his 'amended meta-criterion' (Lakatos, 1978, p.151: original 
emphasis)(his 'second order methodology of scientific research 
programmes': Lakatos, 1978, p.151). The reason for this is not difficult- 
to find. In claiming to propose an objective method (if this is, indeed, 
what Lakatos is claiming - like Popper, he often uses the term 'rational' 
ambiguously), there is clearly no better method (epistemology) that such a 
proposer can conceive. To articulate a "bettor" meta-method to appraise 
the putative objective method would not only be contradictory in principle 
(could one have, say, a "more objective" meta-method?) but would also be, 
were it possible, self-defeating, for it would result in no one paying any 
further attention to the putative objective method (who would be satisfied 
with second-best?).
The tactic of meta-methodological appraisal invites an infinite regress 
for objectivists (e.g. "Under what conditions would you give up your 
meta-criterion? your raeta-meta-criterion?"). Lakatos is aware of the 
problem but the apparent extent of his rationale for proposing only a 
meta-criterion is to assert that 1[ ] one must always stop somewhere'. 
(Lakatos, 1978, p.153* my emphasis). Why? If objectivity of his 
meta-criterion is what Lakatos is claiming, then I conclude that, 
ironically, Lakatos himself was conservative activist. By eschewing 
pretentions to objectivity, Personal Constructivists, by contrast, may 
apply the construct self-transcendentally to POP (a pluralistic 
Methodology), thereby embracing a comprehensively critical rationalism 
(full rationality) but yet escaping charges of emptiness, nihilism and 
irrationalism.
Popper is only able to disguise, his own conservative activism by 
misrepresenting Kant, as we have seen (section 3*3.1., above), and others. 
Popper eventually retreats into an obscurantist metaphysics himself, 
namely, •simplicity1, (I shall discuss the role of metaphysics in 
epistemology, including objectivist traditions, in Chapter 4-).
Like all objectivist epistemologists, especially those who have achieved a 
degree of success in getting their ideas accepted, Popper is only too 
willing in his less formal expositions to embrace personal responsibility 
for creating his "objective" theory of knowledge. In his intellectual 
autobiography, for example, Popper quotes Passmore who states 1Logical 
Positivism, then, is dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever 
becomes'. (Passmore, quoted by Popper, 1978, p.87), and then answers his
own rhetorical question, i.e. 'Who killed Logical Positivism?' (Popper, 
1978, p.87), thus 'I fear that I must admit responsibility' (Popper, 1978, 
p.88). I fear indeedI Popper's pride in his achievement is 
overshadowed only by his fear that he shall not be attributed personal 
responsibility for it. It should be remembered, however, that the Logical 
Positivists' proudest boast was that they had enunciated an objective 
theory of knowledge, thereby "killing" speculative metaphysics.
Although I am cautious as to the extent to which I am prepared to follow 
their "sociological" perspective (see Ch.4), Barnes and Bloor have 
commented on the origins and nature of the "authority" of logic in a way 
which I endorse:
'Logic, as it is systeraatised in textbooks, monographs or 
research papers, is a learned body of scholarly lore, 
growing and varying over time. It is a mass of 
conventional routines, decisions, expedient restrictions, 
dicta, maxims, and ad hoc rules. The sheer lack of 
necessity in granting its assumptions or adopting its 
strange and elaborate definitions is the point that should 
strike any candid observer [ ]. As a body of conventions 
and esoteric traditions the compelling character of logic, 
such as it is, derives from certain narrowly defined 
purposes and from custom and institutionalised usage. Its 
authority is moral and social, and as such it is admirable 
material for sociological investigation and explanation. 
In particular the credibility of logical conventions, just 
like the everyday practices which deviate from them, will 
be of an entirely local character. The utility of granting 
or modifying a definition for the sake of formal symmetry; 
the expediency of ignoring the complexity of everyday 
discourse and everyday standards of reasoning so that a 
certain abstract generality can be achieved: these will be 
the kinds of justification that will be offered and 
accepted or disputed by specialists in the field. The 
point that emerges is that if any informal, intuitive 
reasoning dispositions are universally compelling, they are 
ipso facto without any reasoned justification. On the 
other hand, any part of logic which can be justified will 
not be universal but purely local in their credibility.
The rational goal of producing pieces of knowledge that are 
both universal in their credibility and justified in 
context-independent terras is unattainable'.
(Barnes and Bioor, 1982, p.45-46: original emphasis).
Their next comment is especially telling when compared with Popper's view 
concerning the priority of irrationalism in allegedly 'critical 
rationalist' theories of knowledge such as his own (i.e. Popper, 1966, 
p.231 - quoted earlier in this sub-section):
'There is, of course, a final move that the rationalist 
can make. He can fall back into dogmatism, saying of some 
.selected inference or conclusion or procedure: this just 
is what it is to be rational, or, this just is a valid 
inference. It is at this point that the rationalist 
finally plucks victory out of defeat, for while the 
relativist can fight Reason, he is helpless against Faith.
Just as Faith protects the Holy Trinity, or the Azande 
oracle, or the ancestral spirits of the Luba, so it can 
protect Reason'•
(Barnes and Bioor, 1982, p. 45-46: original emphasis).
I conclude that Popper's theorjr of knowledge has never got beyond the 
'uncritical phase' (Popper, e.g. 1978, p.60: original emphasis) which he 
tells us 'necessarily precede[s]' a 'scientific or critical phase of 
thinking' Xibid); specifically, Popper's appropriation of Modus Tollens 
is historicist in his sense.
Finally, I suggest that Kelly's joint concern that the thinking of 
logicians, like all persons, should be regarded as essentially 
constructive in nature and that the possibility of restating many of 
personkind's achievements in the logic that we have so far formalised does 
not guarantee the utility of doing so (Kelly, 1969, p.71 quoted in section 
3.4*1•> above) is as pertinent in criticism of Popper as it is of Piaget.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
n.1. I first suggested that Lakatos' taxonomy might help to delineate 
Kelly's brand of constructivism from that of Piaget and others in my PCKG 
seminar and accompanying paper (Swift, 1982). This chapter owes much to 
the consti-uctive criticism which I received from colleagues both then and 
in a more developed version which I presented to a conference (Swift, 
1984).
n.2. But to Kant, at least, not actually blasphemy: cf. my discussion of 
Kant's valuation of Newtonian physics in section 3.3.1, below.
n.3. This is my term to refer principally to Popper(ians) in section 
3.4*2, below. It contrasts with the basically Kellyan approach which I 
support and which might be called 'relativist methodological 
constructivism', see Chapter 4«
n.4» I am not suggesting that Kant was altogether blithe as to the nature 
of the objects in his universe: he would seem to have had a marked 
preference for those occurring in Newtonian mechanics. This preference, 
however, is not enforced by his epistemology - cf. my discussion in 
section 3.3.1•, below.
n.5. It should be borne in mind that Lakatos was once Popper's student. 
Under the influence of Popper, Lakatos may have identified Kant's 
epistemology with Newton's physics more closely than I would wish - cf. my 
discussion in section 3.3.1., below. This notwithstanding, Kant's 
epistemology must still be classified as 'conservative activist' according 
to Lakatos' taxonomy.
n.6. The same has been claimed for the development of the classical 
non-Euclidean geometries - see, e.g., Medawar's (1969* p.36) endorsement 
of others who have made this interpretation.
n.7. The nature and extent of my modifications to Kant's dichotomies may 
be discerned by reference to Beck's brief commentary on this part of the 
Critique of Pure Reason:
Kant sets forth three great perennial divisions in 
metaphysics as the theory of the scope and function of 
reason. He gives three dichotomies: between 
intellectualists and sensualists in regard to the object 
of knowledge, between empiricists and noologists 
(rationalists) in regard to the origin of knowledge, and 
between naturalists and scientists (users of the 
Scientifische Methode, i.e., systematic, "scholastic
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philosophers in regard to the methods of knowledge. Among 
the latter, Kant distinguishes two types; those who proceed 
dogmatically, like Wolff, and those who proceed 
skeptically, like Hume. (Beck, 1978, p.4: original 
emphasis)•
n.8. Indeed, reflexivity applies at the meta-raeta-theoretical level of 
'revolutionary activism1, viz. 'revolutionary activism* is itself an 
example of a 'prison' and it may yet turn out to be "absolutely wrong"!
n.9» As I shall hope to show, Feyerabend's recommendation in the last 
sentence complements perfectly Kelly's view that the person is themself 
'a form of motion' (1955> p.48).
n.10. I shall discuss Kelly's views on "ontological" determinism in 
Chapter 4*
ii.l1. I suggest that Kelly was profoundly impressed with the Quantum 
Theory for he retained its fundamental formalism within PCP, namely, 
matrices. This, I believe, is at the core of complaints or suspicions 
that Kelly's theory is epistemologically idealist. For a discussion and a 
defence of Kelly on this issue, see Chapter 4•
n.12. This may account for the‘relatively small impact that Kelly's theory 
made when it was originally published in America. As Davisson comments
Personal construct theory seems to have staked out a 
territory that was neither scientific nor humanistic enough 
in the 1955 sense of the terms for Kelly's views to
become a significant factor in American psychological
thinking'. (Davisson, 1978, p.30: my emphasis).
n.13.Robey (1973) has distinguished two main "schools" or traditions of 
structuralism: the first, to which he contends Piaget belongs, is 'an 
interdisciplinary trend' (p.2); the second, represents a narrower 
'acceptation of the term' as has been elaborated in the 'field of 
linguistics' (p.2). I intend my arguments to apply to all brands of 
structuralism, however, I shall explicitly consider only Piaget since he
has been incomparably the most influential structuralist in a pedagogical
context.
n.14* For my immediate purpose, an ad hoc hypothesis may be understood 
to be an amendment, an "auxiliary addition", to a theory that is made in 
order to accommodate new, unanticipated and otherwise contradictory or 
anomalous evidence. I shall discuss a more "sophisticated" formalism of 
ad hoc hypothesis, due to Popper, in section 3.4*2., below.
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n.15. Interestingly, Piaget seems to have shared something very similar to 
Kelly's initial convictions whilst formulating the basis of his theory, 
viz. that persons should be construed in the 'perspective of centuries' 
and that there is an interplay between the 'durable* and the 'ephemeral* 
in the way that persons contemplate the stream of events. The model of 
person Piaget goes on to elaborate, however, might be described as 
"person-as-mathematician" (or perhaps,"person-as-analytical-philosopher") 
rather than "person-as-scientist". Cf. N16., below.
n.16. Piaget's exclusion of "affective" qualities from his study of 
cognition perpetuates the dichotomous distinction made by Logical 
Positivists between 'cognitive' and 'emotive' discourse. Such may, in 
turn, be construed as variants of the classical distinction, as enunciated 
by, e.g., Hume (see No. 22, below), between 'is' and 'ought' statements. 
These are also perpetuated by 'objectivist methodological constructivists' 
such as Popper (see Chapter 4)•
Kelly's stance on this issue may help further to explain Davisson's view 
(see N. 12, above) that Kelly's theory was not scientific enough, in the 
1955 sense of the terra, for it to gain widespread acceptance in the U.S.A.
We may also suppose that Piaget, for his part, was more influenced by 
Kelly by analytical philosophy (the Logical Atomism of Russell and 
Whitehead and its heir, Logical Positivism) due to having laid the 
foundations of his theory slightly earlier than Kelly. Moreover, Piaget 
may be construed to have had strong personal reasons for wishing to debar 
consideration of the "affective-domain" from his own investigation: 
although modern Piagetians are usually loath to admit it, Piaget greatly 
admired Freud's study of the affect and Piaget regarded it as 
complementary to his ideas (Sants, 1981, 1983). Also cf. N. 19, below.
n.17. Exactly complementary conclusions are made by, for example, Matthews 
(1980) whose investigations concern the development of philosophical 
reasoning in the young child (i.e. approximately age 4 to 6 years):
'Piaget proposes to validate his claims about developmental 
stages by finding the same patterns of responses in all 
children. Such a finding is to be considered a guarantee 
that the thinking of children really does develop in this 
fashion. The unusual response is discounted as an 
unreliable indicator of the ways in which children think;
"The only valid criteria ... are based on multiplicity of 
results and on the comparison of individual reactions". [ ]
But it is the deviant response that is the most likely to 
; be philosophically interesting. The standard response is, 
in general, an unthinking and un-thought-out product of 
socialisation, whereas the nonconforming response is much 
more likely to be the fruit of honest reflection. Yet 
Piaget would have the nonconforming response discounted 
and eliminated on methodological grounds.
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There is yet a further worry. Piaget aims to arrive at 
children's convictions. He distinguishes answers and 
comments that reveal convictions from those that constitute 
what he calls "mere romancing". Romancing, he explains is 
"inventing an answer in which [one] does not really 
believe, or in which [one] believes merely by force of 
saying it". Piaget makes clear in a variety of ways that 
he has little interest in, or appreciation for, romancing. 
"One would like to be able to rule out romancing," he says 
gravely, "with the same severity as [the answer intended 
simply to please the questioner]." [ ] (At this point the 
soft outline of the friendly Swiss psychologist, puffing 
reflectively on his curved-stern pipe, perceptibly hardens 
into the stern features of the no-nonsense schoolmaster and 
disciplinarian). It seems most likely that the 
philosophically interesting comments that a child makes 
will not so much express the child's settled convictions as 
explore a conceptual connection or make a conceptual joke. 
Thus, the most interesting and intriguing philosophical 
comments are likely to be counted by Piaget as mere 
romancing.' (Matthews, 1980, p.38-39: my emphasis).
n.18. Or, perhaps, a Schroedingerian CAT, viz. a creature which lives 
when viewed through a strict-Piagetian perspective, as mediated by 
strict-Piagetian investigative techniques, but which emerges as dead when 
viewed through a Kellyan (or ACM) perspective, as mediated by Kellyan (or 
ACM) investigative techniques^ Cf. Chapter 5.
n.19. I suggest that there may be at least one exception which "proves" my 
rule, namely, Piaget himselfI To explain, Piaget intended his theory to 
have universal application, as we have seen. He managed to initiate and 
maintain a sizable "school" devoted to exploring, developing and applying 
his ideas. The formal aspects of Genetic-Epistemology, however, remain 
Very much Piaget's personal invention. Indeed, if we examine Piaget's 
personal, informal, purposes and anticipations for his theory (e.g. by 
reference to certain of his very early works and to his intellectual 
autobiography of 1952), then it can be construed both as a splendid 
"rational reconstruction" of his own intellectual development and as some 
kind of personal "life-solution" to certain very severe fears that he 
suffered from when young.
With respect to the latter construction (for which I have been greatly 
inspired by the historical researches of John Sants, 1981; 1983? personal 
communications) we find that, as a child and as a young man, Piaget 
harboured a tremendous fear of the irrational. More specifically, the 
young Piaget was terrified by 'autistic thought' (which he construed as 
domination of intellect by affect) and which nearly engulfed him as an 
adolescent.
Given that this was Piaget's preoccupative fear, it would seem quite
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reasonable that he might want to seek out the 'universal1 and the 
'necessary1. These notions are common throughout his long, voluminous 
life's work, but if it is viewed as a whole, then it is, perhaps, not 
surprising that a long, "middle", phase was primarily concerned with 
empirical research and that only in his later years did he devote 
himself to developing his highly abstract logical meta-theory, (viz., the 
extensive empirical corroboration of his views, as interpreted by himself 
and others, might have convinced him that his abstract notion of structure 
was not itself a chimera, an autism).
I must stress that in placing this interpretation I am acting in a manner 
entirely consistent with the approach I endorse and that I do not intend 
them as an argument ad hominem.
n.20. Cf. Feyerabend's (1981b, p.74) comment concerning "full 
rationality", quoted in section 3.4*> above.
n.21. Kelly's example may be construed to allude to one of the most 
important issues raised by post-empiricist philosophy of science, namely, 
sexual politics in and of epistemology. Cf. my discussion in Chapter 4*
n.22. Hume's problem of induction may be understood to have a logical 
and a psychological aspect (Popper, 1.979» P*3 - 4). The logical aspect 
or problem, alluded to in my text, concerns the unattainability of a 
logical justification for making an "inductive leap" from "some" to "all", 
viz. logical justification or proof for reasoning from (repeated) 
instances of which we have experience to other instances (conclusions) of 
which we have no experience (I am here paraphrasing Popper's formulation).
"Hume's problem" should not be confused with "Hume's Law" (again, to use 
the most popular ascribed title) and which may be summarised by the slogan 
"You cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'".
Popper, like all objectivists, would seem also to endorse Hume's Law, by 
contrast with post-empiricists who (to varying degrees) do not (see 
Chapter 4).
n.23. Which is not to say that he succeeds in solving or transcending 
all or even any of them as his growing number of critics attest (see 
Chapter 4)»
n.24. I use the term 'objectivist methodological constructivism' to refer 
to those traditions in which 'objectivity' in Brittan's (1978) second 
sense (see Section 3*3., above) is exhorted in combination with 
'objectivism' in Bernstein's (1983) sense (see Section 3.4*» above), 
thereby (as I shall argue in Chapter 4) confounding Brittan's first and 
second senses of 'objectivity'. (I interpret 'method' always to imply 
some role for empirical evidence in theory choice as opposed to 
reasoning alone which is the meaning Kant articulated for method in GPR,
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viz. the architectonic).
n.25. Chalmers (1982) makes the useful point that sophisticated
falsificationists' proposals for how knowledge can be said to grow (known
to have progressed) are often misrepresented by their critics and
commentators who pay exclusive attention to their demand for
falsiflability and to falsifying instances. He provides an account of the
sophisticated falsificationists' stance with respect to this matter which,
in my judgement, is both lucid and accurate:
'Significant advances will be marked by the confirmation 
[Popper would say 'corroboration'] of bold conjectures or 
the falsification of cautious conjectures'•
(Chalmers, 1982, p. 54: original emphasis).
The problem arises for sophisticated falsificationists, however, when this 
notion of the growth of knowledge is related to their meaning of 
"rational" (i.e. objective) theory-choice, viz. the requirement for 
excess empirical content. As Black comments
'[ ] induction seems to creep in by the back door in 
Popper's theory of "corroboration", that is, of the 
criteria by Which we discriminate between the relative 
strengths of hypotheses, none of which are falsified by 
known observational facts'. (Black, 1973, p. 159: my 
emphasis)•
Black does not develop this criticism of Popper, though others do (e.g. 
Lakatosj 1978, Chapter 3). (N.B. in certain rare cases, such as when the
empirical contents of rival theories are exactly the same, the 
sophisticated falsificationists' rationale for theory-choice is less 
straightforward, however, the methodological principle of content increase 
is essentially upheld).
I shall not consider in detail such criticisms of Popper and other 
objectivist methodological constructivists since their function is 
more-or-less limited to reductionss ad absurdum and my principal purpose 
in this thesis is to endorse and develop Kelly's theory as a viable and 
desirable alternative.
n.26. Albeit, of a special, viz. incommensurable, sort (see Chapter 4).
n.27. Interestingly, Maxwell (1984)> who articulates an otherwise 
uncompromising critique of, and alternative to, (especially) Popper 
(discussed briefly in Chapter 4)» does not put this point so strongly:
'A minor point of criticism (alongside the major 
criticisms) is that an element of authoritarianism lingers 
on in Popper's conception of reason, or method. For 
Popper's method, ideally, determines for us, in a fallible
way, the best choice. It chooses for us, as it were.
The view developed here is that putting into practice the 
heuristic methods of reason enhances our capacity to choose 
as we really desire: it enhances desirable spontaneity, 
creativity, freedom, and does not reduce freedom to the one 
decision to proceed in accordance with the methods of 
reason1. (Maxwell, 1984, p. 88 N.13: original emphasis).
n.28. Popper has also been claimed to misrepresent, for example, Hume 
(Store, 1982) and Bacon (Urbach, 1982) - not to mention relativist 
traditions of constructivism where, at least, some of the original 
protagonists are alive and have responded vigorously: see, e.g., Lakatos 
and Musgrave (eds.) (1970).
n.29. Toulrain makes an analogous point:
'[ ] In the neurophysiology of the higher mental functions, 
the problem of reasons and causes reaches - depending on 
your viewpoint - the ultimate point of acuteness, or of 
absurdity. Many neuroscientists believe that we are at 
last within sight of explaining, in neurophysiological 
terras, all the basic causal interconnections and influences 
involved in the operation of the brain and the central 
nervous system. And when that day finally arrives, - as 
Charles Townes likes to remind us - the scientists 
concerned will certainly Wish to take credit for their 
intellectual feat. 'Take credit for what intellectual 
feat?', we may ask: 'For the scientific discovery that 
strictly causal brain-mechanisms underlie all rational 
thought-processes - including the scientific discovery 
that strictly causal brain-mechanisms underlie all rational 
thought-prooesses'. (Toulrain, 1970, p. :original 
emphasis).
The fact that I happen to agree with Popper that he, more than anyone 
else, was responsible for "killing" Logical Positivism is quite irrelevant 
to the point which I (and I believe Toulmin) am making.
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Chapter 4. Personal Construct Psychology and Post-Empiricist 
Philosophy of Science
'The history of science as a history of truth is quite 
unrealisable. The conception itself is internally 
contradictory.'
(Xllle Congres International D'Histoire des Sciences 
Collogues, Textes des Rapports, Suchodolski, 1970, 
quoted by Canguilhem, trans. Shortland, 1981, p.21).
4.1 Introduction
My purpose in this chapter is to articulate similarities and 
contrasts between Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) and 
influential traditions in philosophy of science as manifested 
especially by their varying constructions of the 'structure of a 
scientific theory' and the consequences these have for construing 
the 'growth of scientific knowledge.' I shall begin, however, by 
briefly articulating the pedagogic pertinence of doing this.
'The function of theories', we are often (and, I believe, quite 
rightly) told, 'is to explain' (e.g. Harre, 1972, p.168: my 
emphasis). But what, then, might be said to constitute or be meant 
by an "explanation"? The need to answer this question becomes acute 
when we recall that the prime concern of epistemologists is to 
articulate how knowledge may be said to grow (cf. Chapter 2) - a 
concern which implies that 'theories' (explanations) must also grow 
or, perhaps, must periodically be replaced.
In pedagogy essentially the same question arises through the 
prevalent aim to promote and achieve "meaningful learning" (this 
actual expression is most associated with Ausubel). Thus, one
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author has similarly argued that lecturing involves explaining and 
that an explanation consists of ’giving an understanding to somebody 
else* (Brown, 1978, p. : my emphasis). Again, I have argued in
Chapter 2 that learning shares with epistemology a preoccupative 
concern with the growth of knowledge. Here, the implication is that 
understandings (explanations) must also grow or be replaced.
i
Now, in this chapter I shall argue that objectivist epistemologies 
can, by virtue of their objectivism, only articulate impoverished 
and untenable meanings of 'explanation1. I contend that the 
prevalence of objectivist epistemology has led to impoverished 
explanations being promulgated through theories of science teaching, 
to the detriment of science learning. In this chapter I shall also 
, argue, however, that certain amongst relativist traditions in
contemporary philosophy of science treat the notions of explanation 
and growth of knowledge in a manner which complements that of PCP, 
indeed, the notion of the construct may be developed by 
incorporating one of their philosophical innovations within it.
This I contend shall be to the benefit of epistemology of science 
and, thence, of science pedagogy and ultimately of society.
As both a broad framework for, and an introduction to, the sorts of
comparisons and contrasts that I shall make within and between
objectivist and relativist traditions in this chapter, I shall use
Hesse’s (1980) distinction between 'empiricist* and 'post­
empiricist' accounts of science, respectively. These comparisons 
and contrasts shall complement and extend many of those begun in 
Chapter 3. Hesse's distinction is particularly appropriate for my 
purpose, bearing in mind that Kelly's theory is (or began as) a
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means of a five part dichotomy of traditional contrasts that have 
been drawn between natural science and the human sciences:
*1. In natural science experience is taken to be 
objective, testable, and independent of theoretical 
explanation. In human science data are not 
detachable from theory, for what count as data are 
determined in the light of some theoretical 
interpretation, and the facts themselves have to be 
reconstructed in the light of interpretation.
2. In natural science theories are artificial 
constructions or models, yielding explanation in the 
sense of logic of hypothetico-deduction: if external 
nature were of such a kind, then data and experience 
would be as we find them. In human science theories 
are mimetic reconstructions of the facts themselves, 
and the criterion of a good theory in understanding 
of meanings and intentions rather than deductive 
explanation.
3. In natural science the lawlike relations asserted 
of experience are external, both to the objects 
connected and to the investigator, since they are 
merely correlational. In human science the relations 
asserted are internal, both because the objects 
studied are essentially constituted by their 
interrelations with one another, and also because the 
relations are mental, in the sense of being created 
by human categories of understanding recognized (or 
imposed?) by the investigator.
4. The language of natural science is exact, 
formalizable, and literal; therefore meanings are 
univocal, and a problem of meaning arises only in the 
application of universal categories to particulars. 
The language of human science is irreducibly 
equivocal and continually adapts itself to 
particulars.
5. Meanings in natural science are separate from 
facts. Meanings in human science are what constitute 
facts, for data consists of documents, inscriptions, 
intentional behaviour, social rules, human artefacts, 
and the like, and these are inseparable from their 
meanings for agents.1
(Hesse, 1980, p.170: original emphasis).
By way of elaboration she adds:
’It follows, so it is held, that in natural science a 
oneway logic and method of interpretation is 
appropriate, since theory is dependent on 
self-subsistent facts, and testable by them. In
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human science, on the other hand, the ’logic' of 
interpretation is irreducibly circular: part cannot 
be understood without whole, which itself depends on 
the relation of its parts; data and concepts cannot 
be understood without theory and context, which 
themselves depend on relations of data and concepts.’ 
(Hesse, 1980, p.173).
Hesse then presents a summary of the new post-empiricist account of 
natural science which parallels the five points of the dichotomy:
'1. In natural science data is not detachable from
theory, for what count as data are determined in the
light of some theoretical interpretation, and the 
facts themselves have to be reconstructed in the 
light of interpretation.
2. In natural science theories are not models 
externally compared to nature in a hypothetico-
deductive schema, they are the way the facts
themselves are seen.
3. In natural science the lawlike relations asserted 
of experience are internal, because what count as 
facts are constituted by what the theory says about 
their interrelations with one another.
4. The language of natural science is irreducibly 
metaphorical and inexact, and formalizable only at 
the cost of distortion of the historical dynamics of 
scientific development and of the imaginative 
constructions in terms of which nature is interpreted 
by science.
5. Meanings in natural science are determined by 
theory; they are understood by theoretical coherence 
rather than by correspondence with facts.'
(Hesse, 1980, p.172-173).
Hesse, again by way of elaboration, adds:
’It follows, so it is held, that the logic of science 
is necessarily circular: data are interpreted and 
sometimes corrected by coherence with theory, and, at 
least in less extreme versions of the account, theory 
is also somehow constrained by empirical data. The 
resemblances between this account and the hermeneutic 
analysis of the human sciences seems so close that, 
among the more extreme post-empiricists, Feyerabend 
at least has drawn the explicit conclusion that 
scientific theories and arguments are closely 
analogous to the circular reinforcement of beliefs, 
doctrines, documents, and conditioned experience that
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may be found in some religious groups, and in 
political party lines and their associated techniques 
of propaganda.T 
(Hesse, 1980, p.173).
In fairness to Hesse it is necessary to point out, as one of her 
commentators has done (Bernstein, 1983, p. 33), that she is not 
saying (and nor does it follow from what she says) that there are no 
important differences between natural science and human science; 
rather, what she is asserting is that the standard ways of making 
the dichotomy are suspect.
4.2 Theory ’Reduction1 vs Theory 1Incommensurability' 
in the Growth of Knowledge
Hesses claims that the five characteristics of the natural sciences 
'presuppose a traditional empiricist view [ ] that is almost
universally discredited' (1980, p. 172). This, I suggest, is an 
exaggeration. Whilst it is true that her account resembles most 
closely the doctrines of Logical Positivism and its heirs, discussed 
below, there are certain important features which are retained by 
objectivist-methodological-constructivist traditions, such as that 
due to Popper as I shall show, and these traditions manifestly have 
not been universally discredited - especially in the minds of 
science educationalists.
To help me to explain why these features were originally created, 
why they have been retained within objectivist-methodological- 
constructivist traditions and why they should be abandoned, I shall
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briefly examine their origin in the context of developments in g7th 
century, and especially early 20th century, science and philosophy 
of science.
From 1620, when Bacon announced his doctrines of empirical- 
inductivism, history of science presented a fundamental problem, 
viz. science could only be portrayed as an accumulation of factually 
true knowledge, i.e. theories induced from, and entirely 
circumscribed by, factually true observations, if a high degree of 
selectivity was exercised. In the 17th century, this was 
particularly so if empiricist-inductivist historians and 
philosophers of science extended their scope backwards, i.e. prior 
to their so-called scientific revolution in method. In the 17th and 
18th centuries it was at least plausible, if not entirely 
unproblematic, to endorse and maintain an essentially Baconian image 
of science due to the relative stability and longevity of the 
central principles in science. Then, indeed, this image was 
officially embraced (in England) by the Royal Society under the 
influence of Boyle (Elkana, 1970, p.16). This notwithstanding, 
revolutionary changes in the construal of aspects of reality, e.g. 
the fundamental nature of matter, continued to occur and required 
Baconian historians repeatedly to re-write their 'true histories'. 
This "Orwellian" or "Whiggish" practice gradually undermined the 
plausibility of the Baconian notion of an incursion of 'prejudice*! 
as an explanation for "erroneous" scientific knowledge claims.
Hesse comments that
'The empiricist response to this instability of theory 
has been the positivist or instrumentalist view of
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science as constituted essentially by accumulating 
knowledge of phenomena of observables, rather than of 
the fundamental but hidden nature of things. This is 
the kind of knowledge that issues in technical 
application, the cumulative character of which cannot 
be in doubt.1
(Hesse, 1980, p.174: original emphasis).
The claim of science for what I shall term ontological truth thus 
gave way to a claim for merely phenomenal truth. As Popper (1972, 
p.107) has said, instrumentalism has the dual attractions of being 
both modest and simple as judged relative to 'essentialist* 
doctrines such as Bacon’s (not to mention rationalist traditions, 
such as that due to Descartes) - but yet, I would add, preserves the 
claim of science to be preeminent in, or even co-extensive with, the 
attainment of objective knowledge.
An early proponent of instrumentalism in science was Ernst Mach 
whose most influential philosophical work was published in the last 
quarter of the 19th century (he died in 1916 still unconvinced of 
the reality of the atom). Suppe (1978, p.9) classifies Mach's 
doctrines, and the school which developed them, as ’neo-positivism* 
because they drew partial inspiration from the social scientist and 
philosopher August Compte - ’Comptean positivism1 (1978, p.8). 
Suppe*s commentary on Mach's neo-positivism helps to explain the 
later emergence of Logical Positivism:
'[in the instrumentalist's view] scientific statements 
must be empirically verifiable, which is to say that 
all empirical statements occurring in a scientific 
theory must be capable of being reduced to statements 
about sensations. [ ] Mach [ ] trie[d], rather
unsuccessfully, to develop this approach into an 
analysis which construes the principles of science as 
nothing but abbreviated descriptions of sensations.
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His lack of success in carrying out this program 
stems partially from the fact that abbreviated 
descriptions of sensations cannot account for the 
fact that scientific principles contain mathematical 
relationships not reducible to sensations alone.1 
(Suppe, 1978, p.10: my emphasis).
This notwithstanding, the status and appeal of instrumentalism in 
science might have remained equivocable, with 'mechanistic 
materialism' and 'neo-Kantianism' as the main competitors at the 
turn of this century (Suppe, 1978, p.10), were it not for the advent 
of the special theory of relativity and the quantum theeoy. Within 
less than three decades (by which time the general theory of 
relativity had entailed the special theory and the quantum theory 
had been superseded by quantum mechanics) these advances were judged 
by the community of scientists to have vanquished the "classical" 
physics which had been dominated by Newton for over two centuries.
Instrumentalists were to claim fresh inspiration and corroboration 
especially from quantum mechanics (as construed by the so-called 
'Copenhagen Interpretation'). Amongst the epistemological 
pronouncements and asides made by its leading contributors and 
seized upon by instrumentalists in support of their case, perhaps 
the most notorious is a remark attributed to Niels Bohr:
'There is no quantum world. There is only an 
abstract quantum mechanical description. It is wrong 
to think that the task of physics is to find out how 
nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about 
nature •~r~
(Bohr, oral comment attributed by Petersen, 1963, 
p.12: original emphasis).2
Instrumentalism thus became more than a doctrine for disappointed
realists, indeed, its basic tenets were taken up and developed by
the Logical Positivists, led by Moritz Schlick and his Vienna
Circle, into possibly the most ambitious form of intellectual (not
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to say, cultural) imperialism ever attempted. For the Logical 
Positivists, scientific knowledge was held to comprise all 
knowledge; all else was held to be 'metaphysics' and, as such, was 
deemed to be not only false but also meaningless. This stems from 
their view that only the language of science (what they termed 
'cognitive discourse') could meet the stringent conditions of their 
'verifiability Principle', ennunciated by Schlick, i.e. 'The meaning 
of a proposition is the method of its verification' (Schlick, 1936, 
P- )•
For my purposes, however, the most important innovation or addition 
that the Logical Positivists made to the neo-positivism of Mach was, 
as their title suggests, their admittance of "pure", i.e. 
"unsensationalized", mathematics to science and of mathematical 
logic to their epistemology for this rekindled interest in, and 
allowed for a greater role of, deductive reasoning in epistemology 
of science. Kraft provides an admirable summary of the 
complementary roles and statuses of logic and empiricism in Logical 
Positivism:
'In the Vienna Circle two points of view were 
fundamental: The special position of logic and 
mathematics and the empirical ground of the knowledge 
of reality. Logic and mathematics are valid not 
because they are concerned with the laws of reality, 
neither in its most general laws nor the natural 
necessities of thinking, but because they establish 
the rules of our language. This is why both are 
valid independent of experience. Knowledge of 
reality, by contrast, is dependent on experience; in 
it lies the ground of its validity.'
(Kraft, 1974, p.187).
The language of science was construed to be comprised of a hierarchy 
of levels, with statements that record instrument readings at the 
base, and their theories at the apex:
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Language Levels in Science
Level Content E.g.
Theories Deductive systems in which 
laws are theorems
Kinetic molecular 
theory
Laws Invariant (or statistical) 
relations among scientific 
concepts
Boyle’s Law 
(‘P oci/V ’)
Values of 
concepts
Statements that assign 
values to scientific concepts
‘P =  2.0 atm.* 
‘V =  1.5 lit.’
Primary
experimental
data
Statements about pointer 
readings, menisci, counter 
clicks, et al.
‘Pointer p  is 
on 3.5.*
Figure 4.1 Table Showing the ’Logical Reconstructionist *
Hierarchy of Language Levels in Science (after Losee, 
1980, p.175)
Logical Positivism in its original extreme form, which embraced both 
the Verifiability Principle of meaning and an epistemologically 
idealistic3 rejection of metaphysics, soon gave way to burgeoning 
formal philosophical criticism and from complementary 
historiographic examinations of the conduct of science itself.
Chalmers has summarized what remains as perhaps the greatest defect 
of instrumentalism:
fThe fact that theories can lead to novel predictions 
is an embarrassment for instrumentalists. It must 
seem a strange kind of accident to them that 
theories, that are supposed to be mere calculating 
devices, can lead to the discovery of new kinds of 
observable phenomena by way of concepts that are 
theoretical fictions.1 
(Chalmers, 1982, p.149).
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As one example in support of this criticism, Chalmers discusses 
Kekule's theory concerning the molecular structure of certain 
organic compounds, notably, Benzene, which were later "observed*' by 
electron microscopes. This example is, perhaps, a particularly 
compelling example because, as Chalmers points out, Kekule himself 
had a somewhat instrumentalist attitude towards his own theory: he 
regarded his ring structures as useful theoretical fictions. 
Although instrumentalism remained most plausible with respect to 
micro-physics it did not prove to be immune to similar criticism 
from even that area. It became accepted that in most contexts 
scientists not only thought realistically (in an ontological sense) 
but also that it was empirically plausible, even necessary, that 
they should do so.
As I have earlier implied, Logical Positivists responded to the 
critical onslaught by weakening their extreme original position. 
Thus the untenability of an inductive logic of discovery led 
Reichenbach (1938, p.6-7) to introduce a categorical distinction 
between the 'context of discovery1 and the 'context of 
justification'. On this view, the problems and importance of the 
context of discovery for the actual conduct of science were now not 
denied, but they were excluded from the concerns of epistemology. 
The context of discovery was held to fall within the province of 
psychology and history; epistemology, by contrast, was deemed to be 
exclusively concerned with, and exclusively competent to deal with, 
the context of justification. Epistemologists intially attempted 
critically to maintain ontological "agnosticism". In response to 
logical criticism (Hume's Problem) they strove to preserve their 
commitment to verificationism by requiring only probabilistic 
inferences: they developed 'inductive probabililistic1 forms of
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logic. By the middle of this century, however, most empiricist 
philosophers of science had come to accept that theoretical terms 
neither could, nor should, be precisely definable in observation 
language (Papineau, 1979, p.10).
Carnap (1956, p.47) introduced his so-called 'double language model' 
consisting of two, semi-autonomous, languages, namely, an 
'observational language' and a 'theoretical language' - the latter 
containing a postulate system.
Suppe lists the following as paradigm examples of observational and 
theoretical terms:
Observation Terms Theoretical Terms
red volume 
warm floats 
left of wood 
touches water 
longer than iron 
hard weight 
stick cell nucleus
, electric field mass 
electron electric resistance 
atom temperature 
molecule gene 
wave function virus 
charge ego
Figure 4.2 Table Showing Paradigm Examples of Observational and 
Theoretical Terms (Suppe, 1974, p. 80)
Scientific theories were construed to be axiomatic calculi in which 
theoretical terms and statements could now only be given a partial 
observational interpretation by means of 'correspondence rules.'
Clusters of the modified doctrines which emerged are referred to 
variously as 'Logical Empiricisms', the 'Orthodoxy' and the 
'Received View^. All of them however, continued to embrace the
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three doctrines of truth by verification, inductive reasoning and 
"brute data" i.e. data which has not been subjected to 
interpretation, judgement etc. Since it is often difficult to 
delineate traditions or sub-traditions in the move away from Logical 
Positivism, particularly as regards the "quality" of truth endorsed 
(i.e. phenomenal or ontological)* I:shall use the title 'empiricist- 
verificationist' to refer to all traditions which subscribe to the
three doctrines above, irrespective of the way truth is understood.
I shall use the title 'orthodox account1 to refer to all 
post-Logical Positivist traditions of empirical-verificationism.
Deductive reasoning was given full reign in what Feyerabend 
([1962] 1981a, p.91) has called the 'orthodox theory of reduction 
and explanation'.
Simply stated, the orthodox theory of scientific explanation, as 
propounded most influentially by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), 
consists of the view that the facts to be explained (the 
'explanandum') must be a logical consequence of the discipline which 
functions as the basis of explanation (the 'explanans'), i.e. the 
explanandum must be logically deducible from the information 
contained in the explanans. If not, then 'the explanans would not 
constitute adequate grounds for the explanation.' (Hempel and 
Oppenheim, 1948, p. 321).
On this orthodox, deductive, theory of explanation there are two 
principal ways by which growth in knowledge might be (said to have 
been) achieved. The first of these is by "confirmation erosion". 
This is where a theory is widely accepted to be highly confirmed but 
subsequent developments, such as technological advances which
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substantially improve the accuracy of observations and measurements, 
undermine the degree of confirmation thereby allowing for a 
replacement theory. As an explanation for the growth of knowledge, 
confirmation erosion complements in many ways the Baconian notion of 
an "incursion of prejudice". The overthrow of Ptolemy’s geocentric 
cosmology by the heliocentric one of Copernicus is a frequently 
claimed example of this. The second way, namely, "theory 
extension", is where a theory which, again, is widely held to be 
highly confirmed, comes to be "extended" from its original range of 
convenience to encompass a larger class of phenomena. An often 
proposed example of this is the development of the theory of 
mechanics which was originally held only to describe the motions of 
point masses but which was later extended to apply to the motions of 
rigid bodies.
Highly complementary to the orthodox theory of explanation is the 
view that to explain a theory is to show that it follows as a 
logical (deductive) consequence of (an)other theories. It is not 
unduly misleading to characterize this view as simply the orthodox 
theory of explanation "grown large".
The most influential proponent of this idea is Nagel (1949, 1953, 
1961) who argues for "growth by incorporation" or, as he more 
formally terms it, growth by theory ’reduction’. He summarizes the 
character and purpose of his theory in the following way:
’The objective of the reduction is to show that the 
laws or general principles of the secondary science 
are simply logical consequences of the assumptions of 
the primary science (the reducing science). However, 
if these laws contain expressions that do not occur 
in the assumptions of the primary science, a logical 
derivation is the explicit formulation of suitable
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relations between such expressions in the secondary 
science and the expressions occurring in the premises 
of the primary discipline.’
(Nagel, 1953, p.541).
And elsewhere Nagel asserts that
’Reduction, in the sense in which the work is here 
employed, is the explanation of a theory or a set of 
experimental laws established in one area of enquiry, 
by a theory usually though not invariably formulated 
for some other domain.
(Nagel, 1961, p. 338).
This is a view which Feyerabend argues' [ ] implies that the 
conditions for explanation and the conditions for reduction coincide 
for Nagel.' (Feyerabend, 1965, p. 169 n.102).
Paradigm examples of such growth in knowledge include the reduction 
of Galileo's terrestrial physics by Newtonian dynamics and the 
reduction of Newtonian mechanics by General Relativity Theory 5.
Returning now to the problems of instrumentalism and which were not 
fully resolved by orthodox accounts, a climate of intellectual 
opinion gradually emerged which sought an ontologically realistic 
but yet corrigible theory of knowledge.
Now, realist epistemology begins with the joint assumption of a 
reality to be known (the Assumptions of Realism or AR) and that a 
means of knowing it may be forthcoming (reality is comprensible: the 
Assumptions of Epistemological Realism or AER).
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The classical constructivism of Kant certainly met these criteria 
but, one way or another, his articulation of the Constructivist 
Knowledge Thesis (CKT) had been judged to be dogmatic, i.e. 
incorrigible. Nor, for essentially the same reasons, could the 
doctrines of the so-called 'neo-Kantians*, who had been influential 
at the turn of this century and who had been led by Cohen and his 
Marburg School, be seriously considered. This was because their 
notion of ’structures’ or 'forms’ of phenomena endorsed a 'Platonic 
sort of absoluteness' (Suppe, 1974, p.9) which virtually precluded 
acceptance of both relativity theory and quantum theory.
A solution attempted by Popper was to render constructivism 
corrigible by means of an injection of empiricism. The 
constructivist foundation of AER and CKT was now augmented by what 
one author has termed 'standard empiricism' (Maxwell, 1984, 
p. 12 n. 2: original emphasis), a view which enjoins as a central 
tenet of epistemology 'the principle of empiricism which asserts 
that in science, only observation and experiment may decide upon the 
acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, including laws and 
theories.' (Popper, 1972, p.54; original emphasis: quoted by 
Maxwell). Epistemological realism, however, was no longer to be 
construed and pursued as an absolute, "global*', affair a la Kant 
but, rather, was to be comprehended piecemeal. At the same time, 
such piecemeal comprehension could not be understood in terras of 
successive verification a la empirical verificationism due to the 
instability or revolutionary character displayed so palpably by 
developments in 20th century science. Popper, as we have seen 
responded by opting for falsifiability in his brand of objectivist- 
methodological-constructivism. By this manoeuvre he hoped to fuse 
ontological realism with corrigible objectivity of knowledge claims.
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Principally under Popper's influence, knowledge came to be 
understood by philosophers of science to grow by successive 
approximation to reality: each later approximation closer than the 
last. Reality, then, was held to be comprehended (and only 
comprehensible) by piecemeal approximation.
Laudan has termed such a view 'convergent epistemological realism' 
(CER) and he characterizes it by elaborating five complementary 
theses, at least the first four of which I suggest are endorsed by 
Popper:
'Rl) Scientific theories (at least in the 'mature' 
sciences) are typically approximately true and more 
recent theories are closer to the truth than older 
theories in the same domain;
R2) The observational and theoretical terms within 
the theories of a mature science genuinely refer 
(roughly, there are substances in the world that 
correspond to the ontologies presumed by our best 
theories);
R3) Successive theories in any mature science will 
be such that they 'preserve' the theoretical 
relations and the apparent referents of earlier 
theories (i.e. earlier theories will be 'limiting 
cases' of later theories).
R4) Acceptable new theories do and should explain 
why their predecessors were successful insofar as 
they were successful.
To these semantic, methodological and epistemic 
theses is conjoined an important meta-philosophical 
claim about how realism is to be evaluated and 
assessed. Specifically, it is maintained that:
R5) Theses (Rl)-(R4) entail the ('mature') 
scientific theories should be successful; indeed 
theses constitute the best, if not the only, 
explanation for the success of science. The 
empirical success of science (in the sense of giving 
detailed explanations and accurate predictions) 
accordingly provides striking empirical confirmation 
for realism.'6 
(Laudan, 1981, p.33).
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Now, Laudan's first thesis, Rl, identifies something that shall 
later be of crucial importance in distinguishing objectivist- 
methodological-constructivist traditions from post-empiricist ones, 
viz. the idea of closer approximations to reality re-admits the idea 
of ontological, truth into epistemology after its long exile from 
mainstream philosophy of science due to the prevalence of 
instrumentalist and orthodox accounts (ef. Popper, 1972, p.231, 
quoted in Section 3.4.2). As Laudan remarks:
’[ ] I take it that a realist would never want to 
say that a theory was approximately true if its 
central theoretical terms failed to refer. [~~]. (An 
i ns t rumen tali stT^ of course, could d<Hi t enance the 
weaker claim that a theory was approximately true so 
long as its directly testable consequences were close 
to the observable values. But [ ] the realist must 
take claims about approximate truth to refer alike to 
the observable and the deep-structural dimensions of 
a theory [i.e. ontological, commitments ].)1 
(Laudan, 1981, p.33: original emphasis).
Notwithstanding his admission of an earlier diffidence, Popper is 
enthusiastic in proclaiming that when Tarski’s (1944) 'semantic1 
conception of truth involving the notion of a 'meta-language' is 
incorporated into his epistemology it re-establishes the 'intuitive 
idea' that truth is 'correspondence to the facts':
'Tarski's greatest achievement, and the real 
significance of his theory for the philosophy of the 
empirical sciences, is that he rehabilitated the 
correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth 
which had become suspect. He vindicated the free use 
of the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to 
the facts. [ ]. Thanks to Tarski's work, the idea of 
objective or absolute truth - that is truth as 
correspondence to the facts - appears to be accepted 
today with confidence by all who understand it.' 
(Popper, 1972, p.224 and p.. 225-6).
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I mention that whilst this last quotation demonstrates unequivocally 
Popper's commitment to a correspondence theory of truth, his 
appropriation of Tarski’s theory has been severely, and in my 
opinion, fatally, criticized (for an especially clear and compelling 
example, see Haack, 1976).
Unaccepting of such criticisms, however, Popper (in common with all 
objectivists) identified truth to be the aim of science. In his 
intellectual autobiography, Popper comments pertinently on this 
issue when he articulates the differences which he perceives to 
exist between his brand of objectivlst- methodological- 
constructivism (or, as he himself terras it, 'critical rationalism') 
and the 'traditional philosophy’:
'[Tjraditional philosophy linked the ideal of 
rationality with final, demonstrable knowledge 
(either proreligious or anti-religious: religion was 
the main issue) while I linked it with the growth of 
conjectural knowledge. This itself I linked with the 
idea of a better and better approximation to truth, 
or of increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. 
According to this view, finding theories which are 
better approximations to truth is what the scientist 
aims at; the aim of science is knowing more and 
more. This involves the growth of the content of our 
theories, the growth of our knowledge of the world.* 
(Popper, 1978, pp.149-150: original emphasis).
For Popper, scientists and critical rationalists are 'guided by the 
idea of truth as a regulative principle' (as Kant [! ] or Pierce 
might have said); [ ].' (Popper, 1972, p.226: original emphasis). 
Knowledge, if unfalsified, is forever conjectural but we are always 
free to re-construe it and, assuming at least some empirical 
corroboration is forthcoming, thereby knowingly advance towards the
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truth. Popper summarises these ontologically realistic yet fallible 
and approximate qualities he sees as characteristic of scientific 
knowledge by means of a striking metaphor:
’The empirical basis of objective science has thus 
nothing 'absolute’about it. Science does not rest 
upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its 
theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is 
like a building erected on piles* The piles are 
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down 
to any natural or 'given'base; and if we stop driving 
the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached 
firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied 
that the piles are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being.'
(Popper, 1980, p. 111).
Now, two Personal Constructivists, Pope and Keen (1981, p. 29), have 
appropriated the widely used expression 'relativity of knowledge' to 
refer to epistemological stances which reject accumulative 
fragmentalism and the attainability of "final, demonstrable, 
knowledge" but which accept persons' perennial freedom to reconstrue 
knowledge claims. Pope and Keen argue that the epistemological 
aspect of PCP is commensurate with the relativity of knowledge and 
they cite a number of other philosophers and social scientists who 
similarly endorse this thesis thus understood.
Whilst I accept that this commitment is indeed shared by those 
authors whom Pope and Keen instance, their characterization of the 
'relativity of knowledge* and their inclusion of Popper amongst 
those whom they cite in support of it should not be taken to imply 
further commonality of commitments concerning the quality and mode 
of evaluating constructs (theories, ideas) 7.
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To clarify, whilst Popper and objectivist-raethodological- 
constructivists endorse the relativity of knowledge, they argue that 
we can and do have "sufficiently good reasons" for knowing that our 
later or preferred theories are more true as judged relative to our 
earlier or rival theories. This contrasts with Kelly and 
post-empiricists who, whilst also endorsing the relativity of 
knowledgej go on to argue that we can arid do have "sufficiently good 
reasons" for knowing "only" that our later or preferred theories are 
more useful as judged relative to our earlier or rival theories. 
Convergent epistemological realism and correspondence theories of 
truth play no role whatsoever in these latter traditions and from 
their perspective these objectivistic commitments undermine or 
preclude a desirable and defensible treatment of meaning - an issue 
of central importance to educationalists. I shall devote the 
remainder of this chapter to elaborating upon, exemplifying and 
justifying these views.
Popper has taken considerable pains to delineate his approach from 
those of other epistemological traditions, especially 
empiricist-verificationist ones. Thus, he claims to be a realist 
but yet a fallibalist; he argues for falsifiability rather than 
verifiability as a demarcation criterion for scientific knowledge 
and he rejects the double-language model for theoretical and 
observational terms.
Popper has been widely interpreted to have been successful in 
demonstrating these differences. Widely, but not comprehensively: 
we have already seen that some critics have argued that Popper's 
notion of corroboration allows inductive reasoning to "creep in by 
the back door" (cf. Chapter 3, n. 25). I point out that Popper,
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like empiricist-verificationists, resolutely excludes metaphysics 
from his demarcation criterion for scientific knowledge - 
notwithstanding his claim to have rehabilitated a role for it in 
science. Again, he would seem to endorse and perpetuate 
Reichenbach’s distinction between a context of discovery and context 
of justification (not to mention Hume's Law, which may be argued to 
complement it in many respects). Most importantly, however,
Popper's objectivism requires him (like all
objectivist-methodological-constructivists) to treat explanation and 
issues of meaning in a manner which is virtually indistinguishable 
from that of orthodox accounts, indeed, Feyerabend( [1962 ] 1981, p. 
48) has argued that the orthodox theory of explanation 'may be 
regarded as an elaboration of suggestions that were first made, in a 
less definite form, by Popper' (cf•Popper, 1980, section 12).
I shall not attempt to present a detailed demonstration of Popper's 
orthodoxy concerning explanation and reductionfor my purposes, 
only brief reference to certain of his remarks and asides should be 
sufficient.
Thus, in his intellectual autobiography, Popper enthusiastically 
cites the formative influence that a remark made by Einstein in 1917 
exerted upon the development of his epistemology:
'There could be no fairer destiny for any physical 
theory than that it should point the way to a more 
comprehensive theory, in which it lives on as a 
limiting case.'
(Einstein, quoted by Popper, 1978, p. 38).
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Popper goes on to approve Havas (1964) as having provided a ’clear1 
demonstration that Newton's theory may, indeed, be regarded as a 
limiting case of Einstein's theory of gravitation (achieved by 
formulating the former in a 'general relativistic' or 'covariant' 
way, viz. 'by taking the velocity of light as infinite.* (Popper, 
1978, p. 38 n. 32).
Popper's notion of empirical corroboration of theories , necessary 
to render useable his requirement of falsiflability of theories, 
explains his sympathy for theory reduction for a theory may be 
regarded as falsified if it is entailed by (is reduced by) another 
theory. Notwithstanding the fact that Popper stops short of a 
straightforward requirement of strict deductive relations between 
> all our earlier or rival theories and all our later or preferrred 
theories (as all orthodox theorists ultimately do), the spell that 
deductivism holds over him is, I think, particularly apparent in the 
following commentary which he provides on the nature and development 
of his ideas:
'I have discussed the question of the degrees of 
independence of tests in various places; it is an 
interesting problem, and it is connected with the 
problems of simplicity and depth. Since then 1 have 
also stressed the need to refer it or relativize it 
to the problem of explanation which we are engaged in 
solving, and to the problem situations under 
discussion, because all these ideas bear on the 
degrees of 'goodness' of the competing theories. 
Moreover, the degree of boldness of a theory also 
depends on its relation to predecessors.
The main point of interest is, I think, that for very 
high degrees of boldness or non-adhocness I have been 
able to give an objective criterion. It is that the 
new theory, although it has to explain what the old 
theory explained, corrects the old theory, so that it 
actually contradicts the old theory: it contains the 
old theory, but only as an approximation. Thus I 
pointed out that Newton's theory contradicts both 
Kepler's and Galileo's theories - although it explains
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them, owing to the fact that it contains them as 
approximations; and similarly Einstein's theory 
contradicts Newton's, which it likewise explains, and 
contains as an approximation.'
(Popper, 1979, p. 16: original emphasis)g.
For Popper, theory reduction might be said to be an "endorsed side 
effect" of his epistemological prescriptions: his main emphasis 
remains on falsiflability as both a demarcation criterion for 
scientific knowledge and as a requirement for its growth. He 
appeals to theory reduction only in his rational reconstruction of 
the history of the growth of scientific knowledge: it helps him 
strengthen his claims both to have provided an ontologically 
realistic method ('objective method*) and that his method has 
actually been used. As Laudan (1981, p. 31 n. 9) has pointed out, 
however, Popper, unlike some of his disciples and intellectual 
descendents, is generally careful not to assert that actual 
historical theories exhibit ever increasing truth content (an 
exception which Laudan cites ocfcurs in Popper, 1972, p. 220). And 
theory reduction, which involves two theories, plays no role in 
Popper's methodology per se. This is why I earlier referred to it 
as only an "endorsed side effect" of Popper's epistemology. Lakatos 
(1970, p. 129) is hence quite correct when he refers to 'deductive 
model[s]' of scientific explanation and change - amongst which he 
explicitly includes Popper's -as 'mono-theoretical' (my emphasis).
Popper's quest for, and belief in the attainability of, objective
knowledge but which is forever conjectural and fallible leads him to
construe all questions of meaning in essentialist terms. In his
notorious table of 'ideas', Popper relegates such questions to a
category of 'unimportant' ('my thesis is that the left side of this
table is unimportant, as compared to the right side [ ]' Popper,
1979, p. 123: original emphasis):
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IDEAS 
that is
DESIGNATIONS Or TERMS Or STATEMENTS Or PROPOSITIONS
CONCEPTS Or THEORIES
may be formulated in
WORDS
MEANINGFUL
which may be 
and their
ASSERTIONS
TRUE
MEANING TRUTH
may be reduced, by way o f
DEFINITIONS DERIVATIONS
to that o f
UNDEFINED CONCEPTS PRIMITIVE PROPOSITIONS
the attempt to establish {rather than reduce) by these means their
MEANING TRUTH
leads to an infinite regress
Figure 4.3 Table of 'Ideas' (after Popper, e.g. 1979, p. 124).
Popper originally proposed this table in a lecture he delivered in 
1960 and which was entitled 'On the Sources of Knowledge and 
Ignorance*. The implication thiat Popper made then, as in his later 
uses of this table, was that questions of meaning were not only 
'unimportant* but also a "source of ignorance". Popper argues that 
instead ’[ ] what should concern us are theories; truth; argument.* 
(Popper, 1979, p. 123).
Notwithstanding the similarities I have drawn between Popper's 
epistemology (as prime representative of objectivist-raethodological- 
constructivism) and orthodox "hypothetico-deductive" accounts, the 
extent of these similarities must remain controversial and somewhat 
obscure owing to Popper's extreme caution whenever the chips really 
are down. I suggest that what is ultimately clear, however, is that 
for all its multi-facetedness post-empiricist philosophy of science 
purports to provide an even-handed critique and alternative to them.
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Now, my discussion of the post-empiricist critique and alternative 
shall be both selective and incomplete in many ways. This stems 
partly from its multi-facetedness as I have recently mentioned - 
post-empiricism is presently constituted of only a loose alliance of 
views and traditions - and partly from my desire to include and 
promote POP amongst them.
The original and essential characteristics of the critical 
alternative of post-empiricism to orthodox accounts and to Popper 
and objectivist-methodological-constructivism may, however, usefully 
be summarised as a two pronged assault, each of which ultimately 
converge.
Thus, firstly, Popper's persistence with a deductive account of
explanation, whereby '[ ]' meaning' in natural science presupposes
*
an account of the empirical reference of terms and of their 
intensional connotations within a scientific theory' (Hesse, 1980, 
p. 171), renders him susceptible of formal criticisms and of the 
charge of instrumentalism - thereby undermining any claim to 
articulate an objectivist-methodological-constructivist 
epistemology. Post-empiricists, by contrast, embrace a "richer” 
meaning of 'meaning' (scientific explanation) since they do not 
divorce 'data' from their human (and possibly culture, tradition or 
even person specific) origin and purpose and thereby 'go beyond an 
external semantics of language' (Hesse, 1980, p. 171). For 
post-empiricists, questions of meaning are far from being 
'unimportant' and amongst 'sources of ignorance' : to the contrary, 
they are considered to be of pre-eminent importance and interest 
(the brand of post-empiricism which I endorse does, however, reject 
essentialism). This difference of approach is reflected in the
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post-empiricists’ treatment of the history of science, viz. they 
include 'external' or 'social' factors as well as 'internal* or 
'rational* ones. I suggest that in at least some branches of 
post-empiricism, history of science (both internal and external) may 
also be said to be - 'constitutive' as opposed to merely 
'illustrative' of philosophy of science.
Secondly, Popper's endorsement of CKT and of the perennial 
fallibility of knowledge claims has been used to undermine his 
demand for (empirical) falsiflability - 'all knowledge is 
theory-impregnated, including our observations’ - and hence any 
claim to articulate an objectivist-methodological-constructivist 
epistemology10. Post-empiricists, by contrast, extend the notion of 
rational theory-choice beyond the demand of 'standard empiricism', 
discussed earlier, to include also as relevant evidence 
compatibility of theories with the metaphysical assumptions and 
commitments informing them.
Occupying an influential position in the critical arsenal of 
post-empiricism is the 'incommensurability' thesis. This thesis was 
originally and "independently" enunciated by both Kuhn and 
Feyerabend (especially Kuhn [1962] 1970, Feyerabend [1962] 1981)n*
The idea that non-trivial theories in the history, and, in 
Feyerabend's account, even in the contemporary practice, of science 
might be incommensurable has variously inspired, baffled and 
dismayed philosophers of science and of social science. These 
widely differing reactions stem partly from ambiguities in the 
original writings of Kuhn and Feyerabend (compounded by many of 
their commentators) and partly from the nature of the thesis itself
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which was never intended by its authors to be "monolithic" and 
which, moreover, critically allows for an inevitable residue of 
"vagueness" in any generalisable account of theory-choice and 
change. These two factors - ambiguity in original presentation and 
critical endorsement of a degree of vagueness - have often been 
confounded by admirers and detractors of incommensurability alike.
I am particulary keen to demonstrate that the typical objectivist 
response to incommensurability, which claims that it represents an 
open invitation to extreme subjectivism, irrationalism and nihilism, 
is inappropriate and to incorporate this demonstration within a 
clear, positive, case for its potentialities.
In his seminal paper on incommensurability, Feyerabend summarizes 
two basic assumptions of the orthodox account which he rejects and 
transcends:
'The first assumption was that the explanandum is 
derivable from the explanans. The second assumption 
was that meanings are invariant with respect to the 
process of reduction and explanation.'
(Feyerabend [1962] 1981a, p. 91: original emphasis).
Now, I suggest that the critical alternative offered by the 
incommensurability thesis to these two assumptions of the orthodox 
account find their respective loci within each of the prongs of the 
post-empiricist assault (as I have earlier characterized it). The 
demise of the first assumption is achieved by demonstrating logical 
incompatibility between rival theories and may be said to follow as 
a trivial and less radical consequence of the rejection of the 
second assumption which is effected by demonstrating ontological
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incompatibility between rival theories, i.e. incommensurability 
proper. The rejection of the first assumption gains its importance 
only by virtue of its temporal relation to the relative 
chronological impact of epistemological traditions, viz. orthodox 
accounts followed by Popper and objectivist-methodological- 
constructivism (be they variants of, or alternatives to, 
orthodoxy). Accordingly, I shall discuss the arguments against the 
first assumption in a somewhat abstract manner and leave contextual 
(i.e. historiographic) support until after my consideration of the 
arguments against the second assumption of orthodox accounts.
Thus, Feyerabend prefaces his arguments for incommensurability by 
making it clear that they apply only to 'general1 or 'universal* or 
'comprehensive' or 'non-instantial' theories such as 'the 
Aristotelian theory of motion, the impetus theory, Newton's 
celestial mechanics, Maxwell's electrodynamics, the theory of 
relativity, and the quantum theory.' (Feyerabend, [1962], 1981, 
p. 44) - in other words, examples of the sort with which orthodox 
theorists have been primarily concerned. For my present purposes, 
Feyerabend's meaning of 'non-instantial' theories may be considered 
to be synonymous with Hempel's meaning of 'explanans' and Kuhn's 
meaning of 'paradigm'. Since it is only with these sorts of 
theories that I shall be concerned I shall refer to them simply as 
'theories'.
Feyerabend allows that the orthodox theory of explanation and 
reduction 'fairly adequately represents the relation between 
sentences of the 'All-ravens-are-black' type, which abound in the 
more pedestrian parts of the scientific enterprise'. (Feyerabend, 
[1962], 1981a, p. 44). This qualification to the applicability of
- 4.29 -
the incommensurability thesis does not constitute any kind of 
concession to the orthodox theory and follows from the different way 
in which empirical generalizations are tested in comparison with 
theories, as Feyerabend explains:
'In what follows, the usual distinction will be drawn 
between empirical generalizations, on the one side, 
and theories, on the other. Empirical 
generalizations are statements, such as "All A's are 
B's" (the A's and B's are not necessarily 
observational entities), which are tested by 
inspection of instances (the A's). Universal 
theories, such as Newton's theory of gravitation, are 
not tested in this manner. Roughly speaking their 
test consists of two steps: (1) derivation, with the 
help of suitable boundary conditions, of empirical 
generalizations and (2) tests, in the manner 
indicated above, of these generalizations. One 
should not be misled by the fact that universal 
theories too can be (and usually are) put in the form 
'All A's are B's*; for whereas in the case of 
generalizations this form reflects the test 
procedures in a very direct way, such an immediate 
relation between the form and the test procedure does 
not obtain in the case of theories. Many thinkers 
have been seduced by the similarity of form into 
thinking that the test procedures will be the same in 
both cases.'
(Feyerabend, [1962], 1981a, p. 44 n. 1: original 
emphasis).
Logical incompatibility of theories which are "in the same domain" 
or, as Feyerabend puts it, situation where rival theories, 
'deductively disjoint1 (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 67), use concepts which 
cannot be brought into the usual logical relations of inclusion, 
exclusion and overlap.
Now, it has long been accepted by orthodox theorists that rarely in 
fact does a strict deductive relation obtain between scientific 
explanans and explanation (and between earlier or rival theories and 
later or preferred theories) but only a relation of "approximate 
fit". And, further, that what counts as sufficiently approximate
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fit cannot be decided deductively but involves a ’complicated 
function of coherence with the rest of a theoretical system, general 
empirical acceptability throughout the domain of the explanandum, 
and many other factors’ (Hesse, 1980, p. 121). Putnam (1965) 
actually suggested that Nagel's theory of reduction could be 
protected against Feyerabend's charge of logical incompatibility by 
specifying that it is only a suitable approximation of the earlier 
theory that is deducible from the later one.
This orthodox manoeuvre, however, omits or glosses an explanation
(and between earlier or rival theories and later or preferred
theories) but only relations of approximate fit, indeed, Putnam
(1965) suggested that if it was actually specified that it is only a
suitable approximation of the earlier theory that is deducible from
the later one, then Nagel's theory of reduction could be protected
«
against Feyerabend*s criticism.
Feyerabend ([1965] 1981a) was quick to respond, however, that this 
orthodox manoeuvre effectively undermined their claim to provide an 
account of actual cases of theory replacement since the 
transformation of the earlier theory into a suitable approximation 
of the later theory requires that " grievous ontological violence" 
be committed against the former. The epistemological account which 
emerges thereafter, however and moreover, disguises the element of 
(often passionate) disagreement over rival theories which Feyerabend 
sees as essential to the development of scientific knowledge.
Now, Feyerabend would not deny the practical utility of sometimes 
construing an earlier theory as an approximation of a later theory 
and then deriving deductive relations beteen them. The earlier
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theory might, for example, offer easier means of calculation which 
are accurate within the limits required (Newtonian rather than 
relativistic mechanics was sufficient to send rockets to the moon). 
But the epistemological force of the orthodox account is lost in the 
process of transforming the earlier theory in order to achieve an 
approximate fit with the later theory for as Hesse points out:
* [ ] what counts as sufficient approximate fit cannot
be decided deductively, but is a complicated function 
of coherence with the rest of a theoretical system, 
general empirical acceptability throughout the domain 
of the explanandum, and many other factors.'
(Hesse, 1980, p. 121: my emphasis).
The reason why logical incompatibility is less radical than 
ontological incompatibility is because the former amounts only to a 
reduction ad absurdum of the orthodox account: for the sake of 
argument, it grants that there is a common framework - a logical 
framework - within which two theories may be demonstrated to be 
incompatible. This crucial assumption, however, is precisely what 
ontological incompatibility, i.e. incommensurability proper, denies 
as I shall now try to show.
In articulating the incommensurability thesis, Kuhn and Feyerabend 
would seem to have drawn partial inspiration and support from the 
ideas of Duhem, Quine and Hanson and so to that extent their thesis 
is compatible and complementary to the earlier work of these 
authors, specifically, Quine's stress on the 'undetermination' of 
theory by data and the 'indeterminacy of translation' between rival 
theories. Quine's epistemology has, In turn, some intellectual 
antecedents in the historical researches of Duhem. Their 
interaction has led to the so-called "Duhem-Quine Thesis" which,
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briefly stated, 'holds that any theory can be permanently saved from 
refutation by some suitable adjustment to the background knowledge 
in which it is embedded' (Lakatos, 1970, p. 184). Hanson's 
influence stems from his emphasis on the. perceptual discontinuities 
which he argues are a consequence of theory-change.
Feyerabend*s development of the incommensurability thesis may be 
said to have begun with criticisms of Carnap's double-language model 
based upon his commitment to CKT.
Thus, for example, in an early paper he argues for the thesis that
*[ 1 the interpretation of an observation-language is
determined by the theories which we use to explain 
what we observe, and it changes as soon as those 
theories change. *
Feyerabend, [1958 ] 1981a, p. 31:. original emphasis).
One of the consequences of this thesis is that the observation term 
- theoretical term distinction is context dependent. This also 
implies, however, that a neutral, tradition independent, language or 
rationale for appraising rival theories is not possible. As 
Feyerabend elsewhere puts it:
'Science has always been a matter of context-dependent 
plausibility and not of a context-independent 
'organon of thought'.'
(Feyerabend, 1981b, p. 18).
Feyerabend states clearly the difference he sees between the 
orthodox account of theory change and his own:
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'What happens here when a transition is made from a 
theory T' to a wider theory T (which, we shall 
assume, is capable of covering all the phenomena that 
have been covered by T') is something much more 
radical than incorporation of the unchanged theory T' 
(unchanged, that is, with respect to the meanings of 
its main descriptive terms as well as to the meanings 
of the terms of its observation language) into the 
context of T. What does happen is, rather, a 
replacement of the ontology (and perhaps even of the 
formalism) of T' by the ontology (and the formalism) 
of T, and a corresponding change of the meanings of 
the descriptive elements of the formalism of T*
(provided these elements and this formalism are still 
used). This replacement affects not only the 
theoretical terms of T* but also at least some of the 
observational terms which occurred in its test 
statements. That is, not only will description of 
things and processes in the domain in which T' has 
been applied be infiltrated, either with the 
formalism and the terms of T, or if the terms of T' 
are still in use, with the meanings of the terms of 
T, but the sentences expressing what is accessible to 
direct observation inside this domain will now mean 
something different. In short, introducing a new 
theory involves changes of outlook both with respect 
to the observable and with respect to the 
unobservable features of the world, and corresponding 
changes in the meanings of even the most 
'fundamental' terms of the language employed.' 
(Feyerabend [1962] 1981a, pp. 44-45: original emphasis).
Hence Feyerabend argues that one may tentatively identify a theory 
as incommensurable with another theory 'if its ontological 
consequences are incompatible with the ontological consequences of 
the latter' (Feyerabend, 1981a, p. xi), mere difference of concepts 
does not suffice: the conditions of concept formation in one theory 
must be shown actually to forbid the formation of the basic concepts 
of the other theory (Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 67-68 n. 118).
Feyerabend's notion of incommensurability, as so far I have 
excerpted it from his writings, does noM differ in any important way 
from Kuhn's. Their fully elaborated accounts, however, display many
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differences of emphasis and of detail and, for reasons that I shall 
make clear in section 4.4, below, these are responsible for my 
preference for Feyerabend's approach. One such difference that may 
be timely to mention is that without compromising his critique of 
the orthodox theory Feyerabend places less emphasis upon 
uni-directionality (i.e. earlier to later theories) and totality of 
incommensurable relations:
’Of course, theories may be interpreted in different 
ways, they may be incommensurable in some 
interpretations, not incommensurable in others. 
Still, there are pairs of theories which in their 
customary interpretation turn out to be 
incommensurable in the [ontological] sense at issue 
here. Examples are classical physics and quantum 
theory; general relativity and classical mechanics; 
Homeric Aggregate physics and the substance physics 
of the Presocratics.*
(Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 67-68 n. 118: my emphasis).
Intrinsic to his ideas on incommensurability, Feyerabend (1965, p. 
180) embraces what might be called a 'theoretical-context account of 
meaning’ whereby the meaning of every term we use depends upon the 
theoretical context in which it occurs and cannot be understood in 
isolation from it. As a consequence of this, where there are 'two 
contexts with basic principles that either contradict each other or 
lead-to inconsistent consequences in certain domains, it is to be 
expected that some terms of the first context will not occur in the 
second with exactly the same meanings' (Feyerabend, 1965, p. 180: my 
emphasis).
This also implies that there can be no 'crucial experiments’, at 
least, none as understood in any objective sense (Feyerbend, 1965, 
p. 214). This is not because the experimental device for such an
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experiment would be prohibitively expensive or complicated; rather, 
it would be impossible in principle: the absence of overlap of 
experiences between rival theories means that there could be no 
universally accepted statement (or, more generally, language) 
capable of expressing whatever emerges from the observation.
For exactly these reasons, the incommensurability thesis shows that 
certain forms of epistemological realism are too narrow and in 
conflict with the actual conduct of science (see e.g. Feyerabend, 
1978, pp. 69-70). Amongst influential views "rejected" are the 
ideas that realism must be interpreted as a particular theory or 
that realism is a necessary presupposition of science (and of 
knowledge in general):
'If theories are commensurable, then no problem arises 
- we simple have an addition to knowledge. It is 
different with incommensurable theories. For we 
certainly cannot assume that two incommensurable 
theories deal with one and the same objective state 
of affairs (to make the assumption we would have to 
assume that both at least refer to the same objective 
situation. But how can we assert that 'they both' 
refer to the same situation when 'they both' never 
make sense together? Besides, statements about what 
does and what does not refer can be checked only if 
the things referred to are described properly, but 
then our problem arises again with renewed force).' 
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 70: original emphasis).
Now, Feyerabend does not abandon or deny a role for empirical 
evidence in the methodology of science; rather, he reconstrues its 
status - downwards - so that it can no longer be held to be the 
sole, universal, arbiter in matters of theory-choice and in criteria 
for the growth of knowledge. Here he abandons and rejects only the 
claim of standard empiricism. Nor can it straightforwardly be 
assumed that the incommensurability thesis denies AER (as
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Feyerbend's recent comment might seem to imply) as I shall try to 
argue in section 4.4, below (my 'transformational theory of 
reference').
For Feyerabend, then, theories cannot be understood or tested 
independently from the metaphysical and other extra-empirical 
commitments of the tradition or school of thought in which they 
occur. Feyerabend construes these latter as instances of 'ideology' 
and in its broad social context he takes the whole of science itself 
also to be just one tradition or ideology which is distinguishable 
but not separable from the others (see, especially, Feyerabend, 
1975a). The fruits of Feyerabend's "anarchistic interpretation" of 
objectivist epistemology might be described as underwriting 'radical 
relativity of knowledge' for even the claim of CER is abandoned:
'Knowledge so conceived is not a series of 
self-consistent theories that converges towards an 
ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the 
truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of 
mutually incompatible (and perhaps even 
incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, 
each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the 
collection forcing the others into greater 
articulation and all of them contributing, via this 
process of competition, to the development of our 
consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can 
ever be omitted from a comprehensive account.' 
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 30: original emphasis).
From the perspective Feyerabend provides, the orthodox account (and 
all its objectivist variants) perpetrates
'[ ] an interesting epistemological illusion: the
imagined content of the earlier theories (which is 
the intersection of the remembered consequences of 
these theories with the newly recognized domain of 
problems and facts) shrinks and may decrease to such 
an extent that it becomes smaller than the imagined 
content of the new ideologies (which are the actual
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consequences of these ideologies plus all those 
'facts’, laws, principles which are tied to them by 
ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations or by the 
say-so of some influential physicist or philosopher 
of science - and which properly belong to the 
predecessor). Comparing the old and the new it thus 
appears that the relation of empirical contents is 
like this
new*
or, perhaps, like this
admittedly V 
unexplained \  
part o f old theory
while in actual fact it is much more like this
old
theory
new theorv
domain D representing the problems and facts of the 
old theory which are still remembered and which have 
been distorted so as to fit into the new framework. 
It is this illusion which :ls responsible for the 
persistent survival of the demand for increased 
content.'
(Feyerabend, 1975b, pp. 177-178: original emphasis).
Amongst many examples which Feyerabend uses to demonstrate 
incommensurability are the alleged overthrow by 'reduction' of 
Galilean terrestrial physics to Newtonian dynamics and of Newtonian 
mechanics to General Relativity Theory. These I shall now briefly 
discuss.
Thus, Feyerabend ([1962] 1981a) argues that a basic assumption
underlying Galileo's law concerning the motion of material objects
(e.g. falling stones, penduli, balls on an inclined plane) in free
fall near the surface of the earth is that their vertical
acceleration over any finite (vertical) interval is constant. This
contrasts with Newton’s theory where vertical acceleration in free
fall of such bodies are inversely proportional to the distance of
the earth due to the mutual attractive force exerted by gravity. If
the ratio distance of fall were equal to zero, then Galileo's law 
radius of earth
could, indeed, be derived from Newtonian laws, but in cases of free 
fall this is never the case. The two laws are thus logically 
disjunct and so, strictly speaking, the Galilean relation cannot be 
derived from Newton's law, notwithstanding their experimental 
indistinguishability under ordinary standards of measurement.
In the case of the supposed reduction in Newtonian mechanics to 
General Relativity Theory, Feyerabend (e.g. 1965) likewise does not 
deny that under certain limiting conditions the equations of the 
latter yield values similar to those of the former but he challenges 
the orthodox assumption that the meanings of shared, fundamental, 
terms or concepts remain invariant when this is done. 'Meaning 
invariance' of such terms is necessary for the orthodox requirement 
of 'logical connectability' to be fulfilled. Feyerabend's critical
comparison of the meanings of classical and relativistic ’length1 
and ’mass’, however, show that in this particular case the 
requirement of connectability cannot be met: they are 
incommensurable notions.
To elaborate upon the example of ’mass', in classical mechanics the 
mass of a particle is assumed to be constant and conserved in all 
reactions in a closed system. In relativity theory, by contrast, 
the mass of a particle is proportional to its velocity relative to a 
co-ordinate system (frame of reference) in which the observations 
are made. Accordingly, each theory contains a different set of 
equations about mass. Feyerabend argues that these sets of 
equations are forever incompatible because they reflect - and may 
only be understood in terms of - mutually exclusive ontologies. 
Whilst 'mass 'in the classical theory is an attribute of the object 
itself and is unaffected by its behaviour in co-ordinate systems, 
'mass' in relativity theory is a relation involving relative 
velocities between an object and a co-ordinate system. Although 
various maneouvres may effect a numerical or quantitative 
reconciliation between the two theories (e.g. identifying the 
classical mass with the relativistic rest mass), any claim for an 
objective account of the growth of knowledge is undermined because 
the two "masses" cannot be represented by the same concept.
Now, objectivist critics of the incommensurability thesis often fail 
to appreciate Kuhn's and Feyerabend’s purpose for introducing the 
notion (which is not to suggest that compelling arguments against 
the thesis might not be forthcoming). Thus, Papineau (1979, 
p. 14) 12 comments that a number of critics have 'pointed out' that 
Kuhn's and Feyerabend's views make an 'extreme relativism quite
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inescapable1 and this they have 'understandably1 found 'impossible 
to stomach'. On the other hand, he (they) concedes that decisive, 
generally accepted, arguments against Kuhn and Feyerabend have yet 
to be advanced. Papineau offers the following characterization of 
the critical state of play that has resulted:
'The situation may be characterized as the 'paradox of 
meaning variance*. There do seem to be good 
arguments for moving away from a traditional 
empiricist conception of meaning towards a 
theoretical context account. But then it follows 
that with every change of theory there will be a 
change of meaning (the 'meaning variance thesis').
And with this there seems no way of escaping the 
unpalatable consequences that objective choices 
between scientific theories are impossible'. 
(Papineau, 1979, p. 41).
The first point that I would like to make here is that only an 
objectivist would construe this situation as a paradox! The 
possibility of objective choices between theories is precisely what 
Kuhn and Feyerabend reject but, far from seeing this as heralding 
'unpalatable consequences', Feyerabend, at least, has emphasized 
that this offers new possibilities on an unprecedented scale for a 
socially pertinent and responsible conduct of science. (I shall 
consider this latter claim in section 4.4., below).
Many critics still persist, however, in asserting that Kuhn and 
Feyerabend argue for irrationality, extreme relativism etc, in 
science but this is just not so. In response to such inappropriate 
construals of their intentions, Kuhn has responded thus:
'[ ] to describe [Feyerbend*s ] argument as a defense
of irrationality in science seems to me not only 
absurd but vaguely obscene. I would describe it, 
together with my own, as an attempt to show that 
existing theories of rationality are not quite right
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and that we must readjust or change them to explain 
why science works as it does.'
(Kuhn, 1970b, p. 264).
Much of the confusion concerning Kuhn's and Feyerabend's intentions 
or purpose for their thesis would seem to derive from the still 
widely held myth that they argue that incommensurable theories are 
radically incomparable. Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend, however, have 
ever argued that incommensurable theories are comparable except in a 
fully comprehehsive or objective sense. What they reject as an 
illusory and unworthwhile goal, tVien, is objectivism.
It is easy to see where the myth of incomparability originated. The
stress which Kuhn and Feyerabend each place upon the 
theory-ladenness of all observations (CKT) and, thence, upon the 
incommensurability of certain theories, has led to an over 
identification of their views with those of Hanson (e.g. 1958) who 
argued that theory-change necessarily resulted in perceptual changes 
also - thereby rendering rival theories radically incomparable.
Now, although Kuhn has claimed in a series of notorious passages 
that scientific revolutions result in a 'shift of vision' (Kuhn, 
[1962] 1970a, p. 119) whereby scientists thereafter 'work in a 
different world' (Kuhn, [1962] 1970a, p. 135), close reading even of 
his original text shows that he exercised considerable 
circumspection over any claim for perceptual discontinuities in the 
development of scientific knowledge. Thus, he heavily qualifies his 
endorsement of Hanson's appropriation of notions from certain 
experiments in perception psychology (Kuhn, [1962] 1970a, pp. 
113-114). Kuhn argues that schools guided by different paradigms 
are always 'slightly at cross-purposes’ (Kuhn, [1962] 1970a, p. 112:
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my emphasis) and although he is critical of the double-language 
model which preserves in all essentials the traditional empiricist 
notion that theories are no more that person-made interpretations of 
’given data’, he claims that
'In the absence of a developed alternative, I find it 
impossible to relinquish entirely that viewpoint.' 
(Kuhn, [1962] 1970a, p. 126: my emphasis).
Kuhn is apparently modest enough not to consider his own doctrines 
to constitute such an alternative.
Feyerabend's stance on this issue is somewhat easier to discern than
Kuhn's. Thus, Feyerabend (1978, pp. 67-68 n. 118) straightforwardly
admits that he believed for 'some time' that conceptual differences
would always be accompanied by perceptual differences but, in his
%
'Reply to Criticism' (Feyerabend, [1965] 1981a), he abandoned his 
commitment to the claim of universality of this consequence due to 
its incompatibility with the 'results of psychological research'.
To the charge that he inferred (comprehensive) incomparability of 
incommensurable theories, Feyerabend has responded
'Quite the contrary, I tried to find means of 
comparing such theories. Comparison by content, or 
verisimilitude was of course out. But there 
certainly remained other methods. There are formal 
criteria: a linear theory is preferable to a non 
linear one because solutions can be obtained more 
easily. This was one pf the main arguments against 
the non-linear electrodynamics of Mie, Born and 
Infeld. The argument was also used against the 
general theory of relativity until the development of 
high speed computers simplified numerical 
calculations. Or a 'coherent' theory is preferable 
to a non-coherent one (this was one of Einstein's 
reasons for prefering general relativity to other 
accounts). A theory using many and daring 
approximations to reach 'its facts' may be less 
likeable than a theory that uses only few, and safe
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approximations. Number of facts predicted may be 
another criterion. Nonformal criteria usually demand 
conformity with basic theory (relativistic 
invariance; agreement with basic quantum laws) or 
with metaphysical principles (such as Einstein’s 
’principle of reality*)'.
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 68: original emphasis - I have combined 
Feyerabend’s text with his footnote, n. 119).
Thus, it is only comparison of rival theories via translation 
("commensuration") that Feyerabend denies with the 
incommensurability thesis.
For Kuhn and Feyerabend, the nature of what is actually involved 
when We jdo compare rival theories is the reason why they introduce 
the notion of incommensurability at all. That incommensurable 
theories are comparable is also clear from the method of 
presentation which Kuhn and Feyerabend use to demonstrate instances 
of the relation as Bernstein’s excellent commentary on Feyerabend’s 
discussion of the incommensurability of archaic Greek art with 
traditional Western art elucidatesj3:
'In [Feyerabend's ] example of the Greek archaic style, 
he does not, as some critics have claimed, tell us 
that because this style (and the world view that it 
embodies) it incommensurable with later styles we 
must dumbly contemplate it. We are not confronted 
with forms of life that are so self-contained that we 
cannot compare them. If this were really the case, 
the appropriate response would be silence. On the 
contrary, he attempts to understand what is 
distinctive about this style - and the procedure for 
bringing out what is distinctive depends on a 
skillful use of comparison and contrast. The basic 
presupposition here is that we can understand what is 
distinctive about this incommensurable style and form 
of life - and we do not do this by jumping out of our 
own skins (and language) and transforming ourselves, 
by some sort of mystical intuition or empathy, into 
archaic Greeks. Rather, the analysis proceeds by a 
careful attention to detail - to the various 
"building blocks" - working back and forth in order
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to appreciate and highlight similarities with and 
differences from other styles and forms of life.' ’
(Bernstein, 1980, p. 90: original emphasis).
Feyerabend (though not Kuhn) additionally argues that the generation 
of inconsistent and incommensurable theories constitutes an 
important part of scientific-method (see discussion in section 4.3, 
below).
From my foregoing discussion I hope that the reader has already 
experienced many "resonances" between the incommensurability thesis 
and the formal content of PCP. In the remainder of this part of the 
chapter, however, I shall try to make some of these explicit and to 
explore their interaction. I shall here concentrate upon drawing 
similarities of "constructive structure" ("products") and leave the 
drawing of similarities of "constructive dynamics" ("process") until 
sections 4.3 and 4.4. Specifically, I shall argue that the relation 
of opposite contrast, which is intrinsic to the notion of the 
construct, may usefully, and non-preemptively develop by construing 
it as a relation of incommensurability. I shall begin, however, by 
contrasting certain formal, epistemological, aspects of PCP from 
those of orthodox accounts.
Kelly's 11 Corollaries to his Fundamental Postulate may be said to 
formalise both the constructive structure and the formative dynamics 
of personal constructs (and, more broadly, of construction 
systems). Prior to presenting them, however, Kelly cautions us that 
although he has termed them 'corollaries', 'logically, they involve 
somewhat more than what is minimally implied by the exact wording of 
the [fundamental] postulate.' (Kelly, 1955, p. 50). And earlier, 
in a complementary manner, he advises us that
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’The [fundamental] postulate we formulate will not 
necessarily provide a statement from which everyone 
will make the same deductions. The system built upon 
the postulate will therefore not be completely 
logic-tight. Rather, we shall strive to make our 
theoretical position provocative, and hence fertile, 
rather than legalistic.1 
(Kelly, 1955, p. 46).
Thus, right from the start we see a departure from the aim demanded 
by orthodox theorists for formal-deductive relations to obtain 
between components of construction systems. One of my principal 
tasks ahead shall be to demonstrate how Kelly manages to avoid 
formal-deductive relations in construction systems (and, by so 
doing, also departs from the orthodox theory of explanation and 
reduction), but yet to allow for 'super-ordination' between 
constructs and elements. (Kelly's notion of super-ordination often 
strikes the unwary as being formal-deductiviBm by another name).
For Kelly, elements cannot be derived from constructs and 
consequently the meaning (or even a meaning) of a construct cannot 
depend upon this being done. A personal construct implies a meaning 
which is, at least in part, also personal (unique). This, in turn,
shall depend upon the personal purposes for which that construct was
created and this may only be gleaned by reference to both the 
dimension of opposite contrast which it embodies and the elements
which are held by the cons truer to come within its purview.
In PCP, then, a meaningful explanation, whether "scientific" or 
otherwise, implies contrast, and dimensionality provides grounds for 
relevance (cf. my discussion in section 3.4). With my intention to 
explicate similarities between the construct and the 
incommensurability thesis in mind, the following summary of meaning 
in PCP by Kelly would seem to be particularly appropriate:
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'Whatever one says about any event gathers its meaning 
from what contrasting things could otherwise have 
been said about it, as much as from the other events 
of which the same might have been said or those 
occurrences of which a contrasting statement might 
have been made. Since every perception we have, as 
well as every statement we make, is no less a denial 
than it is an assertion, it becomes important to note 
what is perceptually negated as well as what is 
verbally affirmed.*
(Kelly, 1969, p. 11: my emphasis).
Now, as we have seen, the incommensurability thesis high-lights 
intellectual disagreement and conflict in science; it is concerned
only with rival theories. As we have also seen , however rival or 
incommensurable, theories are always, in some sense, alternative 
theories. Accordingly, I shall pursue my demonstration of the 
pertinence and applicability of the incommmensurability thesis to 
PGP by considering the notion of an "alternative construct".
Here it might be useful first .to distinguish a "fundamentally 
different" construct from a "genuinely alternative" construct.
A fundamentally different construct is one which is created for a 
completely different purpose than another construct. At the 
methodological level, we can recognize such a construct by virtue of 
it abstracting an entirely different set of elements, i.e. there is 
no overlap of their respective ranges of convenience.
A genuinely alternative construct, by contrast, may be said to be 
such by virtue of its abstracting the same set of elements but in a 
different way. At the methodological level, this means that a
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genuinely alternative construct must be shown to exhibit at least 
one difference, viz. different ordering of the abstracted elements, 
and one similarity, viz. overlap between the classes of elements 
abstracted by the constructs within the respective ranges of 
convenience. With respect to this similarity, however, I think it
resonable to be more specific and suppose that there must be overlap
of the 'contexts' of the two constructs and, further, that it is 
here that the locus of choice - the judgement of relative personal 
utility - resides, notwithstanding that the two constructs' 
respective ranges of convenience (and, hence, utilities) may differ 
elsewhere.
A genuinely alternative construct may also exhibit one further 
difference, namely, different pole or element names(s). It is 
important to note, however, that a construct which displayed only 
this difference (i.e. whilst maintaining the same ordering of 
elements) would not be a genuinely alternative construct; it would
be only a "trivially different'* (or "trivially alternative")
construct. Such a difference might be described as "merely 
semantic" (one of the very few legitimate uses of the phrase). As 
Kelly cautioned: 'Construing is not to be confounded with verbal
formulation.* (Kelly, 1955, p. 51).
Now, it is also useful to point out that our experienced commitment
to constructs which have proven useful to us is normally only to one
pole - the 'emergent* pole; indeed, this would seem to be so except 
in situations of psychological distress or disturbance, e.g. as part 
of the process of re-adjusting to (coping with) stress "caused" by 
problems in interpersonal relationships or an ongoing "scientific 
revolution"13 (the two may coincide). Contrast poles, then, may,
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and usually do, remain implicit: certainly this is the way in which 
knowledge claims have traditionally been linguistically formulated 
and expressed (the subject-predicate mode of speech exerts a virtual 
raono-pole-y! ) . There may often be advantages to be had from such 
a practice - perhaps most obviously, that of "linguistic economy" - 
provided that it is recognized for what it is, i.e. mode of 
linguistic formulation and expression. But in PCP, meaningful 
criticisms and learning of existing knowledge claims may only be 
said to occur to the extent that dimensionality and opposite 
contrast are made explicit. Our psychological processes of creating 
meaningful new constructs are similarly understood to be enhanced by 
explicitly creating opposite contrasts. (cf. my discussion in 
section 4.3, below).
An interesting (and from an objectivist point of view, paradoxical) 
case of sociality of construction occurs in the most alternative of 
all genuinely alternative constructs, i.e. where a construct is 
common to two persons in all respects except that the poles are 
reversed. This shows the highly complementary and social nature 
that "diametrically opposed" views may have. Dimensionality in 
knowledge claims Is thus not necessarily a recipe for personal 
isolation and alienation.
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Having recently introduced the notion of choice, this is as far as I 
can go in my consideration of the 'alternative construct' without 
invoking certain of Kelly's corollaries to his Fundamental Postulate 
which have to do with this since any particular personal construct 
is fundamentally as much a thinking process as it is an epistemic 
product or claim.
Three corollaries in particular emphasize the qualities of choice 
and change in a construction system yet remain compatible with the 
'Organization Corollary' (discussed in section 3.4), namely,
(1) 'Choice Corollary: A person chooses for himself that 
alternative in a dichotomized construct through which 
he anticipates the greater possibility for extension 
and definition of his system.'
(Kelly, 1955, p. 64: my emphasis - capital letters 
used throughout original).
(2) 'Modulation Corollary: The variation in a person's
construction system is limited by the permeability of 
the constructs within whose ranges of convenience the 
variants lie.'
(Kelly, 1955, p. 77: my emphasis - capital letters 
used throughout original).
(3) 'Fragmentation Corollary: A person may successively
employ a variety of construction subsystems which are 
inferentially incompatible with each other.'
(Kelly, 1955, p. 83: my emphasis - capital letters 
used throughout original).
Now, I interpret the Modulation and Fragmentation corollaries to be 
a more-or-less deliberate attempt by Kelly to suggest, on the one 
hand, part of a scheme for "rationally integrating" the contents
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and, thence, of construing the overall form of construction systems, 
but yet, on the other hand, to undermine any attempt to construe the 
Choice Corollary in terms of a universally applicable 
epistemological demand for ’excess empirical corroboration' as 
formally mediated and appraised by deductive relations between 
explananda and explanation.
I shall elaborate upon this interpretation through a very brief 
consideration of Hinkle's (1965) 'laddering technique'. Hinklean 
'laddering' is a technique for moving between levels within a 
construction system, e.g. between 'peripheral' constructs and 'core' 
constructs. To help a person to "ladder up" from a particular 
construct, the researcher asks them which pole of that construct 
they prefer and why. In answering such questions, the person 
usually offers a higher level superordinate construct. Conversely, 
one may "ladder down" by asking what or how questions, e.g. "what is 
it that you perceive in both elements X and Y and which makes them 
different from element Z?".
Now, when "systematic" epistemologists (e.g. orthodox theorists, 
Popperians, Piagetians) attempt to interpret Kelly’s ideas in their 
own terms they soon face a dilemma for, if one "ladders up" within a 
construction system, then these would seem to be two possible 
outcomes to the process, viz. either an overarching superordinate 
construct £r two 'inferentially incompatible' (i.e. fragmented) 
construction sub-systems shall emerge. This situation may 
serai-humorously be described as 'The "Systematic" Epistemologist's 
■Dilemma; of the "Tight Tops" vs "Stocking Tops" Outcome to Construct 
Laddering* and represented by the following diagram:
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Figure 4.4 Diagram Showing the "Systematic” Epistemologist1s
Dilemma of the "Tight Tops” vs "Stocking Tops" Outcome 
to Construct Laddering
For the Constructive Alternativist, this possibility of two outcomes 
to construct laddering presents no problem or dilemma: both are 
possible, albeit, not simultaneously, and which shall depend upon 
the perceived purpose of laddering. Just as theories may be 
interpreted in different ways, emerging as incommensurable in some 
interpretations and not incommensurable in others, so too may 
constructs (contrast poles may be iterative). In PCP, whilst the 
Choice Corollary assumes that a person shall make the 'elaborative 
choice1 (Kelly, 1955, p. 65: original emphasis) this cannot be 
interpreted as a universal test criterion or demand for "excess 
empirical content" for this would prescribe also personal purpose 
and salience. Of course, the range or context of a particular 
construct, Cl, may be construed to entail that of another construct, 
C2, and if, and only if, "comprehensivity" (i.e. "excess content") 
is pre-eminent amongst the construer's test-criteria for each of
-  4*52 -
these constructs, then this situation (entailment) would constitute 
sufficient good reason for preferring Cl to C2. PCP thus rejects a 
universal "arrow of development" in cognition or knowledge claims.
Turning now to the Modulation Corollary, its most important aspect 
may be said to lie in Kelly’s notion of ’permeability1 and which he 
defines (in part) thus:
'A construct is permeable if it will admit to its 
range of convenience new elements which are not yet 
construed within its framework.’
(Kelly, 1955, p. 79).
Kelly makes it clear that his notion of permeability has increasing 
utility according to the degree to which constructs are 
superordinate.
Kelly tells us that he considers his Fragmentation Corollary to be, 
in part, a ’derivative’ of his Modulation Corollary (Kelly, 1955, 
p. 87) and that it follows ’as an explicit statement of the kind of 
inconsistency which the Modulation Corollary implicitly tolerates' 
(Kelly, 1955, pp. 87-88), viz. successive employment of construction 
sub-systems which are 'inferentially incompatible’ with each other. 
This possibility has ultimately to be allowed due to the notion of 
inconsistency - opposite contrast - which is at the heart of his 
notion of the personal construct. Kelly thus signals unequivocably 
his departure from the orthodox account which demands that for every 
’theoretical statement' there must be 'correspondence rules' which 
'will inferentially connect it with certain observational 
statements' (Papineau, 1979, p. 11). In PCP, whilst we can be sure 
(and only sure) that changes that take place from old to new
constructs do so within a 'larger system' (Kelly, 1955, p. 83), 
those constructs which we construe to have had an impact on later 
(i.e. larger) constructs and, hence, to be 'legitimate precursor 
[s]' (ibid) of the larger construct, may only be said to share a 
'collateral [relationship], [ ], rather than a lineal one* (ibid; my 
emphasis). Kelly summarizes the overall import of these views thus;
'[ ] while a person's bets on the turn of minor events 
may not appear to add up, his wagers on the outcome 
of life do tend to add up. He may not win each time, 
but his wagers, in the larger contexts, do not 
altogether cancel themselves out. The superordinate 
permeable features of his system may not be 
verbalized, they may be more "vegetative" than 
"spiritual", or they may be seen as what Adler would 
have called a "style of life"; but they are part of a 
system and, therefore, may be considered from the 
viewpoint of their lawful as well as from the 
viewpoint of their free aspects.*
(Kelly, 1955, p. 88; original emphasis).
Now, although PCP qua meta-theory may be seen as a principled 
rejection of functional invariants in learning or method, at any 
moment in time Kelly would seem to endorse some "Postulate of 
Constructive Connectedness" which complements his 'Postulate of 
Cosmic Connectedness' (discussed in section 4.4, below)* viz. within 
a particular application of a construct, predicated upon a 
particular purpose for that construct, we are entitled to infer some 
kind of "constructive causality" - but only that once. I suggest 
that this, together with his requirement for a dimension of opposite 
contrast in all knowledge claims, represents Kelly's commitment to a 
theoretical context account of meaning.
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If a time frame is imposed, however, then Kelly's Modulation and 
Fragmentation Corollaries undermine any implication of 'logical 
determinism' or any demand for 'formal consistency' within his 
theory. Accordingly, Personal Construct theorists talk of 
'construct heterarchies' (Glanville, 1982) and the like. Similarly, 
if my suggestion that Kelly's notion of 'collateral' relations 
obtaining between otherwise 'inferentially incompatible’ 
construction sub-systems may itself be construed as 
incommensurability relations is accepted, then the overall 
conception of knowledge that emerges from Kelly’s account would seem 
to be "isomorphous" with that of Feyerabend who talks of knowledge 
as 'an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps 
even incommensurable) alternatives ' (Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 30; 
original emphasis - quoted more fully earlier).
In PCP, dimensionality in knowledge claims may be understood to be a 
fundamental orienting process by which object relations (including 
other minds) are imposed. Where something resembling formal 
deductive relations between rival theories can be derived, only ad 
interim commonality can be inferred. Where Einstein said
'There can be no fairer destiny for any physical 
theory than that it should point the way to a more 
comprehensive theory, in which it lives on as a 
limiting case.'
(Einstein, speaking in 1917, quoted by, e.g., Popper,
1978, p. 38)15.
- a remark seized upon by orthodox theorists and objectivist- 
methodological constructivists as a mandate for hypothetico- 
deductivism and CER, I can now propose a "Kellyian” alternative;
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There can be no fairer destiny for any personal 
construct than that it should make an impact upon a 
larger construction system, in which it lives on as a 
relevant contrast.
This, I suggest, has been the honourable fate of classical physics 
in contemporary science. But I also see the ideas of Piaget and 
Popper to be 'relevant contrasts' to those of Kelly, Feyerabend and 
the ACM as considered in the context of concerns of this thesis. My 
remaining sub-sections and chapters, then, shall partially serve to 
demonstrate further this view.
4.3 Dimensionality in Knowledge Claims
In this sub-section I shall take it largely for granted that I have 
already demonstrated compellingly that dimensionality (i.e. a 
dimension of opposite contrast) in knowledge claims is a cardinal 
feature of PCP and that this feature is absent from, indeed, denied 
by, all objectivist traditions in epistemology.
Dimensionality in knowledge claims enters post-empiricist philosophy 
of science through an increased interest in, and emphasis upon, 
meaning, context-dependency and dialetic in the making and testing 
of scientific knowledge claims.
I contend that in the case of Kuhn qua post-empiricist philosopher 
of science, however, the sheer scale of his explanatory notion of 
the 'paradigm', in this 'disciplinary matrix' meaning for the term 
lessens or, at least, obscures from consideration, any quality of
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dimensionality in its component notions. Herein lies my main reason 
for preferring Feyerabend's version of the incommensurability thesis 
and which I shall now discuss.
In his paper entitled Second Thoughts on Paradigms (Kuhn [1974 ] 
1977), Kuhn asks the rhetorical question 'what shared elements 
account for the relatively unproblematic character of professional 
communication and for the relative unanimity of professional 
judgment? '(Kuhn [1974] 1977, p. 297) and answers that his book The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, [1962] 1970a) 'licences 
the answer "a paradigm" or "set of paradigms".' (Kuhn, [1974] 1977, 
p. 297).
Admitting of certain ambiguities in the way in which he used this 
term in his earlier work, however, Kuhn then goes on to clarify two 
main meanings which he intends for it.
Kuhn identifies the first of these meanings by the phrase 
'disciplinary matrix' and which he explicates thus;
'[ ] "disciplinary" because it is the common 
possession of the practitioners of a professional 
discipline and "matrix” because it is composed of 
ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring 
further specification.'
(Kuhn [1974] 1977, p. 297).
Amongst the 'ordered elements' of a disciplinary matrix which Kuhn 
cites and discusses are 'exemplars';
'Exemplars [ ] are concrete problem solutions, accepted by the 
group as, in a quite usual sense, paradigmatic.'
(Kuhn, [1974] 1977, p. 298).
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Although Kuhn holds that exemplars are partially constituent of a 
disciplinary matrix, he also claims that they represent his second, 
and ’more fundamental', meaning for 'paradigm'.
For Kuhn, it is by means of encountering exemplars that student 
scientists learn 'how their job is to be done' (Kuhn 1970a, p. 187), 
viz. they learn, for examplei how to interpret scientific terms and 
to use the particular form or derivation of a 'shared symbolic 
generalization', such as F = rna, which is judged appropriate by the 
community of scientists. It is important to stress, however, that 
whilst Kuhn suggests that exemplars 'can serve cognitive functions 
commonly attributed to shared rules' (Kuhn, [1974] 1977, p. 319), he 
also claims that they are not themselves amenable to such rules or 
to comprehensive systematization.
Since Kuhn's first meaning of 'paradigm' entails his second I shall 
henceforth use the term 'paradigm' to refer to both, but with 
emphasis upon the former.
For Kuhn, commitment @y a community of researchers to a particular 
paradigm is the most important characteristic of science and results 
in what he terms 'normal science*. During periods of normal science, 
practitioners or members of the paradigm unquestioningly endorse and 
employ the fundamental assumptions constituent of the paradigm in 
their research activities. These latter are construed as 'puzzles* 
rather than 'problems' since their solution is confidently 
anticipated - and only permitted - to be achieved entirely within 
the framework provided by the paradigm. Failure to solve a puzzle 
is understood to reflect lack of ingenuity on the part of the 
scientist rather than theoretical and/or methodological weakness.
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The sharing of a paradigm by a community of researchers is construed 
by Kuhn to be the sign of scientific "maturity" of the investigative 
field and, indeed, also serves as an informal demarcation criterion 
for science. Zylberstajn (1983, Ch 1, pp. 5-6) selects from Kuhn's 
work the following 'classical' ("meta-paradigmatic") examples of 
periods of normal science: astronomy during the Middle Ages 
(Ptolemaic paradigm); mechanics during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Newtonian paradigm); and quantum mechanics after the 
1930's (Copenhagen interpretation paradigm).
As the probing of the paradigmatic disciplinary matrix becomes 
deeper and more extensive, the puzzles posed and their suggested 
solutions become correspondingly more sophisticated. Eventually, 
however, it is a characteristic of the history of science that some 
of these later puzzles shall persistently deny the attempts of even 
the ablest members of the research community to solve them. When 
this happens, confidence in the adequacy of the disciplinary matrix 
to provide a foundational framework for puzzle solutions may begin 
to falter, generating a state of crisis. Such crises generally 
occur rarely in the 'mature' sciences but may only be re-solved by 
the emergence of a new disciplinary matrix which is judged capable 
of providing a framework for solving at least the most relevant of 
the puzzles of the previous matrix and also promises to do so for a 
new set of interesting and important puzzles. When this happens a 
'paradigm shift' or 'scientific revolution' has occurred, e.g. the 
overthrow of Ptolemaic by Copernican astronomy.
The constituents of any paradigm are informed by a set of 
fundamental metaphysical (i.e. ontological and/or epistemological) 
commitments. Those of one paradigm are incommensurable with those
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of another. Kuhn stresses that a scientific revolution is not led 
or induced by objective ’refutations' of theories comprising the 
earlier paradigm: an incommensurable alternative must first have 
been suggested, albeit, in a characteristically more tentative and 
necessarily less developed form.
The incommensurability of paradigms, and of certain theories within 
them, are only given explicit, sustained, consideration by the 
community of scientists during the relatively short periods of 
scientific crisis and revolution. For Kuhn, the uncritical 
allegiance of scientists to a paradigm during the far lengthier 
periods of normal science is what allows serious and successful 
scientific research to get done since it avoids, indeed, debars, 
mainstream research effort being diluted in endless debate over 
fundamentals.
Now, as I have already intimated in section 4.2, above, Feyerabend's 
notion of incommensurability differs in emphasis from that of Kuhn.
I shall now try to show that this difference renders Feyerabend's 
ideas much closer to those of Kelly (and myself) relative to Kuhn's.
My discussion of this issue may helpfully be introduced by 
presenting one of Feyerabend's summarized accounts in which he 
delineates his treatment of the incommensurability thesis from that 
of Kuhn:
'General assertions about incommensurability are more 
characteristic for Kuhn [ ]. There do exist cases 
where not only do some older concepts break down the 
framework of a new theory, but where an entire 
theory, all its observation statements included, is 
incommensurable with the theory that succeeds it, but 
such cases are rare and need special analysis.'
(Feyerabend, 1981a, p. xi: original emphasis).
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Feyerabend's statement of his views in the quotation above may seem 
to imply a less radical stance than Kuhn's; however, the reverse is 
actually the case, for whilst Feyerabend agrees with Kuhn that the 
adoption of fundamental assumptions play a crucial part in the 
interpretation of specific situations, he proceeds to challenge 
Kuhn's claims for the pervasiveness, at any one time, and the 
longevity, through time, of the commitment of a community of 
researchers to any particular paradigm and hence also for the 
corresponding rarity of scientific crises and revolutions.
Feyerabend begins his principal critique of Kuhn's ideas by claiming 
'ambiguity of presentation' in the letter's work:
'Whenever I read Kuhn, I am troubled by the following 
question: are we here presented with methodological 
prescriptions which tell the scientist how to 
proceed; or are we given* a description, void of any 
evaluative element, of those activities which are 
generally called 'scientific'?'
(Feyerabend, 1970, p. 198: original emphasis).
To consider Feyerabend's second, "descriptive", interpretation 
first, Feyerabend re-examines the history of science and concludes 
that normal science does not exist. Part of his argument is as 
follows:
'In the second third of [the last ] century there 
existed at least three different and mutually 
incompatible paradigms. They were: (1) the 
mechanical point of view which found expression in 
astronomy, in the kinetic theory, in the various 
mechanical models for electrodynamics as well as in 
the biological sciences, especially in medicine (here 
the influence of Helmholtz was a decisive factor);
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(2) the point of view connected with the invention of 
an independent and phenomenological theory of heat 
which finally turned out to be inconsistent with 
mechanics; (3) the point of view implicit in 
Faraday's and Maxwell's electrodynamics which was 
developed, and freed from its mechanical 
concomitants, by Hertz.'
(Feyerabend, 1970, p. 207: original emphasis).
Feyerabend goes on to argue that far from being 'quasi-independent' 
it was their 'active interaction* which brought about the downfall 
of classical physics - for reasons which I shall not attempt to 
discuss here (but see Feyerabend, 1970, p. 208ff). At any point in 
the history of science up to and including the present, it can be 
shown that there are just too many eminent scientists, recognized 
and funded as such, who are working outside the ruling paradigm of 
the day for the notion to remain tenable (for one contemporaneous 
example amongst many, of Bohm's 'hidden variables' interpretation of 
quantum mechanics with the allegedly 'paradigmatic* Copenhagen 
interpretation). Moreover, if, for the sake of argument, it is 
granted that paradigm bound puzzle-solving activities exist to the 
extent that Kuhn claims, then they constitute a pretty useless 
criterion for science for such a criterion cannot exclude, for 
example, 'organized crime' (Feyerabend, 1970, p. 200).
More serious for Feyerabend than such "academic" disputes, however, 
is the "prescriptive moral" for scientists - and would-be scientists 
- which flow explicitly from Kuhn's (relatively speaking) 
"monolithic" interpretation of history of science. Here Feyerabend 
is totally at odds with Kuhn.
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For Feyerabend, contra Kuhn, the danger is not that ongoing, 
centre-stage, metaphysical disputation amongst scientists shall 
impede the conduct of scientific research, but, rather, that its 
endorsed avoidance would diminish the very processes of 
psychological channelization that created scientific knowledge in 
the first place. The result would be a degeneration into scientific 
dogmatism and anaemia: the ruling paradigm of the day would be 
embraced for no other reason than that it is the current orthodoxy 
(of. Papineau's, 1979, p. 40 commentary). Elsewhere, Feyerabend 
mercilessly concludes his appraisal of Kuhn's work thus:
'Kuhn's ideas are interesting but, alas, they are much 
too vague to give rise to anything but lots of hot 
air. If you don't believe me, look at the 
literature. Never before; has the literature on the 
philosophy of science been invaded by so many creeps 
and incompetents. Kuhn encourages people who have no 
idea why a stone falls to the ground to talk with 
assurance about scientific method. Now I have no 
objection to incompetence but I do object when 
incompetence is accompanied by boredom and 
self-righteousness. And this is exactly what 
happens. We do not get interesting false ideas, we 
get boring ideas or words connected with no ideas at 
all. Secondly, wherever one tries to make Kuhn's 
ideas more definite one finds that they are false.
Was there ever a period of normal science in the 
history of thought? No - and I challenge anyone to 
prove the contrary.'
(Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 6: original emphasis)^ .
Now, I suggest that Kuhn's notion of normal science also renders the 
intellectual edifice of science too monolithic to be compatible with 
Kelly's notion of a construction system, for commonality amongst 
construction systems does not alter their basic constructive 
structure. When Kelly says that the person 'is an inveterate 
collector of paradigms' (Kelly, 1969, p. 47) I choose to interpret 
it not only in the 'perspective of centuries' but also in the
here-and-now sense. (I am not, of course, suggesting that Kelly was 
using the term 'paradigm* specifically in any of Kuhn's specialized 
senses).
Furthermore, I consider Kuhn's notion of normal science only to 
apply (or to apply best) to the traditionally most influential body 
of science pedagogies, as concretely instanced by science 
text-books. It is from here that my principal objections to Kuhn 
arise - perhaps not surprisingly since I am an educationalist.
To explain, the monolithic character of normal science not only 
misrepresents the actual conduct of science as it usually is, it 
also does so in a way which effectively obscures and precludes 
dimensionality (and hence relevance and responsibility) in knowledge 
claims. The most obvious and defensible pedagogic interpretation of 
Kuhn's ideas is thus a very conservative one. The excellence of 
science in general, and the ruling paradigm in particular, is 
assumed; it is not argued for. This accounts for Zylberstajn's 
omission, as I see it, of 'philosophers' science' from his model 
(cf. Chapter 2). Though Kuhn is not an objectivist in his 
philosophy of science, he may, I suggest, be legitimately treated as 
one in his science pedagogy.
These recent points may be illustrated and partially corroborated by 
reference to Kuhn's emphasis upon all-or-none 'gestalt switches' or 
'conversion experiences', as he terms them, in the learning of 
science via repeated encounters with exemplars, e.g.
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’After he [the student ] has completed a certain number 
[of exemplary problems ], which may vary widely from 
one individual to the next, he views the situations 
that confront him as a scientist in the same gestalt 
as other members of his specialists' group. For him 
they are no longer the same situations he had 
encountered when his training began. He has 
meanwhile assimilated a time-tested and 
group-licensed way of seeing.'
(Kuhn, 1970a, pT 189: my emphasis).
From here it may be but a short route to argue for mere 
indoctrination of student scientists in the preferred paradigm as 
the most efficient teaching strategy. This would run directly 
counter to my views on what science education (and, more generally, 
education) is for, and which I shall elaborate in detail in 
Chapter 10. At the risk of slightly pre-empting my exposition of 
these, however, I shall quote the educationalists Rowell and 
Cawthorn who lucidly demonstrate that Kuhn himself is not altogether 
unaware of the paradoxes and ‘other difficulties which his 
epistemological doctrines create for the development of compatible 
pedagogies:
'It is time,’we asked ourselves: 'What do we want our 
students to know about science?' But if the question 
looks disarmingly simple, the answer is less so. For 
example, on the one hand Kuhn himself flays our 
science texts for their 'misrepresentation' of what 
science Is (Kuhn, 1970[a], p. 140), and on the other 
he commends an education based on them for equipping 
the budding scientist 'almost perfectly' for 'normal' 
scientific work (Kuhn, 1970[a], pp. 165-166).
Certainly our texts portray science as some 
inexorable linear pursuit of truth (Cawthorn and 
Rowell, 1978). But Kuhn's deliberations as presented 
here, paint less than half our picture. Science is 
not taught only to intending scientists; indeed that 
group is a relatively small minority. And even for 
them it is certainly arguable that they must be 
'hoodwinked' in order to become effective normal 
scientists.'
(Rowell and Cawthorn, 1982: original emphasis, my square 
brackets).
Thus, it may further be argued, whilst Kuhn states that ’of course, 
[science education] is a narrow and rigid education, probably more 
so than any other except perhaps in orthodox theology' (Kuhn,
[1962] 1970, p. 166), his epistemological doctrines complement just 
such an education and, moreover, would undermine a more 
'revolutionary1 and, as I would see it, enlightened one (cf. my 
discussion of compatible and incompatible relations between 
epistemology and pedagogy in Chapter 5).
Now, although Feyerabend makes it clear that he considers 
incommensurability and meaning to be closely related in the natural 
sciences (as in all "domains" of knowledge), Vie does not decisively 
embrace dimensionality in his theoretical context account of 
meaning* This nothwithstanding, I contend that Feyerabend proceeds 
in a manner which amounts to his doing so, viz. unlike Kuhn, 
Feyerabend elevated incommensurability to an article of 
scientific-method.
Thus, Feyerabend exhorts that the scientist who wishes to maximise 
tVie empirical content of the views they hold, and/or to advance 
tVieir understanding and knowledge in any otlier way, must embrace 
wViat he terms the 'principle of proliferation' and which constitutes 
a 'pluralistic methodology', viz.
'[T ]he principle of prokiferation: Invent, and 
elaborate theories which are inconsistent with the 
accepted point of view, even if the latter should 
happen to be highly confirmed and generally 
accepted. Any methodology which adopts the principle 
will be called a pluralistic methodology. The 
theories which the principle advises us to use in 
addition to the accepted point of view will be called 
the alternatives of this point of view.'
(Feyerabend, [1965.] 1981a, pp. 105-106: original emphasis).
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In a pluralistic methodology, the scientist 'must compare ideas with 
other ideas rather than with 'experience' and he must try to improve 
rather than discard the views that have failed in the competition.' 
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 30: my emphasis). By such means, older views 
shall be elaborated and used to measure the success of 'modern' 
views; history of science is construed to be an inseparable part of 
science itself, contributing both to the development and to the 
content of theories. He argues that the creation, recognition and 
discussion of particular cases of incommensurability 'often reveal 
hidden ideas, replace them by ideas of a different kind, and change 
overt as well as coverL classifications.' (Feyerabend, 1975b, 
p. 225).
One example amongst many which Feyerabend discusses is Galileo's 
analysis and re-interpretation of the so-called 'tower argument' 
which at the time was accepted and used by many (e.g. Tycho) as an 
irrefutable justification for the view that the earth is 
motionless. The tower argument drew its principal empirical 
sustenance from the commonsense observation that heavy, falling 
bodies go by a straight, vertical line to the surface of the earth. 
Galileo's counter-argument (which need not concern us here) not only 
vanquished the tower argument, but also, according to Feyerabend, 
'led to a clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space 
and [ ] revealed the difference between impetus (an absolute 
magnitude that inheres in an object) and momentum (which depends on 
the chosen reference system).' (Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 225; also see 
his Chapters 6 and 7).
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For Feyerabend, the possibility that any earlier theory - and from , 
any "domain" of knowledge, e.g. history of science, alchemy,
Genesis, Greek mythology (students' science?!), might be enlisted in 
this way for the development of scientific knowledge remains forever 
open. No view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account: as 
in PCP, any notion might someday become a relevant contrast and so 
Feyerabend urges that we should not endorse methodological rules 
which would prevent this . History of science is thus an essential 
part of scientific-method - a view which is totally at odds with 
Kuhn's rather conventional endorsement of praxis:
'Science textbooks are studded with the names and 
sometimes with portraits of old heroes, but only 
historians read old scientific works. In science new 
breakthrough[s ] do initiate the removal of suddenly 
outdated books and journals from their active 
position in a science library to the desuetude of a 
general depository. Few scientists are ever seen in 
science museums, of which the function is, in any 
case, to memorialize or recruit, not to inculcate 
Craftsmanship or enlighten public taste. Unlike art, 
science destroys its past.'
(Kuhn, 1977, p. 345).
It is worth noting that Feyerabend's views also further eradicate 
the traditional distinction between art and science that even Kuhn 
shows himself to support by this comment.
Pluralistic methodology is not only the necessary and principal 
means by which Feyerabend supposes science to be carried out in 
fact, but also is an ad interim maxim by which our valuations of the 
fruits of scientific activity may be saved from lapsing into mere
i
dogmatic allegiance to them aided and abetted by (meta-)theory.
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Consistent wih these views, Feyerabend argues that outside the 
domain of empirical generalizations
1 [ ] the methodological unit to which we refer when 
discussing questions of test and empirical content 
consists of a whole set of partly overlapping, 
factually adequate, but mutually inconsistent 
theories.1
(Feyerabend, 1981a, p. 72: original emphasis).
And elsewhere that
\i. Traditions are neither good nor bad, they simply 
are. 'Objectively speaking' i.e. independently of 
participation in a tradition there is not much to 
choose between humanitarianism and anti-semitism. 
Corollary: rationality is not an arbiter of 
traditions, it is itself a tradition or an aspect of 
a tradition. It is therefore neither good nor bad, it 
simply is.
ii. A tradition assumes desirable or undesirable
properties only when compared with some tradition 
i.e. only when viewed by participants who see the 
world in terms of its values. The projections of 
these participants appear objective and statements 
describing them sound objective because the 
participants and the tradition they project are 
nowhere mentioned in them. They are subjective 
because they depend on the tradition chosen and on 
the use the participants make of it. The 
subjectivity is noticed as soon as participants 
realize that different traditions give rise to 
different judgments.'
(Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 27-28: original emphasis).
I consider these and many other views expressed by Feyerabend to 
demonstrate his awareness of the importance of opposite contrasts in 
the making of knowledge claims. Moreover, and as I shall make 
explicit in Chapters 5 and 10, I consider them closely to complement 
both the investigative methods and the educational values of 
the ACM.
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It is also worth noting that providing Lakatos’ objectivistic 
pretensions are ignored (i.e. providing that his ideas are given 
relativistic or post-empiricist interpretation), then his view that 
’history of science suggests that [ ] tests are - at least - 
three-cornered fights between rival theories and experiment* 
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 115) and the 'pluralistic system of authority' 
implied by his 'methodology of scientific research programmes'fmay 
similarly be argued to complement Kellyan (and ACM) notions.
Finally, having argued that Feyerabend (and, to a lesser extent, 
Lakatos) embraces in effect, if not in fact, a Kellyan requirement 
for dimensionality in knowledge claims through their ideas on 
scientific method, let me turn it around and consider possible 
similarities between the methodology of PCP and their 
epistemologies. Here, I believe that an equal case can be made - no 
stronger than that. Thus, whilst Kelly does not actually exhort us 
to embrace a 'principle of proliferation', his advice that 'we must 
continuously and adventurously hold all matters open to the 
possibility of fresh reconstruction.' (Kelly, 1966, p. 5) amounts 
to the same thing. Similarly, his psychotherapeutic (or as Kelly 
preferred to put it, 'reconstructive') tactics, perhaps most 
obviously his 'Fixed Role Therapy' (discussed in Chapter 10), may be 
interpreted as a pluralistic methodology.
4.4 Relevance and Responsibility in Knowledge Claims
Earlier on (in section 4.2) I suggested that CER and correspondence 
theories of truth play no role whatsoever in post-empiricist 
traditions in philosophy of science and that this has been used by
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objectivist-realists to mount a prima facie case that such 
traditions knowingly or unknowingly embrace 'irrationalism1 in 
matters of theory-choice and evaluation - or, to dignify it, 
'idealism', 'extreme relativism' or even 'solipsism', but 
objectivists tend to use the terms interchangeably.
Since I perceive these features of post-empiricism (i.e. rejection 
of CER and correspondence theories of truth) also to be judged 
Anpalatable by most science educationalists and by virtue of the 
same "reasons", in this section I shall attempt to show that this 
objectivist critique represents a paradigm example of "lumping the 
contrasting with the irrelevant" and that with respect to the 
relativist-methodological-constructivist approach which I endorse 
and develop in this thesis in particular they are simply irrelevant
I am sympathetic to certain of Barnes and Bloor's comments on 
relativism and which I believe shall help me further to delineate 
the species which I endorse and shall inform this aspect of my 
counter-critique of objectivism:
'There are many forms of relativism and it is 
essential to make clear the precise form in which we 
advocate it. The simple starting-point of relativist 
doctrines is (i) the observation that beliefs on a 
certain topic vary, and(ii) the conviction that 
which of these beliefs is found in a given context 
depends on, or is relative to, the circumstances of 
the users. But there is always a third feaLure of 
relativism. It requires what may be called a 
'symmetry' or an 'equivalence' postulate. For 
instance, it may be claimed ;that general conceptions 
of the natural order, whether the Aristotelian world 
view, the cosmology of a primitive people, or the 
cosmology of an Einstein, are all alike in being
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false, or are all equally true. These alternative 
equivalence postulates lead to two varieties of 
relativism; and in general it is the nature of the 
equivalence postulate which defines a specific form 
of relativism.
The form of relativism that we shall defend employs 
neither of the equivalence postulates just mentioned, 
both of which run into technical difficulties. To 
say that all beliefs are equally true encounters the 
problem of how to handle beliefs which contradict one 
another. If one belief denies what the other 
asserts, how can they both be true? Similarly, to 
say that all beliefs are equally false poses the 
problem of the status of the relativist’s own 
claims. He would seem to be pulling the rug from 
beneath his own feet.
Our equivalence postulate is that all beliefs are on 
a par with one another with respect to the causes of 
their credibility. It is not that all beliefs are
equally true or equally false, but that regardless of 
truth and falsity the fact of their credibility is to 
be seen as equally problematic.1 
(Barnes and Bloor, 1982, pp. 22-23: my emphasis).
I shall argue that relativist-methodological-constructivism accepts 
f(i)' and '(ii)* in Barnes and Bloor’s account and also their 
version of the equivalence postulate. As I have earlier mentioned, 
however, I depart from the exclusively sociological approach 
pursued by these authors. I shall make clear the reasons for, and 
nature of, my departure from such an approach later in this 
section. This notwithstanding, since Barnes and Bloor's work may 
be argued to extend and to be partially derivative of Feyerabend's 
and especially of Kuhn’s ideas, I shall first examine the way in 
which these latter two authors have responded to the objectivists’ 
charge of irrationalism, or, as Barnes and Bloor might put it, to 
the charge of endorsing "naive" forms of equivalence postulate.
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Thus, Kuhn argues that
'Later scientific theories are better than earlier 
ones for solving puzzles in the often quite different 
environments to which they are applied. That is not 
a relativist's position, and it displays the sense in 
which I am a convinced believer in scientific 
progress.
[ ]. Some critics claim that I am confusing 
description with prescription, violating the 
time-honoured philosophical theorem: 'Is' cannot 
imply 'ought'.
That theorem has, in practice, become a tag, and it 
is no longer everywhere honored. A number of 
contemporary philosophers have discovered important 
contexts in which the normative and the descriptive 
are inextricably mixed. 'Is' and 'ought' are by not 
means always so separate as they have seemed.'
(Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 206-207).
And elsewhere that
'What I am denying [ ] is neither the existence of 
good reasons nor that these reasons are of the sort 
usually described. I am, however, insisting that 
such reasons constitute values to be used in making 
choices rather than rules of choice. [ ]. 
Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness and even accuracy 
[Kuhn has earlier cited these as examples of 'good 
reasons' ] can be judged quite differently (which is 
not to say they may be judged arbitrarily) by
different people. Again, they may differ in their 
conclusions without violating any accepted rule.' 
(Kuhn, 1970b, p. 262: my emphasis).
By means of such arguments I . judge Kuhn plausibly to evade at least 
the charge of irrationalism (though perhaps not some others as I 
shall later discuss).
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Feyerabend may be argued to escape the objectivists' claim for his 
irrationalism by a slightly different route from Kuhn's, viz. unlike 
Kuhn, Feyerabend does not claim to articulate an enduring or 
developed philosophical system of thought, indeed, he explicitly 
rejects such an interpretation of his work and identifies it as the 
principal source of irrelevant criticism of his ideas (see, 
especially, Feyerabend, 1978, Part Three). Irrationalism is 
precisely what Feyerabend argues that objectivists (rationalists, 
methodological monists) cannot preclude from their accounts.
Even if one concedes, as I do, that there is an element of 
disingenuity in Feyerabend's claim not to elaborate any position of 
his own, however, there is still plenty in his account to demon­
strate that the charge of irrationalism cannot be made to stick. 
Moreover, while his ideas on this issue bear many similarities to 
Kuhn's they demonstrate a closer congruency to PCP. Accordingly, I 
shall first consider them in:their own right and in some detail.
Here, the basic difference between. Kuhn and Feyerabend may be said 
to begin with the latter's explicit identification of, and emphasis 
upon, metaphysics as values intrinsic to methodological rules and 
principles. The role and status which Feyerabend attributes to 
metaphysics in the conduct of science and of philosophy of science, 
however, may best be brought out by first contrasting his approach 
with that of Popper and objectivists.
Recall (now in slight elaboration of my earlier comments) that 
although Popper claims metaphysics to be not only meaningful but 
also, in many cases, important in the development of scientific 
theories as a source of initially 'dogmatic' or 'pre-critical'
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inspiration, he ultimately perpetuated the empiricist doctrine of 
excluding it from his demarcation criterion for science - . .
metaphysics are relegated to: 'pre-scientific' or 'metaphysical 
research programmes' (see, e.g. Popper, 1978, pp. 150-151)17*
Some of Popper's disciples have attempted to render more credible 
his claims for the importance of metaphysics in science by 
articulating a more developed role for it. Agassi (1964), for 
example, argues that metaphysical commitments are responsible for 
guiding scientists in their choice of problems and, when such 
commitments are shared, for co-ordinating their research effortslg. 
Although Agassi questions Popper's deductive theory of explanation 
as being the only means of comprehension (Agasi, 1964, p. 199), he 
nevertheless ends up basically endorsing the orthodox Popperian 
line: he excludes metaphysics from his demarcation criterion for 
science in order to preserve the claim for the objectivity of 
scientific knowledge.
Now, although historically it would not seem to have happened in 
quite this way, Feyerabend may usefully be construed as having 
radically extended Agassi's views on scientific metaphysics - to the 
demise of objectivism.
Thus, Feyerabend argues that; the use of methodological rules and 
standards is every bit as much an expression of a commitment to 
metaphysical values as is the creation and/or use of a theory. To 
put this another way, use of such rules has what Feyerabend (e.g. 
1978, p. 213) calls 'cosmological implications', i.e. involves 
cosmological assumptions or principles. For example, the 
methodological rule 'Increase empirical content!' would eventually
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cease to be applicable in a finite universe. In such a world one 
might expect an "ultimate" explanation which subsumes all other 
explanations. This could not be the result in an infinite universe, 
where, instead, one might expect an infinite sequence of 
explanations and so, also, might venerate 'criticizability' in our 
conjectures. Methodologies are theories. Feyerabend thus concludes 
that:
’The standards we use and the rules we recommend make 
sense only in a world that has a certain structure. 
They become inapplicable, or start running idle in a 
domain that does not exhibit this structure.1 
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 34).
And he repeats these sentiments in this more "metaphysical" 
rendering of the incommensurability thesis:
'We have a point of view (theory, framework, cosmos, 
mode of representation) whose elements (concepts, 
'facts1, pictures) are built up in accordance with 
certain principles of construction. The principles 
involve something like a 'closure': there are things 
that cannot be said, or 'discovered', without 
violating the principles (which does not mean 
contradicting them). Say the things, make the 
discovery, and the principles are suspended. Now 
take those constructive principles that underlie 
every element of the cosmos (of the theory), every 
fact (every concept). Let us call such principles 
universal principles of the theory in question. 
Suspending universal principles means suspending all 
facts and all concepts. Finally, let us call a 
discovery, or a statement, or an attitude 
incommensurable with the cosmos (the theory, the 
framework) if it suspends some of its universal 
principles.'
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 269: original emphasis).
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Now, I find the links that Feyerabend draws between methodological 
rules and scientific metaphysics under the aegis of universal 
'constructive principles1 to be a helpful development of Kuhn's 
ideas - a judgement which I have already alluded to by my inclusion 
of constructive principles within my model in Chapter 2 and which I 
shall elaborate upon in my discussion of Kelly later in this 
section.
To press on with Feyerabend's counter-critique of objectivism (and 
to press home his critique of it), however, we have already seen his 
caution that one should not be brow-beaten into believing in the 
objectivity of objectivist methodological prescriptions merely- by 
virtue of their 'objective formulation' (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 23; 
cf. my discussion in section 3.4.2).
Moreover, Feyerabend argues that
'Philosophers of the Vienna Circle and Popperians are 
fond of turning cosmological principles such as the 
principle of causality into formal rules. As a 
result they eliminate circumstances that might 
endanger the rules.'
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 213: my emphasis).
For Feyerabend, all empirical 'evidence', whether in corroboration 
or refutation of a theory, has a 'historico-physiological 
character'; that is to say, it does not simply describe, in some as 
yet uninterpreted way, some objective state of affairs, 'but also 
expresses some subjective, mythical, and long-forgotten views' 
concerning such a state (Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 67: original 
emphasis). There can thus be no 'factual-' or 'observational core' 
in matters of theory-choice (Feyerabend, 1965, p. 203 and p. 216):
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methodologies, like all theories, are "value-laden". From this, 
Feyerabend draws the methodological inference that
'[ ] it would be extremely imprudent to let the 
evidence judge our theories directly and without 
further ado. A straight forward and unqualified 
judgment of theories by 'facts' is bound to eliminate 
ideas simply because they do not fit into the 
framework of some older cosmology. Taking 
experimental results and observations for granted and 
putting the burden of proof on the theory means 
taking the observational ideology for granted without 
ever having examined it.*
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 67: original emphasis).
Such an examination, however, may only be achieved by pluralistic 
methodology.
The objectivist-methodological-constructivists' version of the 
correspondence theory of truth is thus not as liberal a proposal as 
it might initially seem for it amounts to an absolute theory of 
approximate truth. As Feyerabend points out
'"Truth" is such a nicely neutral word. Nobody would 
deny that it is commendable to speak the truth and 
wicked to tell lies. Nobody would deny that - and 
yet nobody knows what such an attitude amounts to.
So it is easy to twist matters and to change 
allegiance to truth in one's everyday affairs into 
allegiance to the Truth of an ideology which is 
nothing but the dogmatic defence of that ideology. 
And it is of course not true that we have to follow 
the truth. Human life is guided by many ideas.
Truth is one of them. Freedom and mental 
independence are others. If Truth, as conceived by 
some ideologists, conflicts with freedom, then we 
have a choice. We may abandon freedom. But we may 
also abandon Truth. (Alternatively, we may adopt a 
more sophisticated idea of truth that no longer 
contradicts freedom; ['])•*.
(Feyerabend, 1975a, p. 4: original emphasis).
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In the wake of objective epistemology, Feyerabend argues, we are 
left with our subjective wishes and desires in matters of theory- 
choice. Our methods and rules for comparing theories, however, are 
'arbitrary1 or 'subjective1 only in the sense that it has hitherto 
proven impossible in practice (and is very likely impossible 
in principle) to find 'wish- independent arguments for their 
acceptability' (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 68: cf. Kuhn's, 1977, pp. 
337-338, remarks on subjectivity). Far from being something to be 
deplored, it is by recognising and celebrating this fact that 
relevance and responsibility of science for society might be 
achieved to an unprecedented extent and duration. Feyerabend's 
views on philosophy of science and on politics may be seen to fuse 
in the following two statements which he makes:
'Pluralism of theories and metaphysical views is not 
only important for methodology, it is also an 
essential part of a humanitarian outlook.'
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 52).
'For me democracy, the right of people to arrange
their lives as they see fit comes first,
'rationality', 'truth' and all those other inventions 
of our intellectuals come second.'
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 145 n. 8).
These are views which I wholeheartedly endorse. (Note that none of 
the above denies the possibility that certain values might actually
be true; what is denied however, is that we presently have
sufficiently good reasons for deciding which and when).
Now, Hesse has commented that
'Post-empiricist analyses of science have placed more 
emphasis on theories than their empiricist 
predecessors, but in the end they support rather than
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undermine the conclusion that natural science is 
essentially instrumentalist.'
(Hesse, 1980, p. 177).
If we ignore Feyerabend's "no position" ("or pluralistic position") 
claim as sufficient defence against this assertion, if held to apply 
against him, then I suggest that its force is still undermined by 
many of his interpretations of particular episodes in the history of 
science and which demonstrate the high utility - in context - of 
(ontologically) realistic thinking, albeit, with no claim to 
objectivity in epistemology. The most noteworthy example here is 
Feyerabend's discussion of the so-called Copernican Revolution as 
mediated by Galileo and which he presents through several chapters 
of his most famous work, Against Method (Feyerabend, 1975b). 
Certainly, Feyerabend often talks in the manner of a realist. Thus 
he states, for example, that 'scientific theories are ways of 
looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs 
and expectations, and thereby also our conception of reality.' 
(Feyerabend, 1965, p. 29) - a view which McEvoy (1975, p. 49) points 
out is in stark contrast to the positivism which sees the aim of 
science as being the systematization of experience that exists 
independently of any scientific theories. Feyerabend, however, 
cannot straightforwardly be said to be either a realist or an 
instrumentalist: he is each in different contexts.
It is also important to note that Feyerabend uses historical 
episodes in the history of science not only to undermine objectivist 
accounts but also to demonstrate the utility of what he terms 
'methodological suggestions' or 'hints' (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 143). 
These include the use of ad hoc theories, connnections with 
influential ideologies, political force to revive theories that are
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(For a list of around eight such suggestions, together with 
references to his detailed discussion of them, see Feyerabend, 1978, 
p. 143 n. 4). This effectively protects Feyerabend against the 
frequently made charge that he is a 'nihilist' and, moreover, may be 
construed as demonstrating some parallels with the 'technical 
eclecticism' (Karst, 1977) sanctioned by PGP in its psycho­
therapeutic setting (cf my extension of this notion to pedagogy in
Chapter 10). The suggestive or invitational character of 
Feyerabend's methodological suggestions is guaranteed by the 
context-dependency, indeed, I propose as an informal rule for 
recognizing and appraising this quality in any field of research 
that the invitational, as opposed to the prescriptive, nature of a 
methodological idea might be said to vary in direct proportion to 
its context-dependency (or in negative proportion to its 
context-independency).
Feyerabend's most famous slogan - 'anything goes* - is thus not a 
'central thesis' or a methodological 'principle' which he personally 
endorses, as close reading of Against Method soon reveals. But he
surely makes this point unequivocably clear in a later reply to a
critic; 'anything goes' is the naive equivalence postulate which 
rationalists (objectivists) cannot preclude from their 
methodologies:
'[ ] 'anything goes' does not express any conviction 
of mine, it is a jocular summary of the predicament 
of the rationalist: if you want universal standards,
I say, if you cannot live without principles that 
hold independently of situations, shape of world, 
exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, 
then I can give you such a principle. It will be 
empty, useless, and pretty ridiculous - but it will 
be a 'principle'. It will be the 'principle'
'anything goes.'
(Feyerabend, [1978] 1978, p. 188: original emphasis).
- 4.81 -
Feyerabend demonstrates that everything can stay in (cannot be 
excluded from) attempts to construe scientific method as a 
'context-independent organon of thought' and, further, that 
everything would stay in a comprehensive account - but only 
rationalists and self-deluders would wish actually to attempt these 
things. As we have already seen, Feyerabend holds that in the face 
of the failure of objectivist epistemology, science emerges as a 
'context dependent plausibility' (Feyerabend, 1981b, p. 18: quoted 
more fully in section 4.2, above).
Hesse's characterization of what she terms 'extreme forms' of 
relativism shall also help me further to delineate Feyerabend's 
pluralist interpretation and thence my own, basically Kellyan, brand 
of relativist-methodological-constructivism:
'In extreme forms of relativism theories are regarded 
only as internally connected propositional systems, 
or 'language games'; they are world views to be given 
significance in their own right. 'Truth' is defined 
as coherence with the theoretical system and 
'knowledge' becomes socially institutionalised 
belief. The view is 'relativist' in the sense that 
there are no cross-theory criteria for belief, nor 
progressive approximations to universally valid 
knowledge in the theoretical domain.'
(Hesse, 1980, p. xiv).
Now, although Feyerabend might be said to endorse each of these 
features in Hesse's characterization, above, I contend that he does 
so in ways which set him apart from most other post-empiricist 
traditions and that these differences bring his ideas closest from 
amongst such traditions to those of Kelly.
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Thus, Feyerabend's context-dependent defences of realism distances 
his ideas from the straightforwardly idealist accounts implied by 
Hesse's first sentence. With respect to her second sentence, his 
acceptance of it would be heavily qualified by his advocacy of 
pluralistic methodology: one of his most important themes is his 
rejection of what he terms the 'consistency condition', viz. the 
methodological requirement that new hypotheses should agree with 
accepted, well established, theories (Feyerbend, 1975b, esp. Ch.
3). Feyerabend would wholeheartedly agree with Hesse's last sentence 
since it may be interpreted as a re-statement of the 
incommensurability thesis.
What I wish now to argue, in outline only, is that it is 
"sociological" perspectives on the construction of knowledge which 
are most susceptible of the charge of 'extreme relativism' by virtue 
of their effective (if unacknowledged) idealism whereby they open 
the door to many of the worst excesses of objectivist-empiricisra, 
including dogmatism, authoritarianism and conservatism, plus one of 
their own: a crucial vagueness over the issue*of (e.g. scientific) 
method. This part of my case hinges' on the evaluation of values 
(constructive principles) underlying theories.
Thus, having demonstrated (as I interpret him) the value-ladenness 
of theories, Feyerabend goes on, however, to argue against
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attributing 'objectivity’ to values merely by virtue of their 
(degree of) sharedness amongst persons:
'Reduction to shared principles is not always possible 
and so we must admit that the demands or the formulae 
expressing them are incomplete as used and have to be 
revised. Continued insistence on the 'objectivity' 
of value judgments however would be as illiterate as 
continued insistence on the 'absolute' use of the 
pair 'up-down' after discovery of the spherical shape 
of the earth.'
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 23).
This not only pulls the rug from under any "final move" of the sort 
attempted by Popper and the more astute objectivist-r-methodological- 
constructivists (cf. Popper, [1945] 1980b, p. 231: quoted and 
discussed in section 3.4.2) but also from objectivist sociologists 
of knowledgeig, such as Bloor, who argues that
'The. objectivity of knowledge resides in its being the 
set of accepted beliefs of a social group [ ]. The 
authority of truth is the authority of society.' 
(Bloor, 1976, p. 76).
Nolwithstanding Bloor's awareness of the dangers of too simplistic a 
construal of such a notion (which I shall term 'social 
objectivism'), I contend that there are many others who do so 
subscribe and lapse into a viciously circular or naive form of 
functionalist ideology which Bloor has elsewhere specifically 
criticized and rejected:
'As a doctrine about society, functionalism, in its 
most naive form sees all the institutions, norms, and 
groupings of people as related to one another in ways 
that subserve the ends of the existing form of 
society, and its survival and stability through 
time. The well-known shortcoming of naive 
functionalism is that it systematically obscures 
those modes of interaction between component parts of
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society that reveal when they cannot coexist. 
Long-term and deep-rooted conflicts of interest, for 
example, are difficult to grasp if one's 
starting-point is to see each component of society as 
having a function that is to be understood purely in 
terms of existing form of society.'
(Bloor, 1973, p. 9: original emphasis).
Even Bloor himself and others, such as Kuhn, remain too close to 
functionalist thinking for my taste.
Those who seek to extend (or;over extend) social objectivism to 
encompass the world's peoples escape Mannheimian paradoxes of 'total 
ideology* only by arbitrarily granting privileged status to certain 
'domains' of knowledge, usually science, and usually also to certain 
categories and schemas for categorization within them^ o*
Some social "constructivists" vaunt not only consensus as a 
criterion for knowledge, but also communicability as a criterion for 
meaning: Ziman, for example, argues that
'[ ] the absolute need to communicate one's findings, 
and to make them acceptable to other people, 
determines their intellectual form. Objectivity and 
logical rationality, the supreme characteristics of 
the Scientific Attitude, are meaningless for the 
isolated individual; they imply a strong social 
context, and the sharing of experience and opinion 
[ ] we come to believe in them as .authorities in 
their own right.'
(Ziman, 1968, p. 144: my emphasis).
Ziman's disarmingly modest caveat that the book from which I have 
excerpted this quotation represents only a work of 'amateur 
philosophy' (p. xi) should not, however, be allowed to excuse or 
disguise the extremity of his doctrine of meaning and he makes it 
without a 'private language' argument in sight (cf. Hesse's allusion
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to Wittgenstein’s notion of ’language games’). Such commitments to 
the social construction of knowledge have been used by some to 
promote what I see as a "false-antithesis" between personal and 
social construction (see my arguments in Chapter 10 against the 
science educationalist Joan Solomon in this regard).
In sociological and consensual accounts of knowledge, the agency and 
integrity of the individual person is either ignored or denied. The 
latter is particularly apparent in sociological theories which have 
a strongly political ideological base, e.g. orthodox Marxist 
'analyses’. I have never seen a remotely convincing account that, 
for example, Einstein created General Relativity Theory in response 
to the 'class struggle' '- or, for that matter, any other social 
"forces" or "pressures". Nor do I envisage one ever being 
forthcoming (though a tentative case for the social construction of 
his 'special' theory might be made).
Alternatively, to pursue a more Wittgensteinian line, philosophy 
becomes an interminable therapeutic activity, as opposed to theory, 
in which (on one interpretation of his ideas) the 'utility', or 
meaning, of a word becomes the sum total of its possible uses.
Echoes of such an approach are to be found in the recent writings of 
philosophers such as Rorty (1980) whose ideas are gaining influence: 
he talks of philosophy becoming a series of 'edifying discourses.'
While I have considerable sympathy for such approaches (when freed 
from Wittgenstein's private language argument) I feel that they 
consistently over extend the universe of discourse in the 
explication of particular words and ideas. As a result, they fail 
to capture the context-dependent pragmatism of knowing in general
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and knowing scientifically in particular. Although relativist- 
raethodological-constructivism means that we cannot ever know our 
theories to "cut the world at its joints" this is exactly the 
assumption we would seem to have to make if we are actually to get 
on with the business of knowing - and these constructive processes,
I contend, can only plausibly and economically be elucidated by 
meta-theory. As if to demonstrate this point, Wittgensteinians are 
notorious for "lapsing" into theory in order to develop their 
philosophical activities (cf. Searle^s, 1982, remarks on 
Wittgensteinians and the philosophy of language).
I consider the forward looking immediacy and pragmatism of science 
to have been most brilliantly identified and discussed by Feyerabend 
and that at least part of this has to do with his emphasis upon the 
interest, expectations and contributions of the individual 
scientist.
Now, I have already remarked upon the pre-eminent concern of PCP 
with the "perspective of the personal" and this is, of course, a 
crucial similarity between Kelly's and Feyerabend's approaches. 
Moreover, this concern of Kelly's would seem to derive from a 
similar construal of constructive dynamics.
As I interpret Kelly, true 'sociality* of construction is impossible 
in all non-trivial knowledge claims, and, however it be understood, 
"consensus” cannot be elevated into a criterion for objectivity as 
Kelly himself explains:
- 4.87 -
* [ ] human constructions derive their objectivity 
wholly from the way they cast events into varying 
arrays - or simply from the lines of perspective they 
provide. Actually it is in terms of such arrays that 
consensual judgment becomes psychologically 
possible. Consensus itself, while often cited as the 
criterion of objectivity, does not properly define 
the psychological grounds on which objectivity 
rests. Only sociological grounds are implied.1 
(Kelly, 1969, p. 290).
I suggest that, instead, Kelly's notion of 'commonality* of 
constructions, i.e. inter-subjective similarity between 
constructions, allows us usefullly to (re)construe all knowledge 
claims and situations which social "constructivists" consider to be 
quintessentially "social" but yet without denying or pre-empting 
individual contributions to the collective constructive processes 
which created it (cf. Kelly's, 1955, pp. 90-94, 'Commonality 
Corollary*: also my discussion in Chapter 10 where I consider the 
dynamics of social construction of knowledge from a Kellyan 
perspective).
Kelly himself clarifies how his notion of personal meaning relates 
to commonality and communication in the following way:
'This concern with personal meaning should prove no 
less valuable to the scientist than it has to the 
psychotherapist. It stems from the notion that when 
a person uses a word he is expressing, in part, his 
own construction of events.'
(Kelly, 1969, p. 74: my emphasis).
And he expresses his commitment to method thus:
'[ ] humanistic psychology needs a technology through 
which to express its humane intentions. Humanity 
needs to be implemented, not merely characterized and 
eulogised.'
(Kelly, 1969, p. 135).
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Kelly renders this latter claim palpable by articulating a whole 
battery of ’re-constructive* technologies, of which Repertory Grid 
Techniques (RGT) share the closest relation to his formal theory 
(cf. my discussion of RGT in Chapter 7). Kelly, then, is a 
relativist- methodological-constructivist.
Now, Feyerabend's and Kelly's joint pre-eminent concern with the 
"perspective of the personal" brings risks of its own, however, as 
Trigg warns:
'Whereas the temptation of those who talk of the 
social construction of reality must always be 
relativism, that of those who deal with the
individual's construction of it must be solipsism.'
(Trigg, 1980, p. xv).
I shall not try to defend Feyerabend against the possible charge of
solipsism (or, more generally^ of idealism): his "no position" claim
would not warrant me even trying to do so. Rather, I shall use my 
recent discussion of Feyerabend's ideas as a backdrop so as to 
defend those of Kelly and to uphold my contention that the latter's 
ideas constitute a metatheory which is application to science. I 
judge Kelly's ideas to provide superior ground for 'rational 
integrat[ion ]' (Karst, 1980, p. 167) than do those of Feyerabend, 
but yet they remain equally non-pre-emptive.
Kelly himself was hot unduly concerned about demonstrating the 
epistemological realism of his theory. Perhaps because his 
principal concerns in psychotherapy lay elsewhere, Kelly simply 
stated that:
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'We presume that the world is really existing and that 
man is gradually coming to understand it.'
(Kelly, 1955, p. 6: my emphasis).
And elsewhere he deals with this issue in a downright peremptory
manner:
'The fact that my only approach to reality is through 
offering some responsible construction of it does not 
discourage me from postulating it is there. The open 
question for man is not whether reality exists or not 
but what he can make of it.'
(Kelly, 1969, p. 25: my emphasis).
In statements such as these, then, Kelly demonstrates his commitment 
to ontological realism and his sympathy for CER. Close scrutiny of
Kelly's text, however, reveals that he does not argue for CER. He
similarly does not propose or endorse a correspondence theory of 
truth or, indeed, a theory of.truth of any kind2i» Even the eminent 
personal constructivists Landfield and Leitner concede that 
'Personal Construct Theory makes some concessions to realism but [it 
Is] predominently idealistic' (Landfield and Leitner, 1980, p. 3).
All this begs an obvious question: is PCP realistic enough to pass 
muster as a constructivist epistemology? Or is its claim to realism 
'no more than an assertion of dogmatic faith belied by all the 
facts' (Trigg, 1980, p. 36)? In other words (to continue in Trigg's 
idiom), is 'reality at risk' in PCP?
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In response to such questions, I shall argue that, suitably 
interpreted (and, perhaps, augmented), PCP does provide compelling 
grounds for it to be considered to be a realist theory of knowledge 
(or, better, since epistemic objectivism is rejected, a 1 realist 
meta-theory1).
I am particularly keen to delineate "Kellyan" relativist-'-, 
methodological-constructivism from idealist brands of relativism 
because I find the Idealist Assumption, with its epistemological 
consequence that sense experience is "rhetorical" and nothing more, 
impossible to accept - yet I have heard ray work, and that of ray 
immediate colleagues, described as "anti-realist".
My rejection of idealist epistemologies begins with two strongly 
held personal convictions, viz. contra idealists, (a) I do believe 
that our useful, and usable, theories share a relationship with 
("collide" with) a mind-independent reality; and (b) I do believe 
that our useful, and usable, theories are partially constrained by 
our sense-experience. I further contend that these convictions can 
be expressed within Kellyan meta-theory.
Now, to justify my further contention would seem to require that I 
postulate, at the very least and in a manner which does not 
contradict any of my earlier endorsed views, (a)1 a relationship 
between our theories and reality (i.e. a theory of reference); and, 
(b)' a role for sense-experience in acts of theory-choice (i.e. 
crucial experiments).
I shall begin my demonstration of fulfillment of requirement (a)1 by 
examining the idea that any construct: or construction system implies
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a kind of "conceptual closure" and is thus "absolute" or 
"deterministic" in some sense: within PCP, "freedom" and 
"determination" are not held to be mutually exclusive or 
contradictory qualities, indeed, they are deemed to be complementary 
notions (cf. my earlier remarks on "constructive causality" in 
section 4.2). Kelly introduces this point by proposing two forms of 
determinism which are pertinent to his theory:
'[ ] there are two forms of determinism which 
concern us. The one is the determinism which is the 
essential feature of any organised construction 
system - the control of superordinate constructs over 
subordinate elements. The second is implied in our
notion of an integral universe.'
(Kelly, 1955, p. 20: my emphasis).
Kelly dismisses the second form of determinism as being ’relatively 
unimportantV(Kelly, 1955, p. 20) to his theory and discusses it 
only very briefly. I suggest that this judgement was basically 
sound with respect to the original.focus and range of convenience 
Kelly anticipated for his theory, viz. 'human readjustment to 
stress' (Kelly, 1955,. p. 12) and, more generally, the concerns of 
clinical psychotherapy. But it does not necessarily follow that 
this judgement of relative importance should be upheld in other foci 
and ranges of convenience to which PCP might be extended - a point 
of which Kelly was well aware (Kelly, 1955, pp. 10-12). I contend 
that such is the case when attempting, as in this thesis, to develop 
the epistemological aspect of PCP for application in formal 
educational settings; Kelly's second form of determinism constitutes 
an important part of my defence of his epistemological realism. 
Accordingly, I shall discuss it first and defer consideration of the 
other form of determinism until later in this section.
I interpret Kelly's second form of determinism - the notion of an 
'integral universe' - to stem from a commitment to the meta-physical 
doctrine (which is applicable at least to the world of middle sized 
objects) that time has an "arrow", viz. that time flows in one 
direction only: the 'Arrow of Time Thesis'(ATT).
Thus, Kelly endorses the view that 'time provides the ultimate bond 
in all relationships' (Kelly, 1955, p. 6: original emphasis) and 
goes on to argue, by way of a principal consequence, that this 
results in an integral relationship between all events comprising 
our world. This is held to be the case however tenuous this 
relationship might appear to be in specific instances. Kelly 
proposes, as an example to demonstrate this last point, that there 
is ultimately even a connection between the present motion of his 
fingers on the keys of his typewriter (presumably typing that part 
of the text to his 1955 work) and 'the price of Yak milk in Tibet* 
(Kelly, 1955, p. 6). This second form of determinism, he tells us, 
'is assumed in the so-called First Postulate of Logic, [i.e.! the 
Postulate of Cosmic Connectedness* (Kelly, 1955 p. 20: my emphasis).
Now, I feel that Kelly overstates his case vis a vis the relative 
unimportance of the second form of determinism when compared to the 
first and this even within his original focus and range of 
convenience for PCP. This is because 1 do not think that the first 
form of determinism could be sustained without the second and, 
further, that the second is logically prior to the first. I contend 
that Kelly himself, however, comes to the brink of under- mining the 
importance of the integral relationship existing between all events 
through trivialising it. For example, the nub of his justification 
for the arrow of time consists of the statement that
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’The universe flows on and on. While one may abstract 
certain repetitive features in its course, it never 
actually doubles back on itself. Matters would 
become enormously confused if tt_ ever did. (The very 
idea of a universe that doubled back on itself is 
highly amusing and might even have some relativistic 
significance for the cosmic theorists).*
(Kelly, 1955, p. 21: my emphasis).
Maybe Kelly had in mind something like the consequences Lewis 
Carroll describes in his delightful 'Wool and Water1 chapter from 
Through the Looking Glass? I contend, however, that much more than 
"amusement" or even 'relativistic significance for the cosmic 
theorist' is at stake here, for I concur with Popper's view that the 
reality of time and change are fundamental to, and necessary for, 
any realist epistemology (Popper, e.g. 1978, p. 129) and that this 
has profound significance for morality.
To render this last conclusion compelling, Popper draws attention to 
some of the broader and undesirable implications of abandoning the 
arrow of time. By way of an example, Popper recalls his criticisms 
of Boltzmann's 'H Theorem'22:
'I think Boltzmann's idea is staggering in its 
boldness and beauty. But I also think that it is 
quite untenable, at least for a realist. It brands 
unidirectional change as an illusion. This makes the 
catastrophe of Hiroshima an illusion jmy emphasis|. 
Thus is makes our world an illusion, and with it all 
our attempts to find out more about the world. It is
therefore self-defeating (like every idealism).' 
(Popper, 1978, p. 160: original emphasis).
With this quotation in mind, then, I identify my own commitment to 
ATT and, thence, to epistemological realism, to be primarily a 
matter of my personal ethics. Alas, I conclude that Popper
- 4.94 -
undermines his own insight with respect to the 'catastrophe of 
Hiroshima' and his otherwise excellent principles of an 'Open 
Society' (Popper [1945] 1980a, b) by insisting upon the objectivity 
of his method.
Kelly uses his commitment to the second form of determinism to 
present in outline what amounts to a metaphysical argument against 
"ontological determinism" or (realist) inductivist epistemology. 
Thus, he argues that any sequence of events is unique due to the 
assumption that the universe does not "double back on itself" (i.e. 
ATT). From this he concludes that there is 'not much point' in 
singling out any particular event and claiming that it was 
'determined' for 'It was a consequence*- but only once 1' (Kelly, 
1955, p. 21: my emphasis).
Now, for a theory of knowledge to be consistent with the Idealist 
Assumption, viz. "the world is my (or our) idea", nothing can be 
assumed to be shared between persons subscribing to different 
views. As I intimated earlier, I find this consequence intuitively 
implausible. In light of ray recent discussion of ATT, however, I 
can now develop my epistemological reasons for rejecting 
idealism/defending Kellyan realism by discussing a "thought 
experiment" proposed by Trigg in a section of his book entitled, 
appropriately enough, 'Alternative Conceptual Frameworks':
'One difficulty arising when we want to talk of 
similarity of belief and yet of possible variations 
in conceptual systems is that beliefs themselves are 
conditioned by conceptual systems. The belief that 
there is a cat on a wall presupposes that the 
believer thinks of cat and wall as separate en­
tities. The tribe which views it as a single entity 
will have a different concept. Can we say that any 
belief is shared when the relevant concepts are not?
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1 [ ] It seems as if there has to be some neutral 
underpinning of them for understanding and 
translation to occur. I have said that there is an 
objective situation which we would describe as a cat 
on a wall and others might see as one entity. For us 
there can be cats not on walls, and walls without 
cats. We would not be disturbed if that cat jumped 
off that wall. The possible tribe we are considering 
would think an indissoluble unit had gone when the 
cat left the wall. Presumably they would think 
something else had come in its place when the wall 
remained. This is of course very significant. What 
the tribe says is constrained by what happens. The 
entity cat-on-wall no longer continues when the cat 
goes, and their description has to change when ours 
does. We each respond to what objectively happens 
and this gives the point of contact between the 
systems.1
(Trigg, 1980, p. 107: original emphasis).
Or in a diagrammatic form:
. *
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Figure 4.5. Diagrams Showing Shared Reference of Alternative 
Conceptual Frameworks to an Objective Situation.
(Based on text by Trigg, 1980, p. 107).
If we agree with the anti-idealist thrust of Trigg's point, then it 
is important not to proceed to run aground upon the opposite bank. 
This is exactly what objectivist-methodological-constructivists do 
do, for they, accepting the possibility of a point of contact 
between systems of belief, then hold that empirical evidence alone 
can constitute a neutral, objective, arbiter in matters of 
theory-choice (i.e. standard empiricism) providing, of course, that 
such evidence is mediated by the particular engine of method that 
they propose. This last part, however, begs the very question at 
issue, i.e. objectivity. From a relativist-methodological- 
constructivist viewpoint, if such objectivists' claim to objectivity 
is upheld, then they end up attributing agency to empirical evidence 
itself (and, thereby, to reality itself) thus undermining their 
claim to constructivism (CKT) and hence also their entire 
epistemology.
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In relativist-methodological-constructivism, by contrast, theories . 
are held to be entirely theoretical, or 'fully abstract1 as Kelly 
might say, in the sense that there is no 'factual core' (Feyerabend, 
1965, p. 203: original emphasis) which may be appealed to in acts of 
theory-choice. This notwithstanding, even, indeed, especially, in 
cases of alternative-conceptual-frameworks - incommensurable 
theories - the assumption of realism combined with the arrow of time 
thesis would seem to render epistemological realism compelling.
To explain, it seemS to me that incommensurable, or genuinely 
alternative theories?3 provide not only the best source of criticism 
and thus method for improving our theories, as Feyerabend has argued 
long and hard, but also, in light of Trigg's "thought experiment", 
the best evidence we may yet have that our preferred theory 
genuinely refers (to a mind-independent reality). From this I 
propose what I shall term a 'transformational theory of reference' 
whereby we can know that our theory 'refers', but not that it 
'corresponds'. CKT prevents us from being more specific than this 
and positing, say, a 'topological' theory of reference in which we 
might presume identity of 'topological types' between the 
cosmological assumptions underlying the rival theories and the 
structure of reality itself: for that we would have to know the 
'genus' of reality itself, the transformational theory of reference 
is, of course, furthest removed from the correspondence theory of 
truth favoured by naive realist epistemology (classical empiricism) 
and which might be termed topographical. I fully realise that 
from all objectivist points of view, the transformational theory of 
reference shall be construed as, at best, "toothless" due to its 
subjectivist element - it is a subjectivist theory of objective
reference. Considering the increased potential for critical freedom 
of (re)construction and for ontological responsibility that such a 
theory of reference admits, (about which, more later) however, the 
possibility of that criticism does not worry me in the least.
Turning now to (b)* - the requirement for a specified role for 
sense-experience in acts of theory-choice - I shall begin by 
considering Kelly’s views on test-criteria for constructs in light 
of my earlier discussion of the links Feyerabend draws between 
cosmological assumptions and methodology. I hope that in the course 
of doing this I shall also be able to clarify further the 
transformational theory of reference.
Recall that Kelly stated concisely his views on construct 
test-criteria:
'[...] the criteria by which a person chooses between 
alternatives, in terms of which he has structured his 
world, are themselves cast in terms of 
constructions. Men not only construe their 
alternatives, but they construe also criteria for 
choosing between them.'
(Kelly, 1969, p. 85).
Perhaps, however, Kelly is a little too concise for my purposes 
since he does not elaborate substantially upon this subject in this 
paper or elsewhere. This notwithstanding, certain consequences may 
be shown to follow more-or-less directly from his proposition. For 
example, if test-criteria are themselves to be construed as personal 
constructs, then they are necessarily superordinate constructs. To 
pursue this, if test-criteria are personal constructs, then they 
would seem each to require a dimension of relevant contrast. Or do
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they? I suggest that ultimately all test-critera may be cast in 
terms of "metaphysical principles": a test-criterion of 
’prediction1, for example, is surely predicated upon some notion of 
’non-randomness in nature’? Indeed, I think it reasonable to say 
that the more highly superordinate a construct is, the more like a 
test-criterion or a metaphysical principle it is: any sufficiently 
superordinate construct is epistemology. Conversely, the more 
subordinate a construct is, the more truly construct-like it is.
This needs more elaboration.
Recall Kelly's Range Corollary:
'Range Corollary: A construct is convenient for the 
anticipation of a finite range of events only.'
(Kelly, 1955, p. 68: my emphasis).
The "need" for this corollary is that a construct which included all 
possible elements (objects, events) would leave us with little or no 
advance upon the 'undifferentiated homogeneity' (Kelly, 1955, p. 9) 
prior to any construction. Herein lies the context-dependency of 
constructs. Nevertheless, the more highly superordinate a construct 
is, the more nearly infinite the class of abstracted elements (i.e. 
range of convenience) shall be. In such cases, the dimension of 
relevant contrast - a necessary feature of any construct - begins to 
break down. Kelly, however, recognizes this phenomenon through his 
notion of a 'Regnant Construct', viz.
'A regnant construct is a kind of superordinate 
construct which assigns each of its elements to a 
category on an all-or-none basis, as in classical 
logic. It tends to be non-abstractive.'
(Kelly, 1955, pp. 564-565).
I construe Kelly's idea of the regnant construct to he an asymtotic 
notion which coincides with my understanding of a metaphysical 
principle, viz. a constructive principle or cosmological assumption, 
as discussed earlier. Regnant constructs may similarly be thought 
of as "ultimate test-criteria", "absolute postulates" and 
"values"^ . Epting has commented in a complementary way upon the 
nature of regnant constructs:
'The regnant construct might be thought of as an 
express train that runs directly from the 
superordinate (value like constructs) down to the 
constructs that are concerned with everyday 
activities.'
(Epting, 1984, p. 45).
Specific examples of regnant constructs in science might include 
simplicity, coherence and non-randomness in nature.
Now, I believe that the characteristic logical form of scientific
laws (laws of nature), viz. universal statementS25, means that they
may be construed as regnant constructs. Consider, for example, 
Boyle's Law for Ideal Gases. Since this law - by virtue of it being 
a law - is held to apply to all (ideal) gases, it is difficult fully 
to imagine it in terms of a construct because there would seem to be
an absence of possible opposite contrast (though we may readily
imagine its irrelevancy when applied, say, to solids). This 
apparent paradox is resolved if we re-examine part of Kelly’s 
rationale for breaking with the traditional notion of 'concept';
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'[ ] a concept as defined in the dictionary is of 
iittle concern to a psychologist. But a concept on 
the occasion of its use is quite another matter.'
(Kelly, 1969, p. 9: my emphasis).
Specifically, a concept 'on the occasion of its use' must be a 
construct. Relating this to scientific laws, we can say that whilst 
they may be "regnant in form", they must be "instantial" at the 
point of use, viz. we must have a finite number of individual 
elements and a dimension of relevant contrast to appraise them 
within.
Strictly speaking (from a Kellyan point of view), then, a scientific 
law - comprising, as it does, a proposition applicable to a single 
class of elements of potentially infinite size - is psychologically 
footless. But when we apply a scientific law, we operate at a lower 
level of superordination, viz. we operate at a level where a 
dimensionality of relevant contrast may be created, albeit, perhaps 
implicitly.
Now, Popper distinguishes between 'strictly universal' synthetic 
statements, to which he is committed in his epistemology and which 
he claims is the form of scientific theories and laws, and 
'numerically universal' synthetic statements. For Popper, a 
strictly universal statement is an 'all-statement*, i.e. a universal 
assertion about an unlimited number of individuals. So interpreted 
it clearly cannot be replaced by a conjunction of a finite number of 
singular statements'. (Popper [1934] 1980, p. 63: original 
emphasis). Numerically universal statements, by contrast, 'can, in 
principle, be replaced by a conjunction of singular statements; for 
given sufficient time, one can enumerate all the elements of the 
(finite)
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class concerned.1 (Popper, f1934] 1980c, p. 62: original 
emphasis). Herein lies a fundamental difference between Kelly and 
Popper (and all objectivist-methodological-constructivists?) for 
although a personal construct cannot be replaced by a conjunction of 
singular statements, in principle, it would be possible to enumerate 
all the elements comprising its range of convenience (i.e. finite 
class).
Scientific laws are, in Kelly's terms, 'superordinate', 'loose' and 
'highly permeable' constructs.
Permeable constructs have 'more of the qualities of a theoretical 
formulation' (Kelly, 1955, p. 81: my emphasis) by contrast with 
'hypothetical formulation fs1' (ibid.) which, in science, are 
'deliberately constructed so as to be relatively impermeable and 
brittle, so that there can be no question about what it embraces and 
no doubt about it being wholly shattered if left intact at the end 
of an experiment' (ibid.).
i construe Kelly's meaning of a 'hypothetical formulation' closely 
to resemble that for his notion of 'an utterly concrete construct', 
viz. a construct which is 'not [ ] permeable at all' (Kelly, 1955, 
p. 79), by virtue of the fact that its range and focus of 
convenience coincide with (and are limited to) the minimum 
requirement of three elements for it to be a construct.
Certain of Kelly's elaborative remarks concerning his notion of an 
'utterly concrete construct' suggest that it is an asymptotic notion 
equal and opposite to that of the regnant construct. This may 
crudely be represented by the following diagram:
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Kognant Constructs
construct
character
a
Concrete Constructs
Where l in e s  'A* and 'B' represent  the  l im its  to K e l ly ' s
formal theory .
Figure 4.6. Diagram Showing Construct Characteristics of Regnant 
Constructs and of Concrete Constructs
Many other construct(ion) characteristics may be added to those I 
have included in Figure 4.6, including looseness vs. tightness, 
dilation vs. constriction. Beyond lines 'A' and 'B1 we are in the 
realm of 'preverbal construction'. To take account of this,
Figure 4.6 may usefully be re-drawn thus;
pre-verbal
construction
Construction
Where c area coveret* by formal content of PCP
j | = area not covered by the formal content of PCP
Figure 4.7. Diagram Showing Areas Covered and Not Covered by the 
Formal Content of PCP
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It is in the zone of 'pre-verbal construction1 that we may discuss . 
notions such as "revelation", "intuition", "tacit knowledge" and the 
like.
These recent views would suggest that in Kellyan meta-theory, as in 
(Feyerabendian) post-empiricist philosophy of science, a'cts of 
theory-choice ultimately and necessarily involve a clash of values - 
understood as constructive principles - and, furthermore, that it is 
principally values that inform any such decision. Hence the role 
that I propose for empirical evidence is that it serves to focus and 
direct attention to a relevant sub-set of competing values in acts 
of theory-choice. Empirical evidence itself it relatively 
unimportant as a criterion in any choice of theory, notwithstanding 
the fact that it may be the first, and constitute almost 
exclusively, the evidence we cite. That this last part is 
especially likely to be the cAse when appealing to another person(s) 
comes as no surprise. This is because sense-experience constitutes 
an experience, perhaps the only experience, that we can reasonably 
predict that we might share something with another person. What the 
relativist-methodological-constructivist refrains from doing 
however, is equating empirical evidence with this small, and 
otherwise unknown, "something" within their epistemology. (This 
does not deny the possibility that, on occasion, "crucial" tests or 
experiments may be negotiated by persons subscribing to different 
values).
The importance of empiricial evidence in acts of theory-choice is 
thus somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand, it seems to be very 
important, even necessary, as a means of "identifying" or "evoking" 
relevant values; on the other hand, it seems very unimportant
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relative to values - empirical evidence itself is the first casualty 
amongst criteria.
Values are implicit to all our theories and formalisms. We can 
invite, but we can never be justified to demand, acceptance of the 
existence of "objective values", i.e., values that are universally 
held. Whilst our theories and formalisms may help us to know and to 
revise our values, they should never be mistaken for values 
themselves. There can be no "objective" expression of values, for 
values really are the bottom-line: this is the most important limit 
of formalism. Hence, relativist-methodological-constructivism 
endorses the third equivalence postulate of Barnes and Bloor: 'all 
beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the causes of 
their credibility.'
I suggest, then, that the role for empirical evidence in acts of 
theory-choice is analogous to icons in traditions of religion. Just 
as a lamb with a flag is a simple problem in Christian iconography, 
(Murray and Murray, 1972, p. 214), so too are certain arrays of 
tracks in a cloud chamber. Or less directly, Michaelson and 
Morley's aether experiments, Eddington's lunar eclipse observations 
and the Chesaspeake Bay atomic clock experiments (among others) may 
be said to have become an "icon" of Relativity Theory. I shall term 
this role the 'Icon Theory of Empirical Evidence'.
Now, as we have seen, personal meaning in relativist-methodological- 
constructivisra is held to be achieved by the meaning-maker positing 
a dimension of relevant contrast. This, however, is a formalism: it 
says little of the nature of the actual experience involved, 
especially in the early stages of developing a personal meaning.
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To elaborate, then, personal meaning may be understood to consist of 
the "apprehension" (whether intuitive and implicit or formalised and 
explicit) of some kind of relationship between one's values and 
one's "life experiences".
Now, consideration of another person's idea constitutes an important 
example of life experience for most persons. When a person 
apprehends a relation of sameness or similarity between their 
personal values and those implicit to the Idea of. the other person, 
agreement shall be the probable result (notwithstanding possible 
disputations over details of formalisation). When a person 
apprehends a relation of difference or dissimilarity between their 
personal values and those implicit to the idea of the other person, 
disagreement shall be the probable result. When no relation is 
apprehended the other's idea shall be construed as meaningless, as, 
e.g., "just so many words". It should be noted that as a doctrine 
of meaning this could scarcely be less dogmatic for, 
methodologically speaking, it allows that, at most, we can 
tentatively identify "value clusters" associated with different 
theories and activities and then invite other persons to share them 
witli us.
Personal values may change (be revised) and theorising may play an 
important role in mediating such change, but empirical evidence is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for meaning. In 
practice, however, the derivation of personal meaning from another 
person's idea relies very much upon the ability to derive an 
empirically knowable consequence (though one is usually cited by the 
proposer). In general, the more discrete and accessible the 
empirical consequence is, the easier it: is to derive personal
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meaning from another person's idea. Where such empirical 
consequences are absent, or are otherwise unclear, vastly more 
effort may be required - often more that a person is able or willing 
to give: as I suggested earlier, sense-experience possibly 
represents the only experience where we can be reasonably sure, and 
sure in advance of our efforts to comprehend, that we might achieve 
at least some point of contact between our belief system and that of 
another person. (The specified consequential or evidential status 
of an empirical event, whether predicted or instantiated, is always 
open to doubt and re-interpretation due to the Theory Ladenness 
Thesis).
This is why comprehension.of certain traditions such as theoretical 
physics, or (especially) pure mathematics and religion, is so 
notoriously difficult, is J^ esoteric^ : it is precisely such 
traditidns which lack clear, accessible, (empirical) "icons" and 
hence require more "value awareness" - and value similarity - in the 
initial stages of attempted comprehension.
Knowing sameness or similarity between one's personal values and 
those of another person may be a very intuitive affair. We often 
experience it all the same. This is what happens when we 
unaccountably, but unmistakably, "click" with some persons and, 
equally, do not with other persons. We may not be able to account 
to others, or even to ourselves, as to why we like or dislike a 
certain other person, we cannot "put our finger on why", i.e. we 
cannot find an appropriate "icon" to evoke in others, or even in 
ourselves, our relevant set of personal values ("feelings") at work: 
sometimes every piece of empirical evidence that we try in this role 
somehow seems to be inadequate.
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The examples I have recently presented have tended to focus upon 
.persons1 personal visions of the ultimate nature of the physical 
universe (whether consciously or unconsciously held and whether 
explicitly or implicitly stated). Earlier on, however, I asserted 
that whilst values may be distinguished, both one from another and 
from theories, they can never be entirely separated in either 
respect. This also has the consequence that personal ethics and (in 
societies) politics can never be entirely separated from any act of 
theorising, e.g. in science, in pedagogy.
In relativist-methodological-constructivism, then, Vis' statements 
are not regarded as categorically separate or separable from 'ought' 
statements. Similarly, "social laws" and "natural laws" are not 
considered to be essentially different in kind, notwithstanding vast 
possible differences in degree. Again, the 'context of discovery* 
is held not to be independent from the 'context of justification'. 
These conclusions may be summarized by saying that to a large, 
though not entire, extent, where an 'ought' was, an 'is* shall be 
and that this ultimately follows from the view that our minds are 
not only a part of nature but also always the most pertinent part.
Now, although I have been highly critical of object.ivi.st 
epistemologists, I do not wish to call into question the good 
intentions of all proposers of such. Popper is a case in point for 
somewhere he defends his commitment to (and the general desirability 
of). 'objective method* on the grounds that any 'irrationalist' 
alternative leaves the door open for, amongst other things, 
racialist interpretations and criticisms of scientific theories. 
There is a prima facie credence to his claim because (to take 
Popper's example) in Nazi Germany some physicists, and many
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non-physicists, criticized (especially) Einstein’s theory in regard 
of its alleged "Jewishness” and of being "Jewish physics" (cf.
Clark, 1973, p. 494 who cites some spectacular, if disturbing, 
examples).
Alas, Popper’s noble aim is undermined by the history of objectivist 
epistemology for such 'methodolatory' (Bakan's, 1969, p. 158, 
excellent expression) can be turned to any purpose. In support of 
this, I point out that Mengele and his co-workers committed most of 
their very worst atrocities against inmates of Auschwitz in the name 
of objectivity, viz. amongst other things, their explicit remit was 
to seek and find ’objective’, ’scientific', proof of the correctness 
of the doctrine of the Aryan Race.
Objectivism in epistemology is culpable because it sanctions, 
indeed,.requires that person's (or persons') specific purposes and 
criteria in the making and appraising of a knowledge claim, and 
which cannot interpretatlvely be subsumed by the objectivist's 
method, be excluded from consideration. In this way, science and 
the philosophical evaluation of science become divorced from the 
social context and hence also from social responsibility. Given my 
earlier arguments, I conclude that there is something inherently 
contradictory - and ultimately disingenuous - about "valuing 
objectivity". The appeal of the objectivist approach is, however, 
quite understandable for the possibility of objective knowledge 
promises also the possibility of an unimpeachable vindication of 
one's "personal" views.:
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Now, practically speaking, I suspect that there are few persons 
indeed whose commitment to objectivity consistently exceeds their 
other commitments. My fear, nevertheless, is that with what I 
consider to be the illusion of objective epistemology, and hence the 
possibility of objective knowledge, before scientists and general 
public alike, (especially politicians) and human ideational 
fecundity being what it is, there would almost always be so many 
ideas proposed that would be capable of meeting the pre-testing 
requirements of an objectivist epistemology that inter-subjective 
moral appraisal (ethical and political) shall only be brought to 
bear upon those objectivistically formulated knowledge claims which 
have also been objectivistically tested. Indeed, in objectivist- 
methodological-constructivist epistemologies, such as Popper's, some 
degree of (successful) empirical testing is ultimately required to 
render the theory of assuredly 'scientific' status, as we have 
seen. But surely this is to £ut the cart before the horse, for by 
then it may be fatally too late? The only 'degree* of empirical 
testing for the atom-bomb, for example, was the "absolute" degree of 
actually exploding it: the critical mass required for such a weapon 
ruled out "small scale experiments". If a person's, or a society's 
commitment to objectivism is over-arching, then this shall 
necessarily delay, perhaps even indefinitely, their personal and/or 
societal moral appraisal of any action.
I contend that even modern, "sophisticated", objectivist 
epistemologists end up by sanctioning a morally blind (which is not 
to say neutral) approach to knowledge creation. This may be 
summarized by one of Bacon's famous dictums:
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'The end of our Foundation is the knowledge of causes 
and secret motions of things, and the enlarging of 
the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all 
things possible.1
(Bacon, The New Atlantis, 1627, quoted by Easlea, 
1981, p. 21: my emphasis).
Now, Easlea (1983) argues corapellingly, albeit in a self-consciously 
ptolemical style (Easlea, personal communication), that gender is an 
important dimension for understanding the creation of nuclear 
weapons and the perpetration of the (nuclear) arms race in 
particular, and the dominant historical orientation of the 
development of scientific knowledge in general.
With close reference to feminist intellectuals such as Simone de 
Beauvoir and using Mary Shelley's novel Frankenstein or the New 
Prometheus as a sub-text, Easlea identifies and critically examines 
the prevalence of birth and sexual metaphors in the (predominantly) 
male accounts of science. Easlea has elsewhere summarized his 
argument thus:
'My point of view [ ] is that in patriarchal society, 
and particularly in advanced capitalist industrial 
societies, men tend to suffer in varying degrees from 
nearly zero to nearly total from what I call a 
'compulsive masculinity syndrome'. I also claim that 
in its near total form this syndrome manifests itself 
in a pathological striving for power and domination 
together with a pathological hostility towards what 
is perceived as 'feminine'. My general argument is 
that abolition of the sexual division of labour would 
do a great deal to reduce the pervasiveness and 
intensity of the 'compulsive masculinity syndrome’ 
and hence make more likely and more sustainable a 
just and peaceful society.'
(Easlea, 1985, p. 17).
The Baconian mandate - 'to the effecting of all things possible* - . 
emerges from Easlea's treatise as just one manifestation of the 
'truly masculine birth of time' (Bacon, quoted by Easlea, 1983, 
p. 19) which Bacon explicitly initiated and promoted and which he 
identified with science. It is a dimension which is perpetuated by 
objectivist philosophers of science, such as Popper, and individual 
scientists, such as Teller ("Father" of the H-Bomb). I shall 
discuss Easlea's thesis in the context of an interview with a young 
student scientist (section 9.3).
In complementary vein, Maxwell argues for the need to put into 
practice *a profound and comprehensive intellectual revolution, 
affecting to a greater or lesser extent all branches of scientific 
and technological research, scholarship and education.' (Maxwell, 
1984, p. v). He argues that the realization of such a revolution 
would bring about a shift in the aims and methods of rational 
enquiry from the relatively modern tradition of what he terms the 
'philosophy of knowledge' in preference for the 'philosophy of 
wisdom * and which has antecedents in the approach of the historic
Soc.rates26 •
Maxwell characterizes 'wisdom' as 'the desire, the active endeavour, 
and the capacity to discover and achieve what is desirable and of 
value in life, both for oneself and for others.' (Maxwell, 1984, 
p. 66). Wisdom includes knowledge and understanding but goes beyond 
them. Wisdom, like knowledge, can be conceived of, not only in 
personal terms, but also in institutional or social terms. 
Accordingly, the philosophy of wisdom enjoins that 'the basic task 
of rational enquiry is to help us develop wiser ways of living, 
wiser institutions, customs and social relations, a wiser world.*
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(ibid., cf. Maxwell, 1986, pp. 79-80). Maxwell argues that the 
standard empiricist view qua philosophy of knowledge, 'seriously 
misrepresents * the true intellectual aim of science, viz.
'The aim of science is not merely to discover truth 
per se, nothing being presupposed about the nature of 
the truth to be discovered. A basic aim of science 
is to improve our understanding of the world.
Science seeks explanatory truth.'
(Maxwell, 1984, p. 96: original emphasis).
Whilst I am most sympathetic to Maxwell's main thesis, I feel that 
he 'seriously misrepresents' both Feyerabend and Kelly in advancing 
his case27•
From these recent ideas, it would seem that in creating and 
appraising theories one must attempt - and be willing - to "lay 
one's personal values on the line", amongst other things. This, 
however, may involve great personal risk, for one's personal values 
may run into direct conflict with those of another person(s). 
Furthermore, one's personal values may come to be rejected - and not 
only by another person(s), but also by oneself. The willingness to 
entertain such risks, however, is a necessary, though not a 
sufficient, condition for true personal responsibility ever to be
achieved28•
Now, personal responsibility can be assumed only if a person has 
first identified what their values are. This is often not an easy 
task and it is not helped by the fact that there is little tradition 
for it in Western civilisations and which might help. I contend 
that the long, and still pervasive, influence of 'British
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Empiricism1 has actually stunted the development of techniques for 
ordinary (i.e. non-philosophers) persons to "get in touch” with 
their values. Modern objectivist theories of knowledge; however, 
simply perpetuate rationales for evading personal responsibility on 
the past of those who propose and/or use them.
At this point it may be timely both to elaborate upon my earlier 
point concerning personal risk and to relate it to (and in 
counter-critique of) an "extra formal" criticism of relativist 
epistemology, viz. I conjecture that the aspect of risk involved in 
taking personal responsibility that is most unpalatable amongst 
critics of Relativism is the possibility that having succeeded in 
"finding out" one's relevant set of values one may not approve of 
what one has found!
I suggest that many persons have some uncomfortable inklings that 
this might, indeed, be the case when they argue against Relativism. 
Feyerabend has made some remarks which are most pertinent and 
complementary to this notion:
'Relativism if often attacked not because one has 
found a fault, but because one is afraid of it. 
Intellectuals are afraid of it because relativism 
threatens their role in society just as the 
enlightenment once threatened the existence of 
priests and theologians. And the general public 
tyrannized by intellectuals lias learned long ago to 
identify relativism with (social) decay. This is how 
relativism was attacked in Germany's Third Reich, 
this is how it is attacked again today by Fascists, 
Marxists, Critical Rationalists. Even the most 
tolerant people dare not say that they reject an idea 
or a way of life because they don't like it - which 
would put the blame on them entirely - they have to 
add that there are objective [original emphasis] 
reasons for their action - which puts at least part
of the blame on the thing rejected and on those 
enamoured by it. What is it about relativism that 
seems to put the fear of god into everyone?
It is the realization that one's most cherished point 
of view may turn out to be just one of many ways of 
arranging life, important to those brought up in a 
corresponding tradition, utterly uninteresting and 
perhaps even a hinderance to others [ ]. Tolerance 
does not mean acceptance of falsehood side by side 
with truth, it means human treatment of those 
unfortunately caught in falsehood. Relativism would 
put an end to this comfortable exercise in 
superiority - therefore the aversion.*
(Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 79-80: my emphasis).
Now, when conjoined with the incommensurability thesis, the arrow of 
time thesis and the transformational theory of reference, Kelly's 
notion of the construct may be said to allow us legitimately to have 
it both ways with regard to realism and idealism: a construct may be 
said to be realist in conceptualization, but instrumentalist in 
application29• Our commitment in any particular application to only 
one pole of a construct but combined with dimensionality and the 
three augmentative theses above allows and ensures our 'ontological 
responsibility', viz. acceptance of personal responsibility for the 
entities one claims to exist. The moral aspect of such 
responsibility, however, resides not in acceptance of one's personal 
act of construction of such entities (God, atom etc) but of personal 
choice. Were is possible to insist on acknowledgement of personal 
construction as a criterion for personal morality in PCP, then this 
would be pre-emptive. For example, I, as an agnostic, can only 
anticipate construing God as a personal construct, but constructs 
with a high degree of commonality amongst theists, such as 'God vs. 
Devil', are presently irrelevant if not totally meaningless to me3Q.
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We are always free to choose and we are always free to 
re-construe3i. Responsibility then fuses with Kelly's first 'form' 
of determinism, viz. 'the control of a superordinate construct over 
its elements' (Kelly, 1955, p. 20), and which he elaborates upon in 
the following way:
'It should now become clear what is not determined.
For one thing, an element does not determine the 
constructs which are used to subsume it; for another, 
an element which falls outside the purview of a 
construct is independent of it. The latter type of 
independence or freedom is relatively unimportant to 
us; it is only the freedom of chaos. The former type 
of independence or freedom is highly significant, for 
it implies that man, to the extent that he is able to 
construe his circumstances, can find himself freedom 
from their domination. It implies also that man can 
enslave himself with his own ideas and then win his 
freedom again by reconstruing his life.
I. ]•' --------— ~ _
One thing more: since determinism characterizes the 
control that a construct exercises over its 
subordinate elements, freedom characterizes its 
independence of those elements. Determinism and 
freedom are thus inseparable, for that which 
determines the other is, by the same token, free from 
the other. Determinism and freedom are opposite 
sides of the same coin - two aspects of the same
relationship.'
(Kelly, 1955, pp. 20-21: my emphasis).
Constructive Alternativism may thus be seen to emerge as a 
philosophical stance which celebrates persons' ability to force 
distinctions but upholds a principled rejection of absolute 
separations. It is not that Kelly denies that absolute separations 
can and do exist; but when they do, then they lie outside the range 
of possible experience. In PCP, we are behoven to accept 
ontological responsibility for our choices and to achieve relevant 
contrasts. In social contexts we should also strive to articulate
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and to communicate them. As Bannister puts it ’we ought not to 
proclaim publicly that which has not personal meaning for us1 
(Bannister, 1979, p. 28). Whereof one cannot construe, thereof one 
should remain silent. In general summary of the arguments of this 
chapter so far, I propose the following syllogism:
All observations are theory-laden;
All theories are value-laden;
Therefore, all observations are value-laden.
What general consequences might these values and arguments have for 
the conduct of science? I am sympathetic to Carl Friedritch's 
speculation that
’All we can really ask of the individual is that he 
pay careful and scrupulous attention to the wider 
framework into which all'scientific and technical 
progress must fit, even when this does not seem to 
further his immediate interests.'
(Friedrich, speaking in conversation soon after 
having received news of the atomic attacks on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; remarks attributed by 
Heisenberg, 1971, p. 196).
Now, I suggest that objectivist epistemology would undermine this 
admirable exhortation in an unacceptably high proportion of cases - 
and where it did not this would be fortunate coincidence. 
Relativist-methodological-constructivism, by contrast, could greatly 
facilitate implementation of such a proposal. Kelly has commented 
pertinently upon the issue of science policy:
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'The use of the construct rather than the concept as a 
unit opens for the scientist a door to quite a 
different line of thinking. It enables him to regard 
science, along with other modes of endeavour, as a 
system of ventures open to psychological study, quite 
apart from their material referrents and outcomes. 
More than this, it turns our attention to the matter 
of relevance, a matter that has aroused the special 
concerns of both the Vienna Circle and of the critics 
of the atom bomb.'
(Kelly, 1969, p. 11).
And with closer reference to the formal content of PCP, Kelly argues 
that
'The construct dimension that lends structure to the 
behavioural event does so by providing contrasting 
poles, and unless we take the trouble to explicate 
both of them the directional trend of the behaviour 
we have observed cannot be plotted.*
(Kelly, 1969, p. 12: my emphasis).
From this we may infer that the process of achieving social 
responsibiltiy and relevance of science would begin with the 
individual scientist who would strive to make explicit to themself 
exactly which relevant contrast is at work in their intended 
application of their theory. The matter would not rest there, 
however, for social responsibility and relevance could only be 
ensured if appropriate interpersonal, institutionalised, practices 
were created and maintained. To elaborate, ideally, science policy 
(including resource allocation) would be decided only where an 
opposite contrast had been able to have been created and had been 
defended. Given that our experienced commitment in any particular 
application, or intended application, of a theory is only to one 
pole, however, the defence of the contrast pole should be undertaken 
by another person. There should, in other words, be a "tender for
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contrast poles" and a debate prior to deciding research policy. 
Even this would not be sufficient, however, for the frequent 
homogeneity of scientists1 values in some areas of science may be 
such that any decision would be prejudiced from the start. The 
search for a contrast pole would therefore have to be open and 
extended to traditions other than science.
This begs the question of who is to decide science policy? I agree 
with Feyerabend's radical answer to it:
*[ 1 fundamental debates between traditions are 
debates between laymen which can and should be 
settled by no higher authority than again the 
authority of laymen, i.e. democratic councils.' 
(Feyerabend, 1981b, p. 32: original emphasis).32
This stands in radical contrast to present practice and, indeed, I 
suggest that objectivist epistemology has been used as a device for 
(amongst other things) restricting or denying public executive 
involvement in science policy. Relativist-methodological- 
constructivism would help put an end to this practice. This, 
however, broadens the scope to embrace politics and, indeed, 
Feyerabend's recommendation for 'democratic councils' stems from his 
notion of a 'free society' based upon 'democratic relativism':
'A free society is a society in which all traditions 
have equal rights and equal access to the centre of 
power (this differs from the customary definition 
where individuals have equal rights of access to 
positions defined by a special tradition - the 
tradition of Western Science and Rationalism [as per, 
e.g. Popper's 'Open Society']).'
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 9: original emphasis).
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I shall not discuss the details of Feyerabend's vision of a 'free . 
society* (for which see especially Feyerabend, 1978 - some elements 
from which I have, in any case, already presented) beyond saying 
that his ideas on this subject are explicitly in the tradition of 
radical liberalism originating from J. S. Mill3 3 and that I regard 
them to be wholly compatible with the tenets and ethos of PCP. I 
would also suggest that a complementary economic theory is at hand 
in the works of Ernst Schumacher (see, especially, Schumacher, 1973) 
and those inspired by him (e.g. Kumar, (ed.) 1982).
Clearly the open and democratic nature of science conducted in this 
manner is at odds with our present society which employs over 40% of 
its physicists (and similarly large proportions of scientists from 
the other branches of science) in "classified", i.e. military, 
research. If the prognosis for a 'free society*, as outlined above, 
seems alarming and unlikely, then it should be stressed that the 
profound intellectual revolution sought would not first require 
political revolution: Feyerabend claims that the necessary 
institutions for bringing it about 'already exist* and that 'The 
question is therefore not how to construct such a machinery, the 
question is how to loosen it up and to detach it from the traditions 
that are now using it exclusively for their purposes; for example, 
how to separate state and science.' (Feyerabend, 1981b, p. 33: 
original emphasis). He argues that such "loosening, up" should not 
come 'from above', e.g. be imposed by a 'gang of radical 
intellectuals', but, rather, should come 'from within', i.e. 
'citizens' initiatives', and the rate of change should be that which 
they, collectively, decide (ibid.). 'Citizens' initiatives* 
discussed or mentioned by Feyerabend include ecological, peace, 
consumer, and women's groups. Maxwell (1984, Chapter 11) proclaims
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science may, indeed, be inferred from such occurrences 
moratorium on recombinant DNA,research in the mid 70*8 
reduction in UK funding of high energy physics in favo
of such reverses (e.g. The Royal Society, 1985)
general public's valuation ('understanding*) of scienc
that 'the revolution is underway' and cites similar so' 
impact or effectiveness of such initiatives upon the c
sciences and the increased vigour with which august bo
the Royal Society are seeking to re-establish or incre
Finally, I point put that Feyerabend's maxim - 'Citizens' 
initiatives instead of philosophy!' (Feyerabend, 1981b, p. 33
original emphasis)- is reflexive with respect to philosophers, 
viz. they are citizens too (though not more so), and as such they 
still have a role to play in proposing 'initiatives'. In the 
remaining chapters, then, I shall attempt to show that the values 
and arguments of relativist-methodological-constructivism are 
plausible and desirable in formal educational settings by showing 
that to a considerable extent they are anticipated and already 
realized (if not always recognized) in the work of the Alternative 
Conceptions Movement in educational research.
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Notes to Chapter 4
n. 1. I am here alluding to Bacon's dictum 'Eliminate prejudice!1 - 
a term he used synonymously with that ol metaphysics.
n. 2. In the early years after 1905, Einstein made many similar 
remarks which were also embraced by positivists. His discussion of 
the concept of simultaneity, in particular, was given an 
'operationalist' interpretation by the physicist and philosopher of 
science P. W. Bridgeman in publications dating from 1927.
Popper describes the philosophical influence of Einstein's early 
statements of his epistemological views and also the profound change 
as he underwent (at least in his expressed views) as he became 
progressively committed to epistemological realism:
'It is an interesting fact that Einstein himself was 
for years a dogmatic positivist and operationalist..
He later rejected this interpretation: he told me in 
1950 that he regretted no mistake he ever made as 
much as this mistake. The mistake assumed a really 
serious form in his popular book, Relativity: The 
Special and General Theory. There he says [ ]: 'I 
would ask the reader not to proceed further until he . 
is fully convinced on this point'. The point is, 
briefly, that "simultaneity" must be defined - and 
defined in an operational way - since otherwise 'I 
allow myself to be deceived... when I imagine that I 
am able to attach a meaning to the statement of 
simultaneity.1 Or in other words, a term has to be 
operationally defined or-else it is meaningless.
(Here in a nutshell is the positivism later developed 
by the Vienna Circle under the influence of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and in a very dogmatic 
form.)1
(Popper, 1978, pp. 96-97: original emphasis).
Einstein's realism eventually led to his rejection of the quantum 
theory - a theory he had helped to create - because he could not 
accept the notions of uncertainty and indeterminism which came to be 
seen as intrinsic to it in the Copenhagen Interpretation. Pagels 
(1982, Part 1, Chapter 1) has described Einstein as .'the last 
classical physicist'.
n. 3. Mach had described his epistemology as 'neutral monism' and 
Carnap went on to decribe him as 'methodological solipsism' (see 
Suppe, 1974 , I).
n. 4. Suppe makes the interesting point that
'That the Received View survived so long after logical 
positivism had been rejected initially seems rather 
surprising. The explanation of this lies, I. think, in 
the fact that positivism unreasonably had tried to 
force all empirical knowledge into the scientific
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mold, and many who rejected positivism as a general 
epistemology did so on the grounds that not all 
empirical knowledge was like scientific knowledge; 
thus in rejecting logical positivism as a general 
epistemology, they were .willing to concede that 
positivism was adequate as an analysis of scientific 
knowledge [ ]. Logical positivism thus became 
philosophy of science, and continued to survive as a 
philosophy dealing with a restricted range of 
empirical knowledge - scientific knowledge.
(Suppe, 1974, n. 7, p. 6).
n. 5. I have noticed a recurrent confusion in the educational 
literature concerning the direction of theory 'reduction*. This 
stems, I believe, from Nagel's use of hte terms 'primary science' 
and 'secondary science'. The secondary science is (usually) 
temporarily prior to the primary science. In any event, however, it 
is the primary science that is the 'reducing science': the
secondary science is 'reduced' by (or 'to') the primary science in 
the sense that it is held to be logically derivable from the primary 
science which encompasses a larger class of phenomena.
n. 6. Whist Laudan's arguments against R5 are clear and fairly 
detailed, I can summarize my own reasons for rejecting R5 by 
quoting, once again, Hughes comment that 'ontological and 
epistemological questions are not to be answered by empirical 
inquiry since they are concerned with, among other things, the 
nature and significance of empirical inquiry.' (Hughes, 1980, p.7).
n. 7. Of. my characterization of 'radical relativity of knowledge', 
below, to which 1 interpret Kelly (and Feyerabend) to subscribe.
n. 8. The matter is complicated by his metaphysical commitment to 
the notion of 'simplicity' in* his later works: this undermines his
objectivist-empiricist commitment to the view that empirical 
considerations alone are to dictate the choice of theory (see 
Maxwell, 1984, pp. 212-213).
n. 9. I have described Popper as being under the 'spell' of 
deductivism because he seems to see nothing unfair in his 
criticizing inductive reasoning for its lack of (possible) 
justification, on the one hand, but yet proclaiming the abitrariness 
of adopting his deductive methodology on the other hand (see Popper, 
1966b, p.: 231 quoted below).
n. 10. Notwithstanding his attempts to counter this criticism by 
means of 'methodological falsificationism* (cf. my discussion, 
section 3.4.2).
n. 11. Feyerabend would seem to have been trying to be a "good 
Popperian" in his early forays into the thesis for his concern was 
almost exclusively with increasing the testability of theories 
(without regard for their meaning). Kuhn, his own person right from 
the start, has done much to bring to light the truly radical 
elements always within Feyerabend's work.
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n. 12. I have not been able to decide where Papineau himself stands 
upon this issue.
n. 13 Feyerabend goes on to employ essentially the same technique 
wiLh scientific theories.
n. 14. In. conversation with Bohr and other around 1926-7, 
Schrodinger, himself a realist, remarked that
1 If all this damned quantum jumping were really here 
to stay, I should be sorry 1 ever got involved with 
quantum theory.1
(Schrodinger, remark attributed by Heisenberg, 1971,
: -P. 7 5 ) .
n. 15. I would not wish to imply that Einstein is either orthodox 
or Popperian by my repeated use of his remark. He also stated, for 
example, that
’No sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a 
clear system, fought his way through such a system, 
than he is inclined to interpret the thought content 
of science in the sense of his system, and to reject 
whatever does not fit into his system. The 
scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his 
striving for epistemological sytematic that far... 
the external conditions which are set for him by the 
facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself 
be too much restricted in the construction of his 
conceptual world by the adherence to an 
epistemological system. 'He therefore must appear to 
the systematic epistemologist as a type of 
unscrupulous opportunist.'
(Einstein, in Schilpp (ed.), 1951, p. 684, quoted by 
Feyerabend, 1986, p. 117).
n. 16. Feyerabend had elsewhere commented that
More than one social scientist has pointed out to me 
that [having ready Kuhn] now at last he had learned 
how to turn his field into a 'science' - by which of 
course he meant that he had learned how to improve 
it. The recipe, according to these people, is to 
restrict criticism, to reduce the number of 
comprehensive theories to one, and to create a normal 
science that had this one theory as its paradigm.
Students must be prevented from speculating along 
different lines and the more restless colleagues must 
be made to conform and 'to do serious work'. Is this 
what Kuhn wants to achieve?'
(Feyerabend, 1970, p. 198: original emphasis).
I was deeply depressed to hear that at the 6th International 
Congress on Personal Construct Psychology last year, Professor Peter 
Stringer - himself a respected personal constructivist - was 
complaining (as I interpret the report) about those who were
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criticizing, re-construing nnd otherwise diluting the orthodoxy ot 
the Master as per 1955: he spec!lically cited Holland (1970).
Now, I cannot imagine a complaint being more at variance with the 
"spirit" of Kelly's work - or more in keeping with Kuhn's doctrine 
ot normal science. In the article in question, Holland did no more 
than take Kelly at his word, albeit, brilliantly.
n. 17. This notion of a 'metaphysical research programme’ was given 
a new and scientific lease of life within Lakatos' 'methodology of 
scientific research programmes' (Lakatos, 1970), as Lakatos 
acknowledges and Popper points out in these respective works.
n. 18. Cf. Lakatos' (1970) notion of a 'negative heuristic'.
n. 19. It is also at variance with those who might be called 
"consensualists" of knowledge, such as Kuhn, though without 
undermining them.
h. 20. See, for example, Sylvan's (985) critique of 'Deep Ecology' 
and Low's (1982) critique of 'General Systems Theory' - the latter 
is written from a PCP perspective.
n. 21. Were a theory of truth to play a role in PCP (or, more
generally, in relativiet-methodological-constructivism), then I 
suggest that it would be along the lines of what is now called the 
'adversary theory of truth' developed by J. S. Mill (see Himmelfarb, 
1974, p. 25) and which I suggest is encapsulated in the following
line from On Liberty: 'He who know only his own side of the case
knows little of that.' (Mill*, 1977, p. 45). Cf. Feyerabend's claim 
that 'prejudices are found by ‘contrast, not by analysis. ' 
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p. 31).
n.. 22. The technical details of Boltzmann's H. Theorem need not 
concern us beyond saying that it is a probabilistic derivation of 
the second law of thermodynamics from the kinetic theory - a 
derivation which has the cosmological implication that the objective 
"universe" is completely symmetrical with respect to the two 
directions of time.
n. 23. Feyerabend characterizes an incommensurable theory as the 
'strongest' amongst a battery of 'alternatives' (Feyerabend, [1965] 
1981a, p. 109 et seq.). My somewhat simplified distinction of 
'genuinely alternative' vs. !trivially different' is due to the 
pedagogic use I intend to make of it in Chapter 5.
n. 24. Cf. their place within my model for the transformation of 
scientific knowledge in educational settings section 2.4.1.
n. 25. Cf. my discussion of Popper's detailed meaning of a 
universal statement, shortly below.
n. 26. The 'historic Socrates', or what we know of the sayings of 
the real Socrates, as opposed to the Socrates of Plato as presented 
in his Meno and Phaedo.
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n. 27.' Thus, Maxwell argues that.
'Kelly, gripped by the philosophy of knowledge, is 
obliged to interpret the personal inquirer as a sort 
ot scientist, seeking knowledge. Personal construct 
theory then itself seeks to develop academic 
psychological knowledge about the knowledge 
acquiring, or construct building, endeavours of 
individuals.'
(Maxwell, 1984, p. 143).
The pursuit of merely 'academic* psychological knowledge could not 
be further from Kelly's stated aims and purposes for his theory and, 
moreover, is a charge that cannot be made to stick if the formal 
content of his theory (as opposed to his slogan 'Man-the-Scientist') 
is examined. The beauty of Kelly's theory is that it provides us 
with some concrete but non pre-emptive techniques for pursuing and 
implementing 'aim oriented rationality' - unlike Maxwell.
Against Feyerabend, Maxwell argues (for example) that:
'Scientists, historians, philosophers and sociologists 
of science have all been too quick to identify 
rational inquiry with science, and the success of 
science with the adoption of some version of standard 
empiricism, so that an attached on standard 
empiricism is interpreted as an attack on science 
itself, and reason itself 1 Even Feyerabend, the 
licensed court jester of orthodoxy, in effect also 
makes these elementary Mistakes, in that his 
challenge to orthodoxy takes the predictable form of 
romantic irrationalism or, as he calls it, 
methodological anarchism. If standard empiricism 
must be rejected, Feyerabend in effect presumes along 
with his opponents, then reason itself must be 
rejected [ ].'
(Maxwell, 1984, p. 36).
On the contrary, Feyerabend does not reject reason; rather, he 
rejects a certain kind of Rationalism - the objectivist, empiricist, 
monistic, comprehensive, systematic kind. 1 suspect thaL Maxwell, 
like so many of Feyerabend's critics, has mistaken Feyerabend's Use 
of reductiones ad absurdum tor direct arguments. The 'elementary 
mistakes' are therefore Maxwell's
n. 28. Sufficiency requires acceptance of personal choice in 
dimensionality of knowledge claims - see my discussion, below.
n. 29. There are close parallels between what I am suggesting here 
and Chalmers' notion of 'unrepresentative realism':
'Unrepresentative realism is realist in two senses.
Firstly, it involves the assumption that the physical 
world is the way it is independently of our knowledge 
of it. The world is the way it is whatever 
individuals or group of individuals may think about 
the matter. Secondly, it is realist because it
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involves the assumption that, to the extend that 
theories are applicable to the world, they are always 
so applicable, inside and outside of: experimental 
situations. Physical theories do more than make 
claims about correlations between sets of observation 
statements. Unrepresentative ralism is 
unrepresentative insofar as it does not incorporate a 
correspondence theory of truth. The unrepresentative 
realist does not assume that our theories describe 
entities in the world, such as wave functions or 
fields, In the way that; our common aense Ideas 
understand our language to describe cats and tables.
We can appraise our theories from the point of view 
of the extent to which they successfully come to 
grips with some aspect of the world, but we cannot go 
further to appraise them from the point of view of 
the extent to which they describe the world as it 
really is, simply because we do not have access to 
the world independently of our theories in a way that 
would enable us to assess the adequacy of those 
descriptions.’
(Chalmers, 1982, p. 163: original emphasis).
n. 30. This not withstanding, constructs such as 'God vs. Devil', 
Good vs. Evil' and so on are all great improvements on the 
psychologically footless formulations such as 'Moral vs. Immoral' 
(whatever that means) currently favoured by our now largely 
atheistic society precisely because they are constructs. This is to 
be expected because religions are self-professedly moral 
enterprises. If meanings for such religious constructs seem elusive 
(as they are to me), then I suggest that this would not be so were 
the reader already committed to a theistic (or Christian) ontology. 
Moreover, many constructs proposed by religious leaders do have 
personal meaning and utility for me: for example, 1 am most 
sympathetic to Dr. David Jenkins' (the Bishop of Durham) arguments 
for 'conflictual collaboration', as contrasted with 'compromising 
consensus', as a means of effecting social policy (Jenkins, quoted 
by Margison, 1986, p. 150: original emphasis).
My earlier remarks should not be taken to excuse or deny that crimes 
against humanity have frequently been committed in the name of 
religion - I have already alluded via a Kelly quotation to the 
witchcraze. I account for this by suggesting that amongst persons 
claiming to be religious, there have been all too few who have been 
able or willing to implement their beliefs in a way even barely 
resembling the ontologically responsbile approach of, say, Sir 
Thomas More (at least, as he is portrayed by Bolt, 1960). Most 
usually, I suppose that such crimes have had nothing whatever to do 
with the personal utilities of faith.
n. 31. This is a point on which Kelly has frequently been 
misunderstood (see Bannister's, 1979, counter-critique of 
Skelton-Robinson) but I would not like to be too dogmatic about it. 
If we exmplain the tragic fact that the vast majority of 
concentration camp victims literally walked quite knowingly to their
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deaths by invoking titanic acts ot re-con6truction on their part, 
then we should counter-balance this by considering that there may be 
minimum physiological and perhaps even psychological antecedents for 
further (reconstruction to take place.
n. 32. This proposal may seem less outlandish if, in addition to 
reading Feyerabend's own detailed arguments, the reader consults 
Perry (1965) who argues that 'commonsense' thought, knowledge and 
judgment should neither be regarded as 'the touchstone of knowledge 
and the arbiter of reason, [ n]or for that it is crude, primitive, 
and finally to be superseded.'» (P. 125). Commonsense has a 
relevance and applicability which expert or specializes knowledge 
can never have - but they serve different functions. Such views 
inform my treatment of the fate of students' alternative-conceptions 
in a 'free society' (cf. discussion below, also in Chapter 10).
n. 33. See especially Feyerabend's essay 'Two Models of Epistemic 
Change: Mill and Hegel' (Feyerabend, [ 1970] 1981b, pp. 65-79).
Also, cf. n. 21.
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Chapter 5. Personal Construct Psychology and the Alternative Conceptions 
Movement In Educational Research
’The opposite of a correct statement is a false 
statement, but the opposite of a profound truth may be 
another profound truth’.
(Bohr, oral comment, attributed by Heisenberg, 1971,
p . 102) .
5.1 Introduction
My prime purpose in this chapter is to make the case that the classroom . 
research of the 'Alternative Conceptions Movement' (ACM) (Gilbert and 
Swift, 1985) now commands the status of a delineable research tradition 
or programme by virtue of its distinctive value commitments as 
complemented and reflected by its central meta-theoretical notions and by 
its characteristic research methods. (I shall defer consideration of a 
compatible theory of teaching until Chapter 10). An intrinsic part of 
my argument is that these aspects of the ACM are compatible, indeed, in 
many areas, isomorphous, with the Kellyan and the Feyerabendian brand of 
relativist-methodological-constructivism which I have argued for in the 
previous two chapters.
In an attempt to keep closely to this aim, I shall not discuss or 
summarise the classroom interpretations of ACM research directly - this 
has already been done both admirably and extensively by others (for 
references, see Chapter 1, also below). Rather, I shall concentrate upon 
presenting meta-theoretical and methodological issues as they are 
discussed in accounts of such field-research and in the growing numbers of
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papers which seek to articulate commonalities across these studies 
considered as a whole. By so doing, I hope also to present a 
counter-critique of the "critical backlash" now facing the ACM and which I 
mentioned in Chapter 1.
In my account of ACM meta-theory, I shall try to preserve something of its 
chronology in development, but, in the interests of brevity, I shall not 
attempt to be comprehensive or systematic in drawing links between it and 
the ideas of Kelly and Feyerabend, relying upon the reader to discern many 
of the commonalities for themself in the light, of my earlier discussions.
Another purpose for this chapter is to articulate and to develop the
relation between ACM meta-theory, as I have interpreted it and as it has
most usually been applied in investigations of alternative-conceptions in
*
science, and my own classroom research into alternative-conceptions of 
service (described in chapters;6,7,8 and 9). By way of further context 
for my enquiries in the field, I shall also present a selective review of 
previous research into educands' and educators1 personal epistemologies of 
science.
5.2 The Alternative Conceptions Movement as a Delineable Research 
Tradition
A perennial problem in the field of science education may be encapsulated 
by the question 'why do so many school students experience so much 
difficulty understanding the conceptual content in our science courses?'
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(e.g. Erickson, 1982, p.1). I suggest, however, that co-extensive with 
educators' and educationalists' concern with this problem there has also 
been a general recognition that recurrent themes exist amongst such 
difficulties in understanding and that these occur both within and between 
educands.
Now, working from a model of learner as passive receiver of information 
('tabula rasa') the traditional pedagogic response to learner 
difficulties has been to emphasise "gaps" in the learners' knowledge and 
which then lead to "systematic mistakes". The teaching solution to such 
"mistakes" was seen to require first uncovering where such "gaps" were, 
and then "filling" them with the curricular orthodoxy. Accordingly, the 
prime pedagogic concern was with the "structure of knowledge".
As a constructivist working in the early decades of this century, however, 
Piaget was instrumental in initiating a shift in orientation in the 
traditional pedagogic response to learner difficulties. Learners were how 
understood to be active construers of their environment and of the world. 
As suchj they were anticipated - and found - to hold their own conceptions 
on many subj ect areas prior to encountering them in formal educational 
settings;
Piaget's early studies (e.g. Piaget, 1929» 1930) were 'naturalistic', 
ideographic and informal - they were, effected chiefly through talking 
with children. As Piaget went on to develop his logical meta-theory, 
however, his research methods and those of his co-workers - 'Piagetian 
School' (PS) - changed ,in accordance with their new research interests.
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Thematic difficulties in concept learning came to be understood to reflect 
not gaps in their knowledge, but, rather, in their (universal) 'cognitive 
structures' - though it would seem that Piaget probably confounded 
structure of knowledge with structure of cognition (Brown, 1984s personal 
communication, see Appendix 2). Elicitation techniques became 
predominantly de-verbalised within the PS. Despite the shift in 
orientation achieved by Piaget's influence, the traditional pedagogic 
response to learner difficulties remained essentially unchanged as a 
results the alleged 'universal necessity' of his cognitive structures 
meant that learners could still be unilaterally attributed with 
"systematic mistakes"; the remedy would be basically the same.
Now many ACM workers cite both the subject of Piaget's early researches,
i.e. children's conceptions of the world, and his principal investigative
*
method, i.e. the clinical interview, amongst their chief sources of 
inspiration. Disaffection with Piaget's ideas, on the part of members of 
the ACM, has come both early and late - and this both in their own 
research commitments and in the development of Piaget's theory. There 
would seem, however, to be a consensus within the ACM that wherever and 
whenever made, it is Piaget's later preoccupation with the development of 
universal logic operations which represents the point of departure. From 
an ACM perspective, these are not only construed to be of greater interest 
and importance to Piagetians than the ideas and concerns of the individual 
child, but also to distance and obstruct investigation of the latter - to 
the Ultimate detriment of the educational welfare of the child (cf. 
arguments of section 3.4*1)•
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I suggest, then, that the emergence of the ACM may best be construed as a 
self-conscious step back to an earlier age of theoretical "innocence1 in 
order to remain close(r) to the actual child rather than as a result of 
the many formal and empirical difficulties which now beset Piaget’s 
structuralist meta-theory. A useful and instructive concern to develop 
formalisations was ever more widely construed to have become a sterile and 
esoteric exercise in formalism. Many researchers, however, initially 
perceived their divergence to be only a change of emphasis in their own 
work relative to that of Piaget himself and his closest colleagues, viz. 
away from Piaget’s later preoccupation with articulating the universally 
necessary development of ’logical operations” in favour of his earlier 
interest in the idiosyncratically pertinent development of ’causal 
frameworks’. The relationship between these two aspects of PS research 
may be elucidated by reference to a diagram used by Driver:
Development of
logical
operations
Development of causal frameworks
Figure 5.1 Diagram Showing Relation Between Research into the
Development of Logical Operations and Research into the 
Development of Causal Frameworks (after Driver. 1982.p.360).
Now, the point at which a change of emphasis in research may be said to
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have resulted in delineable and incompatible research traditions depends 
upon the breadth of ’core commitments’ one attributes to each approach. 
Clearly, both ACM and PS are epistemologically constructivist 
traditions since they each embrace both AER and CKT, as we shall see in 
the latter’s case. These, however, are only necessary conditions for a 
constructivist theory of knowledge - alone they are not sufficient; and 
demonstration of sufficiency in each approach reveals differences which 
show them more plausibly to be different research programmes rather than 
rival versions of the same programme, as some - mainly members of the 
fading PS - have tried to argue. (See, for example, Gilbert and Swift, 
1985, - included as Appendix 1, for a Lakatosian analysis of PS and ACM 
and from which they emerge as rival research programmes).
The ACM’s central meta-theoretical notion was christened the ’alternative
*
framework’ by Driver and Easley. (1978, p.62). Part of these authors’ 
meaning for this expression is as follows:
’In learning about the physical world, alternative 
interpretations seem to be the product of pupils’
imaginative efforts to explain events and abstract
commonalities they see between them. These may be in 
keeping with their experience although they may be 
recognised as partial explanations of limited scope’.
(Driver and Easley, 1978, p.62: my emphasis).
The quality of ’alternativeness’ intrinsic to these authors’ notion may be 
construed to represent a further divergence from the Piagetian inspired 
idea of a ’causal framework’. No doubt this was prompted, in part, by the
semantically and conceptually problematic notion of ’causality’ itself and
which may be construed to be underwritten and reflected by Piaget’s
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structuralist psycho-logic in a very deterministic manner.
As with most emergent traditions, however, implicit value commitments and 
tacit knowledge within the ACM remain well in advance of their explicit 
and formalised counter-parts. Thus, some four years after Driver and 
Easley’s seminal paper, in a survey article of the by then burgeoning 
research literature which claimed or could be argued to be sympathetic 
to the idea that educands might have personal, alternative, 
interpretations in the domain of science, Driver and Erickson (1982, p.17) 
were only able to identify the following three, highly generalised, 
commonalities amongst assumptions informing the body of work which they 
examined:
(1) Some form of ’cognitive Structure' is presupposed. It is, perhaps, a 
structure of 'content-independent' processing skills, but for most of the 
newer investigators (as they interpret them) it is a structure of 
’content-dependent’ elements such as particular concepts or propositions;
(2) A 'constructivist epistemology' is also assumed;
(3) It is taken on trust that understanding educands' ideas is important 
in formal educational settings. .
I suggest that the looseness in the wording of these shared assumptions 
stems partly from the radical nature of certain of Driver and Easley's 
value commitments and their implications concerning the (potential) status 
of educands' personal knowledge within the education system. These were
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value commitments which were only fully shared by a minority of other 
researchers (amongst whom I include myself and my immediate colleagues at 
the University of Surrey - about whom, more later), and which, moreover, 
were not even noticed by many. These value commitments may be 
summarised as a conscious and conscientious desire not to pre-judge, in 
educational research, the worth of educands1 personal knowledge relative 
to the curricular orthodoxy. This runs counter to traditional pedagogy - 
including that sustained by the PS.
To elaborate upon these points, I shall begin by returning to Driver and 
Easley's (1978) influential paper in which they outlined both the semantic 
rationale for their choice of the expression 'alternative framework' and 
their epistemological commitments which informed it. These authors 
suggest that there are some who would question why a study of educands1 
conceptualisations warrants attention at all and that such persons would 
construe them as 'wrong' ideas, being the result of 'incorrect 
observations', or 'illogical thought'. Driver and Easley claim that 
Ausubel's term 'preconception', for example, carries something of this 
connotation. Similarly, the widely used term 'misconception'. They 
conclude that
'Research reported later on common misconceptions in 
various areas of science reflects the fact that this term 
tends to be used in studies where pupils have been 
exposed to formal models or theories, and have 
assimilated them incorrectly'.
(Driver and Easley, 1978, p.62).
and go on to argue for their notion of an alternative framework:
'A distinction needs to be made between this source of 
misunderstanding and the situation in which pupils have
developed autonomous frameworks for conceptualising their 
experience of the physical world; these we will call 
1alternative frameworks1.1
(Driver and Easley, 1978, p. 62: original emphasis).
In this paper, Driver and Easley do not articulate their epistemological 
commitments beyond endorsing the basic constructivist stance (cf. my 
earlier quotation from this paper), though for reasons that should by now 
be clear, I consider it unfortunate that they cite only Popper in 
opposition to empirical-inductivism.
In a paper entitled 'The Pupil as a Scientist', Driver has claimed that
'[ ] pupils, like scientists, come to science lessons 
with some ideas or beliefs already formulated. These 
beliefs affect the observations they make and the 
inferences they draw from them. Pupils, like scientists, 
have construed a view of the world to enable them to 
cope with situations. Changing this view is not as 
simple as giving pupils additional experiences or sense 
data. It also involves helping them to reconstruct 
their theories or beliefs, to undergo, if you like, the 
paradigm shifts which have occurred in the history of 
science'.
(Driver, 1979> my emphasis).
Now, the commitment to some kind of constructivist theory of knowledge 
is clear enough in quotations such as these but there is little detailed 
specification of the particular "brand" of constructivism which is 
endorsed. Without such specification, however, the pedagogic import of, 
for example, the suggestion made in the last quotation that student 
scientists should undergo 'paradigm shifts which have occurred in the 
history of science' must remain somewhat ambiguous, viz. this could be
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given a very (by now) traditional 'discovery learning1 interpretation.
More formal references to constructivist epistemology have tended to be 
tantalisingly brief and similarly ambiguous. Driver and Erickson (19^3 
p.55) for example, claim to reject a 'rational-empirical view' - but since 
they do not discuss the matter further it is not clear whether they are 
merely following the trend in rejecting positivistic theories of knowledge 
or, more radically, those which I have termed objectivist-raethodological- 
constructivist - such as that due to Popper and his school.
In a survey of antecedents to the ACM, Watts (1983, Ch.1, p.10), who 
acknowledges the central influence of Kelly's ideas on his approach, 
proposes the following four dimensions for appraising notions of 'concept' 
and 'concept teaching1, and which gained prominence in the curriculum 
reform movement beginning in the late 1950s and to which the ACM might be 
seen as its heir:
Process -— -------- -—  Product
Informal — ■— —  •— -- Formal
Hypothesis testing —  ---- Abstraction
Semantic  ----- ------ Logical-mathematical
As I interpret him, Watts argues that the meta-theoretical notions and 
work of the ACM reside predominantly, though not exclusively, on the left 
hand side of these dimensions.
In elaboration of, and in addition to, Osborne's (1980) constructivist
(i)
(ii) 
(ill) 
(iv)
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distinction between Children's Science (Sch). and Scientists' Science (Ss) 
-notions complementary to Driver and Easley's idea of alternative 
frameworks - Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham (1982) further delineated
these terras in Chapter 2. With the help of a series of diagrams Gilbert, 
Osborne and Fensham articulated three possible assumptions held by 
educators, educationalists and curriculum planners:
o + © :::s ©
Learner T ea ch er  Learner
Service teaching.in which it is assumed the learners have no theoretical 
views of the topic or phenomena under study.
t
(a) The "Blank-Minded" or "Tabula Rasa" Assumption
Science teaching in which it is assumed that learners may have theoretical 
views but that these are easily displaced by the views presented by 
teachers.
(b) The "Teacher Dominance" Assumption
'Teachers' Science' (St): cf. my discussion of these authors' meanings for
© + © Teach ingLearning
Learner Teacher Learner
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© t © iE2 ©
Learner T e a c h e r  Learner
Science teaching which recognises that learners often do hold strongly 
entrenched theoretical views that persist in the face of teaching.
(c) The "Student Dominance11 Assumption
Fig. 5.2. Diagrams showing Three Possible Assumptions of Science 
Pedagogy (after Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham. 1982)
These authors also considered the way in which the assumptions informing 
the content of science curricula and their associated teaching materials 
might interact with Sts
+ ©  , S J © - ©
T c a c h t r  T .a c h .e
Strongly held teachers' views of science may persist or interact with the 
views in science curricula.
Figure 5.3. Diagram Showing Interactive or Independent Relationship 
between Teachers1 Science and the Science of Curricula 
(after Gilbert. Osborne and Fensham) ' """
Finally, Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham proposed five possible outcomes to
teaching and learning based upon different relationships between S„, and
Ch
© + © :;= i ©
Learner Teacher  Learner
A pre-learning or children's view of science can persist unchanged by 
science teaching.
(a) The Undisturbed Children's Science Outcome
'  S c ic n c t  
C u r r k u la  
• n d  
M .U r U I *
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Learner Teacher  l e a r n e r
Science teaching can result in a second view acquired for use in school 
but the original children's view persists elsewhere.
(b) The Two Perspectives Outcome
^  +  V C /  Learning
Learner Te acher  Learner
The original children's view is,, strengthened by science teaching which now 
is misapplied to support it.
(c) The Reinforced Outcome
© ss ®
T e a c h e r  Learner
Science teaching resulting in a mixed outcome where children's science and 
teachers' science now co-exist together.
(d) The Mixed Outcome
0  +
Learner
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+' © U a r n i n g
Teaching
©
Learner T e a c h e r Learner
Science teaching which extends childrenfs science and teachers* science to
a more unified science view.
(e) The Unified Scientific Outcome
Figure 5.A. Diagrams Showing Five Possible Consequences of Children*s 
Science for Science Teaching (after Gilbert. Osborne and 
Fensham. 1982)
As we have seen in Chapter 2 , Zylberstajn (1983) named the collective
further delineated * Students* Science1 (Sst). Zylberstajn also 
articulated these notions, together with those proposed by Gilbert,
Osborne and Fensham, within a generalised sequence of transformations of 
Ss through formal science education, his diagrammatic depiction of which I 
re-present for the sake of completeness:
Figure 5.5. Diagram Showing Generalised Sequence of Transformations of 
Scientists* Science through Formal Science Education 
(after Zylberstajn. 1983)
(Cf. my addition of 'Philosophers* Science' and other modifications to
assumptions informing science curricular 'Curricula Science* (Scr) and
o c r ) planning»^S ) "planning
classroom
activities
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Zylberstajn*s model in Chapter 2).
Now, as ACM research has gathered momentum, a number of issues have come 
to the fore which have been widely recognised (both within and without the 
ACM) as urgently needing clarification and which have called into question 
the adequacy of original formulations of the meta-theory. Prominent 
amongst such issues is the 'stability* of alternative conceptions - 
stability through time (sometimes referred to as 'durability1) and 
stability across context, and whether the most appropriate unit of 
analysis should be the individual person or a population (see, e.g.
Driver and Erickson, 1983, p.4 for a discussion).
In an influential article, Gilbert and Watts (1983) have responded to such 
issues and controversies. They suggest that while the expression 
'alternative framework' has become widely used as a descriptor for the 
outcome of classroom investigations it commands little consensus in its 
detailed meanings and applications; 'contextual boundaries' and the 
quality and range of 'prediction' within educands* alternative 
conceptualisations nevertheless emerge as two useful markers to help 
distinguish meanings intended for the meta-theoretical expression(s) used. 
These they incorporate within their own distinction between 
'conceptions', 'categories', and 'frameworks':
'Our proposal here is that 'conception' be used to focus 
on the personalised theorising and hypothesising of 
individuals. Our contention is that each person's 
knowledge is unique (though not infinitely diverse), which 
thus limits the generalisability of the single case study.
[ ] Conceptions are accessed by the actions (linguistic and 
non-linguistic, verbal and non-verbal) of the person, often 
in response to particular questions.
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To generalise beyond the individual is to construct 
groupings of responses which are construed as having 
similar intended meanings. This is to construct a 
category of response commonly in the context of single, 
or a specific set of, questions. [ ]. [Categories are not 
individualised and represent an interpretation of 
statements at a more general, but functional, level.
[Ajlternative frameworks can profitably be seen as 
generalised non-individual descriptions. That is, their 
relation to the data base is one level further removed than 
that of a category of response. They can be seen, then, as 
short summary descriptions that attempt to capture both the 
explicit responses made and the construed intentions behind 
them. They are thematic interpretations of data, stylised, 
mild caricatures of the responses made by students’. 
(Gilbert and Watts, 1983, p.69: my emphasis).
Gilbert and Watts illustrate their distinction between the terms by means
of the following diagram:
perto n si
perspective
collective
view
Individualised
accounts
generalised
descrip tion
1st level. . 
C onceptions
Figure 5.6. Diagram Showing the Relationship between Meanings for
’Conception*. ’Category’ and ’Framework1 (after Gilbert 
and Watts. 1983. P.70).
By way of further interpretation of these terms, Gilbert and Watts go on 
to suggest that
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’These represent levels of interpretation of the data and 
there is no suggestion that any one is preferable over 
the other. Each has its own focus and limits..
Conceptions focus on the personalised accounts of 
individuals whereas categories interpret multiple data.
They represent functional subdivisions of bulk data 
according to some features ascribed by the researcher, 
within a logical context. Frameworks focus upon a 
characterisation of responses and bridge small local 
changes in context’.
(Gilbert and Watts, 1983, p.70; my emphasis).
Now, given my stated interests and aims for this thesis, the thing that I 
find most noteworthy throughout the more influential amongst ACM 
researchers who have turned their attention to broader issues of 
meta-theory and their implications for curricular and teaching reform is 
their tacit or ambiguous acceptance of the ’unified scientific outcome’ to 
science teaching.
Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham (1-982), for example, make no evaluation of 
the different outcomes to science teaching - which, I suggest, amounts to
a tacit endorsement of the unified scientific outcome as per the status
quo. Similarly, while I wholeheartedly agree with Driver and Erickson 
when they urge that
’What is called for is a clarification and redefinition of 
what is taken to be ’school science’. If the ’student as 
scientist’ metaphor [ ] is to be taken seriously then this 
requires opportunities for young people to explore both new 
phenomena and new ideas; to listen to and appreciate 
alternative points of view without losing confidence in 
their own capabilities to comprehend and to act; to
construct their own knowledge and, perhaps by so doing,
gain also some appreciation of science as a pursuit of the 
human imagination’.
(Driver and Erickson, 1983> p.55)
I contend that the implications for pedagogy may be very radical indeed
for systematic variance from the curricular orthodoxy of educands’ 
alternative conceptions is all that has so far been claimed. I also 
contend that for such suggestions actually to be implemented requires 
further articulation and agreement of the brand of constructivist 
epistemology endorsed, otherwise the stance taken on crucial issues such as 
assessment shall remain ambiguous - a contention which is central to my 
choice of concerns explored in this thesis. Meanwhile, this ambiguity has 
afforded a toe-hold for critics from more traditionalist research
programmes (mainly the PS) to try to assimilate what I believe to be the
radical and good implications of ACM research for pedagogic reform 
(discussed in Chapter 10) back into the status quo. As attention within
the ACM focusses upon curricular and teaching reform there is, in
addition, some evidence to suggest that certain members are now 
experiencing difficulty in living up to their own liberal, relativist, 
principles of research method, predicated upon notions of 
alternative-conception (no ’wrong1 answers), in their attempts to 
articulate a compatible theory of teaching, indeed, there would seem to be 
some degree of ’fragmentation' (in Kelly’s sense) between the theories of 
learning and theories of teaching that are espoused.
Now, these issues are large and complex: I empathise with the difficulties 
involved and I cite the authors above only to illustrate the nature and 
extent of the problem. Moreover, I have, in a sense, been unfair (though,
I contend, not grossly so) in the manner in which I have de-contextualised 
some of the statements above for there is, indeed, epistemological 
sophistication within the ACM - but, at the present time, it has 
principally to be inferred from the movement’s characteristic research
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methods and from the criticisms which they have drawn.
Accordingly, to complement the 1 conservative activist vs. revolutionary - 
activist1 (Lakatos) and ’empiricist vs. post-empiricist' (Hesse) 
frameworks for appraising epistemology that I have used in earlier 
chapters, I now invoke a dimension for construing research methods and 
which has been called 'Paradigm 1 vs. Paradigm 2' as proposed and 
discussed by Gilbert and Pope (e.g. 1984a, b).
These authors summarise the chief characteristics of the research methods 
of each paradigm by means of the following dimensions (Gilbert and Pope, 
1984b, p.18):
Paradigm 1 Paradigm 2
Traditional v Non-traditional
Scientific Artistic
Experimental Naturalistic
Reductionist Holistic
Prescriptive Descriptive
Quantitative Qualitative
Experiment Case Study
Nomothetic Ideographic
I concur with those (e.g. Gilbert and Watts, 1983) who suggest that the 
work of the ACM falls under the aegis of paradigm 2 and I further suggest 
that the work of the PS (that due to 'Piagetian technologists', cf. my 
discussion in section 2.4.1) is predominantly paradigm 1.
In partial elaboration and justification of these claims, I suggest that 
the mainstay of ACM research methodology i.e. the clinical or focussed 
interview and case study, chiefly reflect the movement's pre-eminent
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concern with eliciting and developing shared meanings (verstehen) in 
volitional purpose rather than in noraethetically ascribing explanations 
invoking causal factors (erklaren).
Recognising the value-laden nature of all research interpretations, 
’triangulation1 of research methods is thus a more characteristic feature 
in the work of the ACM than in that of, say, the PS. Methodological 
triangulation has been summarised by Denzin as involving
’[ ] a complex process of playing each method off against 
the other so as to maximise the validity of field efforts 
[ ] the flaws of one method are often the strength of 
another’.
(Denzin, 1978, p.304).
Thus, for example, Gilbert and Pope (1983) \ised a combination of video 
taped educand group discussions of IAI cards (described in section 
7.4*2.1) and research-educand "debriefing" focussed interviews to explore 
the educands' conceptions of energy. Bell, Brook and Driver (1984) used 
written exercises in combination with focussed interviews to investigate 
educands' personal understandings of the particle theory of matter. I 
have used written exercises (Chapter 7) in conjunction with focussed 
interviews (Chapter.8).
I shall not labour over articulating the many technical similarities that 
exist between the research methods (and the epistemological assumptions 
underpinning them) of the ACM and those of relativist-methodological- 
constructivism as realised by Kelly and Feyerabend.
It is worth first noting, however, that although Kelly is best known for
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his involvement with psychotherapy he himself had a Master's degree in 
educational sociology and considered psychotherapy and education to be 
essentially the same enterprise. Similarly, Feyerabend, best known for 
his work in history and philosophy of science, claims that his work 
originated with an interest and concern for the.'problem of knowledge and 
education in a free society1 (Feyerabend, 1978, p.107: my emphasis).
I suggest then, that the triangulation of research methods which is
characteristic of the ACM's research approach may readily be construed in 
terms of Feyerabend's notion of a pluralistic methodology. A similar 
methodological commitment may be discerned in Kelly's ideas - see Swift, 
Watts and Pope (1983) where we argue that POP embraces '(m)ethodological 
pluralism1.
The ACM emphasis upon the content dependency of constructive structure has 
led to the choice development and use of research methods in a manner 
which complements Kelly's view that researchers
'[ ] should not overlook what their subjects have to 
contribute for psychological research as I see it is a 
cooperative enterprise in which the subject joins the 
psychologist in making an enquiry. I am very sceptical of 
any piece of human research in which the subject's
questions and contributions have not been elicited or have
been ignored in the final analysis of results.'
(Kelly, 1969, p.132).
I suggest that, content-dependency may most fruitfully be thought of as 
a requirement of investigative methodology which complements context- 
dependency in constructivist epistemology.
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Again, the ACM1 s. notions of constructive structure which permit the 
Simultaneous existence of rival points of view within an individual's mind 
complement Kelly's notion,of fragmentation and Feyerabend's 
incommensurability thesis as do the proposed dynamics of learning, and the 
growth of knowledge (discussed in Chapter 10). (Kelly's claim that 
meaning requires a dimension of relevant contrast currently enjoys only 
marginal acceptance within the ACM, however. This I believe has been 
largely due to the perceived difficulties of construing scientific 
theories and laws in these terms - difficulties which 1 hope to have 
elucidated, if not yet overcome, in my previous chapter).
Critics of, and would-be sympathisers to, the ACM who claim to be 
constructivists often first betray their conservative-activism by couching 
their methodological complaints, comparisons and commentaries in the terms 
and values of Paradigm 1.
A case in point concerns a symposium convened by Dr. Michael Shayer (who 
aligns himself with the PS) for the 1984 annual conference of the British 
Educational Research Association and dedicated to appraising how 
!complementary' or how 'incompatible' the approaches of the ACM and PS 
might be. In preparing ray contribution to that symposium (Swift, 1984), 
however, I felt that only around half of the list of six issues, suggested 
in good faith by Dr. Shayer for discussion, were cast in terms equally 
appropriate to either approach, viz. I judged his suggestions for 
considering 'reliability', 'validity' and 'generalisability' of research 
inferences to reflect values and commitments specific to Paradigm 1 and, 
as such, were inappropriate standards for appraising the work of the
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ACM. (see Bassey, 1981, 1983a,b, for spirited and compelling arguments in 
favour of pedagogic research into ’singularities', i.e. case-studies, and 
against research seeking generalisations; also see Phillips, 1974, for 
arguments for 'conservative' influences upon 'experimental', i.e. Paradigm 
1, research in education).
From the point of view endorsed in this thesis, I would suggest that the 
closest respective counter-parts to the Paradigm 1 standards of 
'reliability', 'validity' and 'generalisability' would be 'durability',
'authenticity' and 'commonality'.
To elaborate slightly, I suggest that there has been some confounding by 
Paradigm 1 researchers between their methodological demand that 
research interpretations be reliable and the ACM's existential claim 
that some alternative-conceptions are durable, i.e. exist through time 
and are resistant to attempts to change them. 'Authenticity' of research 
interpretations is a methodological issue which I shall discuss later in 
this chapter, and I have already discussed 'commonality! (in Kelly's 
sense) in Chapter 4.
Now in describing his own work and in responding to criticisms of it from 
members of the ACM, Shayer similarly identified his commitment to 
objectivist epistemology by claiming value neutrality of his educational 
research.
Thus* he responded to the ACM query, that the impact of his 
psychoraetrically orientated research upon teaching policy might lessen or
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underline the development of autonomy in the individual child by stating 
that
'I am bound to say [ ] that in relation to this question 
the published work of Piagetians is, in itself, neutral1•
(Shayer, 1984, p.2).
And elsewhere, with a colleague, Shayer has responded to the criticism of 
’labelling children' by arguing that
'[ ] there seems to be no more grounds for objecting to 
Piaget's work because of its determinist picture of human 
mental capacity than to object to the science of physiology 
for similar reasons. The ability to describe and estimate 
a person's present mental capacity is no more an instrument 
for maintaining the person at that level than is our 
ability to describe a bodily state in physiological terms.
Indeed, both increase our capacity to intervene in what is 
the present described condition'.
(Shayer and Adey, 1981, p.140).
That education research methods are not neutral with respect to 
educational values and teaching policy, has been argued with great clarity, 
and many examples, by Carr, who proposes that
'Specific educational research methods entail specific 
educational values'.
(Carr, 1983, p.6).
Briefly stated, Carr's justificatory argument for this proposition is that 
whilst 'explanatory frameworks' educational research methods cannot, 
strictly speaking, be said to entail conclusions as to educational values. 
They can, nevertheless, be. demonstrated to (tend to) support some such 
conclusions, and to (tend to) undermine others. Put another way, there 
is no sharp division that can be drawn between knowledge claims and 
knowledge uses.
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This often unrecognised and misunderstood point may be further elucidated 
by examining some further remarks made by Shayer, about his work, his 
critics and the ACM, in the symposium mentioned earlier:
'To begin.to realise my own intentions, I have had to spend 
three years following the CSMS [Concepts in Secondary 
Mathematics and Science] programme research, using two 
major and different models of intervention, and it is 
noticeable that both Driver and Erickson (1983) and Gilbert 
and Watts (1983), are somewhat embarrassed in their surveys 
in bringing in intervention studies, recognising I believe 
the lack of necessary connection.'
(Shayer, 1984, p.2).
What is of epistemological interest in Shayer's comment (and several
others which he makes in that paper), is his tacit appeal to Hume's Law,
viz. he is accusing Driver and Erickson and Gilbert and Watts of
embarrassment due to accepting that an 'ought' (i.e. an educational value
informing a policy decision) capnot be derived from an 'is' (i.e. from the
'facts of educands', 'mental capacity', uncovered by educational
research).
As either a critique or a counter critique of the ACM, however, this is 
doubly inappropriate. Firstly, Hume's Law employs the traditional 
categorical distinction between factual and evaluative knowledge, yet, as 
I have argued iii Chapters 3 and 4, the possibility of value-free knowledge 
claims is denied by relativist-methodological-constructivism and thence 
also in Paradigm 2 research. Invoking Hume's Law, therefore, constitutes 
neither a criticism of the ACM, nor a defence of the PS, though there may 
be other criticisms and defences. Secondly, as Haack points out
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'even if it is held that there is no entailraent or derivability 
relation between a set of factual statements (assuming that these can 
be delineated clearly) and a value statement, this is not to hold 
that there is no relation between the two,
(Haack, 1976, p.162: original emphasis)
In some of their appeals to Hume's Law, however, Paradigm 1 workers do 
make this further unjustified assumption: Shayer, as we have seen, claims 
his educational research (and that of the PS) is neutral. I suspect that 
some confusion may have resulted over the intended meanings for terms such 
as 'implies', and 'consequence', viz. in the context just discussed, ACM 
workers do not use such terras in formal deductive senses. I hope to have 
clarified this issue by establishing that educational research methods and 
educational values share a relation of neither derivability nor 
independence.
* ‘ *
So, to Shayer's claim that Driv,er and Erickson and Gilbert and Watts are
'somewhat embarrassed in their surveys in bringing in intervention
studies', I am not aware that these authors experienced any embarrassment
- why should they? Certainly the quality of "constructive connectedness"
which I argued to exist within a Kellyan construction system (section 4.2)
would indicate that even classroom research (a3 opposed to teaching
itself) is intrinsically interventive. And in their paper, to which
Shayer refers, Gilbert and Watts (1983, p.66) explicitly endorse a notion
of constructive connectedness within their 'actional' view of concept.
For the educational researcher, no less than for the teacher, the
classroom is always a "room for improvement". I suggest, however, that
what the ACM workers, whom Shayer cites may in fact have been experiencing,
was not 'embarrassment', but rather a certain amount of diffidence in
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articulating the exact nature and extent of the classroom 'interventions', 
that shall necessarily occur if a theory of teaching, which is compatible 
with ACM meta-theory and research interpretations, is, indeed, realised 
(cf. my discussion in Chapter 10, of individual 'integrity' as opposed to 
'autonomy', within a 'personal construct pedagogy').
Now in a review article on the ACM, in 1982, Sutton, a "sympathetic" 
critic, concluded that
'[members of the ACM] hope to be able to discern the 
organisation of [educands'] prior knowledge, but so far 
descriptions of the supposed "frameworks", "alternative 
conceptions", "personal constructs", or "learners' mini- 
theories" are not very precise, and no method of mapping 
them yet commands wide assent'.
(Sutton, 1982, p.42).
Developments to ACM meta-theory such as Gilbert and Watts (1983),
delineation of 'conceptions', '-categories', and 'frameworks', discussed
earlier, have, gone a considerable way to counter such early criticisms.
Certain others, however, have been more recalcitrant.
I suggest that, amongst these latter, should be included McClelland's 
(1984) thoughtful and provocative article. McClelland claims to accept 
the ACM proposition that 'children spontaneously theorise about events in 
their experience', but he has 'reservations about the level and 
pervasiveness of the activity' (p.2); he arguo3 that many, indeed, most 
alleged alternative conceptions could be construed' more probab[ly] and 
more parsimonious[ly]' in terms of educands' 'strategic inattention', 
'piecemeal explanation' 'instant invention' and so on.
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McClelland's article is unusual amongst critics of the ACM because he 
begins by presenting his personal meaning of an alternative conception 
(alternative framework):
'An alternative framework or private version is alternative 
if it opposes or fails to fit into an accepted pattern of 
scientific explanation, and it may be termed a framework to 
the degree that it consists of interlocking concepts 
unifying more than one set of phenomena. It is science if 
it is the result of a conscious attempt at theorising',. 
(McClelland, 1984, p.1).
And then the epistemological nub of his critique:
'The last . of these points requires elaboration, for there 
is a weak sense and a strong sense, in which the terms 
'science' and 'scientific' are used - at least, in English.
Such phenomena as atmospheric pressure, solution of salt, 
heat conduction, vegetable reproduction, and so on, form 
part of what is commonly termed the content of courses in 
sciemce. Learning about such phenomena thus comes to be 
called learning about science. However, phenomena are not 
. science, nor are ideas about them necessarily scientific in 
a strong sense, otherwise .there are no ways of conceiving 
of them which are not scientific, to suppose that children 
are scientists of a sort when they think about such 
phenomena seems to me to misconstrue totally the meaning 
and purpose of science. The distinction between such 
thinking and that of a science identified by Osborne [Bell 
and Gilbert] (1983) is categoric, not one of degree.
Scientific concepts are deliberately theoretical and 
formulated with aspirations to inclusiveness. This 
ambiguity has underlain many arguments about appropriate 
content in science. Phenomena are not the content of 
science but the vehicle for learning it, for learning 
theories. Children in all societies meet a wide range of 
phenomena, but a glance at history and anthropology is 
enough to remind us that interpretations in terms of 
reproducible, explicable, causally related events are not 
automatic features of human thoughts'. (McClelland, 1984, 
p.1).
Now, I consider McClelland's distimction between 'strong' and 'weak' 
senses of 'science' and 'scientific' to be a useful one, indeed, I use it 
to categorise part of my interview data (Chapter 8). His epistemological
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claim that the difference between 'thinking' about phenomena, and 
scientifically 'theorising' about them, is 'categoric, not one of degree* 
may, however, quickly be dispensed with for this merely states an 
objectivist's position on the matter. As I have argued in Chapter 4, 
objectivist epistemologists including objectivist-methodological- 
constructivists always preserve a 'factual core' in matters of theorising 
and of theory choice; hence they may distinguish phenomena (or merely 
'thinking' about them) from theories. In relativist-methodological- 
constructivisra, by contrast, there can be no such factual core. 
Consequently, to think about a phenomenon is to theorise about it, at 
least to some degree, for otherwise it would be beyond the realm of 
possible experience. Thus, from the relativist-methodological- 
constructivist's point of view, which I have argued coincides with the 
constructivist epistemology of the ACM, the distinction between thinking 
and theorising about phenomena is, indeed, one of degree not of kind - as 
is normally implied about subjects which are distinguished by the 
adjectives 'strong' and 'weak'.
Certain amongst McClelland's methodological criticisms of the ACM are 
not so easy to dismiss. Thus he argues that
'If a research worker effectively says to a child, 'I want 
you to tell me what you think.about X 1, and X is part of 
usual experience, it would be very difficult for the child 
to reply, 'I do not think about X'. Some sort of answer 
is a social imperative'.
(McClelland, 1984, p.4s original emphasis).
and suggests recourse to 'rules and rituals' and 'instant invention' as 
likely response strategies for the child who does not have 'fully formed
ideas1 (ibid).
Now, in taking note of these plausible possibilities I feel that it is 
important not to misconstrue the task ahead: the notion of an 
alternative-conception has great influence upon the choice and development 
of research methods•
Thus, if it is accepted that there can be no absolute, unilaterally 
ascribed, judgements made about the worth of another person's construct, 
then all inferences made about them must be negotiated, indeed, 
evidence of negotiation constitutes the principal criterion for the 
'authenticity' of such inferences. The more evidence of negotiation of 
research inferences that there is, the more authentic such inferences are 
judged to be. Authenticity is thus primarily a methodological 
requirement or quality but it is one that is highly complementary to the 
philosophical basis that we endorse.
This notion of authenticity contrasts markedly with what we judge to be 
the nearest 'functional equivalent' in Paradigm 1 research, namely, 
'validity'. In classical applications of the notion of validity, attempts 
are made to keep persons researched in ignorance of the researcher's 
interests and conclusions. Investigations conducted on the approach we 
endorse, however, are fundamentally collaborative - a quality which 
prompted Swift (1984) to suggest that 'collaborates' would be a more 
appropriate term rather than 'subject' to refer to persons whose ideas are 
investigated. Hence McClelland's point about a child being obliged to 
present some sort of answer in response to a research worker's question
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may be accepted without the same inference being drawn. To explain, as a 
member of the ACM,. I can recognise the sort of situation he describes from 
my own research experience but I consider it to reflect an unfortunate 
aspect of the present education system. Accordingly, I have gone to 
considerable lengths to develop investigative techniques such that a child 
feels able or willing to express their view - oven if that view is that 
they have no view.
I feel, then, that McClelland is being overly cynical about children's 
willingness to be open and frank in interview situations and that this 
stems, in part, from his objectivism. I suggest that members of the ACM 
believe; that there are ways, sophisticated, sensitive, ways of 
effectively asking a child 'I want you to tell me what you think about X' 
so that they do not feel that to answer is a 'social imperative', but 
rather, is an invitation which ,can be refused if desired. Clearly there 
is no independent; 'objective', means for checking this assertion - or, 
indeed, any of the ACM|s research inferences, for this.is precisely what 
the approach denies. Ultimately, the whole research enterprise of the ACM 
rests upon a willingness to invest some degree of trust in the person 
Whoso views are sought. I suspect that Paradigm 1 researchers find this 
notion particularly hard to swallow, McClelland's arguments are no less 
tautological than those of the ACM - if anything, they are more so through 
not having been negotiated with any persons. Moreover, from a relativist- 
raethodological-constructivist perspective, the principle of parsimony, 
which he invokes, is as value-laden a methodological rule as is any other.
Supposing, however, that McClelland is right and most children have indeed
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"instantly invented" the ideas that members of the ACM have labelled 
1alternative-conceptions1• Surely this would render the intellectual and 
imaginative capacities of the children even more staggering than is being 
claimed on the alternative-conception interpretation - at least, with 
respect to instances of 'instant invention1? And it would make a very 
complementary point to that presently propounded by the ACM. Even if the 
only impact that the ACM's central meta-theoretical notion had upon 
educationalists and educators was to be construed as a stimulus to develop 
alternatives ('instant invention' etc), then proposing it would have been 
worthwhile. This is because alternative accounts and interpretations, 
such as those McClelland proposes, may also provide valuable insights into 
the present education system and children's thinking processes within it.
Notv, as I intimated in Chapter 1, I believe that the ACM can and should 
concede to critics that there have been some instances where invoking the 
notion of an alternative-conception has been conceptually extravagant or 
even gratuitous. Specifically, in departing from the traditional notion 
of a "systematic mistake", existing ACM meta-theory still fails to provide 
an adequate rationale for distinguishing the "trivially different" 
learner conception from the "genuinely alternative" learner conception.
Is there some non-preemptive way in which the notion of an 
alternative-conception can be rendered more discriminating and so meet 
such a criticism? I believe there is.
With the links that I have drawn in Chapters 3 and 4 between the formal 
content of Kelly's theory and Feyerabend's post-empiricism in mind, it
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shall not surprise the reader that I propose an 1Incommensurability 
criterion1 whereby the alternative-conception is the incommensurable 
conception (Swift, 1985b),
To elaborate slightly, a putative alternative-conception may be said to 
be such if, and only if,, a relation of incommensurability can be shown to 
exist between it and the reference conception, i.e. the two conceptions 
can be demonstrated to exhibit (1) mutual factual adequacy, (2) mutual 
ontological incompatibility. This criterion may help to explain and, 
perhaps, to justify, the characteristically "atheoretical" form which ACM 
field reports take, as may be further elucidated by Feyerabend!s remark 
that
'As incommensurability depends on covert classifications 
and involves major conceptual changes it is hardly ever 
possible to give an explicit definition of it. Nor will 
the customary 'reconstructions1 succeed in bringing it to 
the fore. The phenomenon must be shown, the reader must be 
led up to it by being confronted with a great variety of 
instances, and he must judge for himself*.
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p.225).
So too with educands' alternative-conceptions (cf. Black's, 1986, review 
of Driver, Guesne and Tiberghien, 1986 - excerpted in Chapter 1). This 
notwithstanding, for a compatible theory of teaching ever to be developed 
and implemented, some kind of 'rational integration' of ACM research must 
be achieved. In Chapter 10 I shall argue that the formal content of PGP 
could fulfill this role.
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5.3. A Selective Review of Research into Students1 and Teachers1
Personal Epistemologies of Science.
My review of the relevant literature, which follows shortly, shall 
concentrate exclusively upon my-stated focus of field research, i.e. 
students' and teachers' personal epistemologies of science. Accordingly,
I shall defer until Chapter 10 my consideration of research which explores 
highly related subjects and issues such as implications for curricular 
reform arid the epistemological assumptions of science curricula and the 
image which they project in the classroom. This deferment applies also to 
those studies which also consider such issues and which are included in my 
review, below.
Notwithstanding the plethora of studies which have used questionnaires to 
investigate educands' 'attitudes' to science and their 'image of the 
scientist', as broadly interpreted by researchers upon an objective - 
subjective dimension, there has been very little detailed enquiry 
conducted in light of traditions in philosophy of science and using 
Paradigm 2 research methods into educands* and educators' personal 
meanings of science and scientific-method - and none (that I am aware of) 
into educationalists' views on these matters.
Partly due to the constraints I impose for my immediate purpose and partly 
due to its apparent novelty, then, my review of the literature shall 
encompass only two studiesi These are due to Rowell and Cawthron (1982) 
and Dibbs (1982). I shall consider them in this order.
Rowell and Cawthron (1982) devised a questionnaire to survey the awareness 
and impact of the conflicting ideas of Popper and Kuhn upon University 
populations. Their sample was drawn from two South Australian 
universities and was composed of a total of 254 students and 52 staff.
The items on their questionnaire consisted of verbatim, or near verbatim, 
statements from the written works of Popper, Kuhn, and 'inductivist- 
empiricists'. A five point (1 to 5) scoring system was used to provide an 
appropriate position on a continuum varying from 'strong agreement' to 
'strong disagreement*. Two responses on such scales were required to each 
statement: the first asked for a reaction to the statement as a comment on 
what science is« the second, a, reaction to the statement as a comment on 
what science should be.
Within the 'as is* and the 'should be* data sets, the factor pattern
*
matrices produced by the statistical methods employed indicated the 
general stability in the clustering of variables. However, the nature of 
both the:'as is' and 'should be* factors provided little support for the 
hypothesis that the three images of science were 'comprehensively and 
separately operated' by groups within the sample to provide 'internally 
consistent frameworks' for their views of science. Rather, what these 
authors interpreted to emerge from the data was a majority view of science 
reflecting a hybrid of Popperian ideas with the earlier more 'traditional 
ones'. Similarly, there was little consensus with respect to the Kuhnian 
view, though factor analysis was taken to suggest that the position is 
known* or is at least meaningful, to some respondents.
From my point of view, the research inferences of this study are
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interesting in two main ways. Firstly, they suggest that, overall, such 
student learning of the 'process of scientific investigation and 
reasoning', now included amongst most curricular objectives (Fensham, 
1983), as may have been achieved has not yet been mediated by formal 
traditions in philosophy of science; likewise, such expertise and 
sophistication as educators might possess in understanding soientifio 
process and reasoning. Secondly, that there is a degree of fragmentation 
within the construction systems of many educands and educators.
In a Ph.D thesis, Dibbs (1982) conducted an investigation into the nature 
and consequences of secondary school science teachers' implicit 
philosophies of science for teaching. By use of questionnaire techniques 
and follow-up interviews with a sub-sample of respondents, Dibbs 
identified four 'extreme types', viz. the 'H type', or
hypothetico-deductivist teach&n; the 'I type' or induetivist teacher; the 
'V type* or verificationist teacher; and the '0 type' who has no 
discernable philosophical beliefs about the nature of science or its 
methodology.
Again, ray interest in this study is for two main reasons. Firstly, I note 
the pluralism of epistemological commitments across the population of 
teachers, albeit, (secondly) tempered by the apparent absence of 
Weltanschauungen, or post-empiricist, notions ('O' types?).
- 5.36 -
Chapter 6. The Context of my Field-Research
6.1. Introduction
My field-research had dual foci within secondary and tertiary levels of 
education and used a number of complementary investigative methods. These 
latter may be grouped under the following three headings:
(1) Lesson Observation (LO)
(2) Written Exercise (WE)
(3) Focussed Interview'(FI)
%
The research was conducted through a series of ’pilot1 studies culminating 
in a ’main’ study, though I have felt free to attach equal interpretative 
worth to material drawn from any stage of the enquiry. The distinction 
between ’pilot1 studies and the ’main’ study is made principally by virtue 
of the coincidence in the development of the final forms of WE and FI, 
rather than LO.
As my title for this chapter suggests, my overarching purpose within it is 
to provide a context in which to construe my discussion of these methods. 
Hence I shall briefly describe the educational institutions in which I 
conducted the research, my means of entree to them, and my rationale for 
choosing them and the sample of subjects from within them. Since LO’s
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were themselves principally intended to provide a context for myself when 
later employing WE and FI (described in later chapters), I shall 
interpolate information concerning my use of this technique with other 
background details prior to discussing the technique in detail later in 
this chapter.
6.2. Choice of Educational Institutions and Human Subjects
My decision to split the focus of my field-research between secondary and 
tertiary levels of education was prompted by a desire to explore the 
possibility that science lecturers’ personal meanings of science and 
, scientific-method might be different from those of science teachers by 
virtue of the former being actively engaged in scientific research, and, 
further, that this might affect the image of science which they project to 
their students.
The research was conducted within five schools (middle and secondary) and 
a university, all of which were located in the south of England. '
6.2.1. The Schools
Jfy first choice of school was largely opportunistic - being decided, in 
the first instance, by an entree facilitated by one of my supervisors who 
had prior links with that (middle) school.
My choice of the remaining (secondary) schools, however, was made chiefly
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by virtue of them all being state comprehensives and their geographical 
proximity, each to the other and all to my place of residence at the time. 
With these schools, I effected entree by means of a letter (or a telephone 
call) to the headmaster, which in some cases was followed by an interview. 
In these, as with later preparatory letters and meetings which I had with 
teachers who had expressed a willingness to be observed whilst teaching, I 
outlined the nature of my intended research and gave assurances that I 
would strive to preserve the anonymity of all concerned (i.e. staff and 
pupils), both within and without the school, with respect to my research 
inferences.
My early pilot research in.these schools was conducted over a period of a 
few days in each and consisted only of informal (i.e. unrecorded) lesson 
observations and interviews with staff and pupils. At the end of this 
period I decided to concentrate my research efforts within only one school 
since I judged the staff and students there to be particularly willing to 
cooperate with the further ramifications (impositions!) that would be 
involved with my main study.
The school in question was opened in the late 1950s and was formally 
recognised by the local education authority as a Community School in the 
late 1970s. It had a roll of around 1,500 pupils, of whom approximately 
200 were in the sixth form. The Science Department taught CSE Integrated 
Science (IS), ’O’ level Schools Council Integrated Science Project 
(SCISP), and Nuffield 'A1 level. The staff of that department were 
predominantly young and enthusiastic in their teaching.
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The LOs of my main study, numbering some 32 in all and observed 
consecutively, were conducted in a lower sixth ’A1 level biology class of 
7 pupils and taught jointly (alternately) by Mr. H. and Ms. S.
I conducted WE and FI with all these pupils and with both these teachers 
(amongst others - see Chapters 7 and 8 for details).
6.2.2. The Univers ity
My choice of university was again decided partly by its geographical
proximity and partly by my ready entree to it due to having met at a
conference one of the lecturers, whose lectures and tutorial groups I
later observed (Dr. T). An important additional factor, however, was that
this university ran an optional cburse for undergraduates entitled
*
’Principles and Perspectives of Science’, and I was interested to explore 
undergraduates’ reaction to it. .
This university was founded in the early 1960s and has enjoyed in equal 
measure a reputation for radical student politics and research excellence, 
particularly in the life sciences. The student population numbers around 
3,500 and staff-student relations are widely thought to be good.
I chose to observe first year undergraduates since I felt that temporal 
proximity to the interface between secondary and tertiary levels of 
science education might bring epistemological awareness and.issues to the 
fore.
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I attended one compulsory course ('Molecules, Cells, and Organisms') for 
first year undergraduate students in the School of Biological Sciences. 
This lasted an entire term and consisted of 23 lectures, 8 pre-lab 
lectures, 8 labs (i.e. practicals), and 8 post-lab lectures.
By observing this course I was guaranteed to share at least some of the 
immediate formal learning context of students whom I observed within two 
tutorial groups which met twice weekly and whom I observed throughout the 
period - 16 Tutorial Observations (TO).
The first of these tutorial groups (TG1) was led by Dr. McG. and was 
comprised of 5 students, TG2 was led by Dr. T with 4 students.
I conducted FIs with all but one of these students, who was absent from 
TG2 during the interview period, and with both the lecturers. (I did not 
use WE with tertiary level subjects).
6.3« Method of Observing Lessons
The method of observation that I used was loosely based upon a model 
proposed by Schatzman and Strauss (1973)*
Using this model, the researcher organises their observation notes into
'[ ] relatively distinct "packages" of material 
according to whether they constitute "Observational 
Notes" (ON), "Theoretical Notes" (TN), or 
"Methodological Notes" (MN)'.
(Schatzman and Strauss, 1973* p.99)*
These authors later characterise each of their '"packages"' in the
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following way:
'ON: Observational notes are statements bearing upon
events experienced principally through watching and 
listening. They contain as little interpretation as 
possible, and are as reliable as the observer can 
construct them. Each ON represents an event deemed 
important enough to include in the fund of recorded 
experience, as a piece of evidence for some proposition 
yet unborn or as a property of context or situation.
An ON is the Who, What, When, Where, and How of human 
activity. It tells who said or did what, under stated 
circumstances.
Each ON is constructed as a unit event that can stand 
by itself as a datum, or can be fully understood in the 
context of other ON's on any given date or 
circumstance. If it records actual conversation, the 
researcher quotes exact words, phrases, or sentences: 
otherwise he uses the apostrophe (single quotes) to 
indicate somewhat lesser certainty, or he paraphrases 
as best he can. If the observer wishes to go beyond 
the "facts" in the instance, he writes a theoretical or 
inferential note.
TN: Theoretical notes represent self-conscious,
controlled attempts to derive meaning from any one or 
several observation notes. The observer as recorder 
thinks about what he has. experienced, and makes 
whatever private declaration of meaning he feels will 
bear conceptual fruit. He interprets, infers, 
hypothesises, conjectures; he develops new concepts, 
links these to older ones, or relates any observation 
to any other in this presently private effort to create 
social science.
MN: A methodological note is a statement that
reflects an operational act completed or planned: an 
instruction to oneself, a reminder, a critique of one's 
own tactics. It notes timing, sequencing, stationing, 
stage setting, or manoeuvering. Methodological notes 
might be thought of as observational notes on the 
researcher himself and upon the methodological process 
itself; as complete a chronicle as the recorder finds 
necessary or fruitful. Were he to plan on writing for 
later publication about his research tactics, he would 
take detailed notes; otherwise his MN consists mainly 
of reminders and instructions to himself'.
(Schatzman and Strauss, 1973> pp.100-101).
Use of this system over a number of observation sessions enables the 
researcher to derive 'thematic categories1, (i.e. classes of events deemed 
interesting to the researcher).
I recorded my observations in a 15 x 21 cm. notebook (usually) while 
sitting at the back of the classroom. In addition, I audio-recorded the 
LO. Wherever possible, I entered both the time and the tape rev-counter 
number next to ON's on the pages of the left hand side only, leaving the 
right hand side free for TN and MN. As was to be expected, some of these 
only occurred to me after the actual LO - here I found the audio-recording 
of particular help in stimulating my recall of events.
i
During LOs I did not converse with either students or staff. After a few 
sessions I got the impression that the pupils and students took no 
significant account of my presence. On one occasion in the school, for 
example, when the teacher (Mr. H) had left the room for a few minutes the 
pupils openly cheated in a test they had been set. In undergraduate 
practicals students likewise soon got used to the "mute demonstrator"I
I augmented my LOs by collecting and examining all teaching materials used 
and also the educands' files - this constituting an informal form of 
documentary analysis. I also wrote (after the LO) short synopses of the 
lessons using basic categories for ON/TN for didactic tactics such as 
'pupil activity' and 'guided discussion*. Finally, I would invite the 
teacher to talk about the lesson they had just presented if there was an ; 
opportunity to do so.
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6.3*1» Example of a Lesson Observation
The lesson that I have chosen to illustrate my method of observing classes 
and the sort of research inferences I felt able to make was given by Ms. S 
to a third year SCISP group upon the subject of 'The Action of Saliva 
upon Starch'• Although this LO occurred during an early pilot stage of 
my field-research, I nevertheless present it as my example because it was 
instrumental in my decision to switch the emphasis of my investigation 
away from educands' and educators' alternative-conceptions 'in science' 
and towards their alternative-conceptions of science.
Synopsis of the Lesson
This lesson, and the one preceding it, comprise the third year digestion 
syllabus.
Teacher begins with a recapitulation of previous lesson. That lesson had 
itself been largely devoted to revising the human digestive system 
conceived in basic terms (see Appendix 4 for second year digestion syllabus). 
The form and function of villi had been introduced (see Appendix 4 for 
teaching materials used).
Guided discussion: Teacher's questions introduce control necessity of
experiment. Experimental design 'negotiated':
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Visking tubing
Boiling tube
Tapwater
1. Saliva + starch. 2.Starch. 3.Saliva.
Figure 6.1 Diagram Based on Teacher!s Blackboard Drawing of Apparatus 
Used in Lesson
Each boiling tube plus contents immersed in water bath (37 deg. C) for 15 
minutes. Contents of visking tubes then tested for presence of starch and 
sugar. Teacher distributes 1Patterns 11 text-book. Advises pupils to 
refer to relevant section for details of method upon which class 
experiment is based ( see appendix for photo-copy).
Teacher requests pupils to work in groups and urges task-sharing within 
conduct of experiment.
Pupil activity: set up experiment. Teacher supplies methodological 
advice on request or need.
In the last 5 minutes: Teacher advises that not enough time to carry out
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starch and sugar tests. Will therefore leave experiment running until 
next lesson.
Homework: Teacher requests pupils to (1) write notes on how food enters
blood-stream, (2) write up class experiment thus far conducted. She 
stresses the need to include methodological details not included in her 
blackboard diagram of the apparatus in order to enable replication of 
experiment by a naive third person.
(N.B. First 15 minutes of next lesson allowed for pupils to conduct starch 
and sugar tests. Short discussion of results).
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Figure 6.2: Photoreduction of a Page from my LO Note-Book Recorded
during this Lesson
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In an informal interview with Ms. S. after this lesson, I was able to 
glean something of her personal (or professional) epistemology of science 
and the role it played in her teaching when I asked her about an aspect of 
the lesson:
I 'In the lesson the children seemed quite at home with the design of
the experiment. Have you ever specifically - you know 
abstractly —  taught them the concept of control?'
Ms. S 'Not control as such but I do teach them the basic scientific- 
method: Aim (can double as a title), Apparatus (if special),
Method, Result, Conclusion. I try to get them out of all that 
personal stuff - "Miss S(.) did this, I put that on there" 
etc. I try to train them in the scientific way - to be as 
efficient and as laboratory like as possible. Most of my kids 
have now got the method pretty well but are still too rowdy 
really'.
Miss S. labelling and sequencing Of stages in scientific-methodology, her 
repeated suppression of the human subject and use of the definite article 
suggest a sympathy for classical empiricist epistemology. (also cf. 
Medawar, 19&4-? for arguments that this format of writing scientific 
papers misrepresents the processes of scientific reasoning and 
investigation, viz. as erapiricist-inductivist, and as such perpetrates a 
'fraud').
The informal interview continued:
Ms. S 'We have a lesson devoted to it in the second-year - well, and the 
laboratory safety. Its usually the first or second lesson of term 
so we also have to get all the files handed out and generally tell 
them what's what'.
I believe Ms. S' comment is indicative of the generally low status
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ascribed to scientific-epistemology within the school science currriculum, 
viz. part of one lesson. She termed this her 1"paradigm lesson"1.
Ms. S. also claimed that
'The sort of science they get further up the school messes up all my 
good work (...) they mess up all my ground work .. I don't like what 
they do up there really ... dilutes it'.
Ms. S.' class was a third year SCISP class. "Further up the school" would 
bring pupils closer to the philosophical orientations of SCISP and 
Nuffield 'A* level. Although not without faults, I regard those 
approaches as being more philosophically enlightened than Ms. S.' rather 
traditional (i.e. empiricist-inductivist) one.
‘Further support for my interpretation that Ms. S. intended to impart an 
empiricist-inductivist image of science came from her treatment of history 
of science in the written work of her pupils.
When I examined her pupils' work-files I found that Ms. S. had only 
required notes on the history of science to be recorded on two 
occasions over a 9 month period.
The first of these occasions consisted of dictated notes concerning the 
development of atomic theory:
'The Atom
About 400 B.C. a Greek called Democritus said that matter was 
composed of atoms. He said they were all the same, but combined in 
different ways to make different substances. He also believed that 
atoms could not be divided or destroyed.
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The first real atomic theory was found in 1803 by John Dalton. He 
said that different chemical elements were composed of different 
atoms. He also believed that the atom could not be divided.
Modern atomic theory was formulated by Lord Rutherford in 1911- 
He said that the atom is composed of a central nucleus surrounded by 
circling electrons:
The nucleus is made up of two different particles, protons and 
neutrons. There is always the same number of protons as there are 
electrons in an atom. Every element has a different number*of 
protons in its nucleus:
The number of protons = atomic number of the element 
An example is Hydrogen [.....]'
* I suggest that this first rare inclusion of history of science within 
Ms. S.' lesson may be construed tq illustrate the way in which accounts of 
the elaboration of scientific theories complements ann 'accumulative 
fragraentalist', i.e. empiricist-inductivist, epistemological image of 
science. Earlier theories are never actually rejected - they are just 
made more detailed. This is possible (in this example) only by strictly 
adhering to the particulate theory of matter and, hence, by making a 
highly selective appeal to history of science.
The second occasion on which Ms. S. had required notes on the history of 
science to be made consisted of an essay she had set for homework. This 
was simply entitled 'Sir Isaac Newton' but issued with the instructions 
'write an essay on his life and work'.
cloud of orbiting electrons
nucleus
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When I read the pupils' essays, I found it instructive to note the sort of 
statements 'allowed' by Ms. S. I resisted the temptation to draw 
inferences relating to the personal epistemologies of science of the 
pupils themselves from this source, because I believe that many had 
simply copied from books. Whilst this was suggestive of the general 
epistemological orientation of text book and encyclopaedic accounts of 
Newton's achievements, no pupil included a bibliography at the end of his 
essay, so I did not pursue it. Cawthron and Rowell (1978) however, have 
drawn attention to the empiricist-inductivist slant to many science 
textbooks•
I construed most pupils to reconstruct Newton's contribution to science in 
empiricist-inductivist terms as evidenced by statements such as the 
following:
Pupil A '(...) a scientific law is a statement which explains the results 
of an experiment. The study of how forces act on objects are 
summed up in Newton's three laws of motion. (...).'
Pupil B '(...) his calculations about the laws of gravity at this time
agreed pretty nearly with the known facts, but to Newton this was 
not good enough, so he laid aside the study of gravitation for 
the time being. (...).'
Pupil C '(...) it is said that while in his garden at Woolsthorpe he saw 
an apple fall from a tree, then he wondered why the apple fell 
straight downwards. Then he decided that the Earth attracted the 
apple. This led on to the discovery of Gravity. (...).'
In all these accounts theory is subservient to 'facts'.
In some pupils' scripts, however, there were references to rival theories, 
the epistemological implications of which were left ambiguous
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r.9 (•••) he gave a paper reporting his works on optics and fell
fowl [sic] of Robert Hook, who upheld the wave theory of light as 
against Newton's corpuscular theory. They were both right in 
their own way (...).
I suggest that Ms. S. and perhaps a minority of her pupils also, might be 
caught in a 'double-bind* viz. on the one hand, accepting the prevalent 
contemporary philosophic notion that there is no such thing as an absolute 
fact, yet on the other hand endorsing with the collusion of many aspects of 
our Western culture, a methodology which is founded upon direct access to 
reality and the attainability of absolute-knowledge.
Ms. S.' apparent fluctuating stringency in her "enforcement" of 
empiricist-inductivist epistemology may also be due to her perceived area 
of competence: her own academic background was in botany rather than in 
physics.
In project work, pupils from both classes often recorded historical 
details. I believe, however, that these were either in the cause of an 
empiricist-inductivist reconstruction, or, more often, merely included as 
"humanistic tit-bits" without epistemological import, e.g. '[so-and-so], 
who married four times, did [such-and-such].'
To conclude, this account records the sort of interpretations which I made 
at the beginning of my field-research. It is not sophisticated, yet is 
probably over-interpretive. This notwithstanding, such early research 
contributed to my growing conviction that educands' and educators'
personal epistemologies of science were worthy of being investigated.
Finally, I was able to explore Ms. S.1 professional epistemology of 
science in more detail in an FI at a later date.
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Chapter 7. Written Exercises
7.1 Introduction
The work that I describe in this chapter places heavy reliance on class 
administered 'written exercise' (WE) techniques to investigate students' 
personal understanding of the following three subjects:
(1) a "scientific job"
(2) a "scientific activity"
(3) a "scientific observation"
I shall describe my use of these investigative instruments in the order 
that I have just introduced them:
7.2 Written Exercise: Content, Collaboratee Sample and General Method
of Administration
I administered WE on four occasions. Between administrations of this 
exercise I undertook minor revisions to the wording that I 
characteristically used and also added two questions. This resulted in 
administering 3 versions of WE (WE.vl, WE.v2, WE.v3). The final and 
complete version, i.e. WE.v3, may be summarised as follows:
Q1 List jobs which you would normally put under the headings
of very 'scientific1, or very 'non-scientific', or 
definitely 'both scientific and non-scientific':
*
scientific non-scientific both
■ 1*
Q2 Why do you think that I have asked you to answer Q1?
A A
Q3 What is your mo3t usual reason for putting a job in the 
scientific column?
04. Have you found it useful to answer Q1 ?
- If "yes", why?
- If "no", why?
Q5 Do a sketch of something that happened outside school in 
which you did something scientific.
B ^ Q6 What is happening in your sketch?
Q7 Why is it scientific?
Q8 Carefully observe, then write down what you have observed,
(Q8a What difficulty had you in trying to answer Q8?).
(Q8b Observations are often very important in experiments.
Does the difficulty that you had in trying to 
answer Q8 tell you anything about people doing 
experiments that have never been done before?).
Figure 7.1. Showing Contents of WE.
(N.B. All three versions may be found and compared in Appendix 5).
As I have indicated in my summary above, I consider these questions to 
fall into three clusters relating to my three areas of interest, i.e. Q1-4 
re. 'A', Q5-7 re. 1B', Q8-8b re. -'C'• I also consider Q1, 5 and 8 to 
represent the 'key' questions respective to my three areas of interest.
I administered WE to four Secondary level classes and an abbreviated form 
of WE (WE.v4) consisting of Q1 only, to a randomised sample of 37 first
year undergraduate students (see Appendix 5)*
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Two of the classes to which I administered the WE were ones which I had 
previously observed in a lesson. Furthermore, I later conducted ‘focussed 
interviews' (FI) with a small group of collaboratees from two classes (one 
class I had observed in a lesson [LO], the other I had not. This was to 
place my research inferences generated from the written responses to WE 
in an overall context and to thereby render it as "holistic" as possible.
I selected the two classes that I had not previously observed 
opportunistically - according to the teacher's willingness to cooperate 
and within strictures imposed by the timetable.
Entree to each of the classes (for the purpose of administering WE) was
effected via the consent of the teacher and a previously granted request
 ^ - • •
made to each class by the teacher.
Basic details of my collaborates sample are given in Figure 7*2 below.
In this Table, I present the classes in the order in which I administered 
WE to them:
WE
Educ
lev
Cl
No
Acd
Ir
T Sc course St
No
WE 
& Q1
WE
v1
WE
v2
WE
v3
LO FI
Secoii
dary
1 4 Mr.F Mixed Ability 
'registrn
22 
' Cl
22 22 2
2 3 Ms.S SCISP 24 24 24 1 2
3 4 Mr.B IS 16 16 16 1
4 4 Mr.A Mixed ability 
'registrn' Cl
17 17 17
Totals/Sub-totals [] [79J [793 22 24 33 2 7
3ry 1 37
Totals 116 116
Figure 7.2. Table Showing WE Data Sources
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It should be noted that Ms.S1 class constitutes something of a 'special 
case' in so far as I used all my investigative approaches with them, at 
least in some form or another.
It may also be worth mentioning at this point that my initial, sole, 
intention for WE was to obtain a set of representative elements for later 
use in a 'repertory grid technique* (RGT), i.e. by means of Q1, as, 
indeed, I did (see section 7.3. below). However, I considered the 
opportunity to augment the RGT investigation to be an opportunity that was 
too good to be missed. Questions 1-3, however, may still be considered to 
be an investigation in their own right, i.e. capable of analysis and 
interpretation without reference to the RGT investigation. As I shall 
later describe in more detail, I administered the grid itself to a 
different collaboratee sample, viz., two fifth form classes. My write-up 
of questions 1-3 incorporates my RGT investigation.
My desire to elicit views genuinely held by pupils meant that I was 
anxious lest they perceive WE as a 'test1, which, indeed, it was not.
With this in mind I characteristically introduced WE as a 'quiz to find 
out what people in schools think about some aspects of science'. For 
similar reasons, I also stated that 'there are no right or wrong answers - 
your set of answers is not something that I can go away with and mark out 
of 10'. To help gain feedback as to the success, or otherwise, of these 
intentions between successive administrations of WE included Q2.
With my verbal introduction completed I distributed three, A4 sheets of
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to each student. These sheets were stapled together in the top left hand 
corner. The first and third of these were lined, the second was plain 
(for response to area 1B*). I then requested each student to record his 
or her first name at the top of the page. This was in order to render 
them identifiable to me since responses which I found interesting 
contributed to my selection of students for interview. This 
notwithstanding, I guaranteed each student's anonymity both within and 
without the school (for later reference, see Appendix 6 for an 
example of a completed WE).
I then wrote WE on the blackboard using the wording that I have already 
presented in Figure 7.1. I did this one item at a time, adding a verbal 
explanation for further clarity, answering any queries voiced by members 
of the class and allowing time for completion of responses by the whole 
class before continuing (this last was to be methodologically important 
with respect to area 'C' - section 7.4 below). WE took approximately 35 
minutes to administer.
My detailed consideration of areas 'A', 'B' and 'C' of WE correspond to 
sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 which follow.
- 7.5 -
7.3 Written Exercise, Part A: Students' Personal Meanings of a 
"Scientific Job"
7.3.1 Introduction
I infer my principal stimulus to investigating students' personal 
meanings of a 'scientific job' as a means of exploring their personal 
meanings of science and scientific method from my experience of early 
interviews. In those, I had noted that when I asked the collaborates what 
they personally understood by the terms 'scientific' or 'unscientific' 
many listed and classified occupations or subjects prior to answering.
This appeared to assist them to clarify and formulate their views so I 
decided that it might be fruitful to mimic this tendency as a research 
strategy. Moreover, I considered that this approach might render issues 
of science epistemology more accessible, at least at the linguistic level, 
to some students.
My investigations in this area began with a version of 'Interview-About- 
Instances' technique (Osborne and Gilbert, 1980). For reasons given in 
section 7.4*2.1, however, I found Repertory Grid Techniques (RGT) more 
suitable.
Before describing my elicitation and analyses of elements and grids, I 
shall make some general comments concerning RGT in order to make clear 
what I consider to be their relation to Constructive Alternativism.
7.3*1*1 Repertory Grid Techniquea and Personal Construct Psychology
Repertory Grid Techniques are a set of techniques devised to facilitate a 
process of inquiry in a manner consistent with the philosophical stance of 
Constructivist Alternativism, as elaborated by George Kelly (1955) and as 
I have already discussed in detail (Ch.3 and 4)*
Much of the nature, purpose and limitations of RGT may be understood by 
reference to both the 'ethos* and the formalisms of Kelly's theory since 
they represent one practical expression of it - in this sense, perhaps, 
more than mere consistency is implied. At the risk of repeating some of 
my earlier expressed views, however, I shall argue for these more recent 
ones rather than assume them. First I shall develop and clarify the main 
point that I shall argue for.
As we have seen, Kelly formulated his theory whilst employed as a clinical 
psychologist. He characterised his overarching aim for PCP in the 
following way:
'We are concerned with finding better ways to help a 
person reconstrue his life so that he need not be a 
victim of his past' (Kelly, 1955, p.23).
This expressed aim establishes Kelly's 'humanistic intentions', for no 
mention is made of externally imposed constraints or norms on the 
subject-person or 'collaboratee' - it is 'client centered'. Interventions 
into the life of another person, then, must be "catalytic", "invitational" 
or "facilitative", rather than "normative". Even these, however, require
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that one first acquires an "understanding" of the person:
'If we reach an understanding of how a person behaves, 
we discover it in the manner in which he represents 
his circumstances to himself'.
(Kelly, 1955, p.16, my emphasis).
This construal of 'understanding' reflects Kelly's constructivist 
conception of 'scientist' and of all persons in their scientist like 
aspects. For Kelly, to know is to construe - and to know another person 
is to know how they construe. This last part implies that we must somehow 
elicit and consider that other person's constructs. Kelly developed the 
original form of RGT as one means of doing this: RGT are a response to his 
own exhortation that:
'..humanistic psychology needs a technology through 
which to express its humane intentions. Humanity 
needs to be implemented, not merely characterised and 
eulogised'. (Kelly, 1969 > p.135).
Of the many investigative techniques whose underlying rationales are 
compatible with the philosophical stance of Constructive Alternativism, 
RGT are, perhaps, the best known, most used and most directly related. 
The closeness of this relation becomes clear in certain of Kelly's views 
in which he develops his notion of a 'construction matrix':
'By a construction matrix I mean a postulated grid 
in which events and abstractions are so interlaced 
that whatever appears to occur independently of one's 
intention is given meaning in depth by being plotted 
against whatever coordinate reference axes he has 
intentionally erected. And in this psychological 
hyperspace the humanly contrived axes of reference, in 
turn, acquire whatever objective significance they 
have through extension - or through "operationalising" 
if one prefers a term that has more current usage.
- 7.8 -
This is to say that human constructions derive their 
objectivity wholly from the way they cast events into 
varying arrays - or simply from the lines of 
perspective they provide. Actually it is in terms of 
such arrays that consensual judgment becomes 
psychologically possible. Consensus itself, while 
often cited as the criterion of objectivity, does not 
properly define the psychological grounds on which 
objectivity rests. Only sociological grounds are 
implied.
But now, since we are talking about human experience, 
including our own particular experience as scientists, 
it may be more precise, instead of saying that the 
matrix is a schema in which events and abstractions 
are interlaced, to say it is man's observations and 
his constructs that are woven into the fabric of 
experience - the one ascribing meaning to the other 
and the other lending palpability to the one* And in 
this more phenomenological sense the grid might better 
be characterised as a "repertory grid," since it 
expresses one's own infinite system of 
cross-references between the personal observations he 
has made and the personal constructs he has erected.
I suppose it is apparent that all of us must have 
quite limited repertories, for the events we encounter 
are experienced only in *such depth as our 
constructions will plumb, and our constructs have only 
that scope which is provided by the ranges of events 
to which we undertake to apply them.' (Kelly, 1969, 
p.290-1: original emphasis).
Kelly is here proposing the notion of 'Repertory Grid' qua 
raeta-theoretical entity, as part of the 'assumptive structure' of his 
general theory. When elaborated by means of his 11 corollaries, it 
constitutes what some might call the 'cognitive structure' (I suggest that 
'constructive structure' would be a more appropriate expression) that 
Kelly assumes all persons to develop, albeit to greater or lesser extents. 
As shall become clear, this notion is intrinsic to that of Repertory Grid 
techniques, or, Repertory Grid qua humanistic technology.
Easterby-Sraith (1981, p.3) argues that RGT exhibit 'three essential
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features*, viz., 'elements*, 'constructs' and a 'linking mechanism which 
shows how each element is described in terms of each construct'.
The expression of links between elements and constructs varies with the 
format of RGT used (cf. discussion of my application, below). All, 
however, are principally informed by Kelly's 'Organisation Corollary' 
without which RGT would be impossible:
'Each person characteristically evolves, for his 
convenience in anticipating events, a construction 
system embracing ordinal relationships between 
constructs'
(Kelly, 1955, p«56: my emphasis).
The Organisation Corollary proclaims Kelly's view that, at any moment in 
time, a person possesses a repertoire, or set, of personal constructs 
and that such a repertoire is not 'to be construed as a mere "aggregate" 
of their (his/her) personal constructs for each construct is held to be 
related to every other construct in a predominately (but cf. 
Fragmentation Corollary: Kelly, 1955, p.87 et seq) coherent and 
hierarchical manner.
Now, there is no reason in principle why a person's entire system of 
personal constructs - their "total personal repertory grid" - should not 
be elicited. In practice, however, this is not possible. Practical 
constraints have mainly to do with elicitation procedures which are 
presently too slow, or to put it another way, persons' total repertoires 
of personal constructs are characteristically too large, though finite. 
Moreover, a person's construct system is not a static edifice: it would
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very likely change during the period of elicitation rendering a "complete" 
elicitation impossible: a person doe3 not cease to be 'a form of motion* 
(Kelly, 1955, p* ) merely because they are having their constructs 
elicited. This points to an important limitation on the inferences that 
can be drawn from an elicited grid, viz., it constitutes a representation
of (an aspect of) a person's ideational world that holds good only at the
temporal point of elicitation. Under no circumstances can RGT be used as 
a 'test'•
More important than practical constraints, however, is the notion that 
were a complete elicitation possible it would probably not be 
desirable. This is because it is difficult to imagine a purpose, or a 
situation, where a person's entire construct system could be pertinent 
(again cf. Fragmentation Corollary). In using RGT, however,
'One is not aiming to encapsulate the whole of an
individual's construct system but that part of it
which is relevant to the defined purpose'* (Pope and 
Keen, 1981, p.44-5: original emphasis).
Paraphrasing this comment, we can see that RGT serve to make explicit only 
those personal constructs, together with their relational structure 
(defined according to the assumptions of PCP), that are relevant to a 
previously negotiated purpose.
Pope and Keen argue that 'thero is no such creature as "The Grid",' (1981,
p.37) applicable for all purposes and propose that five major
considerations will have a bearing on the specific format of grid chosen
(or developed) and used, viz.:
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(1) Purpose
(2) Choice of elements and constructs
(3) Scaling
(4) Elicitation procedure
(5) Method of analysis 
(p.37)
These authors go on to elaborate two aspects of 'purpose1:
(a) What is the topic to be investigated?
(b) What is the intended use of the grid information?
(p.37)
I consider myself to have provided a preliminary answer to '(a)' in my 
introduction to this section. Pope and Keen (1981) however, then 
distinguish five uses for which RGT have been developed:
(i) A conversation with one's self;
(ii) Gathering of information about an individual's 
views on a particular topic;
(iii) A comparison of the viewpoints of two people 
in terms of either:
(a) degree of agreement between them, or
(b) the degree to which either can gauge the 
other's point of view;
(iv) An exploration of the nature and sharing of 
construing within a group;
(v) A monitoring of changes in perspective 
(p.38)
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I considered my interests (intended use of grid information) to lie with 
items (ii) and (iv). This corroborated my choice of FOCUS and SOOIOGRIDS 
programs, developed at Brunei University (see, e.g., Thomas and Shaw, 
1976; Pope, McKnight and Thomas, 1978) as the most appropriate existing 
grid formats to explore my interests. I shall describe briefly the
character of each of these programs later.
7.3*1.2 Method of Eliciting and Analysing and Interpreting Grid 
Information
I elicitated data in two stages:
(a) elements
(b) grids
7.3.1.2.1 Elicitation of Elements
Elements in any grid should be judged by elicitor and elicitee as being 
representative of the 'universe of discourse', i.e. they should hold 
personal meaning within the problem area to be explored. This requirement 
creates special problems when elements must be provided, as wan the 
consequence of my decision to explore issues of commonality of 
construction amongst students, for they must now be regarded as 
representative by more than one person. There are some who argue that 
both elements and constructs should be elicited on an entirely individual 
basis and point to the many abuses of RGT in the other approach.
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For my part, I consider that providing elements or constructs (or both) 
does represent a departure from the "ethos" of Constructive
Alternativism, at least, in its "purest" form. But I also believe that,
under certain circumstances, such departures may be justifiable. Exactly 
what these circumstances are, however, have to be considered with each 
such application and responsibility resides, very largely, with the 
applier. This notwithstanding, it would seem that, in such cases, extra
care has to be taken to ensure that the universe of discourse is
adequately negotiated with the persons from which the "source-set" of 
elements are initially elicited and that the set of provided elements 
derived, derived from the source set, exhibit contrast.
I obtained my source-set of elements by means of Q1. My verbal 
instructions for eliciting elements were very similar to those which I 
wrote on the blackboard and which I have already presented. I did, 
however, particularly emphasise that there was no virtue in listing large 
numbers of occupations unless the respondent considered each to be a very 
good exemplar of the relevant category, i.e. 'scientific1 or 
'non-scientific* or 'both scientific and non-scientific'. As with each 
WE question, I also re-emphasised that there were 'no right or wrong 
answers'.
I initially derived what I judge to be representative sets of elements 
from the Secondary and Tertiary students separately. This was in order to 
establish whether there were large differences between the trends of 
responses from these populations.
I began by taking the first script from the pile and then, in the order 
presented, noted down the occupations that the respondent had listed for 
each category on a ’data analysis sheet’. I entered a dash (tallymark) to 
the right of each occupation to signify its occurrence. I repeated this 
procedure with the remaining scripts. Where an occupation recurred I only 
entered a tallymark. I added ’’novel” occupations, together with a 
tallymark, to the appropriate list and numbered the occupations in the 
left hand margin.
In the early stages of analysis I wished there to be minimal data 
degradation so I corrected only spelling when adding occupations to the
lists, see Figure 7.3 below:
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Figure 7.3. Showing an excerpt from a data analysis sheet
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I soon judged, however, that some ’clustering* of the data prior to 
recording was desirable to avoid unnecessary repetition and labour. This 
’first order clustering’ was done with ’novel’ occupations which I judged 
to be synonymous with one already included in the list. Most trivial and 
unproblematic was the use of singular and plural forms. In certain other 
cases more judgement was needed but I feel confident that this has not 
distorted the data more than the following examples:
e.g. ’brain surgeon’ = ’neurosurgeon',
e.g. ’secretarial work’ = ’secretary',
e.g. ’teaching' = ’teacher’.'
Where occupations appeared to be different but related (examples 
respective to the last 3, above, include ’surgeon’, ’typist', and 
’lecturer’) I made a note to myself in the left hand margin - 'see 5, 12’ 
etc. This was in anticipation of later, ’second order clustering'.
Since second order clustering would further degrade the data, albeit in 
the cause of improved representation, I first obtained a set of 12 
occupations from the first order data. I felt that this number would be 
adequate to function as elements giving rise to grids of sufficient depth 
and detail. I also judged that 12 elements was the maximum that could be 
used within the known time limit for construct elicitation (approximately 
1 hour) and the nature of the respondents (conscripted pupils and 
students). I selected these occupations - elements - by identifying those 
four which occurred most frequently in each category. I then ranked each
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set of four occupations in order of frequency (highest or lowest) prior to 
presenting them in tabular form. The results of this procedure are shown 
in Figure 7.4- belows
Secondary (n=79) Tertiary (n==37)
Scientist Uo) Engineer (24)
Doctor (35) Doctor (17) ’scientific’
Science teacher (33) Physicist (12)
Chemist (30) Chemist (12)
Dustman (54) Musician (11)
Shop assistant (23) Shop keeper (8) 'non-scientific’
Secretary (21) Politician (8)
Milkman (20) Accounting (8)
Teacher (29) Teacher (20)
Doctor (21) Nurse (8) ’both’
Engineer (16) Farmer (6)
Dentist (16) Policeman (6)
The frequency of each occupation is given in brackets
Figure 7.4.. Table showing the four most frequent occupations for each
category drawn from FIRST order clustered data for secondary 
and tertiary populations
Second order clustering appeared desirable due to the high degree of 
overlap between, and equal frequency of, many of the occupations.
To derive second order clusters I collected occupations which I judged to 
be highly related and added their frequencies together. I then adopted 
one of the occupations (usually the most frequent) or invented a new 
generic expression to identify the cluster. The following two examples, 
drawn from the ’scientific1 category of the Secondary education 
population, illustrate this procedure:
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Second order cluster First order cluster
E.g. Medical work (76) Doctor (35),
Surgeon (7),
Neurosurgeon (5),
Medical officer (1),
Optician (1),
Nurse (10),
Vet (6),
Dentist (10),
Radiographer (1).
E.g. Technician (12) Technician (6),
Lab. technician (6).
Where I judged myself to be using the same criteria for inclusion in 
second order clusters I kept the generic name the same across Secondary 
and Tertiary populations.
When I had identified and named the second order clusters I selected the 
four most frequent such clusters from each category of each population and 
ranked them as before. The results of this procedure are shown in Figure 
7.5:
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Secondary (n=79) Tertiary (n=37)
Medical work (76) Medical work (45)
Scientist Uo) Engineer (34) 'scientific'
Biologist (38) Computer work (15)
Science teacher (33) Physicist (14)
Dustman (54) Driver (16)
Driver (31) Musician (12) 'non-scientific'
Shop work (29) Shop work (10)
Secretary (21) Bus work (9)
Medical work (55) Medical work (29)
Teacher (29) Teacher (20) 'both'
Engineer (23) Military service (14)
Electrician (15) Pilot (6)
The frequency of each occupation is given in brackets
Figure 7.5. Table Showing the four most frequent occupations for each
category drawn from SECOND order clustered data for secondary 
and tertiary populations
Even after second order clustering I still had to make some "arbitrary" 
choices for inclusion of occupations in Figure 7.5. For example, *pilot' 
shared equal frequencies with 'farmer1, 'psychologist' and 'policeman'. I 
do not feel, however, that this prejudiced my overall approach and 
intentions. From an impressionistic interpretation of the data analysis 
sheets and from comparisons within Figures 7.4- and 7.5, the responses from 
each population to Q1 of WE appeared relatively homogenous. On the 
basis of this judgement I felt it reasonable to select occupations from 
Figure 7.5 to function as a common set of supplied elements in a SOCIOGRID 
to be administered to either a Secondary or Tertiary population (although, 
in the event, only to the former).
My selection of occupations was guided by the need to represent each 
category and the minimum number that has been recommended as being
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fruitful: about 8 (Pope and Keen, 1981).
I straightforwardly included all occupations which were common to each 
population (i.e. 'Medical work', 'Engineer', 'Driver', 'Shopwork', and 
'Teacher'). I excluded some. For example, although 'scientist' was the 
most frequent response in the 'scientific' category of the secondary 
education population, I felt that this response was tautologous and would 
do little to identify the 'universe of discourse' during construct 
elicitation later. I tend to regard this response as an "unthinking" one 
- spurred by the novelty of the question being asked. Of the 40 who 
included this response, 28 recorded it as their first occupation. All but 
two of these 28 went on to elaborate other more specific occupations in 
this category. Incidentally, four undergraduates included this response 
in the same category! I also excluded 'science teacher'. This was 
because I had already selected the more generic 'teacher' (see above).
Drawing on previous research experience I chose four more occupations 
which I felt would be useful for the purpose of my sociogrid, viz. the 
investigation of commonality of students' personal meanings of a 
scientific job. Accordingly, I selected three out of these four 
occupations from the 'scientific' category.
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My final selection of occupations was as follows:
1 Engineer
2 Shop worker
3 Computer work
4 Physicist
5 Secretary
6 Medical work
7 Driver
8 Biologist
9 Teacher
Figure 7.6. List of occupations selected for SOCIOGRID elements 
(presented in randomised order)
I randomised the sequence by first numbering the occupations and then 
asking a colleague, who had not seen the list, to call out all numbers 
one to nine in any order.
7.3*1.2.2. Elicitation of Constructs
Having selected a set of elements to be supplied which I felt confident 
and justified would be representative, I set about eliciting repertory 
grids to explore the matter further.
My collaboratee sample for the grids comprised a total of 21 persons 
who constituted the entire members of two 5th/lower 6th form classes 
(average student age of 16 years) from school 1. I refer to these classes 
as '5th/lower 6th' since these students had completed their 5th year 
studies, including their GCE examinations, but were, at the time I 
elicited grids from them, being "introduced" to the 'A1 level of their 
subject (Biology) during the last three weeks of term. This period was 
described by one teacher (Mr. F., C1RG1) as being 'mainly a sort of
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P.R. job to see if they might be interested in taking the 'A1 level.1
As with my elicitation of elements, I achieved entree to each of these 
classes (for the specific purpose of eliciting grids) via the prior 
consent of both the teacher and a previously granted request made to each 
class by the teacher.
At the time which I elicited the grids, I had previously observed one of 
the classes and, to further assist my interpretation of the grid 
information once elicited, I conducted a "group interview" (GI) with a 
sample of students from each of the classes.
Basic details of my RG collaborates sample are summarised in Table 7.7 
below:
Cl.RG
T Student Sub-totals GI LO
C1.RG1 Mr.F 9 (5) (6)
C1.RG2 Dr.O 12 (2)
Totals 21 7 6
Figure 7.7. Table Showing Clas3 Repertory Grid Data Sources
My elicitation of the grids from each class was conducted in two stages.
In the first stage, which occupied one lesson period (1 hr), I met the 
students and discussed Kelly’s ideas concerning PGP and the specific 
procedures I intended to use to elicit constructs from them.
I requested students to complete a "practice grid" in order to give them
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personal experience in the processes of negotiation and elicitation. From 
each class I elicited and negotiated a class set of elements as well as 
eliciting constructs from each individual, I felt it worthwhile to elicit 
a "class" set of elements for the practice grid since I wished each 
student to understand the way in which the set of supplied elements in the 
"study grid" had been obtained (with each class I negotiated a purpose for 
the practice grid).
I distributed blank grids to each individual and elicited constructs by 
means of the triadic technique, viz., by offering the collaboratee a 
randomly derived list of triads (of elements), presenting them with a 
triad from that list and asking them to say in which way two of the 
elements were alike and, thereby, different from the third element. I 
asked each student to name both the emergent pole, i.e. the way in which 
two of the elements were alike, and also the implicit or contrast pole, 
i.e. what made the single element different from the pair. This they 
recorded in their grid form. Next, I asked each student to order the 
elements on a construct rating scale of 1...5 and to record their 
allotted values in their grid form.
In my explanation of the above points, and some others, I simplified some 
aspects of Kelly’s terminology: for example, I referred to the ’triadic 
elicidation technique’ as the ’splitting principle'. I wrote up terms and 
their definitions on the blackboard. By this means I tried to make the 
meanings and intentions that I had for the following terms, ideas and 
procedures especially clear:
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(1) ’element1
(2) ’construct’ (and triadic elicitation technique)
- defined as per Kelly, 1955, p.6l. Also the notion 
of ’opposite contrast’ (this to reduce the tendency 
I had found during early pilot testing of the 
technique, to use ’X vs. Not X1 formulations),
(3) ’rating scale’, especially the notion that the two 
elements of the emergent pole need not necessarily 
both be rated *1’,
(4) can re-rate a construct (hence I asked collaboratees 
to complete their grids in pencil),
(5) can re-name either or both of the poles of a 
construct(s),
(6) can add another construal of any triad,
(7) ’full context*
Before collaboratees began completing their practice grid, I first created 
and rated a construct using a triad from the elements we had negotiated 
(this in order to provide them with a demonstrated example). I then asked 
them to start eliciting their grid by re-construing the elements I had
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Based upon PhD thesis Shaw M.L.G. (January 1978) "On Becoming a Personal Scientist: 
interactive Computer Programs for Developing Personal Models of the World". Supervised 
y Dr L.F. Thomas at Brunei University, Centre for the Study of Human Learning.
chosen (i.e. the first triad from my list) for their first construct.
In the first class (i.e. as per Mr.F.- see Figure 7.7 above), the students 
construed makes of motor car for the following purpose: "what makes a 
motor car suitable for the family?”. For an example of a raw practice 
grid, completed by a student (Heather, G1RG1), see Appendix 7.
The day after each class had completed practice grids I elicited the grids 
proper. An example of a completed raw grid (again for Heather, C1RG1) 
is given in Appendix 8. Figure 7.8, below, however, represents an 
illustration of part of that raw grid (elements used in each triad are 
referred to as E1...E9; constructs as C1...Cn):
7.3»1»2.3: Analysis of Grid Information
As I mentioned earlier, I analysed the grids using the Focus and 
Sociogrids computer programs.
* Shaw (e.g. 1980, p.26) describes FOCUS as a program which used a two-way 
cluster analytic technique to systematically re-order rows of constructs 
and columns of elements to produce a "focussed” grid which shows the least 
variation between adjacent constructs and between adjacent elements. It 
is important to stress that focussing is done with respect to the way 
constructs order elements rather than to the verbal labels given to the 
poles of the constructs. Thus ’similarity’ between constructs is not 
based upon "literal similarity" but upon a notion of similarity which is
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defined "operationally" in terras of the ordering of the elements..
Clearly, this particular notion of similarity is rooted in the 'assumptive 
structure1 of PGP, viz., bipolarity of all constructs.
The relationships between constructs and between elements are represented 
in the form of 'tree' diagrams. This is a particularly clear mode of 
representation and which lends itself to conversational feedback with the 
elicitee as part of the process of interpreting the completed and analysed 
(in this case, focussed) grid. An example of a FOCUS-ed grid is given in 
Figure 7*9« (Student: Heather, C1RG1, G1 - as per the raw practice and 
study grids examples given earlier).
I discussed with a sample of students from each class their FOCUS-ed 
grids. This I initiated by first providing each student with a "grid 
feedback package" consisting of:
(1) A reminder of both the purpose of, and methodological 
rationale implicit within, elicitation and creation of 
their grid.
(2) A summary in which I listed the supplied elements, 
that student's constructs and the elements used to 
form them.
(3) That student's FOCUS-ed grid
(4) That student's raw grid
NAME? Heather. C1RG1, GRID No.1.
CONSTRUCTS
C.
No.
EMERGENT POLE E1 E2
C
0
M
P
U
T
E
R
W
0
R
K
E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8
T
E
A
C
H
E
R
E9
CONSTRUCTS
IMPLICIT POLE
Need some kind 
of science 
qualification 
( E l, E3)
Hot necessary 
(E2)
Would work in 
a lab.
(E4, E6)
Not likely to 
work in a lab 
(Ef>)
Would need some 
knowledge of 
biology
Not necessary 
(E7)
10* ■(* This student had 10 constructs)
^ V
Figure 7.8. An illustration of an Example of a Completed Raw Grid 
(Student: Heather > C1RG1, G.1).
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Figure 7.
a -  *
^vti r -£v
? 1 h ! «  ill i it*
3
l j - 1 9  1 «
3 -c ? -
9 Showing an Example of a FOCUS-ed Grid (Student" Heather,
01RG1. G1)
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I include an example of a completed such package in Appendix 9 (again, for 
Heather, C1RG1,G1). I include FOGUS-ed grids for each collaborates in 
Appendix 10.
I then invited each student to come and discuss their grids with me at a 
time convenient to them. I offered to see each of them individually for 
this purpose, however, they expressed a preference for a group discussion. 
I held such discussions with a sample of students from each class but at 
different times. With the prior consent of the students I audio recorded 
both these discussions. During these discussions I followed Pope 
and Keen*s (1981) advice to encourage each individual to:
(a) Note high relationships between pairs or groups of
elements,
(b) Consider personal reasons why pairs or groups within
the total set may be alike or dissimilar,
(c) Consider the clusters formed in order to ascertain
possible superordinate constructs (see later).
In addition I invited each student to consider whether, or to what extent, 
the grid exercise had facilitated alteration or development of their prior 
views. I did this in order to explore the possibility of using RGT as a 
teaching technique. However, one of my main reasons for presenting
-  7 . 2 9  -
these collaboratees with the feedback packages and for inviting them to 
discuss their grids with me was because I was keen to maximise their 
gains from the exercise.
I further analysed the FOCUS-ed grids by means of the SOCIOGRIDS program
since I was interested to explore possible commonalities between students'
constructs.
The raeta-theoretical rationale behind the SOCIOGRIDS program, in 
particular, augments the intimate relation of RGT, in general, to Kelly's 
Organisation Corollary by also emphasising his Commonality Corollary. In 
Kelly's words, the latter states
'To the extent that one person employs a construction 
of experience which is Similar to that employed by 
another, his psychological processes are similar to
those of the other person.' (Kelly, 1955, p.90).
This additional emphasis underlies the judgement that
'Elements are more easily shared than constructs, 
since they are representatives of the universe of 
discourse. If they are physical entities or shared 
experience both participants are likely to be able to 
construe them without difficulty1• (Shaw, 1980, p.88).
This, in effect, supports the view that a set of elements may be 
provided for construal (as is the case with SOCIOGRIDS) provided that 
grounds, judged "sufficient" by all concerned (i.e. elicitator, 
elicitee(s), and, ultimately, readers and critics of the reported study), 
are given for the "representativeness" of the set. I hope to have
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rendered plausible the adequacy of my provided set of elements in this 
study (cf. section 7.3.1.2.1., above).
The SOCIOGRIDS program analyses the set of repertory grids elicited from a 
group, but each person is free to use his or her own personal constructs. 
As with the FOCUS program, analysis by SOCIOGRIDS of similarities and 
differences of construing is conducted in terms of ordering of elements.
The SOCIOGRIDS program may be said to entail that of FOCUS. SOCIOGRIDS 
allows each person in the group to have feedback on their own mapping of 
the area from a FOCUS-ed grid (i.e. as per the RG feedback package, 
described earlier). In addition, however, the SOCIOGRIDS program extracts 
and focusses a "mode" grid which provides a representation of the most 
commonly used condtructs by all members of the group and thereby allows 
additional, qualitatively different, feedback to both the elicitator and 
elicitees (though, sadly, I did not take up this possibility with 
elicitees in this application).
The character, possibilities and limitations of SOCIOGRIDS can best be 
understood through a brief consideration of how the mode grid is created.
What makes SOGIOGRIDS different to FOCUS is that the rating values which, 
for purposes of analysis, comprise each grid are mapped on to those 
comprising each and every other grid (rather than Just within a 
grid). This is done two grids at a time by means of the PAIRS program 
which, with respect to SOCIOGRIDS, may be considered to be a sub-program. 
Shaw has described the mode grid thus:
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'The "mode" constructs of the group can be extracted 
from the maximum values obtained in the PAIRS 
algorithm. These are the constructs most often used 
by all members of the group, found by listing in 
descending order of average match values all the 
constructs from every grid. To find these values, 
each construct in turn is considered, the total of the 
maximum match values of this construct with every 
other construct, scaled over the number of constructs 
with which it is matched, being computed. A cut-off 
point on this list may then be taken at a place 
appropriate to the purpose of the exercise, 
identifying those constructs which are highly 
matched with some construct from each of the other 
grids.
These constructs chosen from the list then make up the 
"mode grid". Each construct in the mode grid has been 
obtained from one individual in the group and is in no 
way changed when used in the mode. This grid then 
is not a consensus grid which averages out the 
individualities to produce a pale imitation of the 
group, but is strongly weighted towards the 
commonality or intersection of construing within the 
group'. (Shaw, 1980, p.92: my emphasis).
One aspect of S0GI0GRIDS that may constitute a constraint in some 
applications is that the program is presently able to deal with a total of 
only 15 constructs in the mode grid.
With C1RG1 I took my "cut off" point at 13 constructs, whilst with 
C1RG2 I used the full 15 construct capability. I present the mode grid 
for C1RG1 (C1MG1) in Figure 7.10 as an example. (I shall discuss my 
interpretation of both C1MG1 and 2 in section 7.3*1*3 below).
One further feature of SOCIOGRIDS is that it produces a table (see Figure 
7.11) showing the ranked sequence of rating similarities between pairs of 
individual grids. This sequence of "socionets" may also and, for purposes
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of interpretation and conversational feedback with elicitees, more 
usefully be presented in the form of diagrams. (I employ such diagrams in 
my later discussion, in section 7.3.1.3.,below)• Socionets facilitate the 
identification of sub-groups where the highest degree of commonality of , 
construing occurs. They also direct attention to those persons who, in 
relation to the group’s identified sub-groups, have strong individual 
viewpoints, indeed, the "individuality” of such persons may operationally 
be defined by their rank position in the ordering of similar measures.
This concludes my description of the methods of grid analysis that I used. 
I have hitherto referred to FOCUS and SOCIOGRIDS as methods of analysis. 
as opposed to "methods" of interpretation, because I contend that the 
mere focussing of a grid (by whatever means) actually provides no 
meaning for a grid - though by so structuring a person's expressed views 
on a chosen subject it (may) facilitate developing one, i.e. it 
facilitates interpretation of the grid elicited information.
Personal utility(s) is intrinsic to the interpretation of any grid. In 
interpreting another person's grid there should, ideally, be a re-visiting 
of that person's personal utility(s) informing their created constructs 
and considered in the light of the elicitor's original intended and 
negotiated purpose for elicitation of the grid(s). But there should also 
be a negotiated elaboration of the elicitor's personal utility(s), as 
well as of those of the elicitee, during interpretation of the elicited 
grid.
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Figure 7.10 Showing the FOCUS-ed Mode Grid for C1RG1
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Ttmcst/ 
XtOIBKHJ 
I 
I
Grid No.
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
NEU Link No.
9  LINK ( i o t a )
M M l t M M H M  t Mi » ♦ 4 I M  » I M M M »  4 4 H
7 7 > 1 i
4 7 4 > 1 2
2 4 7 2 > 1 3
2 4 5 7 5 > 1 4
2 4 5 6 7 7 >  A 5
2 4 5 6 7 9 9 >  b 6
2 4 5 6 7 9 4 > A 7
2 4 5 & 7 9 5 > 4 8
2 4 5 A 7 9 7 > 4 9
2 4 5 6 7 9 2 > A 10
2 4 5 6 7 9 5 >  A 11
2 4 5 6 7 8 9 8 > A 12
2 4 5 6 7 8 9 5 > 9 13
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 3 > 9 14
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8 > 4 15
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 7 > 5 16
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8 > 5 17
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 > 4 18
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2 > 9 19
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8 > 1 20
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 > 1 21
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 7 > 2 22
2 3 4 5 A 7 8 9 1 > A 23
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 9 > 7 24
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 3 > 1 25
2 3 4 5 b 7 - 8 9 3 >  5 26
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 8 > 9 27
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 7 > 8 28
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 3 > 7 29
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 2 > 8 30
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 5  > 2 31
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 2 > 4 32
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 3  > 2 33
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 3 > 4 34
2 3 4 5 b 7 8 9 3 > 8 35
2 3 4 5 A 7 8 9 3 > A 36
Figure 7.11 Table Showing Rank Ordering of Similarity between Fairs 
of Individual Grids (Socionets) for C1RG1
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In practice it is frequently the case, as it is my present application, 
that the interpretation of the grids is skewed in favour of the personal 
utility(s) of the elicitor. This means that,the research inferences that 
I later present should be considered less ’authentic1 (cf. discussion,
Ch.5) than where I have used more developed processes of negotiated 
interpretation. This notwithstanding, I believe that the inferences that 
I draw in this part of my study deserve serious consideration since I not 
only engaged in some negotiation of interpretation of the grids (the 
group interviews) but also the inferences I create may be considered by 
the reader, as indeed they were by me, in the light of certain of my other 
investigations on highly related topics and in which I did employ more 
developed techniques of negotiation (see especially the FI material, 
specifically used to augment this present investigation in section 
7*3*1*4* below, and the FIs, discussed in Ch.8).
My interpretation of the grid information has been guided by my 
meta-theoretical commitments as elaborated in (especially) Ch.3 and 
these commitments are, after all, the subject of ray study. More 
specifically, I have judged McClelland's (1984) distinction between 
'strong' and 'weak' senses of 'science', 'scientific', and my distinction 
between 'strong' and 'weak' senses of of 'method', 'methodology' (both 
discussed in Ch.8) to be of an appropriate level of sophistication for 
purposes of interpreting responses to WE.
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7.3.1«3» Interpretation of Grid Information
Following an "impressionistic" appraisal of the students' fhdividual and 
mode grids, my detailed interpretation of the grid information began with 
"group interviews" (GI) with a sample of collaboratees from each class. 
For ease of reference to the appropriate appendices, I present basic 
details of these samples in Figure 7.12 below:
WE: C1RG G.Is
GI No C1RG No T Student's Name Grid Appendix
No: No.
Heather 1
Sue * 4
GI1 G1RG1 Mr.F Anna . * 5 A.10(a)
Lee T 6
Tim 8
112 C1RG2 Dr.O Stephen 9 A.10(b)
Lester 12
(* = I conducted in depth FIs individually with these students 
approximately one year later: cf. Gh.8).
Figure 7.12: Table showing details of Collaboratee Sample for Group
Interviews
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(Re-presentation of Figure 7»9)
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The first part of each GI was spent trying to sort out students’ queries 
and confusions concerning the nature and limits of the analytic aspects of 
the Focus program. For example, one student, Stephen (C1RG2, G9), 
expressed concern that whilst he had elaborated only four constructs in 
his raw grid, the computer appeared to refer to a total of seven constructs 
in his construct tree... I found these preliminary aspects of the GIs very 
useful in helping me improve the clarity of my exposition of RGT to 
collaboratees. This notwithstanding, there was an enduring tendency for 
students to anthropomorphise the numerical manipulations of the computer. 
GI1 lasted approximately 35 minutes, GI2 approximately 10 minutes.
When I had judged a student’s understanding of the rationale behind their 
grid analysis to be appropriate (or sufficiently appropriate), I 
encouraged them to explore their personal interpretations of the grid 
information with me.
To give an idea of the sort of discussion which took place between 
individual students and myself with GIs, I shall present excerpts from 
that which I had with Heather (C1RG1, GI) and whose FOCUS-ed grid I 
re-present in Figure 7.13«
My discussion with Heather began in the following way:
I: [...] can you see any patterns in [...] your construct tree
[...]?
H: Well that’s obviously the best one [indicates node between
07,8] because its under[neath] a 100 [%construct matching 
scores].
At this point there followed a brief discussion in which I clarified some-
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confusions that I felt Heather had concerning what this meant in RGT 
terms. This culminated with me asking her
(074) Is [...]so what is it you think is so similar about 
constructs 7 and 8?
(076) H: chemistry virtually is all practicals and the 
practicals we do in biology., they’re mainly 
chemistry [...] what I'm getting at is biology’s not 
like it used to be. modern biology is done mainly in 
the lab using all the latest equipment and 
experimental techniques...
(085) Ii I see [...] is that why a knowledge of biology [C3]
is out here?
(093) H: yes all that classification of plants and animals...
you’ve still got to know it roughly but these days 
its more important for a biologist to know the 
periodic table thats what modern biology's about..
(098) I: uhuh [...] can you say a bit more about what you
meant by experimental techniques?
(101) H: set ways of measuring ,and testing things to do with
the living world using incubators microscopes and 
equipment like that...
(103) I: I see [...] is that what makes a job scientific?
(107) H: yes except for if youre a physicist obviously youd
be more involved with the non living world so the 
methods and equipment would be slightly different.
I was able to find out more about Heather's personal meaning of
an 'experimental technique' when I asked her to elaborate upon
why she thought qualifications in science are important in/for
a 'scientific job':
(121) I: according to this [indicate H's construct tree] you
think studying science and being qualified in 
science is important for being a scientist, for 
doing a scientific job?
(122) H: yes they wouldnt even look at you if you werent
qualified
(123) 15 what, interview do you mean?
(124) H: yeah [...]
(126) I: is that the only reason...getting an interview? 
(126) H: oh no no. what a science qualification shows is
that youre competent in all the relevant knowledge 
and techniques of your science according to your 
[academic?] level, thats what science 
qualifications show and thats what youll also need 
as a scientist [...] if you go for a job in 
forensics your employer wont expect to have to 
explain how to do a chromatogram or that keratin is 
a protein hell just assume you know because youve 
applied as a biologist.•.
(129) I: I see. so having a qualification in science shows 
that youre competent in the knowledge and techniques 
relevant to whatever science your qualification is
(134) H: well...I suppose the actual exam itself, its more 6 
[indicates C6] because they11 often give you just
the basic results and want you to make something of 
them..thats where your knowledge [of science?] comes 
in..or they might want you to look for sources of 
experimental error. was there a draught? were the 
chemicals pure? was the apparatus clean? you know 
how to answer these things from having done 
practicals I mean the exams are not practical 
enough, not for me but its not practical for science 
exams to be all practicalsI [laughs]
I judged Heather to place pre-eminent emphasis on 'practicals1, a term she 
seemed to use interchangeably with 'experimental techniques' and 'methods', 
as a criterion for a 'scientific job'. She was somewhat atypical in this, 
relative to the other GI students who tended to place greater stress on 
knowledge of discrete aspects of science theory (e.g. theory of evolution 
by natural selection, Mendelian laws of heredity) in their elaboration of
in?
(132) Hi yeah [for your level]
[
(132) I: [I see.......  ..
test for that?
  does the actual exam
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the requirement of "qualifications in science". This notwithstanding, my 
overall inferences concerning Heather’s views on this subject were in 
sympathy with those that I made in similar respect to the other students 
(see G1, C1MG1) , viz., she seemed to construe both ’science1 and
'method1 in 'weak' senses. This I shall try to explain through a 
consideration of the protocol excerpts I have given earlier.
The main reason for my having drawn these inferences is that Heather did 
not, at any stage of the interview, appeal to a meta-theoretical criterion 
for a scientific job (e.g. "theorising involved"), nor did she posit a 
formative or substantive relation .between theories in science and the 
methods in science. Thus her citation of various parts of the theoretical 
'disciplinary matrix' (Kuhn, 1970) of (biological) science, e.g. 
'classification of plants and animals' (093)» 'periodical table' (093)> 
'keratin is a protein' (126), served only to locate the subject matter 
of biological science; she did not appear to perceive them as its 
(immaterial) products. Her only other reference to science theory, 
albeit in the context of an examination, cast it in the role of "neutral 
arbiter":'[examiners] often give you just the basic results and want you 
to make something of them, that's where your knowledge comes in..' (134)-
Heather's references to 'method' also seemed to display a commitment to 
'weak' senses since they stressed equipment and "means-end" procedures 
rather than episteraic considerations: e.g. '[experimental techniques are] 
set ways of measuring and testing things to do with the living world using 
incubators microscopes and equipment like that' (101), 'doling] a 
chromatogram' (126).
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I used a similar process of discussion to interpret the grids of the other 
GI students. Clearly, constraints of time and method (i.e. GI) meant that 
I was not able to explore their personal meanings in depth, bub my 
interpretations of their responses (and of CIMG3, below) were cast in 
the light of (precursors to) my more detailed FI investigations, described 
in Chapter 8.
In the constructs of both mode grids (C1MG1 re-presented in Figure 
7.14> C1MG2 presented in Figure 7.15) a similar emphasis to that shown 
in the grids of GIs on qualifications and training in science is apparent: 
C1MG1 node 22; C1MG2 nodes 18,20,22 with only G7C2 (C1MG2) 
approaching an explicit ”meta-theoretical” criterion: ’Trying to 
understand phenomena vs. Accepting the world as it is1.
An interesting difference between G1MG1 and 2 may be seen in their 
configuration of elements (E). In G1MG1, these fall roughly into 2 groups: 
E(6,8,4,1>3,9) and E(5,7,2). In the first group, ’Medical Work* (E.6) and 
Biologist (E.8) are the most highly matched. In C1MG2, by contrast, 
the elements fall into l± groups: E(8,4), E(1,6), E(3,9), 12(5,7,2). ■
(The fourth group is identical to the second group of C1MG1). The 
first, most highly matched, pair of elements comprising group 1 of 
G1MG2, however, differ from those of C1MG1: ’Biologist’ (E.8) and 
’Physicist’ (E.4). I suggest that this difference may be due to the fact 
that C1MG1 was predominately an ’A’ level biology class, whilst 
C1MG2 was predominately an ’A' level chemistry class: members of the 
latter may have been using ’Biologist’ as their nearest label for 
’Chemist', this due, in turn, to the high societal status afforded to
science (see Ch.2).
As I mentioned earlier, the SOCIOGRIDS program also produces a series of 
'socionets* from the matrix of similarity measured between pairs of ,
individual grids, presented in tabular form, and with which a sequence of 
socionet diagrams may be created.
In my earlier discussion of socionets I have already outlined the general 
benefits that they afford to analysis and interpretation of mode grid 
information. Now, however, I shall discuss the specific nature and 
Denefits of socionet diagrams in these respects. To assist me, both in 
this task and for later reference in my interpretation of the mode grid 
information, I re-present the tabular form of socionets for C1RG1 
(Figure 7.16) and present selected excerpts from the sequence of socionet 
diagrams, also for C1RG1 (Figure 7.17).
r diagrammatic representation of a completed sequence of socionets consists 
of a number of labelled points, each of which represents a grid, 
inter-connected by straight lines, each of which represents a ’link’, i.e. 
similarity of construct ratings between grids. In such a diagram, the 
ratings of constructs comprising each grid have been compared with those 
comprising every other grid within the group. Every grid, therefore, has 
the same number of links, viz., one less than the total number of grids. 
Thus, in the case of C1RG1, this number was 8, as may be seen by 
reference to both Figure 7.16 and Figure 7.17(g).
For purposes of analysis and interpretation, however, the diagrammatic
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jLepresentation of the completed sequence of socionets is of little use 
(again, see Figure 7.17(g)). Rather, what is of use is the enhanced 
feedback that the sequence of socionet diagrams facilitate (over and above 
oheir tabular counterpart) in the course of their construction - a 
process that may usefully be represented in a "linear-cumulative" manner. 
This enhanced feedback consists of the visual way in which they facilitate 
attention being drawn to the rank order in which individual grids acquire 
multiple links, viz* each new (latest) link in the sequence is represented 
by a dotted, arrowed, line - the dots proclaiming its "newness", the arrow 
indicating the direction in which the similarity comparison has been made. 
More importantly, construction of successive socionet diagrams allows for 
the qualitative identification of 'stars' (i.e. grids with which 
multiple links are formed early within the total sequence) and 
'isolates' (i.e. grids with which few, or no, links are formed unbil 
late in the total sequence) (Moreno, 1953). 'Stars' and 'isolates' 
provide an indication of the distribution of consensual construing within 
the group. Notwithstanding more popular connotations of these terms, 
positive valuations of 'star' construers cannot be assumed on the part of 
other members of the group any more than can negative valuations of 
'isolate' construers, for, as Shaw cautions:
'It sometimes happens that the "isolate" turns out to 
be the creative thinker, and the "star" the muddled 
compromiser in the group'. (Shaw, 1980, p. ).
Figures 7.17(a)-(d) inclusive, represent the formation of a 'star' 
around Heather, whilst Figure 7.17(f) suggests that Lee was an 'isolate' 
construer within the group (n.b. only 36 links in the total set of
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socionets). I shall interpret my analyses of these two students’ grids 
later.
To facilitate comparison between socionet diagrams, each earlier diagram 
should constitute an excerpt from the exact geometry of the last diagram 
in the sequence which is considered. This "last" diagram may or may not 
be that representing the total (completed) set of links. Whichever is the 
case, however, clear presentation is usually best effected by "working 
backwards" - excerpting - from the diagram representing the total set of 
links, for it may easily be drawn as polygon with 3ides of equal length 
and with equal angles subtending between them: herein lies the principal 
use of such a diagram. For purposes of a quick, initial analysis, 
however, a sequence may be construed in a "true" linear fashion.
I shall now present my interpretation of the socionets for C1RG1 and 2, 
and in that order•
I judged Heather (C1RG1, G1: her grid re-presented, once again, in Figure 
7.18) to quickly emerge as the first 'star1 construer since the first 
four links in the total sequence were made to her grid (Figure 7.17(a)-
(d)). This did not altogether surprise me for two reasons. Firstly. I 
judged Heather to be a socially dynamic and influential member of the 
group. Secondly, I considered the character of her constructs, especially 
in the light of our discussion of them in the GI, to reflect views and 
attitudes that I have often encountered with young student scientists.
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Figure 7.16 Table Showing Rank Ordering of Similarity Between Pairs
of Individual Grids (Socionets) for G1RG1 (Re-presentation 
of Figure 7*11)
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Figure 7.17(g) Showing Selected Socionet Diagram for C1RG1
I also consider Lee T. (C1RG1, G6: his grid presented in Figure 7.19) 
to be a ’star1 construer because there were already 3 links to his grid by 
link(s) 7 (see Table 7.16) and by link(s) 12 there were no Fewer than 5 
links (see Figure 7.17(c)).
Lee T. had a very much less extrovert personality than Heather. I 
attribute his ’star’ status to the character of his constructs which might 
be said to represent an even more narrowly stereotypic image of the 
scientist than is usual amongst students: he elaborated only 4 constructs, 
of which 3 formed an equally matched cluster at node 6 (C1,3,4).
Although Matthew’s grid (C1RG1, G1): Figure 7.20) was the most highly 
matched to Heather’s (link 1), I do not consider him to be either a ’star’ 
or an ’isolate’ construer within the group. A perusal of Figure 7.16 shows 
that there were only 2 links to his grid by link(s) 15, yet links made 
thereafter are at roughly equal intervals.
I interpret this analysis by reference both to the large number of 
constructs that Matthew elaborated, viz, 14, more than any other student 
in either C1RG1 or 2, and to the range of character of the constructs 
he elaborated, viz. his constructs varied from those which I consider to 
be narrow, stereotypic and superficial, e.g. G7, to those which I judge to 
be atypical but mysterious (because unelaborated), e.g. C6.
IA
y* r> ri -p £
1  $ ?  *
41 $ «  - - » •
•“ ■*« 1 1 1  j  m^ 0 2  <L.a2 * ^  *7 . .
in ,iii in in in in . i n m -*•
in m in in in in in -< m
in in in in in in in m m
m m * * « ' - * r i n i n m i n  —• 
m JJm ,_t,-4 *-tcN in m cm r* —<
*-« r* r-l m cn
II
V Zr-l i*-* fj
3t£ 3 
'1?
m53
- f *** O i_
SJ
X 31- 5 * «a 3
ft [ro m *o O'
i
Figure 7.18 Showing the FOGUS-ed Grid of Heather (ClRG1t G1) 
(Re-presentation of Figures 7.9♦ 7 . 1 3 ) '
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Figure 7.19 Showing the F0CU3-ed Grid of Lee T. (C1RG1, G6)
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Figure 7.20 Showing the FOCUS-ed Grid of Matthew (C1RG1, G7)
- 7.55 -
I
I 
| 
Bi
ot
eq
ir
r 
ttto
Ht
re*
 u
>a
*x
RE
US
ED
 
GRI
D 
3
O
8
co ro ^  c m
<J
X
rv. JJin
■iNr
m jjro
o.|«
■>*■
■jft ro ■Kutn
3 2 ^<2* 3 *4 5
"" "TT  -------------- -
Irt -43 5s Id &
• • • # • • • • • •
in UO ro CM cm iH cm UO
Irt UO UO ro CM ro ro UO
W UO ro ro ro -<* *+ uo UO
■"«- ro rg CM xn ■*r uo uo uo
cm .cm uo uo UO uo uo uo
m ro «—i «H *+ uo cm ro CM
•H ro cm cm cm «<-
ro cm ro to ro
ro UO UO ro ro r^ uo -
03 ro f*. r-4 o o-« •o t -r
* 5
Si i i  v
—  it!
a k * F
£ 2
-J
■“ .s
3 13 2
i*
I JL
1
i
i
<n
J•j
S
3~> ^  
*3 «
C •«
S i i
Figure 7.21 Showing ihe FOCUS—ed Grid of Lee (ClUG1t G3)
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Figure 7.23(a)-(c) Showing Selected Socionet Diagrams for 01RG2
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Figure 7.27 Showing the FOCUS-ed Grid of Irrel. (C1RG2. G3)
Matthew was considered by his peers, his teacher and myself to be the 
’’brightest" in the class: he seemed to be the most innovative and creative 
thinker and was often given to cogently arguing for radical ’’offbeat” 
views (both with respect to biology and elsewhere). His undoubted 
influence and status within the class, however, did not extend to 
commonality of construction - he might be considered to be a ’’free 
thinker”, indeed, he left school in favour of the local Technical College 
because he could not study the combination of ’A’ levels that he desired.
I consider it unfortunate that I did not try more strenuously to secure an 
interview with him in particular.
Lee (C1RG1, G3: his grid presented in Figure 7.21) was the only 
collaborates whom I considered to be an ’isolate* construer within the 
group. Lee’s grid was the last with which a link was made (link(s) 14-) 
and additional ones were not made until near the end of the sequence.
I interpret this by reference to his atypical preference for elaborating, 
almost exclusively, constructs which might be termed ’socio-environmental” 
in character (see especially C1,2,3,5).
Turning now to C1RG2, I present the tabular form of socionets in Figure 
7.22, and selected excerpts from the sequence of socionet diagrams in 
Figure 7.23(a)-(b).
In Figure 7.23(a), ’stars’ may be seen to have formed around the grids of 
Frances (C1RG2., G8: 8 links), Robert (C1RG2., G4.: 7 links) and 
Richard (C1RG2., G6: 6 links) at a point roughly one third of the way
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through the total sequence of socionet diagrams (links 23/66).
If the grids for these students (Figure 7.24, Figure 7.25, Figure 7.26) 
are compared, then it may be seen that family themes emerge, e.g. 
"qualifications”, "lab work". However, there is also the idea that "high 
pay" is a criterion for a scientific job (Frances, see G8, C2; Robert, 
see G4, C2) and this may serve to contrast the commonality of construing 
in G1RG2 from that of G1RG1 (in the former, there were 10 grids 
featuring constructs relating to pay, whilst in the latter, there were 
only 2). I speculate that this reflects a greater "vocational" 
orientation with respect to C1RG2 as compared with C1RG1 and further 
suggest that this is due, in part, to the predominance of 'A1 level 
chemistry candidates in C1RG2, viz. a career, and career structure, 
would seem to be more assured, arid more defined, in chemistry as compared 
with biology: this seemed to be considered an important criterion for 
C1RG2 students - an interpretation given further support from the 
comments expressed by Stephen (G9) and Lester (G12) in the GI: Lester, 
for example, claimed that he '[...] usually think(s) of an industrial 
chemist working for ICI as a scientific job*. (See Appendix 10(b) for 
these students1 grids).
The student who gave his name as 1 Irrelevant]1 (G1RG2, G3) emerged 
as the most isolated construer within C1RG2: in Figure 7.23(b) it may 
be seen that only one link had been made to their grid at a point nearly 
3/4 of the way through the total sequence of socionets (links 48/66).
If the element tree of Irrel’s grid is examined (Figure 7.27), then it may
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be seen that their constructs do, indeed, result in a highly atypical 
clustering of elements. For example, in Irrel's first construct (C.1: 
'non-creativity vs. Creativity') the elements 'Biologist', 'Medical Work', 
and 'Shop Work' are all rated equally (2), whilst the element 'Engineer' 
receives the highest (and only) rating for the contrast pole (4)* The 
only (highly speculative) interpretation that I can place on this is that 
Irrel construed the contrast pole, i.e. 'Creativity', to mean something 
along the lines of 'Construction of artefacts'. Again, in Irrel's third 
construct (C.3: 'Salary (good) vs. (Bad)'), the element 'Medical Work' 
receives the highest rating (5) for the contrast pole, whilst the 
elements 'Secretary' and 'Shop Work' are each rated 4* I interpret this 
to mean that Irrel construed 'Medical Work' to mean nursing and 
auxiliary medical servicing by contrast with most students who seemed to 
interpret that element to mean the work of medical doctors.
7.3.1.4. Comparative Interpretation of Responses to Written Exercises 
Question 3 'What is your most usual reason for putting a .job 
in the Scientific Column?'
I included Q3 in WE.v2 and 3 (n=57) as an adjunct to the grid 
investigation.
I verbally introduced this question to the students by suggesting that 
they 'might like to tackle this question by looking over the jobs you have 
listed in the 'scientific' column and then see if there is anything in 
common between them which might have made you label them scientific'.
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In analysing responses to Q3, and, indeed, for all the remaining items in 
WE, I used essentially the same clustering technique to derive 
categories as I used for Q1, (cf. section 7*3.1.2*1, above).
Where students gave what I judged to be a "compound" response to any of 
the WE questions, I classified their answer under the two, or more, 
categories which I felt best characterised their answer. This did not 
occur in my analysis of responses to every WE item, but where it did, 
there were no more than 3 instances. In categorising such responses I did 
not take account of the order in which the components were expressed, 
though in my overall interpretation and discussion I have tended to assume 
that priority of order implies priority of (student perceived) importance.
Throughout this chapter I shall not make more than passing references to 
my analyses of responses to Q2 and Q4 since I included these for purposes 
other than the present investigation (see Appendices 11 and 12 
respectively).
I present a summary of the categories I derived from responses to Q3 in 
Figure 7.28 below:
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WE. Q3: 'What is your most usual reason for putting a job in the 
scientific column?'
Cat.No Category of Response Freq. of
response
1 Requires qualifications/special skills 17
2 Tautologous 11
3 Mere use of sophisticated/lab. equipment 8
4 Mere involvement with Natural Phenomena 7
5 Is complex or difficult 6
6 Requires mental activity 6
7 Related to school science 6
8 No response 2
9 Uncategorised data 6
Figure 7.28: Table Showing Categories of Response for WE, Q3
My discussion of these categories which follows, is highly selective. 
However, in Appendix 12 I present, a more detailed summary table, my 
rationale for each and every category together with further examples from 
students’ responses (I also include these features in appendices for WE, 
Q2, 4-86).
Amongst responses to Q3, easily the most prevalent criterion for an 
occupation’s scientific status was whether or snot, or whether to a 
sufficient extent, it "required qualifications":
Category 1: ’Requires Qualifications/Special Skills (n=17)f
e.g. Class 3, r.1
’Because you have to have the qualifications to have a 
scientific job so you could be classed as a scientist’
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(n.b. only 3 students specified the requirement of 'special skills' and 
none elaborated the nature of such skills).
Now I contend that mere possession of a present day qualification in 
school-science (and even in university science, with the exception of some 
research degrees) can only be used to confer the 'scientific' character of 
an individual in the 'weak' sense. This is because such qualifications 
presently represent only a hierarchical recognition by society of an 
individual's grasp of the content of science, i.e. of the theories of 
science. They do not, however, provide a demonstration, still less a 
measurement, of an individual's ability to theorise. Whilst theories 
are the vital content of science they are also its most important, albeit 
immaterial, products. I contend that qualifications in school-science 
ignore the process(e3) by which such products are created. At.most they 
show the individual's ability to reiterate, select or apply theories, not 
to create one. (For a more detailed discussion, see Ch.5).
If I exclude 'tautologous' responses (e.g. Class 2, r.5: 'Whever or not 
science is yoused to do the job'), then the next two most frequent types 
of response also suggested 'weak' senses of science.
Respondents in the first of these categories saw the mere use of certain 
types of equipment as a criterion for classifying a job as being 
scientific. Responses in this category referred either to sophisticated 
or complicated equipment (e.g. "high technology") or to equipment which I 
judged to be normally - and stereotypically - associated with the conduct 
of science (e.g. "microscopes", "computers").
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Category 3: 'Mere Use of Sophisticated/Laboratory
Eq uipment' (n=8)
e.g. Class 2, r.15
'I think the most usual reason for a scientific job is 
whether or not the job involves high technology or using 
scientific implements1.
These responses discussed neither the way in which such equipment was 
used nor why it was required: mere involvement with, or use of, it was 
enough. Mere use of laboratory equipment does not make the user a 
scientist any more than the mere use of paints and brushes makes the user 
an artist. By this criterion an actor portraying a scientist, and whose 
portrayal required him to look through microscopes etc, would become one. 
Nor is a judgement of the relative sophistication of equipment used 
appropriate for inferring the degree of scientificness of the user. This 
would make the user of a computer more scientific than the user of an 
abacus in the solution of a common problem. Equipment represents only a 
physical tool of science (as opposed to an abstract tool, such as 
method). Finally, for reasons that should be apparent, appeals to what is 
arguably scientists' most common workplace, certainly in western lore, 
namely: the laboratory, demonstrate only a 'weak' sense of scientific.
The second category consisted of responses in which the pupil classified 
an occupation as being scientific if it required mere use of, or 
involvement with, materials, physical properties or phenomena normally 
associated with school-science. In these responses, little or no attempt 
was made to elaborate any way in which they were used and so reflect 
only a 'weak' sense of 'scientific':
- 7.69 -
Category 4: 'Mere Involvement with Natural Phenomena1
(n=7)
e.g. Class 2, r.10
'My usual reason is when chemistry gases or electricity or 
biology are involved'
My impression, corroborated by many sources of experience from this 
investigation, was that there was a very prevalent initial assumption 
amongst students that the notion of 'scientific' was 'coramonsense'. Where 
elaborations were made, they seemed to reflect predominately 'weak' senses 
of scientific. Where elaborations vrere not made, there seemed to be an 
assumption that the character of 'science' was known or knowable in some 
absolute way, albeit presently not by them (cf. 'inexplicable explicative 
device* strategy, described in section 7.4* below).
Strong support for these interpretations come from the FIs where students' 
responses were roughly co-extensive with the categories of responses to Q3 
and to the inferences I drew from the grid investigation (cf. Ch.8). In 
interviews, many students seemed surprised and perplexed by my 
confrontations to their criteria: for many it appeared to be their first 
experience that their *coraraonsensical' understanding of 'scientific' 
might, in some ways, be inadequate or inappropriate.
Again, support may be inferred from the categories of response to Q2 and 
04.
With Q2 ('why do you think that I have asked you to answer Q1? *), no
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student considered Q1 to constitute an investigation of their views on the 
nature (character) of the conduct of science. Most students1 
responses to this item fell into one of two 1 superordinate’ categories of 
response, viz. 'normative* responses (Cats. 2,4) or 'didactic* responses 
(Cats. 3,6,7). I was either assessing them against some absolute 
criterion or I was teaching them (the latter primarily in the sense of 
career guidance).
Complementary inferences can be made with respect to responses to Q4 
('Have you found it useful to answer Q1?'). The minority of students 
who did find answering Q1 useful, again saw this primarily in terms of 
career guidance, whilst the majority, who did consider themselves to have 
benefitted, claimed that this was because it was 'commonsense'.
(n.b. in my appendices for Q2 and Q4, I include a brief interpretive 
discussion of the two categories).
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7.4? Written Exercise. Part B; Students1 Personal Meanings of a 
'Scientific Activity1
7*4*1i Introduction
In this section I describe my attempts to investigate students' personal 
meanings of a 'scientific activity' by means of pictorial methods.
Before presenting this account, however, I would first like to advance a 
general case for eliciting personal constructions by such methods and to 
indicate how I consider them to be compatible with, and complementary to, 
more established POP investigative methods such as RGT. My advancement of 
this general case is heavily indebted to the generative discussions I had 
with Mr.(later Dr.) Mike Watts and Dr. Maureen Pope, as expressed in 
Swift, Watts and Pope (1983).
7.4.2.; Pictorial Methods of Eliciting Personal Constructions
'All art is a kind of confession, more or less oblique.'
(James Baldwin)
The use of pictorial methods for "capturing" a representsbion of 
persons' personal understandings now has a reasonably long and established 
tradition in investigations conducted by and with my immediate colleagues. 
In some cases the pictures are provided whilst in other cases 
collaboratees are asked to produce their own. In our work, the pictures 
have tended to find optimum use as a focus for recorded interviews (though 
other uses may profitably be made as, indeed, was mainly the case with my 
application described in this chapter).
Our experiences show that they provide an excellent facility for focussing
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attention, stimulating recollection of experimental details, refining and 
directing previous statements, allowing protracted and varied discussions, 
and exploring the extent to which the meanings received by the interviewer 
are similar to the intended meanings of the interviewee.
It is this last feature that we find to be of particular interest: the 
role of pictures as semiotics within a meaning system. Before describing 
in detail those pictorial methods which I have personally used/developed,
I shall make reference to other works which advocate pictorial methods for 
similar purposes.
The term "picture" can be both a verb and a noun: the act of making a 
representation of some form ("to picture") and the form itself ("a 
picture"). Common usage often tends to hide the distinction between the 
two. Novitz argues that anyone producing a picture of any sort is 
engaged in an act of communication:
'Clearly, then, pictures are like sentences... for they can 
be used to express what I have called propositions: they
can be used to indicate a subject and to attribute certain 
properties, dispositions, states, actions etcetera to it'
(Novitz, 1977)
Part of Novitz's case is that pictures are produced with an audience in 
mind - even if that audience is the picture producer himself. In this way 
pictures can be seen to act as a focus for both an 'author message' and an 
'audience message' (Sless, 1981). Sless points out that both such messages 
operate within a 'framework of assumptions and expectations* and that 
there is no logical basis for presuming that there is necessarily a nexus
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between the two:
'They represent two worlds in which the only unconditional 
similarities are the physical form of the message and the 
humanity of the participants'.
(Sless, 1981)
My own interests lie in exploring the personally constructed worlds of 
participants. There is a long tradition of using pictures in 
psychological research. Partly for reasons of brevity, and partly for 
emphasis, I shall not present an exhaustive or detailed review of such 
uses. Much of the work, however, lies within a strictly-bound 
psychometric paradigm concerned with memory recall, face recognition, and 
stimulus-response contingencies. Little, if any, of this work has 
attempted to explore the "internal world" of the participants.
Where the internal world of the individual has been explored using 
pictorial methods the psychological approaches used tended to depict the 
person as the victim of internal forces - as is the case of the extensive 
psychoanalytic literature. Either way the approaches have denied 
reflexivity, the participants are victims either internally or externally 
determined (Bannister, 1979). This runs counter to the spirit of PGP, for, 
as Kelly has said, we are
'[ ] very sceptical of any piece of human research in which
the subject's questions and contributions have not been 
elicited, or have been ignored in the final analysis of 
results'.
(Kelly, 1969, p.132)
- 7.74 -
Marton (1981) refers to this as a 'second-order perspective' which 
describes the imposition of meaning on the outside world as it appears to 
the actor himself. The central feature of the uses of pictures described 
in this paper is their emphasis upon a second-order enquiry into students' 
own statements. Such use can be seen as an attempt to
'compensate for the traditional emphasis on behavioural 
data by building a body of experimental data'
(Colaizzi, 1971)
The studies that I have referred to so far have used pictures as a method 
but have not been conducted within any explicit reference to Kelly's 
meta-theoretical methodological stance. In contrast, the work of my 
colleagues and myself draws extensively on the spirit of Kelly's work.
Our use of pictures falls into two categories - the use of pictures in a 
way that is akin to "supplying elements" which is called the Interview 
about Instances (IAI) approach, and a second approach, 'Responding-with 
Pictures' (RWP), (Swift, Watts and Pope, 1983), where "elements" are 
elicited.
My development and use of pictorial investigative methods has focussed on 
RWP, whilst my use of IAI has been only "peripheral". This 
notwithstanding, I shall present a brief account of IAI approach (see 
below), prior to that of RWP (see below), since it represents a worthy 
addition to PGP (and ACM) methods and it provided an influential 
methodologico-ideational context in which I developed my application of RWP.
7.4.2.1.: Interview-about-Instances (IAI) Approach:
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Research using this approach was initiated by the study made by Osborne « 
and Gilbert (1980) and, to date, most investigations which have used it 
have been concerned with exploring young persons' understanding of ideas 
in (school) science.
In the IAI approach, a series of line drawings that have been prepared by 
the researcher play an important role. These drawings (known as a "deck" 
of IAI "cards") depict various situations which embody elements of a 
particular concept in science. That is to say, from a science teacher's 
point of view, the drawings on the cards of an IAI deck provide a 
representation of a variety of clear-cut examples of the concept (e.g. 
'force') under consideration. Some non-examples and a number of 
'borderline cases' (being unusual or unorthodox applications of the 
concept) are also included.
The collaboratees are asked to respond to the pictured situations in 
terms of their personal explanatory concept. In this way the cards can be 
seen to act as a focus for both an 'author-message' and an 
'audience-message' (Sless, 1981, discussed earlier).
More specifically, collaboratees are asked to consider whether the 
pictured situations are examples or not of their concept and to give a 
reason why.
Bannister and Mair (1968) argue that the essential purpose for developing 
personal constructions is for anticipation, for the better understanding
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of future events. Accordingly, many of the pictures on IAI cards contain 
a "dynamic element" that require the pupil to make some comment as to the 
outcome - to predict and hypothesise.
The interviews are conducted one-to-one and are audio-recorded. They are 
semi-structured in that the colaboratees are encouraged to sort the 
pictures as they see fit and an informal discussion is allowed to develop 
concerning the meanings for the concept.
On occasions when later "analysis" of collaboratees' responses yield an 
inference about their understandings that is judged to be incompatible 
with, or very different from, that negotiated within the interview, then 
an attempt is made to re-find that person and ask them to respond to the 
new inference.
In studies using IAI, interviews have been conducted in two phases. The 
first phase is the pilot stage for a particular set of cards, the second a 
series of interviews with a settled deck.
During the pilot stage a considerable amount of feedback is used to make 
adjustments to the drawings, to the selection and to the order of the 
instance cards. It allows for the use of the students' own examples and 
counter-examples where appropriate. More importantly it allows for a 
selection of cards that "work": that provide lengthy and varied 
discussion. These represent the negotiated range of instances which can 
be construed by each individual. The research outcomes have been 
reported in terms of students' alternative conceptual frameworks of, for
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instance, potential difference (Gilbert), force (Watts and 
Zylbersztajn, 1981), gravity (Watts, 1982a), colour (Zylbersztajn and 
Watts, 1982), energy (Watts, 1982b; Gilbert and Pope, 1982).
To illustrate the approach I shall consider an example from a study 
conducted by Watts (1983)J
1Michael, a first year 'A* level pupil aged 17 years, 
discusses a picture of a potted plant (Figure 7.29 below) 
in the context of his meaning of heat':
A FLOWER IN A POT
Figure 7.29: Showing an 'Interview-about-Instances1 
(IAI) Card: fA Flower in a Pot' (after Waits« 1983)»
'M  well in the plant cell. it absorbs energy from the
sun in order for it to make its own food. '
I how does the sun do that?
M (laughs) Its got packets of sunlight. , we were told
(laughs) to think about packets of sunlight thats it.
Thats what we were told to think except that it doesn't 
really help here...
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I you think,.. that it has something to do with packets of 
sunshine?
M yes but it doesn’t really help,..thats what we were told to
think of but I don’t think that really helps uh its
photons or something that’s what springs to my mind. I 
don't think that really helps... we were told to think 
about. just to go on thinking about packets but never 
really helped me
I can you tell me anything else about it?
M ... I was wondering about the sun I don’t I don’t really
know I know its got something to do with the sun’s energy, 
urn the plant can absor can absorb the heat its got an 
ability . it could possible be because um ... heat is used 
as a catalyst not a reaction . and so for a plant to make 
its own food the heat could be used... as a catalyst or is 
it light? • um oh I’m not sure (laughs) um.....1 think it’d 
be heat because . from light you get heat . so it’d be the 
heat .’
In his commentary on this excerpt, Watts speculates about this 
pupil's derivation of personal meaning from school science lessons:
’In this extract there is evidence of considerable 
con-fusion, of unease and difficulty. During some point in
his 'A' level work he has clearly been told to regard
photons as 'packets’ of sunlight. It is the kind of 
statement that occurs many times, in the course of A-level 
physics, chemistry and biology. Wenham et al [ ] for 
instance attributes the metaphor to Planck’s proposal of 
quantum theory in 1903. In this case, and in Michael's own 
words, the metaphor has been of no help in either 
clarifying his own thoughts on sunlight or in explaining 
what a photon is or does. There are a range of
possibilities as to why this might have been the case. The
teacher may have established the notion of 'photons are 
packets of light' uncritically, without being aware that it 
is a metaphor. Or it may be that, although aware of its 
metaphorical status s/he failed to draw out its 
implications and the purpose and the limits of its 
transferability. Perhaps, too, in the face of the most 
detailed and complete of analyses, it would simply have 
been an inappropriate discomfiting metaphor to draw 
(between sunlight and packets) for Michael's own approach. 
Whatever the circumstances, the argument here [ ] is that 
the teacher is only in s. position to highlight and 
ameliorate such conflicts if they know about them.'
(Watts, 1983> pp.13-15: original emphasis)
- 7.79 -
I believe that Watts1 suggestions can be complemented by reference to a 
’model for conceptual exchange’ proposed by Hewson (1981) and which, in 
Gilbert and Swift (1985), we suggest represents a raeta-theoretical 
framework that is both compatible and useful within the ACM. This model 
incorporates four necessary conditions for ’conceptual exchange' which 
complement the notion of 'personal utility':
^.Conceptual 
exchange, 
.01 to C2
Figure 7.30: Showing a Model of a Conceptual Exchange (after Ilewson,
1 9 8 1)
With this model in mind, the pupil discussed above can tentatively be 
construed as having appraised the notion of 'quantum', as instantiated by 
that 'photon' and as portrayed by the teacher, with respect to.(I), (P) 
and (F) - and found it to be "lacking" on all counts 1
I hope that my recent account of IAI approach has made it clear that the 
persons whose ideas are investigated are substantially involved at all 
stages in its development and use. In IAI approach, as in all ACM
(D) Dissatisfaction 
with C1
(F) Fruitfulness 
of C2
(I) Intelligibility— ^(P) Initial
of C1, C2 plausibility
of C2
Where C1, C2 = Concept 1, Concept 2.
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investigative methods, there is an especial reliance on such persons 
expressed views ("content") in the making of inferences with, and 
about, their ideas. In other words, there is genuine collaboration 
between the researcher and the person whose ideas are researched (i.e. and 
hence, 'collaborate^', cf. discussion Ch.5)• This quality of 
collaboration is not only the main way in which ACM investigative methods 
implement the core philosophical commitments of ACM meta-theory but is 
also the principal means by which they may be .judged to be doing so.
In striving to create a mutually agreed understanding about another 
person's understanding of a selected topic, ACM researchers adopt a 
'credulous approach' (Kelly, 1955, p.586) prior to making negotiated 
inferences. This contrasts with strict-Piagetians who, it seems to me, 
adopt some "principle of charity" prior to making normative, un-directed, 
inferences. Thus, in the 'photon' example described earlier, the ACM 
researcher seriously discussed and appraised the pupil's personal meaning 
of the concept largely in terms of that pupil's personal purposes and 
anticipations for it. For the ACM researcher in such a context, a 
consideration of the collaboratee's personal purposes and anticipations 
for a concept is the most important way in which they (the researcher) may 
"come to know" the collaboratee's personal meaning of a concept and it 
is upon these that personal relevance for the collaboratee depends.
Kelly comments on this issue:
'Relevance must come to light, and not be dismissed as a 
"value" beyond the concern of scientific psychology. It 
can come to light if the discussional structure of 
psychological space is explored, and the course of events, 
behavioural and otherwise, is plotted within personal 
construct systems that hopefully are cognate to each
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other!.
(Kelly, 1969, p. 42-4-3).
ACM workers’ high positive valuation of ’relevance1 in investigation 
situations may be further demonstrated by considering how, say, a 
’Piagetian technologist1 (cf. Ch.3) might consider the student’s expressed 
personal utility for the notion of ’photon1, recently cited. I suggest 
that their main concern would be to relate the pupil’s remarks to, and to 
judge them against, a postulated "stage level of cognitive demand" 
allegedly required for the meaningful learning of the concept. The 
Piagetian technologist, like the Empirical-Critical-Rationalist, would 
not be concerned with the respondent’s personal meaning of the concept 
except in a "diagnostic" sense (i.e. according to the standards of "stage 
level of cognitive demand" and "objectivity" respectively); their ultimate 
preoccupation would be with the form of the respondent’s utterances. In 
such approaches, personal relevance for the researched person is ignored, 
and may be denied, through being assumed.
The open-ended and collaboratee originated qualities of ACM research 
methods render inferences made with them less open to the charge of 
"context dependence" than classical Piagetian task-analytic methods (see 
especially Donaldson’s (1978) contributions to, and survey of, such 
criticisms of the Piagetian school). These qualities afford ACM research 
methods a flexibility which allows inferences made with them to reduce and 
even transcend physical and environmental constraints on the 
investigation-situation. With these claims in mind, it might be useful to 
consider the following example of an IAI card which is from a deck 
concerned with the concept of ’heat’;
- 7.82 -
A rtm COAT AND A METAL DUSTBIN LEFT OUT IN TOE SNOW ALL NIGHT .
Figure 7.31: Showing an ’Interview-about-Instances* (IAI) Card: ’A
Fur Coat and a Metal Dustbin Left Out in the Snow All Night1
Finally, the corapatability of the *IAI approach with the core philosophical 
commitments of POP and ACM (which I hope to have demonstrated through 
prior argument and discussion) coupled with its normal incorporation of 
other investigative methods (mainly interviews) render it an example of 
•methodological triangulation• (Denzin, 1978) or •(methodological 
pluralism’ (Swift, Watts and Pope, 1983) - cf. my discussion, Chapter 5.
As I mentioned earlier, I have not strongly featured IAI approach in my 
own investigations. My ’’peripheral” involvement with IAI began when, in 
an early form of FI (my ’3 questions approach*, discussed in Chapter 8)
I noticed a marked tendency for collaboratees to list what they considered 
to be a ’scientific’ and ’un-scientific1 subject -disciplines and 
occupations prior to expressing their personal meanings of the
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,,unembodiedn term 1 scientific ’.
This practice seemed to help colluboratees to formulate their views and so 
I quickly decided that it would be worth trying to mimic this tactic in my 
investigative methods. I began by explicitly requesting the next few whom 
I interviewed to supply exemplar occupations for each category 
('scientific* and 'un-scientific*) and, additionally, some about which 
they felt unsure. From interview protocols I then compiled a list of some 
24. occupations, with each category represented (see Appendix 1.4 
for complete list). I then constructed a pilot IAI card-deck which 
consisted of a line drawing, drawn by myself, for each of the 24- 
occupations and the occupation title on each appropriate card. In these 
drawings I attempted to portray each occupation as "mimicably" and as 
stereotypically as possible:
A Doctor
Figure 7.32: Showing an 'Interview-about-Instance1 IAI Card: 
’A Doctor*
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I then conducted a series of interviews using the deck. In these 
interviews I intimated the content of the deck prior to presenting the 
cards. When I did present the cards, I did so one at a time and in 
alphabetical order (I also advised each student of this latter fact prior 
to my presentation). With each card I asked the student two questions:
Q1 Is this person a scientist?
Q2 What tells you that?
I asked the first question in order to find out whether the student 
categorised the occupation as an exemplar or non-exemplar of a scientific 
occupation. I allowed, but did not encourage, a "don't know11 category.
I asked the second question in an^attempt to investigate their reasoning 
behind their categorisation. By this means I hoped to elicit from each 
student a set of 'criterial attributes* for a 'scientific occupation*.
I used this approach in only three interviews and then abandoned it. The
main problem that I encountered was that each occupation may be subject to 
many classifications - some falling into each of my categories - yet my 
drawings tended to "fix” the classification and category and in a way 
which each student did not necessarily approve in every instance. The 
sort of objection that I encountered may be exemplified by the following 
remark made with respect to my ’doctor* card, recently illustrated in 
Figure 7.32 above:
t.(s).9 ’It depends whether you mean a research doctor 
[•••] like Fleming or an ordinary family doctor1
Whilst the ensuing discussion to such objections often proved insightful,
I felt that the means by which I had generated the deck had 'short 
circuited1 the process described by the initiators of the approach and so 
would cast doubt on any research inferences that I might make using my 
deck. I suspect that the inadequacy of my deck was also heightened by the 
absence, or near absence, of a ’dynamic element’ to my instances.
In the event, I decided to pursue ray investigation of students’ personal 
meanings of a ’scientific job’ by other means (RGT and Q1-4 of WE., cf. 
section 7.3 above). My experience with IAI approach was, nevertheless, 
useful since students had expressed enjoyment and interest in using 
illustrations.
7*4»2»2: ’Responding-with-Pictures* (RWP) Technique
My development and use of RWP was prompted by Pope’s (1931) suggestion 
that Gortazzi and Roote’s (1975) ’Illuminative Incident Analysis (IIA)' 
represents a technique that is compatible with the tenets of Constructive 
Alternativism.
Cortazzi and Roote developed IIA primarily to explore the thoughts and 
feelings of members of teams working in health and social services. It is 
based upon the idea that team harmony and development can be encouraged by 
a frank exchange of ideas and feelings about experiences involving the 
team as they have worked together. This exchange is initiated and
facilitated by illustrations of incidents from the team's working history 
drawn by team members.
The IIA technique appears to be especially useful in investigations where 
there is some difficulty on the part of the collaboratee(s) in verbalising 
their thoughts and feelings. In Cortazzi and Roote's study, 
collaboratees1 difficulties in verbalising their views were apparently due 
to the considerable emotion connected with incidents involved in the 
working of the team, indeed, in that study, drawings were used instead 
of words. These authors argue that:
'[...] verbal discussion of an Illuminative Incident is 
likely to be abortive [...] Reality is easily hidden 
behind words, but difficult to disguise in pencil lines, 
certainly feelings will be more accurately indicated in a 
drawing, as every art therapist knows; and ultimately, it 
is feelings that interest us*.
They concede, however, that an IIA investigation may profitably move 
from the non-verbal to the verbal mode.
As we have seen (Ch.3), Kelly was emphatic that 'cognition* and 'affect' 
could not be separated within POP. I suggest, however, that other 
difficulties in verbalisation may have to do with interrelations between 
the collaboratees and their (young/old) age, and/or their competence within 
a linguistic tradition for discussing a certain subject, and/or the 
traditional degree of complexity of the syntax and vocabulary associated 
with ways of discussing a certain subject. In researching into students' 
personal, scientific, epistemologies, I have encountered collaboratees 
with difficulties of verbalisation of particularly these last sorts -
- 7.87 -
hence the suitability of IIA for me. IIA approach may be construed to be 
a methodological response to Kelly's caution that 'Construing is not to be 
confounded with verbal formulation' (1955; p.51)» a caution that is less 
heedable with RGT due to the reliance on verbal labels in that technique.
'Responding-with-Pictures* is the name that my colleagues and I have given 
to our variants of IIA, my personal endeavours with which are described in 
the account which follows:
7.4.3 Investigation of Students' Personal Meanings of a 
'Scientific Activity* using RWP Approach
I
i ’  .
Science epistemology is a notoriously linguistic enterprise and, 
furthermore, is one which has little or no (explicit) tradition in science 
education.
In my experience, investigating pupils' personal meanings of 
"scientific-method" lessens difficulties of verbalisation but at the 
risk of encouraging mere recitation of specific experimental procedures as 
had been carried out or described in school science lessons. Furthermore, 
in enquiring into pupils' personal meanings of scientific-method as a 
means of initiating exploration of such personal science epistemologies as 
they might have, I did not wish to "beg the question", i.e. pupils might 
not perceive that scientists refer to method(s) as a means of acquiring 
knowledge.
I have found that asking young persons to produce pictures of a
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"scientific" activity has helped to overcome these difficulties: RWP. 
7.4.3.1 Method for Eliciting Pictures
Within WE this part of my investigation was effected by means of 3 
questions:
Q5 Do a sketch of something that happened outside school in 
which you did something scientific
Q6 What is happening in your sketch?
Q7 Why is it scientific?
I shall now describe my purpose and development of each of these
questions.
(a) Q5 Do a sketch of something that happened outside school in 
which you did something scientific
I included this question in all three versions of the WE., however I 
modified its wording and format in the first two. I will discuss these 
modifications later.
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My purpose for this question was similar to that of Q3> namely, to attempt 
to elicit what pupils considered to be the 'essence' of scientific 
activity.
In my verbal presentation of the question I stressed that I did not 
require a "work of art". I also advised them that if they included people 
in their sketch then "pin-persons" would be perfectly acceptable. I said 
these things to allay the fears of those who claimed not to be 'able to 
draw' when they first saw the question on the blackboard. I also 
requested pupils to draw their sketch on the plain sheet of paper I 
provided.
I 'pre-piloted' this question on six fourth-year pupils from a class which 
I did not use for the full WE.
I shall now describe the modifications I made to the wording of this 
question. My first version (i.e. WE.vl) was as follows:
Think of something that you have done which you think was 
scientific and do a sketch of it
- what is happening, in your sketch?
— why is it scientific?
This wording resulted in many pupils drawing a sketch of an experiment
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which they had conducted in a school science lesson but which could have 
been conducted out of school. On the whole I did not regard this as the 
most fruitful sort of response in pursuit of my purpose for the 
question. For example, it begged quasi-tautologous responses to Q7 (see 
below): '[it was a scientific activity] because I did it in a science 
lesson'. I therefore reworded the question and added emphases for clarity 
(i.e. WE.1.v2):
Do a sketch of something that happened outside school in which 
you did something scientific
- what is happening in your sketch?
- why is it scientific?
In this version, another problem which had also applied to the first 
version, came to my notice. This was merely that some pupils were unsure 
of the status of the questions following the dashes. Accordingly I 
numbered them separately as Q6 and Q7.
(b) Q6 What is happening in your sketch?
My purpose for this question was twofold. Firstly I included it to aid my
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interpretation of the sketch with those respondents whom I did not 
interview. Secondly, I intended its inclusion to reinforce my earlier 
verbal claim that the artistic quality of the sketch was irrelevant.
In my verbal introduction to this question, I characteristically asked 
students to 'write down what is happening in your sketch in a word or 
two'.
(c) Q7 why is it scientific?
As with Q6 I included this question to aid my interpretation of the 
sketches of those respondents whom I did not interview.
In my verbal introduction to this question, I characteristically asked 
students to 'write down what you thought was scientific about the activity 
you have drawn'.
7.4.3.2: Method for Interpreting Pictures
My analysis of responses to these questions focusses on Q7 for which I 
created categories of response. Although I make frequent reference to the 
'incident' where I feel it relevant, I do not offer a categorical analysis 
of them. It is possible that this would be worth doing in the future.
I found many of the pupils' sketches extremely pleasing in their own
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right. However, I do not believe that the sketches themselves contributed 
anything additional to the information obtained from my analysis of 
responses to Q6, i.e. in this application of the methodology the 
sketches were incidental to analysis.
I present a summary of the categories I created for responses to Q7 in 
Figure 7.33•
WE., Q7: ’Why is it scientific?1
Cat. Category of Response Freq.
No. 1
r... , . ......
of Resp.
1 Mere Use of/Involvement with Natural Phenomena 16
2 Related to School Science 14
3 Involved Principle 10
4 Mere Use of Equipment Invented by Scientists 6
5 Complex/Inexplicable 6
6 Tautologous 6
7 Required Cognitive Skills 5
8 Required Personal Qualities 4
9 Involved Writing 2
10 No Response 3
11 Uncategorised Responses 7
Figure 7.33 Table Showing Categories of Response for WE. Q7 
My discussion of these categories which follows, is highly selective. 
However, in Appendix 15> I present a more detailed summary table, my 
rationale for each and every category together with further examples from 
students1 responses.
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7.4.3.3» Interpretation of Picture Responses
My interpretation of categories of response to Q7 begins with a 
consideration of the two largest ones in which appeals were made by 
students to the mere use of, or involvement with, materials and natural 
phenomena (i.e. the vehicle of science) and the relatedness of the 
incident to school-science•
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Figure 7.34.: Showing a Sesponse-with-Picture*. Category 1, re a
Scientific Activity* (Class 2. r.9).
In these responses, little or no attempt was made by the pupil to 
elaborate the way in which they were used. In FIs, pupils who had given 
a 01 (Category 1) type answer to Q7 often appealed to the relatedness of 
their scientific incident to school-science as one of their first lines 
of defence (i.e. a verbal equivalent of the Q7, C2 type of response, 
discussed later) when I confronted their C1 criterion(-ia).:
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Figure 7.35 i Showing a Sesponse-with-Picture1« Category 1 re a
1 Scientific Activityf (Student= Danny; Fl6: Class 3» r.16)
/
131 I ['•••] to do with electrodes anodes atoms and things.....whys
that scientific?
132 D [...] you heard all that in science [...] you learn all
about electrodes and things in science...its just sort of 
scientific... *
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Figure 7.36: Showing a Sesponse-with-Picture*« Category 2, re a
Scientific Activity, (Glass 2. r.4.).
In these responses, pupils claimed that the activity was scientific either
because it had originally been done in a school science lesson or because
it bore a resemblance to a school-science activity. This criterion
suggests a weak sense of scientific: not only does the criterion itself 
make no reference to theorising but also the incidents themselves 
characteristically implied the mere use of, or involvement with, natural
to have used the criterion as an ’inexplicable explicative device1 (this 
sort of use appeared to be repeated in a more direct manner in Q7, C5 - 
see discussion below). Such appeared to be the case with one pupil whose 
illuminative incident was ’playing rounders” on a "SCISP field trip" and 
whom I later questioned about it:
Figure 7.37: Showing a ’Response-with-Picture’, Category 2, re a
phenomena and/or sophisticated/laboratory equipment. Some pupils appeared
o.
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’Scientific Activity’ (Student- Neil: FI.1; Class 1. r.4.)«
322 I (...) why was playing rounders scientific?
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331 N well because it was on a scientific trip so it must have
been a little scientific... because there must have been a
reason for it...
339 I [... ] if it had been a geography field-trip would it have 
been scientific?
34-3 N I shoulnt think so...it could be [...] using four points...no 
but I think its [playing rounders on a SGISP field-trip] 
scientific because they were trying to find out how much 
energy you were getting out of a hamburger
352 I did the teachers put it to you like that?
352 N no...it was just to keep us occupied.
Neil's later justification - 'energy from a hamburger'(34-3) - casts 
himself in a passive role. I suggest that this was an ad hoc 
justification, a piece of 'instant invention'I However, even the 
teachers' activity, as described by Neil, can only be said to be 
scientific in a weak sense.
In the third largest category of response to Q7, pupils cited the use or 
demonstration of a theory as their criterion for scientific activity:
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Figure 7.38: Showing a 'Response-with-Picture' Category 3 (Class 2t
r.10).
The majority of these respondents appealed to the demonstration of 
hand-me-down theories from school-science or common-lore. Others appeared 
to embody a very loose, general principle such as 'finding out1. I 
suggest that these responses show at least some recognition, on the part 
of the pupils, of the importance of theory in the conduct of science. A 
difficulty in applying McClelland's strong-weak differentiation to 
responses to Q7 became especially apparent with responses in this 
category, viz. I concede that the request to draw a scientific activity 
tends to preclude the act of theorising. I nevertheless find it 
interesting that none of these pupil3 abstracted a method - though 
empirical verification appeared to be implicit in most.
Only one pupil, FI(P')4- (Nigel), whom I interviewed had given a C3 type 
of answer to Q7:
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Figure 7.39* Showing a ^esponse-with-Picture1. Category 3. re a 
Scientific Activity1 (Student= Nigel: FI.4.; Glass 2. r.12).
205 I [...] why is the contracting of cool air scientific?
212 N because it shows how heat affects air...
213 I but [...] why did you pick on that?...[N shrugs]...[...] why
is showing the effect of heat on air scientific?
231 N ...dunno really...I spose...wellits to do with air pressure 
and things like that...[...] I just cant think of anything 
else that its to do with...well maybe its because its to do 
with heat...
238 I again you see. Ill have to ask you why is something to do 
with heat.. .or something to do with air pressure 
scientific?
24-1 N ...I suppose its just the nature of it at the moment if
I was to think of anything that I could say was scientific Id 
think...what lesson would it come under..[...] thats all really
On the evidence of this excerpt, it would appear that, for Nigel, the 
essence of the scientificness of his incident was neither the creation nor 
the demonstration of a theory ("heat affects air11); but rather the mere 
use of, or involvement with natural phenomena ("heat", "air pressure"), 
i.e. ’weak1 elements of science. When I confronted him on this (238) he 
further retreated into a ’relatedness to school-science' type of
justification (24-1). At the point where my excerpts ends I asked Nigel if
'the effect of heat on air’ might be considered in non-science lessons.
Our discussion then moved into a fruitful consideration of what he saw to 
be the differences in approach to this phenomenon between science lessons 
and cookery, pottery etc. lessons.
In smaller categories of response to Q7, some pupils cited the use of the
physical tools of science: G4-. "Mere use of Equipment Invented by
Scientists". Others appeared to use the term ’scientific’ as an 
"inexplicable explicative device" - a label for things they did not 
understand: C5, Complex/lnexplicable. No pupil elaborated a method as 
such, though the appeals made by some to cognitive processes, e.g. the 
use of 'logical processes of elimination', were suggestive of one: C7 
Required Cognitive Skills. Finally, a handful of pupils cited aspects 
of personality such as 'patience': G8 Required Personal Qualities.
These last were to feature prominently in discussions within FIs as to the 
pupils' personal raeaning(s) of scientific-method.
I regard all the minor categories of response above as embodying 'weak'
senses of scientific for reasons that should be apparent from my earlier
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comments and discussion.
Clearly there are many interesting lines of discussion whose initiation 
was facilitated by RWP but which were beyond the scope of WE. I pursued 
such lines of discussion later.
RWP approach may appear to be rather a simple technique and, indeed, it is 
qua technique. But from this one should not infer that it allows for 
only simplistic dialogue. On the contrary, RWP technique has, on many 
occasions, shown its facilitative utility for highly abstract or complex 
discussions.
Earlier in my account I emphasised the usefulness of RWP as a technique 
which lessens or overcomes difficulties on the part of collaboratees in 
verbalising their ideas. In my experience, however, it has also 
demonstrated its utility in exploring the personal views of certain highly 
articulate collaboratees. At first glance this may appear to be somewhat 
contradictory to my earlier remarks, but, verbally fluent collaboratees 
sometimes have difficulties in condensing their ideas and in expressing 
them without a confusing abundance of caveats (confusing to both them and 
to me). In such cases the RWP approach may help to direct us and focus 
the collaboratee1s attention upon a personal experience instantiation of 
the issue under consideration and to reduce their sometimes expressed 
feeling of being "trapped" by their own words. Again, verbal fluency may 
disguise not only the tentative nature of a person's views, but may also 
mislead the researcher as to what the collaboratee1s views actually are. 
With respect to. the latter case, my use of RWP technique has sometimes,
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for example, helped me reveal, by negotiation, a distinction between a 
collaboratee1s confident and initial articulation of, say, 
characteristically Kuhnian doctrines, and their personal science 
epistemological views to which they are really committed. Kelly’s claim 
that ’Construing is not to be confounded with verbal formulation’ (1955, 
p.51) may thus fruitfully be construed as a caution in at least two major 
senses.
Notwithstanding my recently expressed views, I consider the RWP approach 
to be a principal use with young persons; that is to say, persons of age 
16 or less.
RWP represents a flexible investigative approach which allows links with 
related techniques to be explored'and /or strengthened fruitfully. For 
example, following ray RWP investigation described above, Gilbert and Pope 
(1982) extended their basically IAI approach to investigating young 
persons* understanding of energy by requesting collaboratees to amend, 
improve upon or design some of the instance cards to exemplify their ideas 
of energy i.e. their instances were elicited, e.g.
sp- ~ w  »
»  I.iy , junViiiy . w l y f t w  W 4 , ^ , 1 ^  H u t.
(Student aged 10 years)
Figure 7.4-Os An ’Elicited Instance’ re Energy.
Gilbert and, Pope found that conversations about the personal pictures
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provided a fruitful source of constraints/alternative conceptual 
frameworks which their collaboratees used to construe the concept under 
consideration (energy).
In addition to suggesting IIA might be used in formal educational 
research, Pope also speculated upon potential other ways in which 
the approach might be useful in an educational context:
’IIAI] could act as a catalyst to help a student 
review his/her personal learning, to help groups of 
students communicate about experiences in their 
learning and also allow the tutor some Insight into 
some aspect of learning from the student’s point of 
view.’ (Pope, 1981, p. ).
I judge certain of these conjectures to have received indirect 
corroboration from research conducted at the same time as my RWP study.
For example, in an informal interview a science teacher, whom I shall name 
Miss S. (and with whom I later conducted an FI), claimed that one of 
the main difficulties for her in teaching science was ’getting pupils to 
pay attention long enough to become interested1. She cited 'laziness and 
general lack of motivation’, on the part of many pupils, to be ’one of the 
main hurdles facing the conscientious science teacher today1 in this 
respect. She went on to suggest that ’many pupils would far rather talk 
to their friends about what they’ve seen on telly the night before than 
get on and do some science’ and then she named and described some pupils 
who she felt exemplified this. Amongst these pupils I recognised one in 
particular from whom I had elicited a RWP:
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instead of uOrttuwy
^  becoU*? skfl. iaM . MciW
UjO COPH (V q ia  IB o o k s  Set \ ta X /u J i^  _
(lout^ OJhiV HToAlu^ j
+ (15 year old)
Teacher’s name altered to preserve anonymity
Figure 7.4-1; A ’Response with Picture’ re: Scientific Activity
I tentatively suggested to this teacher that such pupi Is as sh
described might have personal ideas on what it is "to do science”, that 
these ideas might be different from hers and that these pupils might talk 
in her lessons as a ’sort of protest'. I judged this interpretation to • 
come as something as a revelation to this teacher, though in fairness to 
her, she was somewhat loath to accept it. One of Kelly’s comments seems 
to be specially pertinent here:
’a teacher might complain that a child was ’’lazy”, but 
when asked to observe him for several days to see how he 
went about being "lazy", came up with a descriptiom of 
some very active and purposeful behaviour. "Laziness", 
then although attributed to the child, has as its 
principal referrent as far as the psychologist was 
concerned, the frustration the teacher experienced in 
trying to get the child to join her in something she 
thought they ought to be doing.’
(Kelly, 1955, p.58)
I suggest that whilst pedagogical implications of ACM research are 
difficult to make and presently far from clear despite my attempts,
(see Ch.10), the straightforwardness of most of the ACM1s investigative 
methods and the nature and extent of reliance on collaboratee "content" in 
the drawing of inferences has meant that school teachers may easily be 
admitted to the research enterprise. Moreover, it may sometimes be 
possible to provide teachers with feedback of a personally, or locally, 
useful nature and with a speed that would be quite impossible with 
research conducted in, say, a "Piagetian-technological" or a psychometric 
mould. I hope to have rendered plausible this last possibility through my 
recent example: of course, with appropriate negotiation between researcher 
and collaboratee, the latter’s pictures could be used directly.
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7.5« Written Exercise. Part C: Pupils1 Personal Meanings of a
’Scientific Observation1
7.5.1. Introduction
In this section I describe my attempts to elicit and explore pupils' 
personal meanings of a 'scientific observation’, on the one hand, and to 
teach pupils, by means of a demonstration personal to each of them, the 
'Constructivist Knowledge Thesis' (CKT) ("All observations are 
theory-laden") on the other. My interests and intentions in this part of 
my study were, therefore, jointly investigative and didactive. I pursued 
them principally by means of certain items within WE but additionally by 
means of FIs, with a subset of pupils selected from the overall 
collaboratee sample - these I shall later describe (sections 7.5.3, 7.5*4 
below). Prior to that, however, I would like to discuss what I consider 
to be the importance of this part of my study in an educational context.
I construe the worth of the investigations that I describe in this section 
to be informed by two, related, areas of personal philosophical 
commitment:
Firstly, all traditions in philosophy of science that are given serious 
attention today share a commitment to CKT. Since I have already argued 
(Ch.2) that a science episteraology is a necessary, though not a 
sufficient, condition for any theory of science teaching and, secondly, 
since teaching is to be construed as 'collaborative research' (Ch.10), I 
conclude that science educationalists must nowadays consider how to teach 
CKT. How, then, might the teaching of CKT even be begun? CKT runs
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counter to common experience of knowledge acquisition and theories of 
knowledge derived from it. Following Hewson (1980) I suggest that CKT 
will not seem fruitful to an individual until he has first come to 
regard it as plausible.
The task might be best first tackled in a negative way viz. through 
demonstrating the impossibility of a presuppositionless approach in 
either practice or principle. This method appears to have been used by 
Popper:
'[ ] The belief that we can start with pure observations 
alone, without anything in the way of a theory, is absurd 
.... I try to bring home the ... point to a group of 
physics students in Vienna by beginning a lecture with 
the following instructions: 'take pencil and paper;
carefully observe, and write down what you have observed' 
They asked, of course, what I wanted them to observe. 
Clearly the instruction, '.Observe!' is absurd .... 
Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen 
subject, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a 
problem. And its description presupposes similarity and 
classification, which in turn presupposes interests, 
points of view and problems -'
(Popper, 1972, p.49; original emphasis)
Popper's instructions - 'Carefully observe' etc - appeared to me to 
represent an easily repeatable classroom exercise.
In considering how a genuinely "constructivist curriculum" should be 
planned and implemented I am in sympathy with the broad.implications that 
Hirst (1980) derives from Popper's (1945) arguments against large scale 
('Utopian') engineering, for, as I argued in Chapter 3, the commitment to 
'reflexivity' by Constructive Alternatives entails a rejection of any form 
of Utopian engineering.
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Hirst (1980) made a number of recommendations for enquiry into curriculum 
planning. For Hirst, such enquiry should involve many "small scale 
experiments" and it 'must involve a great deal of evidence from the direct 
participants, both teachers and pupils as much as from observers.' Whilst 
I considered myself to have at least attempted to fulfill these aims with 
respect to classroom research, I was concerned lest my research interests 
and activities "migrate" away from possible and desirable (given my 
philosophical commitments) pedagogy. Thus my inclusion of Q8, 8a and 8b 
in WE began my attempt to act upon my own recently expressed conclusions 
and suggestions:
7.5«2. Procedure for Eliciting Pupils' Personal Meanings of a
'Scientific Observation' and for Teaching the Constructivist 
Knowledge Thesis
Q8 Carefully observe, then write down what you have
observed.
(Q8a what difficulty have you had trying to answer
Q8?).
(Q8b Observations are often very important in
experiments. Does the difficulty you had
trying to answer Q8 tell you anything about 
people doing experiments that you have never 
done before?)
Clearly, these instructions in Q.8 are based upon those suggested and used 
by Popper (1963) and which I cited earlier. I regard my use of Popper's 
instructions as a 'small scale experiment' in curriculum planning. In the
Popper quotation, given earlier, he implies that all his physics students
saw the fallacy in his instructions: "they asked, of course, what I
wanted them to observe". I was interested to see whether or to what
extent this was the ca3e with schoolchildren (I suspect, but do not yet
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know for sure, that Popper’s students were undergraduates). Thus ray 
inclusion of Q.8 was, in part, a "replication study”.
I shall now discuss the alterations and additions that I made to the 
questions in this part of WE.
Q.8 appeared in all three versions of WE, and in the wording given 
earlier.
In the first and second versions of WE, I included only one subsidiary 
question. The wording of this question was the same in both of these 
versions:
Does the difficulty that some of you have had answering 
Q.4 tell you anything about people who do experiments . 
that have never been done before?
My purpose for this question was twofold:
Firstly, I wished to focus the didactic element of the question on the 
conduct of experiments. This was partly due to my main area of interest 
being science-education. I also felt that to attempt to teach the full 
implications of the theory-ladenness thesis through a class exercise 
without discussion would be hopelessly over-ambitious. My most optimistic 
didactic aim was to bring pupils to accept that observations made in an 
experiment are both guided and limited by its purpose/design.
Secondly, I hoped to elicit pupils' perceptions of the learning process.
In view of my two-fold aim for the subsidiary question, I split it into
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two questions in the final version of WE:
Q.8a. What difficulty have you had trying to answer 
Q.8?
Q.8b. Observations are often very important in
experiments. Does the difficulty you had trying 
to answer Q.8 tell you anything about people 
doing experiments that have never been done
before?
This made it easier both for pupils to answer and for me to analyse their 
responses.
As can be seen, I also added a statement ’Observations are often very 
important in experiments” to Q.8b. I did this because the ‘didactic leap’ 
otherwise required seemed too great. It was a statement which pupils 
readily accepted or else expressed during structured interviews. By 
including it I brought the didactic strategy of the questions within this 
part closer to that which I used in the corresponding part of the 
structured interviews, which I shall discuss later.
In my verbal presentation of the questions in this part of WE I began by
requesting pupils to ’answer the next question in ink". I also asked
pupils not to call out when I had written the question (Q.8) on the 
blackboard. I then wrote Q.8 and allowed what I considered to be a 
sufficient length of time for those who had interpreted the question 
"naively” to commit the beginning of their answer to paper. By "naive" I 
mean an answer in which the pupil had begun noting down observations of 
any sort. After this period I asked those who had had any difficulty 
answering the question to answer the next question instead (Q.8a). Before 
writing this question I stressed that I would accept it as an equally good 
alternative answer to Q.8. I also invited pupils who had answered Q.8 but
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who were unsure about their answer, to answer Q.8a if they wished. In the 
final version of WE I also included Q.8b. I requested pupils who had 
answered Q.8a to also answer this question.
In that part of the FI in which I considered students! personal meanings 
of a ’scientific observation’, the didactic strategy that I attempted to 
follow consisted, roughly speaking, of the following 4 steps:
1 Bring the pupil to accept that had he attempted to write 
down all he could observe in the lab. he would never have 
finished. Draw attention to the fact that he had 
probably imposed several unbidden rules on his 
observation method even if ’naive’, e.g. that he should 
not move, that he should use only his unaided eyes.
2 From (1) bring the pupil to realise that all observation 
/attention is selective.
3 Relate (2) to experiments. Bring the pupil to accept 
that experimental observations are normally restricted by 
the purpose of the experiment.
4 ’Chance favours only the prepared mind1. Bring the pupil 
to accept that 'all observations are theory-laden1.
7.5.3: Analysis of Responses
My analysis of responses was conducted in 2 parts, (1) Q.8, 8a, 
(2) Q.8b.:
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WE Q.8 'Carefully observe, then write down what you have observed 
WE Q.8a 'What difficulty have you had trying to answer Q.8?'
Cat.No. Category of Response Freq.
1 Sophisticated ("What to observe?") 34
2 Naive (List of Observations) 31
3 Sophisticated? ("Do not understand Q.8") 9
4 No Response 6
5 Uncategorised data 0
Figure 7.42. Table Showing Categories of Response for WEt Q.8, 8a
WE Q8b 'Observations are often very important in experiments. Does 
the difficulty that you had in trying to answer Q.8 tell 
you anything about people doing experiments that have never 
been done before?'
Cat.No. Cat. of 3ub.Cat 'Sub-category of Response Freq.
Response No.
1 "No" 1 Unelaborated 15
2 Irrelevant to Science 3
2 "Yes" 3 Need for Instructions 3
4 Should Observe More 2
5 No Response (but answered Q.8a) 49
6 No Response (Neither Q.8a nor 8b) 6
7 Uncategorised Data 1
Figure 7.4-3* Table Showing Categories of Response for WE, Q.8b
As usual, I present more detailed versions of these summary tables, my ' 
rationale for each and every category within them and further examples of 
students' responses in appendices (16(a), 16(b), respectively). In my 
interpretative discussion of these response categories, below, I shall
- 7.112 -
consider the questions roughly in the order that I presented them in WE.
7.5.4. Interpretation of Responses
From Figure 7.42 above, it can be seen that approximately equal numbers of 
students responded in ways which I construed to be 'naive1 as did in 
'sophisticated' ways.
My working criterion for 'sophisticated' responses was as follows:
'WE. Q.8, 8a, Category 1: 'Sophisticated': Responses in 
which students demonstrated at least some recognition of 
the basic flaw I intended to be in Q.8, viz. the 
unrestricted scope for observation rendered the question 
unanswerable in either practice or principle.'
e.g. Class 2, r.18
'I think the question is silly because anyone can observe 
hundreds of different things'.
e.g. Class At r.12
'The difficulty is that you have said Carefully Observe, 
Observe what?11 This is a badly laid out question no-one 
could give you a decent answer I ! You have not told us 
what to observe.'
My working criterion for 'naive' responses was, by contrast, as
follows:
'WE, Q.8, 8a: Category 2: 'Naive': Responses in which
students straightforwardly described idiosyncratically 
chosen objects or events.'
e.g. Class 2, r.9
'Chalk dust on board, people moving around [I], Tony 
scratching his armpit.'
e.g. Class 2, r.20
'I have observed the fish swimming in the tank.'
I tentatively suggested that this relatively high proportion of 
naive-responses - roughly A0% of the total - is symptomatic of the 
prevalence of passivist, 'spectator' theories of knowledge:
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Naive-responders appear to have unwittingly and unprobleraatically assumed 
responsibility for generating categories for observation. I conjecture 
that many of these individuals would also regard observations made within 
experiments as self-evidently 'given* responses.
FIs often pointed to the dangers and inadequacies of deriving inferences 
about individuals' beliefs from a questionnaire. Such as comments made by 
two pupils in FIs did, however, support my decision to derive a third 
'Sophisticated?' category of response. My criterion for including 
responses in this category was as follows:
'WE, Q.8, 8a: Category 3: 'Sophisticated?': Responses
which I felt Unwilling to classify as 'naive' but whose 
'sophistication' I either doubted or otherwise felt was 
an inappropriate classification.'
Although I went on to discern three sub-categories within this category 
(see Appendix 16), most (n=4.:2:2) were where the student responded, 
without further elaboration, that they had been unable to answer Q.8 
because they had not understood it:
e.g. Class 3i r.1
'I have not been able to answer Q.8 because I don't 
understand the question.'
In an FI later however, the same student, Paul (FI.5), did express 
(or develop) his rationale behind his WE response:
086 I [...] you've written here. I have not been able to 
answer Q.8 because I don't understand it....
P .....
I why didn't you understand it?
P couldn't see what we had to observe!
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This verbal response "upgraded" ray interpretation of his original WE 
response from ’sophisticated?’ to ’sophisticated' and serves as a salutory 
reminder as to the degree of authenticity that should be attributed to my 
other categorisations.
Six students recorded no attempt to answer any of the CKT questions 
(i.e. Q.8, 8a, 8b). 31 had given ’naive’ responses to Q.8, 8a. This left 
4-2 to answer Q.8b. Of these 4-2, 17 went on to give no response and the 
other 15 gave an unelaborated negative one (sub-category 1):
e.g. Class 1, r.1 
’No'
I suggest that it is risky to draw detailed inferences from these last two 
frequencies though, clearly, most of the 4-2 students who were "eligible" 
to answer Q.8b did not do so. So why aid they not record any gained 
insight? The inferences that I intended the students to draw from Q.8, 8a 
roughly correspond to steps '(2)' and '(3)1 of my didactic strategy, 
outlined above. Perhaps these students were naive empiricists despite ' 
their ’sophisticated' responses to Q.8, 8a? The 'conceptual leap’ may 
have been too great for them in the manner in which I presented it to 
them, i.e. WE.
Only 6 students (Q.8b, sub-categories 3, 4-> and (?) 7) recorded having 
derived any insight or benefit from their experience of having answered 
Q.8, 8a. Two of these students concluded that experimentalists should 
"try to observe more" (Q.8b, sub-category 4):
- 7.115 -
Class 3, r,15
'Yes you 3hould observe more and try to understand'
Class 4» r.12
'Scientists have to be aware and observe anything new all 
around'
In the absence of further elaboration this would seem to be almost the 
reverse of the epistemological lesson which I intended them to draw. For 
these pupils, more observation - without reference to theory or 
experimental design - is better. This would seem to betray a sympathy to 
naive-empiricism in which knowledge and truth is a quantitative matter, a 
function of accumulated fragments.
Three pupils implied the need for "instructions" when conducting 
experiments (Q.8b, sub-category 3):
e.g. Glass 3, r.14
'Yes it tells me that when doing experiments you should 
have full instructions'
e.g. Class 4» r.4
'He might not be clear explaining what is to be done'
Again it is difficult to say whether these pupils had drawn the 
epistemological lesson I had intended them to draw, namely, that the 
experimental observations are both guided and constrained by the purpose 
and design of the experiment or some other 'superficial' variant, e.g. 
instructions are necessary in order to answer a question. I suspect the 
latter because in each of these responses there was an implied passivity 
of the experimenter: instructions were 'received' rather than 'created*. 
This despite the fact that in my wording of Q.8b I had specified "(...) 
people doing experiments that have never been done before". The students
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perceived passivity of the experimenter might reflect their school 
experience of experimentation - including that of the so-called 'discovery 
methods' of science teaching.
I tackled the theory-ladenness thesis in four structured interviews. Two 
of these students had given 'sophisticated?' responses to Q.8a 
(FI(P')4,6), the other two had given 'naive' responses (FI(P')3» 7).
I began this section of the interview with a reconsideration of Q.8 and 
their response to it. A recurrent hurdle was that the pupils were loath 
to accept personal responsibility for the observations they had recorded 
(in the case of FI.7, voiced in the interview). Put another way, these 
pupils appeared loath to accept that there was not, and had not been, a 
hidden category of observations required by me, the researcher:
e.g. FI(P')3 (Michael)
TUT /  ^ T  T ~  1 ~  ~ ______3 4- ~   if' 4-1_____-  -----
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anything to notice deliberately..• maybe we were 
meant to observe people looking puzzled and so I 
wrote that down as I thought that's what the 
question had to do . make people look puzzled so 
the answer was being puzzled.
e.g. FI(P»)4 (Nigel)
4-24 N well it says observe and then write down what 
you've observed so I took it that you'd got to 
write down what you'd observed as soon as you'd 
read that and that was the writing.
Through successive confrontations in discussion of their experiences I 
believe that I was able to bring three of these pupils to realize that 
observation is selective, both in everyday life and experiments. (N.B. 
the constraint of available time dictated that I terminate the interview 
very soon after I'd begun to consider the theory-ladenness thesis with the
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fourth interviewee: FI(P')5)•
e.g. FI(P')3 Michael)
327 M (...) its saying there're things which you can sort of sense
at one time ... and things that you can deliberately observe 
and things that are sort of hidden that you can observe.
468 M (...) you're just noticing the things you wanna know (...)
The sophistication of this realization varied considerably. FI(P')3
seemed aware that in conducting a Benedict's test for reducing sugars 
there may be observables other than the colour change/non-change that 
might get missed out:
345 M (...) sometimes its sort of just so obvious that
its an orange colour ... and sometimes you have 
to search through your head, is it a dye, is it 
poisonous, is it so and so.
FI(P')7 by contrast, ended by accepting that observation made within 
experiments was selective but, for him, this was trivially true. I could 
not get over the epistemological significance of this to the individual.
I suggest that recognition by the student that attention/observation is 
non-random is still a long way from accepting CKT: I did not, in other 
words, make much progress beyond step '(2)' of my 4 stage didactic 
strategy, described earlier. This, I suspect, shall be a recurring 
difficulty in attempts to teach CKT by other means, notwithstanding 
certain reservations that I have with respect to the approach that I used, 
and which I shall discuss below.
I now feel that the fact that I debarred those students who had recorded a 
response for Q.8 from answering Q.8a and b must have left at least some of 
them with a sense of having "failed" the exercise.
Although I consider my application of the "Popper question" through a 
written exercise has provided some useful interpretations, any didactic 
intentions using this mode of application alone would seem unlikely to 
succeed. I suggest, however, that a classroom activity involving group 
discussion, i.e. more along the lines of Popper, would be a useful way of 
introducing CKT to science students.
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'Virtually all our disciplines have relied on conceptions 
which are now incompatible with the Cartesian axiom, and 
with the static world view we once derived from it. For 
underlying the new ideas, including those of modern 
physics, is a unifying order, but it is not causality; it 
is purpose, and not the purpose of the universe and of 
man, but the purpose in the universe and in man. In 
other words, we seem to inhabit a world of dynamic 
process and structure. Therefore we need a calculus of 
potentiality rather than one of probability, a dialectic 
of polarity, one in which unity and diversity are 
redefined as simultaneous and necessary poles of the same 
essence'.
World Perspectives, Ruth Nanda Anshen (1971, p.250: 
original emphasis).
ABSTRACT
CURRICULAR PHILOSOPHY AND STUDENTS1 PERSONAL
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF SCIENCE
In this thesis I employ a constructivist epistemological stance 
(principally influenced by that due to George Kelly) to critically examine 
the curricular response to contemporary notions of truth, objectivity and 
knowledge.
I take science education (at both Secondary and Tertiary levels) as my 
special reference within the education system.
An important part of my work explores students1 and teachers1 personal 
meanings of science and scientific method, i.e. alternative conceptions 
of science, and I see it as contributing to the growing body of research 
concerned with alternative conceptions in science: the 'Alternative 
Conceptions Movement1 (ACM) in educational research.
To help articulate my views on these matters I use an augmented version of 
a framework or model, developed by my immediate colleagues, for 
conceptualising cognitive aspects of science education and the 
transformation of scientific knowledge. My version of this framework 
features components under the following main headings:
1 Scientists'-Science1, 'Philosophers1-Science', 'Curricular-Science1,
'Teachers'-Science1, 'Students'-Science', and 'Childrens'-Science1.
I argue that, suitably augmented and interpreted, Kelly's theory is 
capable of rationally integrating existing ACM research, together with my
own.
(i)
My classroom research uses a number of complementary investigative 
methods, some of them novel. These may be grouped under the following 
three headings:
- interviews
- lesson observations
- written exercises
I present an outline of a theory of teaching which is compatible with ACM 
research and make recommendations for future science teaching and 
research.
N.B. To avoid an insidious (male) sexism and 'his/her* formulations which 
I find tedious, I shall use plural forms throughout this thesis, 
e.g. their, themself.
(ii)
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Chapter 8. Interviews
8.1 Introduction
My purpose in this chapter is to describe the means by which I explored 
in interviews educands' and educators' personal epistemologies of 
science. My interviews were of two types: (1) formal and pre-focussed, 
(2) informal and opportunistic.
8.2 A Focussed Interview (Fl) for Exploring Educands* Personal 
Epistemologies of Science
I developed my focussed interview (Fl) through 3 main variants, the 
first 2 of which were applied principally in pilot studies. These may 
be designated as follows:
FIv1. ' 5 Categories', )
) Pilot Studies (n=47)»
FIv2. ' 3 Questions', )
FIv3.' 15 Questions' ) Main Study (n=22).
These I shall now describe:
8.2.1 Pilot Study FIvi. '3 Categories'
This was where my entire thesis investigation began. To help focus and 
guide ray initial investigations into the nature and development of 
educands' personal understandings of ideas in biology (cf.Ch.1), I 
examined all the 'O’ and 'A* level biology syllabi and developed a five
- 8.1 -
part categorization of central themes or concepts in the discipline. 
These themes were
Life,
Cell,
Heredity
Evolution,
Ecology.
My pilot fieldwork actually began in a Middle School but I rapidly 
included Secondary Schools (for details see section 8.5.1., below) and 
conducted the work more or less concurrently. I chose to initiate my 
classroom research towards the lower end of the education system for 
three, highly related, reasons: firstly, although even then I
anticipated basing my research at the secondary level, I desired to 
have an overview of the entire school education system in order to 
provide a context for my main study; secondly, as an intending 
researcher into concept development this seemed to me to be the most 
reasonable place to start; thirdly, I wished to make an informed choice 
of target population for my main study.
My work in the Middle School consisted of three, day long, visits. I 
spent these days informally observing lessons and generally getting used 
to talking to children of that age again. In my lesson observations, I 
noted down what I perceived to be the subject content of the lesson 
together with any other aspects which I found interesting, but 
especially anything which I construed to be a pupil’s difficulty in 
understanding an idea. In addition, on the first day of my visit, I 
conducted an informal "group" interview with five 11 year olds.
- 8.2 -
Although informal this "group interview" was conducted in private and 
was, with the prior consent of the pupils, audio-recorded. I simply- 
asked them "What do you think biology is?" and encouraged them to debate 
it amongst themselves. I judged a familiar broad consensus that biology 
was "the study of living things" soon to emerge. I was, however, 
particularly struck by the comment of one individual named Mark, who 
confidently claimed that biology was "the scientific way of studying 
nature" and that it was 'not like nature study'. It seemed to me that 
whilst this view was also fairly readily accepted by the others in the 
group, some pupils differed in the way in which they understood the 
expression "the scientific way". Accordingly, when I interviewed these 
pupils individually the next day, in addition to eliciting their 
personal meanings of (up to two) terms selected from my 5-part thematic 
categorization of biology, I asked them to articulate their personal 
meaning of Mark's expression "the ^ scientific way". Thus it was held 
variously to be "grown up", "detailed" and "serious". It was "clever" 
because "you use complicated equipment and chemicals".
Meanwhile, in a series of twelve, day long, visits divided amongst three 
Secondary Schools, I similarly interviewed three individual pupils 
about aspects of the lesson(s) in which I had observed them. With these 
pupils I elicited their personal meaning of 'biology' and each of the 
five terras comprising my thematic categorization of the discipline - 
this providing a common, structured, component to my interviews. As 
with my work in the Middle School, with the prior consent of both the 
teachers and pupils concerned, I audio-recorded both the lessons I 
observed and the interviews I conducted.
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During my initial interviews with these Secondary school pupils I 
noticed that all three of them appealed to ’scientific method', 
'experimental proof', and the like in the course of justifying (as I 
judged it) their views in and of biology, whether they be "alternative" 
or "orthodox". Such appeals were most often left unelaborated unless 
prompted by me. In one interview, however, a 14 year old, 4th year 
pupil, named Peter (P), introduced within our exploration of his views 
on heredity a personal meaning for 'control experiment* which was at 
striking variance with the orthodoxy. The exchange occurred after he 
had correctly listed some of the advantages of using drosophila fruit 
flies in genetic studies:
drosophila,
P. ( ) biologists tend to use small organisms like/for 
controlled experiments.... ^
I. Why do you think that is?
P. Well..small insects like that are more easily
controlled... you don't need big strong cages for them 
and they re not dangerous.
After further questioning I was convinced that Peter meant this both
literally and sincerely. When I asked him if there might be any other
meanings for the expression 'controlled experiment' his answers veered
into notions of biological control, (i.e. artificial control of pests
and parasites by use of other organisms).
Now, I have already commented upon the nature and importance of the 
control experiment in (especially biological) science and upon the 
presence of other 'alternative conceptions' which I elicited from 
pupils in informal interviews within my early lesson observations (see 
Ch.4). Accordingly, after these initial FIs I resolved to refresh and 
to clarify my personal understandings of basic principles of 
experimental design. I soon found, however, that such principles, as
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classically presented in text-books, rarely helped me to understand the 
way in which pupils were using expressions such as 'scientific', 
'scientific method' and 'experimental proof' for they seemed to me to be 
invoking qualitative differences or levels of truth. These, I soon 
found, could only be elucidated by appeal to philosophy of science.
My growing interest in educands* personal meanings of science and 
scientific-method was further deepened and extended by two sources of 
interaction with University students.
Firstly, through my teaching involvement with Dr.John Gilbert on a 
departmental course on 'Science in Society' I became exposed to first 
year undergraduate scientists’ ideas on these subjects. Certain of 
these students' responses to our talks led me to believe that most of 
them subscribed to an 'accumulative fragmentalist' epistemology of 
science. I first felt this strongly in a lecture which I gave upon the 
subject of 'The Role of Metaphor in the Conduct of Science’. In this I 
interpreted the majority of students to express a clear preference for 
the traditional, empiricist inspired, 'substitution' and 'comparison' 
theories of metaphor as opposed to the more recent, semantic, 
'interactive' theories of metaphor (see Black, 1979 cf. my discussion, 
section 8.2.2.1., below). The students' scepticism of anything 
suggesting relativism or even fallibilism in scientific knowledge claims 
was expressed even more clearly in a later lecture in which I discussed 
the ideas of Kuhn and which, in these respects, were in close agreement 
with the epistemology underlying my pedagogical stance.
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Secondly, at this time I was resident on the University campus. 
Challenges to Darwinian theory were then newly popularized in the 
national press (the so-called 'Creation Controversy') and were a 
frequent source for debate amongst students. There was much discussion 
about whether fossil evidence could ever constitute scientific evidence 
and, consequently, whether Darwin's theory could be held to be a 
scientific one. Again, this exposed me to students' personal meanings 
of science and scientific-method. i I took advantage of my situation by 
interviewing a small, opportunistically selected, sample of university 
students drawn from a broad range of academic years and scientific 
disciplines. In one such interview, with a 20 year old, 1st year 
undergraduate Human Biology student named Janet (j), the following 
exchange occurred during my exploration of her personal meaning of 
'evolution':
I. ( ) just now you referred to natural selection as the law
of natural selection...can you tell me why you did that?
J. Yeah I did that deliberately because its only because its 
traditional to call it the theory of natural selection
because that's what Darwin called it. Everyone knows
it's really a law ( ) apart from the ultra religious 
types•..
I. ( ) why do you think Darwin himself called it the theory 
of natural selection then?
J. Well because he was just being modest... he had to be
modest because he knew he was going against the church
and would probably get excommunicated and what have you. 
that was something a lot more important to people in 
those days...
I. So.... calling something a theory.... that's being modest?
J. Yeah definitely.
I. ( ) how do you mean modest?
J. When you say its a theory you're saying how about this
to explain it but I might be wrong what do you think but 
when it's a law that's it. that's how it really is....
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What interested and impressed me most at the time of this interview wa3 
Janet's absolutism with respect to the truth status of scientific laws 
in general and Darwin's "law” in particular. Our discussion turned to 
the relative merits of the various factions comprising the 'Creation 
Controversy'. Later, however, my interpretative interest in this and 
other parts of our dialogue focussed upon the differences between her 
personal meanings of the terms 'hypothesis', 'theory' and 'law' which, 
although most usually embedded and used in the manner of merely 
descriptive labels in scientific discourse, are properly a part of 
scientific meta-theory. The choice and use of such terms necessarily 
imply epistemological commitments. Distinguishing between meanings of, 
for example, 'law' and 'theory' invokes epistemological issues and 
controversies such as form vs. corroborating empirical evidence or 
corroborating empirical evidence tfs. acceptance by a consensus with the 
community of scientists as well as relative levels of truth and 
objectivity (hypothesis: theory: law). Again, these were concerns which 
I realised would not adequately be elucidated by reference solely to 
principles of experimental design and this contributed to my decision to 
shift the focus of ray work towards philosphy of science.
As ray first, tentative, step in this direction, I appended the following 
question to my '5 Categories' FI:
"What do you understand by the expression 'scientific'?"
I have culled the following brief excerpts from these interviews to 
illustrate responses to this last question:
"scientific means machines like computers which calculate
things accurately"
(Paul, aged 11 years, Middle School pupil).
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"Margaret Thatcher thinks she's scientific but really she's 
unscientific because nothing she does works"
(Susan, aged 11 years, Middle School pupil).
"scientific is being a good observer., scientists don't miss 
anything, that's why they know the most."
(Greg, aged 13 years, 3rd Year Secondary School pupil).
"scientific means logical ( ) scientists don’t rely on
imagination, they use proven logic."
(Tony, aged 15 years, 5th Year, Secondary School pupil).
"these days scientific is taken to be a synonym for
intelligence..basically if you’re scientifically minded you're 
bright, if not. you're dim."
(Chas, aged 18 years, 1st Year Undergraduate Chemical 
Engineering student).
"if something's described as scientific it means that its been 
shown to be true by experiment ( ) not just maths and
speculative reasoning."
(Pauline, aged 18 years, 1st Year Undergraduate Physics 
student).
"scientific suggests a certain degree of order and logic in 
your approach, both theorizing and experimental work, it's 
when you depart from this for any time that the blunders get 
made."
(Mike, aged 24 years, 1st Year Undergraduate Chemical Physics 
student).
"to be granted the status of a scientific subject it has to be 
seen to have been developed by the technique which confines it 
to the facts ( ) subjects which do not have this technique do 
not deal with facts, the technique I am talking about is of 
course the scientific method."
('Oti', aged 30+, 2nd Year Postgraduate Chemistry student).
Whilst I have been highly selective in presenting quotations from these .
particular individuals, I do not judge the contexts from which these
excerpts came to have much elaborated or ameliorated their meaning - no
doubt partly due to the crudity of ray interview technique. Even at
this early stage of my research, however, I considered many of the ^  
students that I was interviewing to express views on science and
scientific-method which I felt to be at variance with those held by
myself and modem post-empiricist traditions in philosophy of science
and many of the stated objectives of modern science curricula, viz. they
emphasise logicism, naive-erapiricism and absolutism. It occurred to me
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that students' alternative conceptions of science and scientific-method 
might be as prevalent as those of the biological concepts which had been 
the main subject of my investigation and, further, that the two might be 
causally connected, i.e. students’ alternative-conceptions of science 
(and scientific-method) might help to explain the origin and maintenance 
of their alternative-conceptions iu science. This latter inference is 
strengthened by the prima facie case that scientific knowledge is 
legitimized in the science classroom, as in science, primarily by 
appeals to scientific-method (understood in both specific and general 
'meta', senses, and whether (re)enacted or merely reported).
Accordingly, I endeavoured to gain some acquaintance with philosophy of 
science (or, as it turned out, with philosophies of science) and to 
develop a new version of focussed interview with increased emphasis on 
eliciting students' personal epistemologies of science.
8.2.2 Pilot/Main Study FIv2' 5 Questions'
I conducted investigations using this second variant of FI in two, 
distinct, periods which, although sharing a common core of questions, 
might, for other reasons, be distinguished into two sub-variants of 
FIv2, viz., '(a)' and '(b)'.
8.2.2.1 Pilot Study FIv 2(a).
In these interviews my sample of educands came from Middle, Secondary 
and Tertiary levels of education, as before. With the Middle and 
Secondary school pupils, however, I now began to slant my questions 
relating to the lessons in which I had observed them to issues of method
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and methodology (see Ch.4). Another change which I made was to drop my 
'5 Categories' FI in favour of another intended specifically to explore 
educands' personal meanings of science and scientific-method.
Prior to these interviews I had striven better to acquaint myself with 
'scientific method' - a task which, for reasons already given (section 
8.2.1., above), required that I study philosophy of science. From a 
survey of the relevant literature, both specialist and introductory, I 
selected 6 traditions from philosophy of science whose ideas I judged to 
continue to exert significant influence within the "community of 
philosophers of science". The traditions are associated principally 
with the following names:
Bacon
Schlick,
Popper,
Kuhn,
Lakatos,
Feyerabend.
My purpose in identifying these major traditions and achieving at least 
a basic understanding of them was twofold. Firstly, I intended my 
grounding in philosophy of science to enable me better to identify and 
to characterize whatever conceptions educands might have of science and 
scientific method. Since I judge the traditions vrhich I have listed to 
be the most influential and long lasting ones, I anticipated that many 
educands' conceptions might at least approximate to one or more of them. 
I intended, however, that these traditions be used only as a guide to 
help me to interpret the nature of educands' responses, not as "norms"
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to measure them against. My personal epistemology and pedagogy allows 
for a pluralistic viewpoint within a person. Secondly, I intended ray 
personal education in philosophy of science to inform my construction of 
FIv2, viz. by examining these 6 traditions I identified a number of 
highly interrelated topics or issues which were common to them:
- demarcation criterion for 'science', 'scientific';
- 'scientific-method' as a universal procedure, a "method 
without a subject";
- criterion for theory-choice and the growth of 
scientific-knowledge;
- the role of history of science in the conduct of science;
- the truth and/or objectivity of scientific knowledge claims;
- the role and value of science in society.
I then devised three questions intended to elicit educands’ views upon
‘ such issues, viz.
Q1. What do you understand by the expression 'unscientific'?
Q2. What do you understand by the expression 'scientific- 
progress'?
Q3* What do you understand by the expression 'scientific- 
method'?
In the first question I decided to use the term 'unscientific', rather 
than 'scientific' (as per FIvl), in order to avoid the individual 
merely reciting a popular clichje or algorithm which might not truly 
represent their views but which they might then feel trapped into 
justifying. I had inferred from earlier interviews that educands felt 
strongly that they ought to be able to define 'scientific', especially 
if they were studying science, and notwithstanding the considerable 
difficulties they often had in doing so. This was in opposite contrast 
with the term 'unscientific' which almost all educands seemed happy to 
elaborate upon. In interviews the emphasis characteristically shifted
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to a consideration of ’scientific' after the individual’s meaning of 
'unscientific' had been elicited, whether facilitated by myself or not.
In responses to my three questions, educands from all educational levels 
tended to express surprise at the questions I asked. Many claimed that 
they had never been asked them before or even that they had never 
thought about them before. Almost all professed extreme difficulty in 
answering them - an experience which I judged to be pedagogically 
important due to the prevalence amongst science curricula of major 
teaching and learning objectives concerning 'the process of scientific 
investigation and reasoning' (Fensham, 1983, p«5 - draft of paper 
circulated in 1980 c.f my discussion in Ch.2).
In their responses to Q1 , educands claimed usually to have heard the
expression 'unscientific' but were* not sure where. However, they
commonly recalled it as having been used in a rather pejorative sense to
indicate subjectivity, equivocality, emotionality, inaccuracy and even
fraud. Thus, for example:
"unscientific means the man [sic] could have cheated."
(Simon, aged 10 years, Middle School pupil).
"unscientific means easy things like P.E. [Physical 
Education]."
(Heather P., aged 11 years, Middle School pupil).
"unscientific investigations are normally superficial and 
prone to error but they can be right by accident."
(Mike S., aged 16 years, Lower 6th Year Secondary School 
science pupil).
"unscientific subjects [] are areas of study which lack logic 
and objectivity."
(Stephen, aged 21 year3, 1st Year Undergraduate Physics 
student).
"unscientific theories are myths [] they show what people want 
to believe rather than what is true."
(Mike L., aged 18 years, First Year Undergraduate Mechanical 
Engineering student).
"unscientific means a theory where the inventor has filled in 
the gaps between the facts but has not admitted this publicly." 
(Eric, aged 22 years, Fourth Year Undergraduate Biochemistry 
student).
When I went on to elicit educands' personal meanings of 'scientific',
most of them began by giving accounts which might be characterised as
'true by definition* or, as what amounts to the same thing, 'true by
traditional subject classification'. Examples of these respective types
of response are:
"unscientific is when you havent got a knowledge of 
science [] scientists study science specifically."
(Doug., 18 years old, Upper 6th Year - "7th Year" - 
Science pupil).
"science is the study of scientific things: physics, 
chemistry, biology."
(Sue K., 14 years old, 4th Y£ar Secondary School Pupil).
On further questioning such educands characteristically expressed 
positive valuations of 'scientific' in counter-part to their earlier 
negative ones of 'unscientific'. In these responses the quality of 
objectivity, or "value-neutrality", of scientific investigations was 
stressed by educands and (in my interpretation) provided support for 
Chalmers' assertion that 'The naming of some claim or line of reasoning 
or piece of research "scientific" is done in a way that is intended to 
imply some kind of merit or special kind of reliability.' (1982, p.XV).
With Middle School pupils chemistry was held to be the most scientific 
of the three traditional sciences by virtue of its involvement with 
chemicals and scientific impedimenta (test-tubes etc.). By contrast,
- 8 . 1 5 -
almost all Secondary School pupils and University students ascribed this
status to physics using mainly reductionist arguments such as this:
"The better a subject is the more scientific it is [and] the 
more scientific something is [] the more fundamental its got 
to be....physics is the best science because thats what all 
the others can be boiled down to. its at the heart of 
literally everything [] chemistry and biology naturally., but 
I wouldnt be surprised if even french turned out to be physics 
at the end of the day."
(Jim B., aged 17 years, Upper 6th Year, Secondary School 
science pupil).
The marked tendency which I noticed for interviews to list scientific 
and unscientific (or non-scientific) subject-disciplines and occupations 
as a first stage in their formulation and/or expression of their 
personal meanings of the otherwise decontextualised terra 
'(un)scientific' supported my decision to compile a list from interview 
protocols and to use them in the elicitation process. I selected 
exemplars from each category ('scientific', 'unscientific') and some 
whose status I judged to be equivocable. These I later used with 
accompanying pictorial representations (’Occupation Cards') in a manner 
which I intended to be an application of Interview-About-Instances (IAI) 
technique and to offer a more accessible (because contextualised) form 
of Q1 in my 3 Questions FI (for a critical account of this attempted 
elicitation method, see section 7.4.2.1.). Although I soon abandoned 
this adjunct to my 3 Questions FI due to methodological criticisms I had 
of it, my experience of using Occupation Cards did help me to develop an 
initial awareness of the potentialities of using occupations as 
'elements' for pictorial methods of eliciting personal constructions 
(later explored in my main study use of Repertory Grid .PA Techniques 
and Responding-With-Pictures techniques, respectively - see Ch.7).
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In their responses to Q2, educands unanimously construed the expression 
‘scientific progress' in a manner which supports Putnam's (e.g. 1978) 
assertion that science has come to mean a term for the successful 
pursuit of knowledge. Examples of such responses include:
"when you find out that something's for definite that's 
scientific knowledge hut when it's something that nobody knew 
before it's scientific progress."
(Simon, aged 10 years, Middle School pupil).
"scientific progress [] that's the discovery of more facts and 
laws of nature."
(Christopher, aged 14 years, 4th Year, Secondary School 
pupil)•
"scientific progress means [] the gaining of knowledge [] 
we've definitely improved."
(Doug., 18 year3 old, Upper 6th Year - "7th Year" - science 
pupil).
"scientific progress [is] man's increasing understanding and 
mastery over the world, the universe as a whole."
(Mike L., aged 18 years, First Year Undergraduate Mechanical 
Engineering student).
I further explored educands' personal meanings of scientific progress
usually by asking "How do you think science progresses?" In their
responses to this question, interviewees usually cited scientific-method
as the main mechanism. This aspect of their replies led me into an
exploration of issues considered in my discussion of their responses to
Q3, below. As a prelude to elaborating upon their views of scientific-
method, however, educands often expressed historical appraisals of
scientific progress which I interpreted as commitments to variants of
'accumulative fragmentalist' epistemology of science, for example,
"somebody does some work and somebody else carries on... so 
it's built up stepwise really."
(Mike S., aged 16 years, Lower 6th Year, Secondary School 
science pupil).
And in this perhaps more sophisticated version where the pupil employed
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a theory of scientific progress by successive entailinent of theories:
"to advance science [] you must know all the accepted theories 
so you can make up a new one by scrunching them together [] 
the newest theory contains all the old ones, it swallows them 
up., they're not gone, they're hidden inside if you look hard 
enough."
(Sian, aged 17 years, Upper 6th Year, Secondary School science 
pupil).
These last two quotations also exemplify something else that was very
common in educands' answers to my 3 questions, namely, their tendency to
/ euse extended metaphors, similes and the like (N.B. henceforth I shall use 
the term 'metaphor* to refer to all such forms). This tendency was 
central to the first of 2 compound reasons why I decided to elicit 
metaphors as part of my interview method:
My first reason originates from my judgement that interviewees who used 
* metaphors found them to be a very helpful vehicle with which to 
formulate and initially articulate their ideas. I partially explain 
this by virtue of the novelty which many interviewees claimed ray 
questions had for them, a quality which meant that they lacked a ready 
"form of words" with which to answer. In further and complementary 
elaboration of why metaphor may facilitate response to such questions, 
many of the issues and ideas which I wished to elicit from, and to 
explore with, interviewees were profoundly metaphysical in nature. 
Accessing one's metaphysical commitments is notoriously difficult and, 
indeed, it is normally possible never to need to do so (Taylor, 1974, 
p.1). Again, metaphysical commitments are often highly personal beliefs 
constituting 'values', 'core constructs', 'constructive principles' and 
the like (cf. discussion, section 4*4.). The critical and interrogative 
qualities of the interview situation, particularly with respect to 
metaphysical beliefs, may have evoked feeling of 'threat' and/or of
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'hostility', in Kellyan senses (see Appendix 3)> on the part of the 
interviewees and may have been behind their often repeated claim to find 
ray questions difficult to answer. Metaphorical expression may be 
especially suited for eliciting and discussing metaphysical beliefs 
because it allows extra room for personal and negotiated development 
(and re-interpretation} of meaning by virtue of the "non-literality" of 
the metaphor's reference. This last point may best be developed through 
a brief, joint, consideration of both the form which metaphysical 
commitments often take and of modern theories of the function of 
metaphors. Such a consideration, however, comes under the purview of my 
second reason for deciding to elicit metaphors:
My second reason, then, is intimately connected with my interest in 
theories of metaphor, an interest which was prompted by Dr. John Gilbert 
who, early in 1981, introduced for discussion within the Personal 
Construction of Knowledge Group (PCKG) the collection of papers entitled 
Metaphor and Thought, edited by Ortony (1979)* The bulk of essays in 
that collection are written from a constructivist perspective and it was 
naturally these which we explored in our discussions and seminars.
In a paper written and circulated in draft form during that time, Pope 
and Gilbert provide a lucid summary of a framework of perspectives for 
appraising metaphor proposed by Max Black who is one of the leading 
constructivist theorists:
'Firstly, there is the substitution view. According to 
this the entire sentence that is the focus of the 
metaphor can be replaced by a set of literal sentences.
In the comparison view, the sentence containing the 
metaphor can be reduced to a paraphrase which contains an
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implicit literal statement of some similarity or analogy.
A third model, the interactive view, can be summarized as
follows:
In the metaphor 'A is as B',
(i) *A' is the 'primary subject* and 'B' is the 
'secondary subject';
(ii) the secondary subject can be regarded as a 'system 
of relations', or 'implicative complex';
(iii)the metaphor works by 'projecting upon the primary 
subject a set of "associated implications" comprised 
in the implicative complex, that are predictable of 
the secondary subject';
(iv) 'the maker of the metaphorical statement selects, 
emphasizes, suppresses and organizes features of the 
primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic 
with the members of the secondary subjects implicative 
complex';
(v) the two subjects interact as follows: the primary 
subject causes the learner to select some of the 
secondary subject's properties and causes construction of
a parallel implication complex to fit the primary subject
which reciprocally induces parallel changes in the 
secondary subject.'
(Pope and Gilbert, 1985, p.251: original emphasis).
Pope and Gilbert's main concern in that paper was to formulate a set of
empirical questions concerning the use of metaphor, construed 
constructivistically as per, e.g., Black's interaction model, in 
explanation in the context of science education.
For my part, I saw the exploration of interviewees* metaphors primarily 
in terms of methodological triangulation, viz. as an additional means of 
construing their idea3 - their personal explanations- dimensionally, 
invoking similarities and contrasts, without using classical Kellyan 
elicitation techniques.
Constructions of a profoundly metaphysical nature are often expressed 
initially in an overtly metaphorical form, e.g. light-wave. It thus did 
not surprise me that interviewees characteristically employed metaphors 
when answering Q2 (re. their personal meaning of 'scientific progress')
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since it may be argued that it is in that question that metaphysical 
commitments, concerning ultimate reality and our access to it etc, come 
most to the fore.
With this in mind, I initially considered supplying metaphors culled 
from the writings of influential philosophers of science and/or their 
commentators to explore educands' personal meanings of 'scientific 
progress’. Such an approach has been successfully used by Beck, an 
anthropologist, who supplied a set of 4 choices of (e.g.) vegetal images 
to interviewees in order to elicit their personal constructions of 
'ethnicity' and 'ancestral identity' (Beck,^ 1981). Despite strenuous 
attempts, however, I could not find (or create) metaphors which I judged 
to be either specific enough between epistemological traditions, on the 
one hand, or general enough within such traditions on the other hand. I 
also felt that it would be closer to the principles of my research 
philosophy if I elicited metaphors. This I did with a handful of 
postgraduate students by first asking them if they could give me an 
example of a metaphor or an analogy. If they responded with what I 
considered to be an authentic example I went on to explain how any 
metaphor will, in addition to implying some quality of similarity 
between referents, also "break down" in some area(s) of comparison.
This I demonstrated with either their example or one of my own 
(unrelated to science). With this done I asked the following question: 
'Can you give me a metaphor for 'scientific progress'?'
One student's metaphor which I elicited in this way was as follows:
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"science is like a projector which scientists are trying 
to focus. We know that there is a perfec-t clear picture 
somewhere at the end...but they are not sure, cannot be sure 
whether they will ever be able to focus to it. ( ) All we
can be sure of is that the pictures we are getting now are 
better than those earlier ones and science is getting quicker 
all the time ( ). At any time the picture is blurred. We
know this because scientific predictions often fail to be 
exact. ( ) we know we're going in the right direction
because... by comparing later predictions with earlier 
predictions we can see that we're advancing in the right 
direction because the predictions are becoming less 
approximate, you know, more sharp ( ) when the end of science
is reached everything will be clear everything will work and 
have its place, nothing will be a mystery.
(Stephen A., aged 25 years, 3rd Year Postgraduate Biochemistry 
student).
I construed this metaphor to indicate a commitment to convergent 
epistemological realism and to objectivist epistemology - 
interpretations which I soon corroborated by further questioning. This 
student expressed enjoyment at having thought about science in this way 
and said that he was glad that I had not asked him "cold" - a sentiment 
expressed by some of the others.
Encouraged and informed by these early successes, which seemed to 
promise a novel means for short circuiting the elicitation process, 
at least with this particular question, I developed the following 
guidelines for eliciting and exploring metaphors:
(1) Ask the interviewee if they know what a metaphor is (e.g.
"Can you tell me what a metaphor is?").
(2) If you consider the interviewee to have a personal 
understanding of metaphor which i3 suitable for your purpose, 
then elicit any metaphor (e.g. "Can you give me an example of 
a metaphor?"). This shall be the 'specimen metaphor*.
Usually the interviewee shall have generated one 
spontaneously in their answer to *(1)’. If the interviewee 
has difficulty, however, it may be helpful to provide one, 
making sure that it is as unrelated to your intended universe 
of discourse as possible.
(3) Specimen metaphors obtained by either means (i.e. 
"spontaneous" or "provided") may need negotiation, viz.
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converting into a mutually clearer or otherwise more 
convenient form.
(4) Explore the specimen metaphor, viz. draw attention to its
features of (a), non-literality (non-identity of referents), 
and, by way of elaboration, (b) similarities and, (c), 
contrasts between its referents (i.e. areas of comparison in 
which it "breaks down").
(5) Explain that the features you have identified are common
to all metaphors; that the specific manifestations of these 
features were found by your exploration of their specimen 
metaphor and it was these which enabled you to understand 
their personal meaning for that metaphor; that you shall wish 
to repeat the exploratory process with another metaphor which 
you shall soon ask them to think up.
(6) Elicit the 'research metaphor': e.g. "Can you give me a 
metaphor for scientific progress?"
(7) Negotiate the research metaphor if necessary - as per
*(3.)*• Repeat '(4)' in light of your specialised knowledge of 
the subject area.
I used this technique - 'elicited metaphors' - with the 7 pupils 
comprising the Fl(P’) population of my main study (see table 8.4., 
below; for a full example and discussion of this technique see Chapter 9)»
In their responses to Q3, a minority of pupils attributed neither
investigative nor epistemic qualities to 'scientific-method'. Thus, for
example, I construed one pupil to understand 'scientific-method' as a
very broad characterization of the activity of conducting science
differing from that in science classrooms only in degree, not in kind:
"real scientists do the same as us but they use more 
complicated equipment...and maths...ours is never very 
dangerous."
(Terry, 17 years old, Lower 6th Year Secondary School science 
pupil).
Another such pupil seemed to construe scientific-method as a convention 
for the clear communication of facts for assessment later:
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"We use scientific-method to write our experiments down in [] 
it's so Mr. [x]  can mark it easier."
(Jackie, aged 14 years, 4th Year Secondary School pupil).
This comment reminded me of Ms. S' comments concerning her attempts to 
teach her pupils "the basic scientific method" (see Ch.6.), an account 
which recapitulates the 'scientific fraud' described by Medawar (1964) 
and which in turn embodies an essentially Baconian, accumulative- 
fragraentalist, epistemology of science.
I did, indeed, construe the majority of pupils to articulate an
accumulative-fragmentalist epistemology of science, some in an almost
overtly Baconian manner:
"First you do your observations to get your hypothesis...then 
you can prove your hypothesis by doing a test of it., if it 
happens like it says it should, you're right., if not you 
start again taking more care this time."
(Mike S., aged 16 years, Lower 6th Year, Secondary School 
science pupil).
Finally, a recurring idea in educands' responses which may be argued to
complement the last one was that scientific-method is an algorithm for
the achievement, or at least, progress towards the achievement, of
objective or factual knowledge. In such constructions the main
contribution of scientific-method is the negative one of excluding
unscientific elements in thought and action (cf., for example, the last
quotation from Mike S. re. 'scientific-method' with that for hi3 view on
'unscientific', quoted earlier). This view was particularly strongly held
amongst the older educands whom I interviewed:
"the use of scientific-method stops scientists getting carried 
away with themselves [] it stops the discovery of new theories 
being contaminated with things the scientist might want to 
believe [J in this way science gradually sorts facts from 
fiction."
(Anita, aged 20 years, 2nd Year Undergraduate Biochemistry 
student).
- 8.22 -
I hope that the quotations which I have excerpted from the interviews of
FIv1 and FIv2(a) illustrate the sorts of categories of response which I 
n
was beginning to discern. Whilst I believe that these interviews
provide a compelling case for the view that amongst the educands whom I
interviewed there was a prevailing commitment to some kind of empiricist
epistemology of science - and it can be put no more precisely than that
*
- I came to doubt the subtlety and sophistication of my 3 Question 
approach. In some of my later FIv2(a) interviews which tended to be 
longer I discerned slight indications that whilst some educands might 
initially elaborate and endorse (say) an empiricist-inductivist 
epistemology they might later in the interview seem to favour (say) a 
Weltanschauung one, or vice versa. In some cases like these I suspected 
that the context of our discussion (e.g. specific episodes from the 
history of science) might influence the educand’s epistemological 
commitments - a feature that would be consistent with my own 
epistemological stance which both embraces context dependency of meaning 
and tolerates epistemological pluralism. The approach I adopted in 
phase 2 of my 3 Questions approach - FIv2(b) - was influenced by such 
possibilities and considerations.
8.2.2.2. Main Study FIv2(b)
I conducted these interviews with only 7 educands drawn entirely from 
the 3rd and 4th Years of a Secondary School.
Partly in an attempt to develop FIv2, I augmented my 3 Questions with a 
prior Written Exercise (WE), as discussed in Ch.7* Pupils’ responses 
to each of the 3 sections of WE provided me with information as to
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their views roughly corresponding to my 3 Questions in the following 
way:
WE Section 'A' re. classification of a scientific job: FIv2,
Q1 re. unscientific;
WE Section 'B' re. illuminative incident of scientific 
activity: FIv2, Q3 re. scientific-method;
WE Section 'C' re. theory-ladenness of observations: FIv2, Q2 
re. scientific progress.
In each interview I had the pupil's WE before us. This provided not only
a useful entree into my 3 Questions of FIv2 within the interview itself,
but also on-going feedback for the development of ray WE which went
through a number of revisions partly as a result of this. The
interviews also provided some degree of corroboration that the
occupation classifications of WE Q1 would, indeed, constitute
’representative elements' in my later application of a supplied element
Repertory Grid.
In addition to augmenting FIv2 with references to WE I had observed two 
lessons immediately prior to conducting this set of interviews. I had 
chosen to observe each of these lessons partly due to their respective 
teachers' common intention to use a model as part of the experimental 
design and partly due to my desire to pilot my use of a lesson 
observation method developed by Schatzman and Strauss (1973, as 
described in Ch.4. Pive of the seven interviewees were drawn from one or 
other of these lessons. With these pupils I asked questions relating to 
the specific experimental design used in each lesson (which was of 
intrinsic interest to me) and so was also able to appraise the relative 
efficacy of Schatzman & Strauss' observation method in the cause of 
'methodological triangulation' (discussed in Ch.5.) relative to my own 
methods which I had used before.
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Although I originally intended these interviews to he only a part of my 
pilot-studies, in the event I judged the material they generated to be 
sufficiently rich to be included within ray main study: the FIv2(b)
interviews correspond to the Fl(P') educands of my main sample, 
described in section 8.5*2., below. This notwithstanding, prior to 
interviewing the remaining educands comprising my main sample, I strove 
to improve my interview method further: FIv3*
8.2.2.3* Main Study FIv3> *15 Questions*
My sample of educands for these interviews was as co-extensive with my 
main-study class/tutorial-group observations as possible, viz. 7 x Lower 
6th Year science pupils - 'Fl(P")'; 8 x 1st Year Undergraduate science 
students - 'Fl(St)’ (see Ch.6 for my discussion of class/tutorial-group 
observations). Within FIv3, however, I tended only to refer to 
observations I had made in a class or tutorial group if they concerned 
that particular interviewee and if I felt that by my doing so I might 
develop my personal understanding of that interviewee's ideas. 
Alternatively, an interviewee, knowing that I had been present at the 
time, might occasionally include within their exposition a reference to 
a discussion or some other incident which took place within a lesson or 
tutorial. In FIv3> then, my class and tutorial observations served 
primarily as a critical background knowledge informing ray interpretation 
of interviewees' responses.
As my account so far implies, by the time of these interviews I had 
given up as over-ambitious my earlier plans to link specific 
alternative-conceptions of science with specific alternative-conceptions
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in science by way of an explanation - I suggest that such would make an
interesting project for future research for the origin and maintenance
of the latter (see Ch.10). This notwithstanding the fact that I was
beginning also by now to find independent ,>theoretical, corroboration
(i.e. a complementary philosophical rationale) for this conjecture in
the writings of both Kelly and Feyerabend and whose basic stances I had
embraced almost from the beginning of my research, e.g.
'Men not only construe their alternatives, but they construe 
also criteria for choosing between them*
(Kelly, 1969, p.85)
'We concede that our epistemic activities may have a decisive 
influence even upon the most solid piece of cosmological . 
furniture - they may make gods disappear and replace them by 
heaps of atoms in empty space.'
(Feyerabend, 1978, p.70).
My experience from FIv2(a), (b) corroborated my judgement that only one
form of FI would be necessary for application across Secondary and
Tertiary populations of educands. ’ I made the majority of my
improvements to FIv2 by examining the sub-questions and elicitative
tactics which I had been using and then including more of those which I
judged to have worked both more explicitly within interviews and more
consistently within interviews. I was also guided by the tentative
categories of response which I had created in earlier pilot-studies.
(This very largely explains the compatibility, for purposes of
interpretation and analysis, of Fl(P') with Fl(P") and Fl(St)
populations of educands). Finally, I also found Klemke, Hollinger and
Kline's list of 'some main topics in philosphy of science' helpful in
this task:
V(1) The formal sciences: logic and mathematics. Logic and math 
are often referred to as sciences. In what sense, if any, are they 
sciences? How do we know logical and mathematical truths? What, 
if anything, are they true of? What is the relation of mathematics 
to empirical science?
- 8.26 -
(2) Scientific description. What constitutes an adequate 
scientific description? What is the "logic" of concept formation 
which enters into such description?
(3) Scientific explanation. What is meant by saying that science 
explains? What is a scientific explanation? Are there other kinds 
of explanations? If so, how are they related to those of science?
(4) Prediction. We say that science predicts. What makes this 
possible? What is the relation of prediction to explanation? What 
is the relation of testing to both?
(5) Causality and law. We sometimes hear it said that science 
explains by means of laws. What are scientific laws? How do we 
serve to explain? Further, we sometimes speak of explaining laws. 
How can that be? Many laws are known as causal laws. What does 
that mean? Are there noncausal laws? If so, what are they?
(6) Theories, models, and scientific systems. We also hear it 
said that science explains by means of theories. What are 
theories? How are they related to laws? How do they function in 
explanation? What is meant by a "model" in science? What role do 
models play in science?
(7) Determinism. Discussions of lawfulness lead to the question 
of determinism. What is meant by determinism in science? Is the 
deterministic thesis (if it is a thesis) true? Or what reason, if 
any, do we have for thinking it to be true?
(8) Philosophical problems of physical science. The physical 
sciences have, in recent years, provided a number of philosophical 
problems. For example, some have held that relativity theory 
introduces a subjective component into science. Is this true? 
Others have said that quantum physics denies or refutes 
determinism. Is this true or false?
(9) Philosophical problems of biology and psychology. First, are 
these sciences genuinely distinct? If so, why? If not, why not? 
Further, are these sciences ultimately reducible to physics, or 
perhaps to physics and chemistry? This gets us into the old 
"vitalism/mechanism" controversy.
(10) The social sciences. There are some who deny that the social 
sciences are genuine sciences. Why? Are they right or wrong? Is 
there any fundamental difference between the natural sciences and 
the social sciences?
(11) History. Is history a science? We often speak of historical 
laws. Are there really any such laws? Or are there only general 
trends? Or neither?
(12) Reduction and the unity of science. We have already briefly 
referred to this issue. The question here is whether it is 
possible to reduce one science to another and whether all of the 
sciences are ultimately reducible to a single science or a 
combination of fundamental sciences (such as physics and 
chemistry).
(13) Extensions of science. Sometimes scientists turn into 
metaphysicians. They make "radical" statements about the universe 
- e.g., about the ultimate heatrdeath, or that it is imbued with 
moral progress. Is there any validity in these claims?
(14) Science and values. Does science have anything to say with 
regard to values? Or is it value-neutral?
(15) Science and religion. Do the findings and conclusions of 
science have any implications for traditional religious or 
theological commitments? If so, what are they?
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(16) Science and culture. Both religion and the domain of values 
may be considered to be parts or aspects of culture. But surely 
the term culture also refers to other activities and practices. 
What is the relationship of science to these?
(17) The limits of science. Are there limits of science? If so, 
what are they? By what criteria, if any, can we establish that 
such limits are genuine?1
(Klemke, Hollinger and Kline, 1980, p.4-5)*
My deliberations resulted in an FI comprised of _1_5 questions amongst
which my original 3 questions of FIv2 were retained, albeit, the
expression 'scientific-progress' now amended to 'an advancement in
scientific knowledge' in an attempt to focus attention upon epistemic
dimensions of scientific-progress. The key words associated with these
questions (which were asked in a similar manner to those in FIv1,2) may
be grouped into the following "domains" which, in some applications or
within some persons, may overlap or even co-extend:
'coramonsense' 
'to know' 
'fact'
'truth'
'proof'
'hypothesis' 
'theory' 
'law'
'scientific method' 
'experiment'
'control experiment' 
'experimental test'
'unscientific'
'an advancement 
in scientific knowledge' 
’a knowledge of 
history of science'
A.Personal 
Epistemologies
B.Scientific 
Meta-Theory
C.Scientific 
Meta-Method
D.Scientific 
Epistemplogy
Table 8.1. FIv3» '13 Questions' (Key Words)
In FIv3 I would additionally resort to classification of occupations, 
responding-with-pictures technique and/or elicited metaphors where I 
thought that this might help.
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8»3« A Focussed Interview for Exploring Educators' Personal 
Epistemologies of Science
My sample of educators was comprised of 6 teachers - 'Fl(T)', and 2 
lecturers - 'Fl(L)'. Included amongst them were those educators whose 
classes or tutorial groups I had observed a3 part of my main study 
(Fl(T)2, FI(L)1 ,2 - see section 8.5.2., below; also see Ch.6 for an 
account of the class/tutorial observations).
I "pilot^ ed", or developed, this FI only in the sense that I had had 
many informal interviews (see section 8.4*# below) with educators by the 
time of conducting these interviews and some of the questions which I 
tended to ask were derivative of my FI for educands.
Amongst things which I wished to explore with educators was whether they 
perceived a difference between their 'personal epistemology of 
science' and what I shall call their 'professional epistemology of 
science'. In this study I have tended to assume that the latter 
coincides with, or includes, what I shall term the educator's 
'pedagogic epistemology of science' although I concede that they 
need not do so in all cases. Where such a distinction could be made 
(for example, with some lecturers), however, my interest for purposes of 
this thesis would only be with their pedagogic epistemology of science.
With respect to educators' pedagogic epistemology of science, then, I 
was keen to explore their perception of curricular constraints and 
possibilities for the teaching of science in general, and philosophy of
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science in particular (of my 'strong thesis' for philosophy in science 
education, Ch.2.).
Finally, I was interested to look for any general similarities and 
contrasts between teachers' and lecturers' personal and professional 
epistemologies of science and which might be argued to be attributable 
to the lecturers' current occupational status of 'scientist'.
I would start interviews with a request for the educator to provide me
with a synopsis of their personal academic background. In the case of
teachers, my principal research interest here was to find out if they
had ever been employed as a scientist. Following this I would proceed,
where appropriate, with a series of questions the main one of which was
"Can you tell me what, in broad terms, you are trying to 
achieve through your science teaching?"
If the ensuing conversation did not cover the issues in which I was
interested I would pursue ray enquiry with questions such as
"Do you try to engender understanding about scientific - 
method through your teaching?"
"What is your personal meaning of the expression 'an 
advancement in scientific knowledge'?"
"Do you think that a knowledge of history of science is 
important for the scientist? (vs. the student-scientist?)"
"Are there any teaching techniques that you feel are 
especially enlightened or useful in the science 
classroom?"
With those interviewees whose classes or tutorial groups I had observed 
as part of my main study, I would usually ask some pre-prepared 
questions which were specific to them.
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I deliberately timed my FIs with each population of educators to take 
place only after I had implemented all other investigative methods with 
the educators' associated populations of educands and had also completed 
at least a preliminary interpretation of the data created therefrom.
This was in order for me to achieve the richest possible contextual 
knowledge informing my conduct and interpretation of these interviews 
since it was principally in light of these that I anticipated making any 
recommendations for improvements in the actual practice of teaching, as 
opposed to more-or-less academic suggestions for "future research".
8.4 Informal Interviews
In between lesson or tutorial observations and FIs there were many 
opportunities for me to talk informally with educators and educands. 
Similarly, there were many occasipns when I overheard conversations held 
by others or individual comments made. Again, at the end of a lesson or 
tutorial observation or an interview educators and educands would often 
add or volunteer comments after I had switched off the audio-recorder 
(sometimes because I had switched it off: see discussion, section 8.8., 
below). When such comments or dialogue seemed to me to be relevant to 
my research I noted down the actual words spoken as accurately as I was 
able to do. I did this at the earliest opportunity after the event. 
To assist me in the task I often spoke my recollections into a miniature 
audio-recorder which I carried around with me at all times for this 
purpose.
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8.5 Interviewee Main Sample
8.5.1 Source of Interviewees
I have presented a description of the educational institutions, classes 
and tutorial groups from which I selected interviewees, together with 
details of my entrees for them, in Ch.6.
8.5*2 Details of Interviewees
A total of 30 interviews comprised my main sample. These interviews 
were conducted between two main interviewee populations, viz. educands 
(pupils and students) and educators (teachers and lecturers):
Educands Educators
P,n = 14 T,n = 6 Secondary Educ. Level.
St,n = 8 L,n = 2 Tertiary Educ. Level.
Where P = Pupils, St = Students,
T = Teachers, L = Lecturers.
Table 8.2. Showing Composition of Interviewee Main Sample
A more detailed presentation is given in Table 8.4 overleaf.
I selected P' educands on the basis of responses to WE which I found 
interesting. Thus, for example, I selected (subject to the willingness 
of the individuals concerned) 3 pupils from my 3rd category of response 
to WE Q8, i.e. 'Sophisticated?', in order to explore the possibility
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that some pupils who^I had categorized in this way mi^ itmore 
authentically have been included in either ray 'Sophisticated' or 'Naive' 
category. In the case of one of these pupils - Paul (Fl(P')5) - I judged, 
this, indeed, to be the case and so "upgraded" my categorization of his 
response from 'Sophisticated?' to 'Sophisticated' - thereby indicating 
not only a limitation upon the authenticity of my categorization of 
responses to this question but also the value of 'methodological 
triangulation' as a methodological check.
I intended P" and St populations of educands to be co-extensive with my 
main study class and tutorial observations, respectively. With the 
exception of one pupil (from T.O. Group 2), who was ill throughout the 
period during which I was conveniently able to conduct interviews, this 
1 was, in fact, the case.
Finally, I similarly chose to interview all educators whose lessons or 
tutorials I had observed. In addition, however, I interviewed an 
opportunistically selected sample of teachers.
8.6. Method of Conducting Focussed Interviews
When eliciting consent from educands and educators to interview them I 
characterised the purpose of my research as "an investigation of pupils* 
(students’) and teachers'(lecturers’) personal meanings of some words 
commonly used in and about science". I also gave educands an assurance 
that there were "no right or wrong answers".
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With the prior consent of interviewees I audio-recorded all interviews 
which I conducted. Interviews were private and anony^mous in so far as 
no one else from the relevant educational institution was present at the 
time or ever heard the recording. I also promised each interviewee that 
I would strive to preserve their anonymity in every other way both 
within and without their institution. To render this promise palpable 
to interviewees, I told them that at the conclusion of the recorded part 
of the interview they would have the option of retaining the recording 
if for any reason they so wished - an offer which I repeated at the 
conclusion of the actual interview.
Within schools, I usually interviewed both pupils and teachers in an 
empty laboratory and preparation room previously designated for this 
purpose. Within Universities, I conducted my pilot-interviews within 
my student accommodation (a study,-bedroom). For my Main-Study, the 
University library kindly made available, at my request, a room (with a 
key!) specifically for my use throughout the interview period of one 
week. I interviewed lecturers in their personal laboratory-office.
I began all FIs with a request for a synopsis of the educand's or 
educator's personal occupational and academic background. I also 
committed these details to an 'interview proforma', appropriate to each 
interviewee population, i.e. P, St.y T, or L.
My methodological concern during this part of the interview 
was to help the interviewee relax and to speak whilst being audio­
recorded.
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With all educands, I began the FI proper by asking them for their 
personal meaning of ’unscientific'. Thereafter, however, I did not 
rigidly adhere to either a set sequence in which to ask the remaining, 
pre-planned, questions or selection from such questions, over and above 
my ’3 Questions' of FIv2 which were common to all my Main Study FIs. In 
my '15 Questions' interview (i.e. FIv3), for example, I did not always 
elicit meanings for every expression - my list was only intended as a 
guide. During FIv3 dialogues, I used a series of 12.5 x 7.5cm cards 
upon each of which were the key words (as per Table 8.1., above) 
corresponding to one of the 15 questions. I "embedded" each key-word(s) 
within a question in a manner similar to FIv2. I hoped that these cards 
would assist in the elicitation process by hel^ping the educandsto focus 
their attention upon the expression under consideration and, likewise, 
by their manual sorting and clustering of cards where the generation of 
distinctions between personal meanings of key words seemed useful. An 
example of these cards is reproduced in Figure 8.4» below:
scientific-method
Figure 8.4. Showing FIv3 Elicitation Card (Actual Size).
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In all Main Stud FIs with educands, I also had elicitation proformae
for "scientific occupation" (4-- -- 1--   Cf. Ch.7, section
7*3«1.2.1.: discussion re. ’Elicitation of Elements') and for
"scientific activity" ( 4---------  Cf.Ch.7, section 7«42.2.:
discussion re. 'Responding-With-Pictures Technique') in case I might 
wish to incorporate these approaches. With P' educands only I had their 
school exercise hook, any documentary teaching materials used in lessons in 
which I had observed them , and their WE script at hand to assist 
with my questions. This was principally to minimize the purely memorial 
demands of my questions.
At the end of each FI, by which I mean when I had ceased to audio-record 
it, I invited each interviewee to comment upon their experience of the 
interview. This was to find out whether they had views which they had 
not felt able or willing to commit to the audio-recording. I also 
repeated as sensitively as possible my invitation to keep the recording 
if they so wished - an offer never taken up. Finally, I asked 
interviewees to refrain from discussing the content of the interview 
with any potential interviewee until after the collective interview 
period.
Interviews lasted from 20 minutes to nearly 2 hours: with P' educands 
the mean duration was around 20-25 minutes and with P" and St. educands 
around 40-50 minutes; with teachers around 30-40 minutes and with the 
two lecturers, one lasted 45 minutes, the other 2 hours.
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8.7. Method of Transcribing and of Interpreting Focussed Interviews
Clearly no method of "recording an interview" - here understood only in the 
very general sense of making some kind of representation or account of it - 
can recapture the total experience of the interview. From the moment a 
"record" is made, "data" is inevitably "degraded" to some degree.
Equally from that moment, however, an interpretation has begun even if 
this is "only" in the sense of endorsing, tacitly or explicitly, the 
constraints which are necessarily imposed by the method of recording 
upon the possible class(es) of "data" to be sought. Audio-recording 
alone, for example, imposes the interpretative judgement that spoken 
words (language) are more important than, e.g., gestures (movement). If 
the reverse judgement is made, or a judgement which attributes more 
equal importance to the two, then some form of visual, or audio-visual, 
method of recording might respectively be more suitable. Moreover, the 
choice of method of recording may impose specific constraints upon the
responses of the collaboratee and which may only be discerned when a
different method is adopted. The principal purpose, which I have
already alluded to, of appending IIs to FIs was to explore the well 
recognised possibility that some persons do not feel that they can speak 
freely when being audio-recorded however sensitively the interview may 
have been conducted. Thus the activities of recording and interpreting 
("analysis") cannot ultimately or entirely be separated, though they may 
continue usefully to be distinguished in many contexts.
With these recently made points in mind, I can state that, at different 
stages of the whole process, I carried out elements of my methods of 
transcription and of interpretation either concurrently or cyclicly
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("re-iteratively"). This was partly due to my being personally 
responsible for executing all aspects of these tasks, as I hope shall 
become clear in my account which follows.
As I mentioned earlier, at the end of the FI proper I engaged in an II 
with the interviewee. Following this, i.e. immediately after the 
interviewee had departed, I noted pertinent details of the II in an 
'Interview Field Notebook'. Also then, or on the evening of the 
interview at the latest, I began a first, or "preliminary", stage of 
interpretation. This consisted of my implementing, in a very 
abbreviated way and with the aid of memory and/or a "scan" listening to 
the audio-recording, the 'strategy of recording' due to Schatzman and 
Strauss (1973) and which I had also used in my Class Observations (see 
Ch.6 for my detailed description of this method). Thus I made 
'Observation Notes' (ONs) relating, principally to the interviewee's 
emotional or gestural state at certain points of the interview (FI 
and/or II) which I felt might be important in my detailed interpretation 
later and which I might otherwise forget, e.g. 'John appeared very 
nervous when I asked him to distinguish 'fact' from 'truth'.' I also 
noted down the gist of any responses which I found interesting in light . 
of my then reasonably undifferentiated and unelaborated complex of 
psychological, epistemological and pedagogical knowledge and 
commitments. I often accompanied these tentative interpretations or 
'Theoretical Notes' (TNs), and which I would sometimes also propose as a 
possible 'category of response' (' (c)?'), inferred from my prior 
interpretative experience of pilot-FIs and WE^with a 'Methodological 
Note' (MN) to repeat the question or other tactic which elicited the 
view if I judged it to have been efficacious. In my field note-
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situation - naive empiricist? Ask next C. for origin of scientific 
problems.' The purpose of these notes was simply to initiate, right 
from the start, and in the context of my interviewing, what might be 
called a "formative" or "cyclical", rather than a deductive or 
analytical, method of interpretation. Figure 8.5*, below, shows a 
photo-reduction of my field interview notes which I made for an 
undergraduate student, named Andrew (FI (St) 3)» (cf. transcript 
Appendix i )
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Figure 8.5* Showing Photo-Reduction of Field 
Interview Notes for the Focussed 
Interview with Andrew (Fl(St)3)»
This first, preliminary, stage of interpretation partially pre-empted 
and short-circuited my second stage. The latter consisted of a full 
transcription of the FI, together with a more thorough and explicit 
(re)application of Schatzman and Strauss’ (1973) 'strategy for 
recording'.
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To elaborate upon my second stage of interpretation, I used a 
transcription method or format which was loosely based upon one proposed 
by Watts, Harrison and Gilbert (1982). This was partially because I 
shared with these authors the fundamental judgement that whilst the 
content of speech should be recorded as accurately as possible, the 
representation of intonation, pitch range etc was thought to be 
relatively unimportant for our research interests (alternative 
conceptions in and of science, respectively).
I shall follow Watts et al. by discussing the transcription method in 
terms of style and notation, although I have altered many details of 
their original proposal.
‘ (&) Style Capital letters, quotation marks, full stops, commas, semi­
colons and the like are features of written English which correspond 
only loosely to those of spoken English. Accordingly, these are kept to 
a minimum to avoid pre-emptive interpretation.
(b) Format and Notation. To facilitate tracing any part of the 
interview when editing, the transcription is laid out with a first 
column on the left-hand side for recording the number of tape 
revolutions from the "rev-counter", e.g. 001. Side two of a tape is 
indicated thus, e.g. 2/001. The first side of a second tape is shown 
e*g» 3/001 , the second side by, e.g. 4/001 , and so on. In the 
second column on the left hand side are entered the initial of the 
speaker - 'I' for the interviewer and the initial of either the first 
name for educands or the second name plus title (e.g. Mr, Mrs, Ms, Dr) 
for educators. In typed transcripts, the speech fills the rest of the 
page but in the original manuscript (from which they are copy-typed)
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there is a 3 l/2cm margin on the right-hand side in which ONs, TNs and
MNs may be recorded. The following are details of notation.
(1) -Use of capital letters is generally restricted to an unambiguously 
begun new utterance, for a similarly begun new sentence within an 
utterance and for proper names. Question and exclamation marks are 
used in the normal way.
(2) -Pauses are shown by a full stop or series of full stops, the
number providing a rough indication of the duration of the pause. 
Longer pauses are shown thus, e.g. (pause), (long pause). Commas
are used only as apostrophies; colons and semi-colons are dispensed
with.
(3) -Interruptions are shown by ending the previous speaker's utterance 
with two dashes, enclosing the interrupter's utterance with two 
dashes at either end, and prefacing the original speaker's resumed 
utterance with two dashes.
e.g. A. 001 the quick brown......
B. 001 ....the quick uhuh...
A. 002 ....fox jumps over the lazy dog.
(4) -Transcriber's doubt is shown by an asterisk within a bracket with
as much of the sound included as possible, e.g. (*), (*the quick).
(5) -Minor interpretations and observations are included within 
brackets where appropriate, e.g. (agreeing), (laughs), (looks 
distressed), (coughs) (alarm bell sounds).
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(6) -Repetitions and minor errors of speech which are judged to be non­
substantive are omitted without indication. Urns and ers are 
included where appropriate.
(7) -Within excerpts from transcripts, used for purposes of commentary 
and interpretation, omitted, locally non-substantive, speech is 
indicated by empty brackets inserted within an utterance(s), e.g. 
the quick brown fox ( ) jumps over the lazy dog. A short
"bridging passage" or word may be included within the brackets
where this is judged to assist the flow of words and not to alter 
the sense originally intended by the speaker, e.g. the quick brown
fox jumps (over) the lazy dog.
‘ I made free reference to my Field Interview Notebook throughout my 
interpretative annotation of the transcript which I interpolated with my 
transcription.
A page exerpted from my "second stage" interpretative transcription, 
again of the FI with Andrew (Fl(St)3) shows some of these recently 
discussed features of the method:
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the Transcript/Interpretation of the 
Focussed Interview vith Andrew (Fl(St)3)«
I may now return emphasis to a consideration of my method of 
interpretation.
I began with a single audio-recording of an FI and at appropriate points 
during (or after) transcription would attempt to decide what that 
particular interviewee was trying to say about the 'meta-concept' in
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question. Such decisions would represent "interpretative hypotheses". 
These I would note down as TNs and would use tentatively in my approach 
to interpreting the corresponding parts of the next FI. As a result of 
this subsequent application of interpretative hypotheses, I would judge 
some to have utility in understanding and explaining a response(s) from 
the later transcript, suggesting a commonality between responses. Where 
I judged this to be the case I would propose a tentative explanatory 
title for a ’category of response'. I was assisted in this process by 
the patterns of responses which I had already discerned and recorded in 
my Field Interview Notebook, which, in turn, was informed by my prior 
interpretative experience of WG and pilot-interviews. Equally some 
interpretative hypotheses from a later transcript helped me to 
(re)interpret responses from an earlier transcript. So my strategy of 
1 interpretation duly became cyclical. I additionally used MNs to alert 
my attention to, and to direct, my inter-transcript comparisons and re­
interpretations. Throughout this process I repeatedly "collapsed" a 
number of tentative categories of response under one of what became my 
"final" set of categories (see section 8.8., below). Of course, some 
interpretative hypotheses remained unique and specific to a respondent.
- 8.45 -
8.8 Categories of Response.
8.8.1 Introduction
In this section of the chapter I shall present a summary of the categories 
of response for each of the two populations (ie, educands and educators). 
With each category I shall present the substantive meta-theory where it is 
novel or seems necessary to do so, otherwise I shall refer the reader to 
where it was introduced earlier in the thesis.
For an in-depth interview case-study of a pupil, see Chapter 9. Full 
transcripts of an interview with a student, a teacher and a lecturer are 
included in Appendices i ? , it and respectively.
8.8.2 Educands 
Category 1
Questions re Epistemology of Science Novel and Difficult to Answer
(a) Tautologous
(b) Related to School Science
(c) No Personal Scientific Activities Outside School
(d) Inexplicable Explicative Device
(e) Rhetoric of Conclusions
(f) 3rd Personification
Category 2
"Weak" Senses of 1 Science', 'Scientific1 
- in McClelland's (1984) sense, see Chapter 5.
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Category 3
"Weak" Senses of 'Method1, 'Methodology'
Complementing McClelland's distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' senses 
of 'science' and 'scientific' (Category 1, above), I propose a distinction 
between 'strong' and 'weak' senses of 'method' and methodology'.
(a) 'strong' senses of 'method', methodology':
These are where an individual articulates, or where the description of an 
experiment makes more-or-less explicit mention of, the design of an 
experiment, ie, the mechanism for theory-choice used. For example, 
use of a control. It should be noted that whilst the grounds for 
theory-choice are usually empirical, they are neither always nor necessarily 
so.
(b) 'weak* senses of 'method', 'methodology':
These are where reference is made in only description terms ’to  the 
equipment chosen and its method of operation, or to materials chosen 
and their preparation. These 'weak' aspects of method make no direct 
reference to a mechanism for making a knowledge claim (theory-choice).
They cannot, however, be entirely separated from it: my distinction 
between 'strong' and 'weak' senses is one of degree, not of kind.
For example, the selection of porcelain as the material bound up with 
ideas from within a broader theoretical context concerning chemical 
structure and bonding. References solely to the impedimentation and 
sub-procedures associated with the conduct of scientific investigation 
reflect uses of the term 'scientific-method' in only my 'weak' sense.
Such references coincide with 'weak' senses of 'sciende', 'scientific'; 
however, 'strong' senses of 'science', 'scientific', need not necessarily 
coincide with 'strong' senses of 'method', 'methodology'.
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Category 4
Empiricist Epistemology of Science 
- in Hesse's (1980) sense, see Chapter 4.
(a) Empirical. Verification.
(b) Inductive Reasoning.
(c) Brute Data.
(d) "Accidental" Scientific Observation.
(e) Mysterious Origin of Problem Situation.
(f) Importance of Priority in Scientific Discovery.
(g) Proof Exclusively Empirical.
(h) 'Operationalism1.
(i) Exclusion of 'Context of Discovery'.
(j.) Growth of Scientific Knowledge by 'Accumulative Fragmentation'.
(k) Growth of Scientific Knowledge by 'Theory Reduction'.
(1) Growth of Scientific Knowledge by 'Convergent Epistemological Realism'
(m) Value Neutrality of Scientific Knowledge and Conduct of Science.
(n) Empiricist Meanings for Some Key Meta-Theoretical Scientific Terms 
(ie, Hypotheses, Theory, Law, Experiment).
Category 5
Post-Empiricist Epistemology of Science 
- in Hesse's (1980) sense, see Chapter 4.
(a) Cult of Personality
(b) Post-Empiricist Meanings of Some Key Meta-Theoretical Terms
(c) Ethical Criterion for 'Scientific Progress' ('An advancement in scientific 
knowledge') .
(d) Epistemological Pluralism
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Category 6
'Self-Organised Learning* in Science Education Expressed as Desired 
Alternative to Current Practice
'i. Real personal learning depends upon an ability to use
oneself as a test-bed for personal validity and viability.
The construction of internal referents is primary. External 
criteria, normative standards, and assessment by others are 
secondary. Thus the quality of learning becomes defined 
within the person's own evaluative systems rather than judged 
against the criteria arrived at by 'experts'.
2. The dynamics of self-organised learning depends upon an 
ability to monitor the construction and reconstruction
of personal meaning over time. The development, expansion, 
modification and refinement of our personal models of the 
world can thus be systematically regulated and appreciated. 
Inadequate monitoring leads to inappropriate models and this 
can be viewed as disruptions to personal growth.
3. Shared meaning as against public knowledge must be truly 
negotiated. Individuals, pairs, groups, and institutions 
can each become conversational entities capable of adaptive, 
organised learning. Such conversational networks construct 
their own viability and validity and thus exhibit a capacity for 
creative and flexible growth.'
(Thomas and Harri-Augstein, 1985, pp xxix - xxx).
8.8.3 Educators
Category 1. Personal vs Professional Epistemology of Science
Category 2. Empiricist Epistemology of Science
Category 3. Post-Empiricist Epistemology of Science
Category 4. Epistemology Not Necessary for Learning Science
Category 5. History of Science Not Necessary for Learning Science
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Chapter 9? Case Study
9.1 Introduction: Purpose and Method of Presentation of Case Study
In this chapter I present a case study of a focussed interview which I 
conducted with a secondary school pupil named Michael (FI(P’)3).
My purpose for this case study is to provide an enriched representation of 
the complex interactive processes involved in eliciting and exploring in 
interview students’ personal episteraologies of science to complement the 
summarised account of my previous chapter. I intend this case study also 
to serve as an "argument-in-application” for the pluralistic methodology 
which I have advocated and used throughout this thesis.
The method I have used in presenting this case study consists of a series 
of excerpts from the interview transcripts I have selected interpolated 
with my own interpretative commentary. In accordance with my research 
philosophy I have also included material from Written Exercises, Classroom 
Observations, and Informal Interviews etc. where I have judged this to be 
useful.
The excerpts which I present are never less than an ’exchange * t viz. a 
question asked by one speaker followed by a response from the other 
speaker. This I consider to be the minimum authentic unit commensurate 
with my purpose for this case-study, indeed, I have more usually excerpted 
’episodes’, viz. a series of exchanges bound by a common theme.
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I present exchanges and episodes in the order in which they actually 
occurred in the interview. Where I present excerpted utterances1 viz. 
speech from a single speaker within my commentary, however, I sometimes 
alter this where I judge this to.be helpful. For similar reasons I 
sometimes alter within excerpted utterances the original emphasis placed 
upon the word (s). I append tape revolution counter numbers to utterances 
to facilitate reference to (and only to) the fuller context of exchanges 
and episodes already excerpted within the case-study.
I have retained the transcription notation described in the previous 
chapter. The excerpted dialogue amounts to approximately 80% of the full 
transcript.
9.2 Case Study; a Focussed Interview with Michael (FI(P’)3)
At the time of the interview Michael was a 13 year old pupil who was 
‘’double-entered1 for both GSE IS and GCE ’O’ level SGISP examinations. I 
agreed with his teacher, Ms. S., who described him as “one of the 
brightest" in her class. I also judged Michael to possess quite a 
sophisticated sense of humour and an outgoing personality. Although so 
young, I thought that the combination of these qualities rendered 
Michael's career ambition to become either a 'polititian' or a ’medical 
doctor' not unrealistic.
I began this interview as with all P' educands, by asking Michael some
questions to do with the experimental design used in the lesson which I 
had pilot-observed, and in which he had taken part as a member of the
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class, viz. 'The Action of Saliva on Starch' - see Appendix U for 
lesson synopsis and teaching materials. That lesson was particularly 
interesting to me because it employed a model within a control-experimental 
design. To help reduce the demand on memory in my initial questions, 
which I intended to elicit Michael's personal understandings of both these 
things, I referred to a labelled diagram of the apparatus used in the 
lesson:
' S 7 &
Visking tubing
Boiling tube
Tapwater
1. Saliva + starch
(7#
2.Starch. 3. Saliva.
Figure 9.1 Diagram showing Apparatus Embodying Model and Control
Aspects to the Experimental Design used in Lesson Observed
Part of our first exchange was as follows:
I 004. why do you think that you did the various things that you did
within that experiment to somehow answer this question . how does 
food get into the body?
M 017 well we've done it because the food goes into the oesophagus and 
goes down to the intestines and we wondered how it was absorbed 
into the blood stream as to using starch . starch on its own 
would be too large • the molecules would get through the 
Visking tubing which is semi-permeable so that wouldn't do it on 
its own so it had to be broken down somehow so it was through the 
saliva that it got actually broken down and got through into the 
bloodstream.
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I considered this answer to demonstrate a perfectly adequate, albeit, very 
basic, exposition in terms of Scientists’ Science. I noticed in 
particular that Michael had grasped the central problem of the 
experiment, namely that starch molecules would be too large to get through 
the Visking tubing.
I next tried to focus upon Michael’s understanding of the modelled 
components within the apparatus, e.g.
I 024. you're saying this is how it got through into the bloodstream . 
just one thing Mike . I didn't notice any blood in the 
experiment!
M 025 no we used water instead . we didn't want to knife people and get 
their blood • we used water I
I 034- I see • um ... go back to the title again . how does food get 
into the body? you mentioned Visking tubing
M 036 yes . semi-permeable sort of thing .. its in a way like the
intestine .. how it works .. things can be absorbed all the way 
through it .. things can be absorbed through it in say water's 
like blood isn't it .
I 039 so Visking you mean is like the gut wall?
M 039 yeh
I 040 do you know how its like it . you say its 3emi-permeable .. um 
what does semi-permeable mean?
M 043 its a bit like a leaking skin .. things can get out of it ..
control things and control things can be moved out of it like it 
brings oxygen in from the wall then it expels carbon dioxide out 
.. its like that thing from ...
I 046 I see • so you're using the Visking tubing to what?
M 048 to show that using it sort of as the gut or the intestines show 
that things can be passed out .
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It is not unknown for pupils not to realise that, in the experiment, water 
is being used to model blood (as opposed to, say, urine) and that Visking 
tubing is, in fact, a model (as opposed to a section from real gut). 
Michael's humorous retort (025) and later comments, however, convinced me 
that he was aware of both modelled components and at least something of 
the value, if not the limitations, of using them. I did not pursue his 
apparent comparison (043) of the function of the gut wall with gaseous 
exchange in the lungs since I was keen to move on and explore his personal 
perceptions of the control aspect to the experiment, the more so since he 
had introduced and used the term 'control* in what I judged to be a 
conventional sense within that utterance.
Michael, however, soon convinced me that he had indeed grasped the basic 
significance of the experimental design, e.g.
1 060 why did you have those three test tubes do you think?
M 062 to show that it was no fluke .. that starch and saliva .. it was 
a mixture that made it get through the Visking tubing . not just 
that saliva goes through it .. but starch can't go through it .
I 065 you needed all three to show that it wasn't a fluke?
M 065 yes •
I 065 O.K. . um to show that what couldn't get through it?
M 067 that er starch on its own . or saliva on its own . couldn't get 
through . it had to be a mixture of both .
I 067 I see • I see . what would have happened if you hadn't had for 
example er if you hadn't had this middle test tube the one with 
just starch in it . what would have been the problem then?
M 070 well . we wouldn't have been able to do the experiment properly .
I 071 why?
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M 071 well . we wouldn't have known whether it was just the starch on 
its own that got through • or the saliva breaking it down into 
particles .. its just that the saliva breaks down the starch . 
but we didn't know that it could have been the starch just going 
through on its own so we needed the middle test tube.
This was also the inference I drew from my interview with his classmate,
Nigel (FI(P')4) and from my impression of the general confidence and
competence with which members of the class had actually undertaken the
experiment. I found their apparently ready understanding of this
experimental design particularly interesting since, in an II after the
lesson in question, the teacher had declared that she and that class had
"never done anything like this experiment before" and, further, that
neither she nor anyone else had taught them the principle of control.
I speculate that the "embedded" manner in which I discussed this aspect of
the experiment may have rendered my questions more meaningful rather in
*
the manner that problems in logical or deductive inference have been shown 
to be more tractable when embedded in familiar contexts (see, e.g. Wason 
and Johnson-Laird, 1972). I also suspect that the use of controls in many 
"experiments" intrinsic to advertisements, especially those 011 television, 
may facilitate learning of this experimental design - an interesting 
possibility for future research.
I devoted the rest of this interview to eliciting and exploring Michael's 
personal episteraology of science. From this I concluded that overall he 
endorsed a positivistic brand of empiricism as I shall now try to show.
I had interpreted Michael's responses to WE, section B, viz. RWP re "a 
scientific activity outside school", to reflect a frustrated desire, by
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now familiar to me from other WE scripts and FIs, to include an 
"off-the-peg" school science activity and as such, represented an uneasy 
compromise between his criterion for scientificness and the demands of my 
question:
kow o-rv A-bonk 
UH>rks PvM 'cno prwpA
\ V W V  Wcow^e on A-Y>ok!&
Jbcwv\V\^cky k V rtc*A akooV
< x ( \Y  p r o W i S ,  c u V t c a Y  W v c L  A ) . r u n w * v
Figure 9.2. Showing Photo-reduction of Michael!s Responses to WE,
Section B
His written justification of the activity's scientific status similarly 
followed a familiar route of tautology followed by an appeal to 'weak' 
senses of science. These things not withstanding, his responses exhibited 
some novel twists which led me to request the interview with him: while 
the 'scientific activity' was carried out in school, as with so many 
examples chosen by pupils, Michael's took place in an English, as opposed
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to a science, lesson; the activity was a CND project which promised bo 
raise moral and/or political issues to do with the conduct of science; he 
had read about the "scientific" phenomena he referred to (albeit in this 
instance, necessarily sol).
I began the epistemological part of the interview with a request for 
Michael to elaborate upon his responses to this section of WE:
I 076 ( ) may I ask you a question about four • which if you remember
is where I asked you to think if something happened in your life
outside school and in which you were involved in scientific
activity? That was the question and I asked you to draw a sketch
and write a little description underneath . now ... you've put
here seeing how an A-bomb works in my English CND project.
••
yeah . well before I had to explain what CND was all about I had
to see how the atom bomb worked . the uranium protons and 
electrons went together and how neutrons bombarded the other 
neutrons to make it split and that's the only thing I could 
really remember that was scientific . well it Wasn't that 
scientific really .
why wasn't it all that scientific?
because it was mostly reading about it .. it wasn't actually 
doing something scientific • like actually building one or 
something . something like that.
[laughs] I see . so a scientific activity er would it be right to 
say that a scientific activity is where you actually do 
something scientific . rather than just read about it?
yeh .. because sitting down in a chair picking up a book isn't 
really scientific? so its more scientific if you're doing 
whatever you're doing - what is scientific
Michael's qualification to the scientificness of his 'scientific 
activity', immediately following his approximation to a scientist's 
science explanation of the working of an A-bomb (088), supported my 
initial conjecture that his selection of an activity which could meet my 
otherwise unelaborated dual criteria of 'scientific' and 'outside school'
M 088
I 092 
M 093
I 094
M 096
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had been something of a struggle and a compromise to him. Most
interesting to me, throughout this last series of exchanges, was Michael's
emphasis on the practical in the conduct of science. This provided the 
first indication of Michael's commitment to some form of empiricist 
philosophy of science* I immediately sought a way to test this 
interpretation. Luckily, discussion of the development of the A-bomb (and 
nuclear weapons in general) is ideally suited for this purpose since it 
provides one of the clearest demonstrations of both massive "pure", 
theoretical, science on the one hand, and unequivocable and indispensable 
empirical test on the other hand. My entree to this subject was
facilitated by the then current television series on the life of J.R.
Oppenheimer, theoretical physicist and so-called "father of the atomic 
bomb" - upon enquiring I found that Michael had viewed part of the second 
episode. I tried to elicit his views upon.the role of theory in a manner 
which related both to the activities of the weapon physicists and to 
Michael's views on the scientificness of reading:
I 100 what about the original scientists? these were the people who 
were designing the atom bomb in the '4.0s and they were called 
scientists in the programme anyway, they were all physicists, and 
yet certainly-at the stage that that episode ,that you saw was at 
* the second one . they weren't actually doing anything in terms 
of making anything or whatever they were tending to sort of read 
books do a few calculations • draw a few things on blackboards 
and so on. how do you think it was that they called themselves 
scientists in the programme . when you say that scientific 
activity means that you actually do something?
M 117 well . they were intending to do something but they had to make 
sure what they were doing at first of all which was really 
scientific • so they were making calculations .
I found Michael's statement that the scientists 'were intending to do
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something, an ingenious way of preserving the practical quality he had 
earlier identified with scientific activity. I also found it interesting 
that Michael had, as I interpreted, selected 'making calculations' from 
amongst.other activities I has suggested and proposed this as a means by
which the scientists could 'make sure', from the outset, that what they
were doing was really scientific. Although (perhaps because)
"performing calculations" is a stereotypic scientific activity, I note 
that calculations are ontologically neutral - performing them is not, of 
itself, theoretical activity - and as such mathematics is embraced by 
positivistic brands of empiricist episteraology of science. Our dialogue 
continued:
I 121 so ... there's two things here, isn't there? if you're
intending to do something . then you can still be scientific?
M 124. well I suppose what I was reading in books . it was fairly 
scientific . but I wasn't actually doing it was I?
I 124 I see . and the fact that you didn't do anything at the end of it 
.you didn't actually make an atom bomb thank goodness . does 
that mean that your CND project was unscientific?
M 128 not as such . but part of the project had to be had to be on how 
it works because you can't criticise something or be in favour of
i£ if you don't know what its about, so you had to write down
what it was about and weigh up the two sides of it .
I 131 I see .so it wasn't scientific as such?
M 132 no . it was more social you know . knowing what it was actually 
about •
I 133 does that mean it was unscientific or does it mean it was less 
scientific? I'm not quite clear
M 135 it isn't unscientific its less scientific .
In addition to reaffirming 'actually doing it' (124) as his pre-eminent 
criterion for a scientific activity, Michael introduced the first 
reference he had made to criticism and judgement which was not directly
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tied to practical experience (128). He seemed to me, however, to identify 
the fruits of 'knowing what it was actually about' with 'more social' 
activities (132), and to contrast this with scientific activities (cf. 
128:132). This was a contrasting aspect of science which Michael was to 
repeat and to elaborate upon later.
I proceeded by attempting to get Michael to clarify his personal meaning 
for his phrase 'less scientific' (135), by asking him to give me an 
example of an activity which would be 'definitely un-scientific' (136). 
Michael gave several examples only to dilute their un-scientific status by 
appealing to some aspect of each of them which he could relate to 
School-Science. This series of exchanges ended with Michael concluding 
that 'there's nothing really that could be definitely un-scientific*
(142).
We continued:
I 146 so everything is scientific more or less . sometimes more or 
sometimes less . is that what you're saying?
M 147 yes . there are some jobs that are definitely really aren't
scientific .you know just a little bit in it . then there are 
some jobs that are really just scientific • and some that are 
both like doctors because there's the social side of it . dealing 
with the patient and the medical side of it .
I 151 I see doctors and nurses are both scientific and unscientific?
M 152 yeah
I 152 because they have this mixture of the social side of it like
you had in your CND project as well as the scientific side • so 
is it fair to say from what you've said so far that the more 
scientific something is the less of the social aspect?
M 157 yeh . be present in that activity
In this series of exchanges, Michael reintroduced his contrasting aspect
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of scientific, viz. 'the social side of it' (14-7). As his response at 
(157) makes clear, however, the 'social side' of an activity represents 
only a difference in degree, not in kind, from what, to mimic Michael's 
idiom, I shall call the "scientific side". I judge this distinction to 
again betoken a sympathy to empiricism, viz. the separate between fact and 
value•
I attempted to corroborate and to explore this possibility by considering 
how the "social side" of Oppenheimer's later work may have altered his 
status as a scientist in Michael's opinion:
I 158 tell me something about Oppenheimer. after he had done a lot of 
work on the atomic bomb • a lot of this reading and all the rest 
of it . he actually was in charge of making it . and as you know 
they dropped it in Japan and then later in his life he was still 
a famous scientist . a fambus physicist but then . particularly 
Oppenheimer became very worried about the social aspects of the 
atomic bomb . did he become less scientific when he was becoming 
concerned after the war with the social aspects?
M 168 when he was actually making it .he didn't know how the super 
powers were going to use it . he was thinking .. they knew 
roughly that it would kill a lot of people - but he wasn't really 
interested . he just did the sort of historical thing of actually 
making the bomb that might have been er ..
I 172 he was interested in the historical thing . what was the 
historical thing?
M 174- well like being the first person to build a bomb . or doing it 
before the Germans did because the race was on at that time • 
they had to do it . because the Germans were doing it .
In light of ray earlier arguments in Chapter 4- concerning personal
responsibility and epistemology, together with my support for
post-empiricist epistemology, I suggest that this exchange provides a
clear demonstration of one of the social dangers of empiricist
epistemology, viz. it provides a tacit or explicit rationale for
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distancing oneself (and for others) from one's social context, thereby 
abnegating one's personal responsibility for one's thoughts and actions 
expressed in a social context. Thus, Michael began by claiming that 
whilst Oppenheimer was 'actually making' the A-bomb, he didn't know how 
the super powers were going to use it (168). Almost immediately, however, 
he seems to me to judge the patent unlikelihood of this and so atbempts, 
rather unconvincingly, to dilute it - 'they knew roughly that it would 
kill a lot of people' (168). Michael goes on to separate Oppenheimer from 
his social context - 'but he wasn't really interested' (168) - except 
insofar that what Oppenheimer was interested in was 'the historical 
thing (of) being the first person to build a bomb' (168,174)*
Now Michael's interpretation of Oppenheimer's position on these issues in
contrast with his "repentance" in' the '50s, is closely corroborated by
some of this scientist's own words, e.g.:
'A scientist cannot hold back progress because of 
fears of what the world will do with his 
discoveries' (Oppenheimer, quoted by Goodchild 
1980, p.170).
and later, with reference principally to the development of the hydrogen 
bomb:
'It is in my judgement in these things that when 
you see something that is technically sweet you 
go ahead and do it and argue about what to do 
about it only after you have had your technical 
success' (Oppenheimer speaking in 1954> quoted by 
Easlea, 1983, p.129).
But the image of science that both Michael and Oppenheimer project, in
which scientists are portrayed as seeking priority in empirical
verification ('technical success') and this is understood to be undertaken
and appraised independently of social circumstance, implies that it is
-  9 . 1 3  -
"objective" and in other respects also it is amorphous with the empiricist 
account. The case of Oppenheimer and the weapons physicists, however, 
illustrates one of the chief inadequacies of the empiricists' account, viz. 
it is blind with respect to human justice and morality. This is not 
however to say that it is neutral - after all, 'they had to do it 
because the Germans were doing it' (174)* The sad fact is that the work 
on the A-bomb actually imtensified after the surrender of Nazi Germany 
(Easlea 1983, page 83 et seq). and, indeed, it is possible to argue that 
empiricist thinking facilitates wars, including 'cold' wars, by providing 
scientists with a rationale for insulating themselves from personal 
responsibility for their thoughts and actions expressed in a social 
context, viz. 'objectivity', with the result that their efforts may be 
appropriated to whatever ends those who are willing to fund them decide.
Now, in practice, empiricist thinking provides only "time out" for 
investigators to indulge in their, otherwise blind pursuit of 'technical 
success' - few empiricist scientists consistently and enduringly maintain 
their aloofness from social and humane concerns whatever the effects of 
their scientific enquiries may have been. I have already alluded to 
Oppenheimer's famous change of heart and mind concerning the morality of 
the A-bomb research in which he claimed that 'the physicists have known 
sin' (Oppenheimer speaking in 1948, quoted by Goodchild, 1980 p.174) - 
much to the distress and annoyance of many of his colleagues. Be this as 
it may, from a post-empiricist point of view, this is not enough: the 
empiricist account culpably puts the cart before the horse both in 
practice and in principle. Moreover, there have been, and no doubt always 
shall be, enough outstanding and influential individuals who adhered
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rigidly and enduringly to orthodox empiricist doctrine. These points have 
been argued in detail by Easlea (1983) who identifies empiricist 
epistemology with a 'compulsive masculinity syndrome' (cf. my discussion 
in chapter 4)* Easlea takes the development of nuclear weapons in general, 
and that of fusion weapons in particular, as a paradigmatic example of the 
syndrome in action:
'Even in his published works, Teller [the so-called 
'father of the H-bomb'] does not claim that his 
impassioned advocacy of super weapons was entirely a 
consequence of the physicist's belief in meeting the 
'security' needs of the Western Alliance. Teller's credo, 
in fact, takes us back to the credo of the founding 
father of the 'masculine philosophy', Francis Bacon, and 
to Mary Shelley's profound commentary on that masculine 
philosophy. We need only remember Francis Bacon's cry 
'to the effecting of all things possible', and the 
compulsive, dangerous search into the unknown conducted 
by Walton and Frankenstein, best characterised by 
Walton's confidence to his'sister, 'there is something at 
work in my soul which I do?not understand'. For 
immediately Teller refers in his 1955 apologia to the 
story of the fusion bomb - the super bomb - as the story 
of 'the adventure of trying to do what at one time seemed 
impossible'
(Easlea, 1983, page 136).
My dialogue with Michael continued:
I 177 I see . can I just ask you about one part of what you've just 
said which was the bit about being the first to do something?
M 179 people are like that sometimes . they always want to be the first 
second is not good enough • that's the thing that people have
sort of grown up with the . like put into their system like
wanting to be the first . not just him the people wanted to beat
the Germans and be first.
I 185 is wanting to be the first part of being scientific, do you 
think?
M 186 no . no .not all the time no . There are social science like
people kidney patients and heart patients and people like that . 
there's a thing of not just feeding them pills every day • 
getting to know them .doing good more psychologically than 
medically.
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In light of some of Michael's earlier views (e.g. 168), I interpreted his 
first remark here (179) to indicate a distinction between competitive 
victory and priority in empirical verification - with the latter being the 
more important as a criterion for scientific, though the two may 
coincide in some instances. These features again are commensurate wibh 
empiricist epistemology and are noticeably absent in his contrasting 
illustration of 'social science' (186), which features qualities of 
cooperation and benevolence.
We continued:
I 191 would you say Mike . that on the whole science nowadays is taking 
more notice of the social side of things or less?
M 192 yes I think it is . you've got scientist organisations take 
America and Britain against the bomb, they help make it well 
actually they may help make it then they realised it was a 
mistake and they are paying to get rid of it
I 196 you say that they realise that it was a mistake, in what way is 
that?
M 197 well they've got so many weapons and they're going to eventually 
use them and lots of people are going to get killed and those 
have got families . cos they got families . other people have got 
families . they just don't want their families to be killed sort 
of thing • like that they're more aware of it.
I 202 so are you saying that sometimes scientists um ... might have to 
as it were give up the pleasure of being the first to do 
something because they realise that they might by being the first 
to do something actually ...?
M 207 yeah . actually to do something wrong so I think they have to
give up that bit apart from .... there's always wrong things like 
building bombs and things like that but its better if its things 
like the heart if they're successful the product comes on the 
market but so many people can survive and its important of being 
first not actually another one just of being first .....
I construe certain of Michael's remarks to show a tendency for fatalistic
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thinking - a characteristic which is paradoxically combined in equal 
measure with that of manipulative intervention in empiricism. Thus 
’they've got so many weapons and they're going to eventually use them' 
(197). Similarly, his concluding analysis seems to be a rather bleak 
mixture of market economics and evolution theory in which choice and 
morality within scientific enquiry are absent: 'there's always wrong things 
like building bombs and things like that but its better if its things like 
the heart .. if they're successful the product comes on the market but so 
many people can survive' (207). Part of Easlea's Commentary on Teller's 
autobiographical reminiscences of his involvement with the development of 
nuclear weapons may help further illustrate how these seemingly 
irreconcilable qualities of fatalism and manipulative intervention can 
actually be made to complement, indeed to amplify, each other within an 
empiricist rationalisatiom of literally any "scientific" enquiry and at 
any stage:
'Whatever [ ] the many specific political and military 
reasons why such 'experiments' should continue, there 
also exists, Teller writes 'this very general reason - 
the tradition of exploring the unknown' in one of his 
very latest publications - his 1979 book Energy from 
Heaven and Earth - Teller states he is sometimes asked 
whether he is sorry he worked on nuclear weapons. He 
answers that he is not. He was privileged indeed to
have had the opportunity of participating in 'one of the
most fantastic adventures that a scientist can have'.
Teller's final verdict is that 'the atomic adventure was 
not the first, nor the last, nor the greatest adventure 
in history. But it was great and it was inevitable'.
Whatever the verdict on the building of the super weapon
it was, however, clearly not inevitable. That it was 
built was very much in part a consequence of the 
'magnificent obsession' of Dr. Edward Teller'
(Easlea, 1983, page 137: original emphasis).
I next confronted Michael with what I considered to be a discrepancy
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between my request for the scientific activity to be outside school and 
his selection of one conducted within an English lesson:
I 212 yeah . yeah may I ask you another question about your example
here Mike . you've chosen something . in my original question I 
asked if you could draw something that had happened to you in 
which you were involved in scientific activity not in school, 
now ... you've chosen something that looks rather like the sort 
of thing that you would do in school • um ... why was that?
M 220 (pause) um I'm not really sure if it would be something in school 
. something in school is more like if you're doing the experiment 
we've just talked about you know . things like that ..we don't 
read a lot of books in science
I 223 you don't in school?
M 224 I do normally • but not in science . we don't read a lot of books 
• you work from books but mostly the experimentations are not 
from books .
I 226 so ..... the fact that you were reading books was one reason why 
you thought this was an activity um ... which although it had a 
scientific aspect it was something which you could legitimately 
put down as something as being outside school.
M 231 yes
Here Michael again affirmed the primacy of practical ability - 
'experimentations' (224.) - amongst his criteria. It seemed to me that 
Michael might, like so many pupils, have chosen the activity partly due to 
the fact that it could have been done outside school (unlike, say, a 
school experiment involving specialised equipment) and partly because of 
the subject matter involving stereotypic phenomena of science, i.e. 
implying a 'weak' sense of science.
I went on to explore this latter possibility:
I 231 uhuh . I've noticed that you put as your reason as you thought it 
was scientific as an atom bomb works scientifically .1 read
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about neutrons and protons, critical mass, uranium.
M 234 (laughs) well I don't mean the actual bomb works scientifically. 
Scientists make the atom bomb work and to normal people its 
complicated um it does work so in a way its scientific because 
scientists make it scientific.
I 237 scientists make it scientific?
M 238 ... because scientists . people think ... you know . ordinary
people that if a scientist does something like that ... the 
actual thing is going to work scientifically . as it does it 
doesn't work physically
I suggest that Michael's responses in this episode fall into a combination
of categories: 'tautology', e.g. 'because scientists made it scientific'
(234); 'inexplicable explicative device', e.g. 'its complicated' (234).
As with many interviewees, Michael also started to express his views in
the third person, e.g. 'to normal people' (234)> 'people think ... you
know ordinary people' (238). This I took to be a possible ploy to avoid
taking personal responsibility fob the views he was advancing due to his
personal doubt and anticipated criticism from me. In chapter 4 however I
have also argued that the objectivism of empiricist epistemology is one of
the main attractions for precisely this reason: avoidance of personal
responsibility. I thus came to interpret the adoption of third person
form by an interviewee as a (very) tentative indication of sympathy to
empiricist epistemology. Michael's closing remark - 'the actual thing is
going to work scientifically, as it does it doesn't work physically' (238)
- would contradict his opening statement that 'I don't mean the actual
bomb works scientifically' (234) were it not in "third personified". Here
also 'tautology' and 'inexplicable explicative device' categories may.be
expressed in equal measure: the bomb works 'scientifically' but apparently
not 'physically'I
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I next tried to get Michael to generalise away from his specific example 
of a scientific activity in case of its possible exotic uniqueness and the 
already established scientific status of the leading individuals involved:
I 24-1 um . yes ... one thing I'm a bit confused about there though Mike 
is that er its one thing when its a famous scientist working to 
make something like the atom bomb .. Oppenheimer . what about 
when someone else, Joe Bloggs is working on some project we won't 
say what it is, now, how did you decide when he's a scientist 
or not • because what he makes sound rather like if you were the 
famous scientist to start with if Joe Bloggs was known to be a 
famous scientist to start with . whatever he made might be 
scentific just because he was called a famous scientist in the 
first place on the other hand if he was completely unknown? •••••'
M 252 yeah . thats another thing . a scientist has got an aspect of
being a person with not much hair • glasses and a white coat and 
a board, writing down notes but you can be just as scientific if 
you've got a name like Fred Smith. You can just go along and 
propose to do something . its the image that's created by the 
media .
I 257 so ... scientists come in &11 shapes and sizes?
«
M 257 yeah
I 258 men and women, and they don't necessarily have to wear white
coats and to be the nutty professor type image that's what you're 
saying?
M 260 yeah
I 260 but . being scientific .what's that you see? ... its a bit more 
tricky isn't it?
M 263 .... scientific is more like being clever in a technical sort
of way
I 264. clever in a technical sort of way?
M 264. people don't understand such things like atoms for example • but 
scientists have sort of . not say got a gift you know in that way 
they know a lot about it and they can put it to use . for example 
• • • • •
Perhaps in consequence of my poor phrasing of the first question (24-1)
Michael's exposition and criticism of the stereotypic image of the
scientist (252-260) was confined to what I considered to be trivialities 
(i.e. forms of dress). Michael's answer to my second question (260) once 
again evoked an empiricist (operationalist?) account of science: 'being 
clever in a technical sort of way' (263). When I asked him to elaborate 
(264), however, he again adopted a 'third person' form in combination with 
an 'inexplicable explicative device': 'people don't understand such 
things like atoms for example, but scientists have sort of, not say got a 
gift you know in that way they know a lot about it and they can put it 
to use' (264).
In another attempt to elicit any role that Michael might perceive 
theorising to have within the conduct of science without, as it were, 
imposing or presaging ray own requirement for it by the form of my 
question,I went on to describe the greater relative emphasis placed upon 
thinking, as compared with experimenting, about the atom in early Greek 
history:
I 269 the atom's an interesting example .because the idea ofNthe atom 
goes back a long long way many centuries before the image of the 
scientist with the bald head and a white lab. coat came about •.• 
now they didn't have books to read about it because they hadn't • 
been written then, but they had to do an awful lot of thinking 
about atoms and . of course when the original people . the Greeks 
did it they hadn't got all the technological things to go with 
their thoughts they hadn't got laboratories or all the rest of it 
. now they were thinking about the ideas of atoms . small 
particles and that .... were they scientific do you think?
M 284 yeah . I think If the Greeks wouldn't have been where they were 
then people wouldn't be as scientific as they are today . but 
then it might not have been the Greeks it might have been the 
Egyptians .. but the Greeks were a scientific race of people.
I 289 so they were less scientific because they hadn't got the 
technical side of it?
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M 290 I’m not saying that • but the image that's created is that if its 
scientific you've got to have computers and everything .. and its 
not so.
I 291 well this is the image as you've said comes from the media.
perhaps . but what's your view Mike . what do you think? do you 
think the Greeks were less scientific or do you think they were 
just as scientific in their way or? ....
M 296 I think they were scientific but not as scientific as the people 
today because the people today have got computers and everything 
but they wouldn't have that today if the Greeks didn't exist . 
because they were the first ones to bring science into our ...
I 301 so you go along to some extent with the media image, you think 
the media has got it right to some extent?
M 303 to some extent, yeah
In this episode I found it interesting that although Michael initially 
criticised my interpretation, which he 'third personified' by identifying 
it with 'the image that is created1 (290) - again, presumably by the media 
(cf. 252), when I put him on the spot - 'what's your view Mike' (291) he 
immediately appealed to 'weak' senses of sciences: 'I think [the Greeks] 
were scientific but not as scientific as the people today because the 
people today have got computers and everything' (296).
I next turned my attention to Michael's WE1 response to my 
'theory-ladenness' question:
I 303 if you remember I said "take a piece of paper and pencil
carefully observe and then write down what you have observed" and 
you^ve written as your answer 'I've observed people looking 
puzzled at this question'.
M 314 well because everybody was looking puzzled . so I thought I'd 
better write down . that's an observation • it just come to me 
like that . everybody was like that • and I feel that everybody 
was looking puzzled so I write it down like that •
I 317 what do you think they were being puzzled about? what were you 
puzzled about?
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M 318 what the question really meant • you could observe anything . you
could have a baby picking his nose or Barry sucking the end of
his pencil or something like that .people tapping their fingers 
on the desk . it could be anything at all . ( ).
I 329 this fact that people are puzzled, were you puzzled?
M 332 first of all . yeah . then I was looking around to see if there 
was anything we was meant to notice deliberately . maybe we 
were meant to observe people looking puzzled . so I wrote that 
down because I thought that's what the question is supposed to do 
to make people look puzzled so the answer was being puzzled
Michael's initial response seemed to me to fall into the same category as
that which he gave to WE, i.e. 'naive' : 'it just come, to me' (314)* He
soon showed, however, that he had seen the central flaw to the question -
'you could observe anything ( ) anything at all' (318). Furthermore, the
rationale he gave for his specific choice of 'people looking puzzled'
(332) showed clearly that his own mind had been anything but 'naive',
'tabula rasa', during his participation in WE: 'I was looking around to
see if there was anything we was meant to observe deliberately • maybe
we were meant to observe people looking puzzled, so I wrote that down*
(332) .Michael's script answers to other questions in WE1 also showed
that he had ideas and expectations about what he thought I was "really"
(i.e. covertly) trying to find out; e.g. WE Q2 (cf.Appendix 11):
'you have asked us this question to ask us to categorise 
everyday jobs, all jobs involve a little science though.
You wanted us to find out what jobs contain science and 
non-scientific things. You expect us to find more 
non-scientific than any others'
When I told Michael that I hadn't in fact intended them to observe
anything specific and that 'I was just curious to see what you put', he
reiterated his view that the observation (s) 'could be anything'. I
proceeded to try to elicit or achieve an awareness on Michael's part 011
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the selectivity of observation and attention (cf. stage 2 of iny 'didactic 
strategy' described in Section 7.5):
I 34-8 do you think you've learned anything from that problem you had 
with the questions?
M 350 yes its the same because ..... things you can observe at one time 
. things that you can deliberately observe and things that are 
sort of hidden that you can observe like people looking puzzled 
.its not something you'd really notice all of the time . when 
you look around the classroom, those hidden things that you 
didn't give a thought • luck or coincidence or whatever you make 
of it or answer
I 357 tell me Mike . you do a lot of experiments don't you in school?
M 357 Yeah
I 358 do you think this question and the problem you had answering it 
has any relevance to doing experiments?
M 361 yeh . it has because when you observe something it can go a
bright orange colour so you could observe that or it might have 
black specks in it or whatever .you don't actually have to 
observe you can make experiments to see if its poisonous . its
sort of got hidden things . its not just a clear orange liquid
you could observe that it might be say a dye or something like 
that or anything . iodine or •.
1369 I see . so whether you notice thats got an orange colour or
whether you test it for something else like whether its poisonous 
or not depends on what you're trying to look for is that right?
M 373 yeah . yeah but sometimes you don't have to look for anything . 
its just so obvious that its an orange colour but sometimes you 
have to search for is it a dye or is it poisonous or is it so and 
so •
I felt that Michael's remarks in this episode demonstrated that he had, 
indeed, grasped the notion that all observation and attention is 
selective. I also, however, judged there to be some indications that the 
route from here to an acceptance of the theory-ladenness of all 
observations would not be easy, viz. the examples of 'hidden things' (361) 
which Michael gave were things which could not, in any straightforward
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sense, be considered to be unobservable, e.g. ’poisonous' (361); similarly 
his statement that 'sometimes you don't have to look for anything, its 
just so obvious1 (373) might be interpreted to be a sympathy for the 
empiricist notion of 'brute data' due to the implied possibility of 
genuinely "accidental" observations. I construed Michael's references to 
'a bright orange colour' (361) etc to be an allusion to the class 
experiment which we had discussed earlier. I attempted to confront 
Michael with a phenomenon which could not be construed within the horizon 
of phenomenal expectations of the theory underlying Benedict's test for 
reducing sugars, viz. I chose his suggestion of 'black specks' (361).
This he quickly and not unreasonably dealt with in terms of experimental
error and he recommended repeating the experiment. Part of his answer,
however, cast some light both on the frustrations experienced in the 
science classroom by Michael qua young pupil scientists and a hint of 
the sort of science learning activities that he would prefer to engage in:
I 4-05 so you'd do it under different conditions . um ... in the hope of 
what?
M 4-07 in the hope that it would come out how it should come out because 
scientists and people have been doing it for . I don't know how 
long . been doing it for a long time . but Benedict's solution 
has always turned orange . and I don't know why I should be 
wrong and I don't know what the point is of doing the experiment
in the first place but it would be worth doing it again to see if
I had found out something more or perhaps the Benedict's solution 
wasn't Benedict's solution.
This I took to be a tentative advocacy of Self Organised Learning.
I tried to render less ambiguous the epistemological issue that I wished 
to explore by inviting Michael to consider the blue colour of his jumper 
as a variable in his repeat of the experiment:
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I 44-8 I was just thinking Mike • you're wearing a blue jumper today . 
would you think of maybe changing the colour of the jumper when 
you repeated the experiment . as one factor to alter?
M 4-54 no I wouldn't think about that actually.
I 455 why not?
M 455 might have black dandruff or something like that well if I was a 
scientist I'd probably wear some sort of cover like a white coat 
. something like that but I wouldn't think of changing it no .
I 463 well what you've said about having black dandruff . is a
perfectly good idea . I was thinking from another angle ( ) might
just the colour . the Benedict's solution brought within in a
foot of blue might have a n —
M 469 I don't think it would have any effect . no .
I 470 what makes you think it wouldn't have any effect?
M472 well people . scientists haven't come up and said things like
that before . blue jumpers maybe but acrylic wool having an
effect on Benedict's solution or it could be say my (* albion
neck) could affect your tape recorder something like that ... so 
strange you don't really think about it .
Whatever the demerits of my question with respect to its didactic purpose,
I was interested that Michael chose to justify his answer by invoking the
authority of other persons - 'people, scientists haven't come up and said
things like that before' (472) - rather than speculating (as I had hoped
he would) upon the likely irrelevancy of the colour of his jumper for this
particular chemical reaction, i.e. Benedict's test for reducing sugars, 4
given the accompanying theoretical context in which it is presently
understood. This response also diluted slightly his earlier advocacy of
Self Organised Learning (407).
We went on:
I 479 so you'd draw a bit on what scientists had found out or not found
- 9.26 -
out before. Can you now Mike relate back to um ... this question 
about carefully observing and write down what people observe and
the difficulty you had observing it . now in your repeat of
this experiment with the Benedict’s solution you’d talked about 
altering a certain number of factors . all sorts of things . the 
Benedict’s • the test tube . the temperature etc etc but there 
are certain things that you wouldn * t think of altering like •• 
the colour of your clothes just for an example you wouldn’t for 
example take into account what you'd had for breakfast that 
morning . um does this tell you anything about the range of 
things that you're observing?
M 4-99 its endless . really . theres just endless of things that you 
don't think to observe like my (indicates pen kit) being in a 
plastic bag which you know things you don’t really put down .. 
they're not important ( * ) you're sort of noticing things you
wanna know ...
I 505 ....... so just observing . like in the question . it could be
endless could it?
M 505 yeah
I 505 you could go on observing more and more things and more and 
more aspects but when you're doing experiments .. you don't 
write down endless observations do you?
M 512 no ... not really . you need to . like the test tube was 5 cm. 
above the flame or in the flame I suppose that would have some 
bearing but if you said you moved it around that would be an 
observation that you could, write down • not like Paul's wearing a 
red jumper and er I was wearing blue socks you know things like 
that •
I 521 so . what does that tell you about when you're doing an
experiment • bearing in mind that just observing . is endless . 
yet in an experiment you don't write.down that Paul's picking his 
nose or whatever?
M 526 I suppose the teacher gives you some idea or your knowledge of 
what to expect first of all. If the teacher says I'll do this 
experiment you might expect something to blow up deliberately • 
like we did these experiments with sodium .
I 531 ah yes .
M 531 things like that, you know you're a bit wary .... the teacher
might warn you that its got an explosive tendency something like 
that so er if its safe in doing the experiment you would expect 
the teacher to tell you that there's a chance of it spitting up 
in your face and you see its like that its part trust part 
experience so you really know roughly what to expect •
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I 54-0 part trust • part experience? ;
M 54-1 say if you were mixing an iodine Benedict's solution, I don't
know what would happen and it turned pink and you turned to your 
teacher is it allright turning pink and she said yes I would have 
expected it to turn pink so if it ends up turning green then you 
ask her is it meant to turn green and she says no its meant to 
turn pink and everybody else's turns pink you've done the 
experiment wrong and you have to do it again .
I 550 yes * this is where the trust bit comes in is it?
M 550 mm
Despite two promising remarks made by Michael which suggested to me that
he had clearly grasped the selectivity of observational attention and
recording, i.e. 'you're sort of noticing the things you wanna know' (4-99)
and his view that only observations which 'would have some bearing' (512)
need be written down, he again went on to cast himself in a theoretically
passive role albeit by a slightly different route, viz. by appeal to the
authority of the science teacher:' 'I suppose the teacher gives you some
«
idea or your knowledge of what to expect first of all'(526). I consider 
Michael's views in each of these last two episodes to embody 'weak' senses 
of scientific and to invoke a 'rhetoric of conclusions'.
Partly in case we became rooted in an over literal account of Michael's 
experiences of school science, however interesting they might have been in 
other ways, I attempted to elicit comparisons and contrasts between the 
activities of scientists and those of pupil scientists:
I 550 tell me Mike . do you regard yourself being really the same as a 
scientist . when you're in your school laboratory?
M 555 no
I 555 no?
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M 557 no • its part science . part • social is not really the word . no 
• you know . you are fairly scientific but not all of it like 
you've got to consider • do an experiment with things like 
equipment . you might have an argument about the result or 
something like that you know ...
I 564. who might have an argument about the result?
M 565 me and say the next group . so that would be more as a scientific
argument . .
I 568 that would be more like real scientists would it?
inverted commas • real scientists .
M 570 that's a bit more scientific . having an argument . but putting
stuff away that isn't scientific • .
Notwithstanding Michael's ambiguous contrasting characterisation of school
science - 'its part science, part, social is not really the word' (557) -
I took his suggestion that having 'an argument about the result' (557)
would be 'a bit more scientific' (570) as compared with 'putting stuff
‘away [which] isn't scientific' (570), to be an interesting development in
his criterion for science for it may be construed as the first suggestion
of fallibility of scientific knowledge.
By this point in the interview, however, I had already decided to proceed 
by asking Michael to elaborate upon his meanings and criterial sympathies 
for the terms 'trust' and 'experience' which he had introduced earlier • 
(531):
I 571 could you tell me if there's any difference between you and as it 
were official scientists • in terms of trust and experience you 
mentioned a bit earlier?
M 577 well, scientists are a lot older than more • they're more
experienced and probably more trustful because they've worked 
with people a long time .
I 581 they're more trustful?
M 581 yeh . to people that work with them . so I can trust ray friends
I 583 not to cheat on the experiment?
M 584 yeh . not to throw Bunsen Burners around and ...
I 584 I see .
M 585 or splash sodium around •
I 585 or deliberately put black specks in your Benedicts!
M 585 yeah!
Recognising that ray question (571) might have begged this more
conventional meaning of ‘trust’, I gradually, and with some difficulty,
attempted to home in on possible epistemological meanings that Michael
might have for the terms ‘trust’ and 'experience':
I 585 um . that's one way of using the trust isn’t it . but I . maybe I
misunderstood you a bit earlier • I thought that when you were
talking about what you observed in an experiment . I got the 
impression that if you were looking for something . like the 
possibility of it blowing up you mentioned that it was in a way 
trusting • your teacher and also based on your own experience of 
other things . they'd blown up accidentally or whatever .a 
combination of those two things .. contributes to how you behave 
in an experiment . what you look for, what you do and how careful 
you are etc etc. now official in inverted commas scientists 
where does ••. how does the trust part of it come into their 
work do you think, or does it not come into their work?
M 609 if they've done an experiment they've done loads of times before ' 
they sort of trust that it will come up with the same results as 
it has loads of times before and they . the people they work with 
try and help . they've got to help them . trust them not put 
different things in their .....
I 615 yes • but you see this is trust in the sense of not being a faker 
of results and things . isn't it • that's one side of trust . and 
then on the other side you're saying if the real scientists . 
official scientists had done the experiment loads of times you 
can trust his results . but what about the first time he does 
an experiment ...?
M 626 yeh . it was what I was just going on to say . scientists . when 
sort of more alchemists .... they didn't know what was going to 
happen .. they didn't have no trust .. its just through them
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their early scientific experiments that we can roughly know 
what'll happen when we do our experiments .. its sort of 
through them we can do science more safely
I 636 I'm sorry Mike I'm not making myself very clear here am I .you 
see I was just thinking . you know what we were saying about 
observation being endless and so on and so forth then if we 
relate that to trust and saying that in a school classroom um ... 
you've got your own experiences of previous experiments and 
you've got some trust as well about the official inverted 
commas scientists um . do they not have trust if they're doing
the experiment for the first time ever in the world .... you
know what does trust mean for an official scientist doing an 
experiment for the first time?
M 658 he hasn't really got no trust has he?
I 659 he hasn't?
M 659 well say if he was mixing sodium with water he might know roughly 
what sodium was like but of he'd probably say oh the water is 
turning green but on the other hand you know it pops . but he 
wouldn't know that so he wouldn't really have no trust . just 
that he's unlucky to be doing the experiment first .. bit of bad 
luck •
I 668 so he would have no idea?
M 668 no . he might have a little experience which gives him that trust
I 671 little bit of experience .. what from?
M 671 sodium . just imagine sodium has been around right .. and they
know roughly what it is like but they've never tested it with 
water or in liquid (*) there might have been an explosion in a 
sodium factory and they could put it down as a faulty thing . he
could just have that thing in the back of his mind . it might
have been the faulty equipment . it might have been the actual 
sodium that could be unbalanced but apart from that he hasn't 
really got no guarantee that is safe
I construe these last two episodes to show the tension that I felt between
my joint desire to elicit Michael's views about theory-ladenness on the one
hand and, on the other, to teach it . The issue of 'safety' may also have
become conflicted with that of empirical prediction in this part of the
elicitation process. These things notwithstanding, I interpret Michael's
remarks to provide further evidence of his commitment to empirical
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inductivism.
Thus, Michael began (609) by distinguishing between two meanings of 
'trust* . The first is understood in terms of induction (which I shall 
call 'inductive trust'): 'if they've done the experiment loads of times 
before they sort of trust that it will come up with the same result as 
it has loads of times before' . (609) The second meaning of 'trust' is 
the more familiar one of personal qualities such as honesty, integrity, 
etc. (which I shall call 'personal trust') 'the people they work with try 
and help . they've got to help them . trust them not to put things in 
their ... ' (609) •
Next, when I confronted Michael with the instance of a scientist doing an 
experiment for the 'first time' in an attempt to explore his awareness 
of the possiblity of an empirical prediction (knowledge claim) being 
justifiable by imagination alone, i.e. 'trust' as an uncorroborated 
conjecture, as opposed to knowledge by empirical induction, he expressed 
the classical empiricist assumption of the mind as (initially) a tabula 
rasa by claiming that 'scientists ( ) didn't know what was going to 
happen .. they didn't have no trust' (626). This remark should be 
compared with that he made earlier (168) concerning the alleged ignorance 
of the Los Alamos scientists of the likelihood of the atomic bomb actually
being used .... Michael goes on merely to assume the pioneering success
of scientists - 'its just through them . their early scientific 
experiments . that we can roughly know what'll happen when we do our 
experiments .. its sort of through them that we can do science more 
safely' - in what amounts to a defence of induction-by-induction (Humel),
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viz. the established empirical success of scientists1 science, albeit 
mysteriously achieved in pioneering instances, justifies the school 
science 'trust1 in (and repetition of) it.
I repeated my question concerning the possible role of epistemological 
'trust* in conducting an experiment for the first time, this time trying 
to focus Michael's attention on scientists' science alone (636). 
Michael's reply that the scientist 'hasn't really got no trust has he?' 
(658) may again be interpreted to mean a "blank mind" on the part of the 
scientist, i.e. the scientist had no expectations with respect to the 
outcome of the experiment.
The example Michael used in his elaboration (659-671) of his answer 
similarly shows a sympathy for empirical inductivism. My detailed 
demonstration of this may be assisted by prior reference to Medawar's 
description of a 'Baconian experiment':
'The word experiment has changed its meaning . [ ]
A Baconian 'experiment' had the connotation that still 
persists in the French experience today: a Baconian 
experiment is a contrived experience or contrived 
happening as opposed to a natural experience or a 
happening, for Bacon rightly supposed that common 
knowledge was not enough and that there was no relying 
upon luck of observation - upon 'casual felicity of 
particular events' .[ ] Rubbing two sticks together to
see what happens is an experiment in Bacon's sense; 
rubbing two sticks together to see if enough heat can be 
generated by friction to ignite them is an experiment in 
the modern sense. An experiment of the first kind leaves 
one with no answer to the question:
"Why on earth are you rubbing those two sticks together?" 
(Medawar, 1969* • original emphasis).
- 9.33 -
Thus, Michael’s example begins 'if [the scientist] was mixing sodium with 
water* (659): there is no explanation as to why the scientist might wish 
to do so and I suspect that had I had the presence of mind to ask Michael 
about this he would have replied along the lines of "to see what happens".
Because the pioneer scientist cannot already know from experience what 
happens under these conditions 'he wouldn't really have no trust* (659) 
and so he is just 'unlucky to be doing the experiment first .... bit of 
bad luck ' (659) this, again, may be understood to imply a 
conjectureless mind as may be elucidated by some further comments by 
Medawar who writes from a constructivist perspective:
'What are we to make of luck in our methodology of 
science? In the inductive view, luck strikes me as 
completely inexplicable; it can arise only from the 
gratuitous obtrusion of something utterly unexpected upon 
the senses; it is like winning a prize in a lottery in 
which We did not buy a ticket. To buy a ticket is to 
define a category of expectations, and then the reason 
why we win is obvious: we were in luck; for once in a way 
our hopes were gratified. We have Fontanelle's and 
Pasteur's word for it but luck makes sense only against a 
background of prior expectations. Ever since his 
experiences in the First World War, Alexander Fleming had 
been deeply concerned by the problem of infected wounds.
It was his lifelong ambition to discover a non-toxic 
anti- bacterial agent, and in penicillin he found a 
winner - by luck, if you like; but he held a ticket which 
entitled him to win a prize.'
(Medawar, 1982, p. 93: original emphasis).
It is important to understand that Medawar is debarring only a certain
type of luck from the conduct of science: I take the allusion to Pasteur
to his famous dictum that 'Chance [or "good luck"] favours only the
prepared mind'; conversely, "bad luck" might be said to afflict only the
inappropriately prepared mind. Given this caveat, there is still space
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for "luck" in constructivist mythology of science and, indeed, the case of 
Fleming and penicillin provide an excellent example for as Medawar later 
explains:
fAs it happens there was an element of blind luck in 
the discovery of penicillin, though it was unknown to 
Fleming. Most antibiotics - hundreds are now known - are 
murderously toxic, because they arrest the growth of 
bacteria by interfering with metabolic processes of a 
kind that bacteria have in common with higher organisms.
Penicillin is comparatively innocuous because it happens 
to interfere with a synthetic process peculiar to 
bacteria, namely the synthesis of a distinctive 
structural element of the bacterial cell wall.1
(Medawar, 1982, p. 274: original emphasis).
Finally, Michael's reintroduction of 'inductive trust' - 'he might have a
little experience which gives him that trust' (668), and his example that
‘- 'there might have been an explosion in a sodium factory' (671), all
but begs the question at issue: for Michael, the scientist's insight
remained empirically led.
A little later I made ray final attempt to elicit, or bring about, 
Michael's awareness of theory-ladenness:
I 2/008 would you think Mike that given the question about carefully
observe . and observation being endless do you think that
from all that you've said ... that it would be fair to 
say that er scientists always have some idea as* to what 
might happen when they do an experiment?
M 2/012 (long pause) . well ...
I 2/012 I* m not saying that they are always right .• but do you
think that a scientist always has an idea as to what might 
happen when he does an experiment?
M 2/014 I wouldn't say always • I'd say for a fair amount of the time 
though . ( )
I interpret Michael's response (2/014) again to allow for the possibility 
of presuppositionless, Baconian, experiments.
Now it was only after I had completed my P' interviews that I came to 
judge that whilst a consideration (involving actual experience) of 
selective attention is useful, even necessary, as both the means to 
investigate persons' awareness of the theory-ladenness of observations 
and as a vehicle for beginning to teach the notion, it is actually 
insufficient with respect, at least, for the latter purpose. I now feel 
sure that to stand a realistic chance of teaching this thesis requires a 
direct consideration (again, involving actual experience) of being able to 
perceive successfully a single object or image in different, mutually 
’exclusive, ways, i.e. a direct consideration and experience of 
theory-ladenness, e.g. by means of the classic illusion figures of 
perception psychology. Hence the authenticity of certain of the inferences 
I have felt able to make in connection with "theory-ladenness of 
observations in the classroom" may have been weakened slightly by this 
shortcoming of my initial questioning strategy.
In the final part of the interview, I elicited from Michael a metaphor for 
'scientific progress' using my 6 stage procedure (cf. Section 8.2.2.1):
I 2/034 can you tell me what a metaphor is?
M 2/037 is it when a state changes? like ... metamorphosis when say a
metal is heated to a high temperature it turns to liquid • or 
is it more like body changes like the incredible hulk
I 2/039 (laughs) well you're quite true • about metamorphosis ... but
I'm just thinking now .. just in ordinary language • do you
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know what a metaphor is • a metaphor?
M 2/042 no
I 2/044 can you give me an example?
M 2/044 metaphor is when • er . could it be melting like solidifying? 
is it Greek for changing or ?
I 2/046 you’re right in many ways but I think you’re trying to relate 
it to chemistry • you know sublimation and all that sort of 
thing . changes of state and things like that • now you’re 
quite right about metamorphosis being about changing um its 
just that if you could try and get outside the science lesson 
part of this interview and just think .. if you were in the 
playground . • of an example of what someone was saying just 
speaking about anything at all . of a metaphor do you know 
what it means in language?
M 2/055 change in certain conditions?
I 2/056 well I'll tell you what I will do I'll give you an example of a 
metaphor .. Peter is a lion . O.K. that's an example of a 
metaphor
M 2/058 so's they'll expect Peter to be a boy do you mean it more in 
that way?
I 2/060 Peter is a boy?
M 2/060 you know instead of Peter is a lion
I 2/06l yes . yes . you see Peter is a boy • is um quite true isn't
it as a statement of fact • Peter is a lion is not true is 
it? .• its not literally true .• Peter is not equal to a lion 
because he's a boy um . now would that saying make sense to you 
if someone said ooh Peter is a lion . would that make sense 
to you even though its not true?
M 2/067 yes . if he's going around (growls) like that you know 
pretending to be a lion say .
I 2/069 if he's pretending to be a lion then would it make 
some kind of sense would it?
M 2/069 it would make some kind of sense . yeh
I 2/070 if Peter was um beating up Paul in the playground and
someone else said • Peter is a lion now there he wouldn't 
be pretending that he was a lion but would this expression 
Peter is a lion would that still make sense to you?
M 2/074 well it could do in the meaning that he was ferocious •
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menacing • like he was beating up this boy orwhatever .
I 2/076 I see so .. what made you think of that particular aspect of 
menacing . ferocious?
M 2/078 that he's fighting and that they'd call him a lion . if er
Peter is going to sleep you can't really say that Peter is a 
lion .
I 2/080 why not?
M 2/081 well its the image that we're given that a lion is a ferocious 
menacing animal .
I 2/082 so when you use the metaphor like Peter is a lion .• you're 
thinking now what's a lion like • its known .. the image of 
a lion to use your expression * is ferocious and menacing? (M 
agreeing) and .. they're using those parts of the image of a 
lion to as it were characterise what Peter's like or what 
Peter's doing • O.K.? They're not using --
M 2/087 adjectives in another way?
I 2/087 yeah that's right he's beating up Paul in a lion like way ..
what they're not doing is saying that he's literally a lion 
in all respects . he hasn't got 4 legs and a tail for 
example •• O.K. so this is a metaphor where you're using 
certain aspects ..in this case its the lion • to characterise 
what say what Peter is doing but it is not complete . there 
are parts where this is metaphor ... you can't carry over 
similarities . now this is true of all metaphors .. There 
are similarities between the two things you're considering . 
but you can't say one equals the other because it will always 
at some point not be exactly equal . ( )
Since Michael didn't know what a metaphor was (2/034-2/055): of.
stage'(1)'), I provided a specimen metaphor, namely 'Peter is a lion'
(2/056: cf. stage '(2)'), which we then explored. I drew attention to (or
elicited) similarities between referrants, e.g. 'ferocious and menacing'
(M 2/094)> contrasts between referrants, i.e. '(Peter hasn't got 4 legs
and a tail)' (I 2/087), and the fact that these qualities are
characteristic of all metaphors: 'O.K. (et seq)' (I 2/087, excerpt
above cf. stages '(4)1 and '(5)1).
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In the latter part of my last utterance, begun above (I 2/087), I went on 
to elicit and explore the research metaphor (cf. stages '(6)' and 1(7)1):
2/087 ( ) now what I would like you to do in the last ten minutes or
so . is can you think up a metaphor for scientific progress?
Scientific progress is?
2/103 (long pause) well its good and bad ..well .. like a tiger 
menacing and .... something like that?
2/105 something like that-yeah . you think in your head what you 
think scientific progress is
2/108 (long pause) its like a schizophrenic
2/108 its like a schizophrenic . scientific progress is
schizophrenic?
2/110 schizophrenic yes . it could be bad in ways and good in other 
ways .. like schizophrenics sometimes you’re a good person and 
another time you could be murdering someone . that’s what 
science is like in a way you've got people making building 
bombs and other people getting antidotes for cancer and heart 
disease . so there's two sides to it in a sort of Jekyll and
Hyde . 4
2/115 I see . so scientific progress is like a Jekyll and Hyde? ..
2/115 yeh .
Now, before I consider my exploration and interpretation of Michael's
metaphor for 'scientific progress', I would like briefly to discuss the
elicitation technique itself, i.e. 'elicited metaphors'.
Whilst my use of the technique in this particular interview is far from my 
best example, it does illustrate a number of recurring problems which I 
encountered with eliciting metaphors.
Firstly, and perhaps predictably with persons of his age, Michael was 
unfamiliar with the notion of metaphor and I would probably have done
I
M
I
M
I
M
I
M
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better to start (as I did in later interviews) by asking him to consider a 
provided specimen metaphor.
Secondly, I discern problems with my purposes for the technique which are 
of a more fundamental nature concerning the underlying theory. To 
elaborate, one of the attractions to me of metaphor, constructivistically 
construed, is that it shares a certain feature with the notion of a 
personal construct, viz. it constitutes simultaneously both a mental, 
process and a mental product. As Schoen puts it in discussing his 
'generative' theory of metaphor:
'[metaphor is] central to the task of accounting for our
perspective on the world: how we think about these
things, make sense of reality, and set the problems we 
later try to solve. In this [generative] sense,
'metaphor* refers to a certain kind of product - a 
perspective or frame, a way of looking at things - and to
a certain kind of process - a process by which new
perspectives on the world come into existence*
(Schoen, 1979, p. 254).
Eliciting metaphors as an investigative technique thus seemed to me to
complement the inferences which I had made for PCP/ACM (cf. chapter 5•),
notably that there is no purely descriptive educational research: every
investigation of a person's views necessarily involves some degree of
learning on the part of researcher and researched.
I now feel, however, that unless metaphors are elicited with the 
expressed purpose of learning something new, then some kind of merely 
figurative employment of metaphor by the interviewee shall almost 
inevitably result, thereby negating the chief hoped for potentiality of
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the technique, viz. facilitating a person's access to, and communication 
of, certain of their core constructs. This, indeed, seemed to be the case 
with Michael who first stated his view "literally" - 'well its good and 
bad1 (2/103) - and then went on to advocate his 'tiger' (2/103) and 
'schizophrenic' (2/108) metaphor.
I believe that, appropriately handled, 'elicited metaphors' may constitute 
a powerful teaching technique which is compatible with, and contributive 
to, a 'Personal Construct Pedagogy' and, furthermore, that constructivist 
theories of the dynamics of metaphor function may help elucidate the 
Kellyan process of 'superordination' in personal construction systems, 
i.e. learning (see my discussion of these claims in chapter 10).
Where the emphasis in purpose is upon eliciting a person's existing 
ideas, as in my investigation, exploration of "tacit" metaphors i.e. 
metaphors introduced spontaneously by interviewees, using some of my 
guidelines for 'elicited metaphors' technique, may bear fruit. A further 
comment from Schoen made in applying his 'generative' theory of metaphor 
to the critical exploration and explanation of social policy, may be 
argued to support this conclusion:
'[ ] the notion of generative metaphor then becomes an
interpretative tool [my emphasis] for the critical 
analysis of social policy. My point here is not that we 
ought to think metaphorically about social policy 
problems, but that we do already think about them in 
terms of certain pervasive, tacit generative metaphors; 
and that we ought to become critically aware of these 
generative metaphors, to increase the rigour and 
precision of our analysis of social policy problems'
(Schoen, 1979, p« 256: original emphasis).
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Notwithstanding ray recent criticisms of ’elicited metaphors’ technique in 
its investigative role, Michael’s research metaphor of ’scientific 
progress’ being ’like a schizophrenic' (2/108) perhaps provides more than 
a merely figurative summary of certain of his earlier expressed views.
To elaborate, Michael's example of 'a schizophrenic' i.e. 'Jekyll and 
Hyde' (2/110), suggests to me that his meaning of the term, like that of 
many lay persons, corresponds more closely to clinical notions of 
multiple personality ("split” personality) rather than those of 
schizophrenia. This I found fascinating because Michael's metaphorical 
application of Jekyll and Hyde might suggest a fracturing of 
consciousness on the part of scientists (considered as a community or as 
‘individuals) in pursuit of their work and which might correspond to (and 
be explained by) the empiricist separation of an 'is' from an 'ought'.
With this possibility in mind I first tried to find out whether Michael 
construed 'scientific progress' as a perspective dependent on an objective 
phenomenon:
I 2/115 would it be fair to say that every time that one person says
science has progressed .. another person would say no it hasn't 
progressed . its got worse . would you say?
M 2/118 yeh . you can say that . it has got worse because people die
because of it but it has progressed as well because people are 
living because of it .
I 2/120 do you think that this Jekyll and this Hyde .. the good and the 
bad sides of science . • do they exactly balance each other out.
•• or do you think that the good is slightly more than the bad 
element • or bad element is slightly more than the good element 
.?
- 9.4-2 -
M 2/124. I think the good is slightly more than the bad . you do hear a 
lot of more bad things than there are good things . about it . 
in the press . I would imagine so • you hear about the 
experiments on animals which is bad .• bombs and that which is 
bad • but (* there's) good things like er treatment and new 
technology things like ....
Michael's answer is ambiguous: on the one hand, he recognises the
existence of different perspectives, i.e. 'you can say that' (2/118), on
the other hand, he reinforced his earlier, "absolute", examples of 'good'
scientific progress, i.e. 'people getting antidotes for cancer and heart
disease (2/110): 'treatment and new technology' (2/124.), and 'bad'
scientific progress, i.e. 'people building bombs' (2/110): 'experiments on
animals'( )'bombs' (2/124.) conducted by different individual, or groups of
individual, scientists.
‘We continued:
I 2/129 now you're saying that you think that the good side of
science outweighs the bad side overall? (M agreeing) .. but 
what you tend to read about more often is the bad side? (M 
agreeing)
M 2/132 when you watch programmes like Tomorrow's World you realise
there's a gooder side like what you read in papers and
experiments on animals which is bad and should be stopped 
things . like that . like er . the scientists have just built a' 
new super bomb so in a way the bad outdoes the good because if 
it was used a lot more people would be killed and that is very 
bad . you can look at it in that way but really I think in 
normal non-war times say the good is better than the bad but 
when it comes to a war or something science is worse than good.
I 2/14.1 so far you've related good and bad to what you earlier called 
the social aspect of science can you talk about scientific 
progress without referring to the social aspect?
M 2/14.5 yeh if you're that way inclined you could say progress is
making the atomic bomb but I don't think that • for example you 
could say oh its peaceful • it keeps the peace • another may 
say that scientific progress is computers and things like that 
storing information and things like that .. if you are • sort
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of say science is good 'cause its built an hydrogen bomb 
because its keeps the peace that's what some people think . I 
don't agree with that idea but some people do think like that 
.. there's a new computer which is a good science progress .. 
things like that •
In this final episode in the interview, Michael again showed his
willingness and ability both to acknowledge the existence of different
points of view, e.g. 'you can look at it in that way' (2/132), 'if you're
that way inclined you could say' (2/14.5), 'another may say' (2/145)> and
to assert and delineate his own position, e.g. 'experiments on animals
which is bad and should be stopped' (2/132), 'but I don't think that'
(2/145)> 'I don't agree with that idea but some people do think like that'
(2/145).
I interpreted Michael's personal meaning of scientific progress to be 
cast primarily in terms of technology (and 'technical success') in the 
cause or application of preserving and enriching all forms of life. Such 
is determined by a post hoc evaluation of the empirically (technically) 
successful conduct of science for being "merely" scientific, recall, is 
'more like being clever in a technical sort of way' (263). Michael seemed 
to me both to accept and reject aspects of empiricist epistemology, viz. 
he seemed to accept the empiricist's view that the conduct of science 
itself, and scientificness, is independent of social and moral issues, but 
yet seemed to reject the empiricist notion that empirical success is not 
only a necessary condition for scientific progress but also a sufficient 
one.
I have for the sake of clarity, perhaps, presented Michael's position 
rather too simply in support of this two part case.
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With respect to the former, i.e. Michael's acceptance of the objectivity 
of science, much of my interpretation rests upon Michael's earlier 
contrast between 'technical' and 'social' aspects of occupations. While I 
have treated these as opposite poles of a personal construct in Kelly's 
sense it might be more authentic to say only that they tend very nearly to 
a relation of oppositeness.
With respect to the latter, i.e. Michael's rejection of empiricist 
criteria for scientific progress, I corroborate this interpretation by his 
use of the construct 'good vs. bad' and by his choice of instances of 
'bad' scientific progress (or non progress, i.e. mere 'science' ?) which 
he rejects and delineates from his meaning of 'good' scientific progress 
(i.e. scientific progress). Most'noticeably amongst these, bearing in mind 
his earlier defence of Oppenheimer, is his judgement that 'if you're that 
way inclined you could say progress is making the atomic bomb but I 
don't think that' (2/145). Here it may be more authentic to construe 
Michael as a person with a developed social conscience, the effective 
exercise of which is undermined by his commitment to empiricist 
epistemology.
To explain how Michael's apparent double standard (defence of Oppenheimer 
qua scientist versus nuclear weapons as 'bad' scientific progress) may 
have come about, I suggest that one of the central doctrines of empiricist 
(objectivist) epistemology, namely, the distinction between an 'is' and an 
'ought', reinforced by the doctrine of 'brute data' in all its many forms 
(including that of 'objective' falsification), encourages (now to
- 9.45 -
interpolate Michael's idiom) a 'Jekyll anf Hyde' fracturing of 
consciousness between the 'technical' and the 'social'.
From the post empiricist perspective that I have been defending throughout 
this thesis, empiricist objectivism is a dangerous shimmerer. It is 
dangerous because such epistemologies may, as I suggested earlier, be 
appealed to in support of any enquiry at any stage (Teller), 
notwithstanding changes of heart on the part of some (Oppenheimer). The 
same applies to empiricist mentors or commentators of science, including 
student scientists such as Michael.
Traditions of empiricist epistemology strive to exclude all considerations 
of the personal and the social in their criteria for science, propounding 
instead an objective or scientific calculus of prediction. Science and 
scientists are thus removed from their social context and thereby also 
from social responsibility. From a post empiricist viewpoint, however, 
our understanding of science and scientists is correspondingly impaired by 
so doing. This is particularly apparent in the cruder, "after the fact", 
forms of empiricist epistemology such as was expressed by Michael: cf. his 
opaque speculations about the ability of scientists to be 'clever in a 
technical sort of way' (263) being a 'gift' (264.) etc.
Although no doubt moving beyond the meanings Michael intended for his 
metaphor, it may be interesting to note that Robert Louis Stevenson 
himself (as he has been interpreted by Galder, 1979) used his composite 
character of Jekyll and Hyde to symbolise not only the good and evil 
aspects which are a proper part of every person but also to present a
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critique of a certain kind of goodness, namely, Calvinism.
Calder argues that Calvinism was construed by Stevenson to be a repressive 
and counter productively rigid form of morality:
'the point about Jekyll is not that he is a moral and 
decent man but that he has always been leading a double 
life. And he is leading a double life because he has 
aimed so high. He wanted respect, honour and 
distinction, to be highly regarded in society, and thus 
felt that he had to conceal any irregularities in his 
life.'
(Calder, 1979, p.11)
She cites a passage from Jekyll and Hyde in support of this view:
'Hence it came about that I concealed my pleasures; and 
that when I reached years of reflection, and began to 
look round me and take stock of my progress and position 
in the world, I stood already committed to a profound 
duplicity of life. Many a man would have blazoned such 
irregularities as I was guilty of; but from the high 
views that I had set before me, I regarded and hid them 
with an almost morbid sense of shame. It was thus rather 
the exacting nature of my aspirations than any particular 
degradation in my faults, that made me what I was, and, 
with even a deeper trench than in the majority of men, 
severed in me those provinces of good and evil which 
divide and compound man's dual nature'.
(Stevenson, quoted by Calder, 1979* p. 11)
What I am suggesting is that traditions of empiricist epistemology share
some of the excessively high minded idealism - and consequent defects - of
Calvinism. Specifically, the unobtainability (from a post empiricist
point of view) of the empiricist goal of objective knowledge endorses a
'profound duplicity' on the part of empiricist minded scientists and their
commentators (philosophers, historians, teachers, students etc). Thus
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Calder goes on to relate the hidden 'irregularities' of the character Dr. 
Jekyll, referred to in the passage quoted from the novel, above, to those 
of Stevenson's own life, viz. his 'bohemian reaction to Edinburgh middle 
class respectability, which involved frequenting the taverns and brothels 
of Edinburgh's underworld' (Calder, 1979, pages 11-12). I, by analogy, 
evoke the empiricist rewriting of history of science (and "whiggish" 
history of science generally cf. Section 4*2.) and demonstrated by some 
teachers (cf. Section 8.8.3).
Calder later concludes:
'Dr. Jekyll, in becoming Mr. Hyde, is liberating himself.
He experiences a 'solution of the bonds of obligation, an 
unknown but not an innocent freedom of the soul' and 
because Jekyll has tried so hard to be good - he has led 
a life 'of effort, virtue and control* - the undeveloped, 
unexercised evil side of his nature is what is set free.
The greater the aspirations towards good of Jekyll, the 
greater the monstrosity of Hyde.
Was Stevenson suggesting that it was dangerous to 
suppress certain elements of human nature? I think he 
was, and I think there is a great deal of psychological 
truth in what he is saying. He had experienced directly 
the iron grip of Calvinism and of bourgeois morality on 
human behaviour, and he had recognised that it could be 
destructive, destructive because it affirmed that good 
for the majority was something external, artificial, not 
intrinsic to human nature: men could not be good Unless 
they were told how to be good. Stevenson himself 
recognised a rather different kind of morality, a 
morality that came from within, that depended on a 
sensitive understanding of human relationships and 
responsibilities, that was flexible, individual, 
spontaneous.'
. (Calder, 1979, p. 13: my emphasis).
Here again, I suggest that Calder's construal of Stevenson's morality 
closely complements features of post-empiricist approaches to history and
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philosophy of science (cf. chapter 4)*
Calder argues that Stevenson 'maintained very strong feelings about human 
nature, about man's inhumanity to man in general, and to women even more' 
(1979, p» 9) and remarks that
'It is interesting and significant that all the 
characters in the story are in a sense isolated. They 
have no wives, no family, no close friendships. They 
have servants and they have acquaintances, but that is 
all. And there is little sense of busy city life. Mr.
Utterson and his friend Enfield clearly have a cool,
distant relationship; there is no real intimacy. One of 
the most striking effects of the story's tone is the 
juxtaposition of these cool, rather arid characters, 
isolated and emotionally uncommitted, with the extreme 
horror and disgust which Hyde and all that is associated 
with him engenders. The result is more sinister than if 
the story were built up out of warmer, communal 
relationships.'
(Calder, 1979, p. 12). « '
I suggest that Calder's views, above, have pertinence to empiricist 
epistemology and that further elaboration of them mediated by appeal to 
Jekyll and Hyde as a sub-text, would complement and* in a modest way, 
extend the approach adopted by Easlea (1983) who similarly refers to Mary 
Shelley's Frankenstein in his critique of empiricist epistemology qua
'masculine' service (cf. my discussion of Easlea's thesis, chapter 4,
section 4*4).
Whatever the worth of my scanty articulated views, it may be argued that 
by relating them to Michael's quality and degree of epistemological 
awareness I have overstated my case, given his younger age. Against this, 
however, I refer the reader to my previously and subsequently described
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research from which I conclude that whilst it is always possible for an 
educand critically to create, modify or maintain a personal epistemology, 
there is little justification for relying upon the existing education 
system to facilitate these processes (cf. especially chapter 5). As I 
shall argue in more detail in chapter 10, the case of Michael (and other 
interviewees) corroborates my view that the empiricist image of science 
projected overall by our present education system undermines the 
responsibility of science to society: it effectively precludes those who 
are not themselves (or do not become) professional scientists from 
science policy and it leaves empiricist scientists poorly equipped to 
behave in a socially responsible way (which is not to say that post 
empiricist epistemology would preclude all scientific errors with social 
import). Lest it be thought otherwise, then, my purpose in this 
case-study has not been to criticise Michael himself. On the contrary, I 
greatly admire the way in which he stated and defended his own views 
whilst entertaining the views of others. I suggest that this interview 
demonstrates that Michael was both able and willing to assume personal 
responsibility in a formal educational setting and would thrive in a 
personal construct pedagogy.
Finally, on a methodological note, I suggest that this interview 
demonstrates the considerable benefits that may be had from 
(m)ethodological pluralism (triangulation of research methods).
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Chapter 10. Discussion: Beyond Scientism in Schools?
'Let him [the child] know his fairy tale accurately, 
and hence perfect joy or awe in the conception of it as 
if it were real; thus he will always be exercising his 
power of grasping realities ....'
(John Ruskin, introduction to German Popular Stories.
1868; quoted by Pagels, 1982, p.155).
10.1. Introduction
This thesis began with three, overarching, complementary and overlapping 
aims, viz:
(1) To explore students' and teachers' personal epistemologies of
science;
(2) To elucidate the epistemological image of science projected overall
by the existing education system;
(3) To reconstrue Kelly's 1955 articulation of 'Man-the-Scientist'
The reconstruing of 'Man-the Scientist' is carried out in light of both 
influential traditions in epistemology, on the one hand, and of the 
interests and commitments I discern to inform the Alternative Conceptions 
Movement in educational research, on the other hand, with a view to 
outlining a 'Personal Construct Pedagogy' applicable with initial special
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reference to the teaching of science.
My purpose in this chapter, then, is (a) to summarise the inferences I 
have made from my investigations of ’(1)’ and '(2)', and which I have 
already discussed in detail,in their respective contexts, and, (b) to 
extend these inferences in further elaboration and corroboration of 
arguments already begun in Chapters 3, 4- and 5 and in fulfilment of '(3)’«
10.2. Epistemology in the Classroom - A Contemporary Appraisal
My field research corroborates the view that departures from the 
'empiricist-inductivist' ("Baconian") model of science, long discredited 
by philosophers of science and science educators alike, are more 
apparent than real. I concur, then, with Cawthron and Rowell who, from 
their own studies, which included, interpretation of curricular materials 
(for which see also Zylberstajn, 1983)> conclude that ’school science 
generally projects an image of science which can be called empiricist 
induetivist’ (1978, p.33) and moreover, extend it - with some 
qualifications - to undergraduate ’university science' ('tertiary 
science').
Thus, from my investigation of teaching materials and teaching practice 
(Chapter 6), I suggest that philosophy of science is generally dealt with 
sparsely, implicitly, and in an objectivist-empiricist image.
In the school, one teacher claimed to introduce consideration of
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scientific method (along with laboratory safety and administrative 
procedures concerning homework etc) in the first lesson of term by means 
of a "paradigm lesson" (her descriptor). This consisted of a demonstration 
experiment together with a demonstration write-up. The format of the 
write-up was not identified to the class as scientific method, but it 
matched the teacher's articulation of it in interview: it had all the 
features of a "Medawar fraud" (cf. Medawar, 1964) i.e. empiricist- 
inductivist. Other teachers similarly introduced scientific method in an 
embedded and piecemeal manner through considerations of experimental 
design. None voluntarily considered the nature of scientific knowledge 
sub specie acternitatis. Consideration of history of science by means 
of classroom discussion, dictation or teaching materials was extremely 
rare and when such consideration was given, the history of science had the 
quality of a "Whiggish" account, usually of an empiricist-inductivist and 
certainly of an objectivist- empiricist nature.
At the tertiary level, the overall picture was the same. There was more 
discussion of the nature of scientific evidence but again in embedded 
form, viz. the merits of competing experiments and experimental designs 
used to investigate particular subject areas in science. Again, a 
"Whiggish" history of science was projected in the empiricist-inductivist 
- or at least - objectivist-empiricist image.
In interviews (Chapter 8), educators demonstrated little detailed 
knowledge of philosophy of science but all displayed a predominant 
sympathy for an objectivist-empiricist model, with two teachers 
articulating overtly Baconian accounts. Whilst many educators expressed a
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desire to include more (1) philosophy pf science in their teaching, they 
characteristically appealed to constraints imposed by the existing 
curriculum content. On further enquiry, however, all educators seemed to 
support only a "weak" thesis of philosophy Of science in science education 
- thereby effectively underwriting an objectivist-empiricist image of 
science projected by the education system. I judged overall that 
educators' personal epistemologies of science matched their 
professional ones (both extant and desired) and that these were 
predominantly objectivist-empiricist.
Most educands found my questions both novel and difficult to answer - 
which I took to be a reflection, in part, upon the low valuation placed 
upon philosophy of science by both teachers and the curriculum, 
notwithstanding the stated curriculum objectives. As with their 
educators, I interpreted a prevailing commitment to objectivist-empiricist 
models of science, with the Baconian and Positivist accounts strongly 
represented.
Now, my many caveats concerning interviewees' commitments to 
objectivist-empiricist epistemology are because none could rigorously be 
categorised even that broadly. Commensurate with Kelly's Fragmentation 
Corollary, all my interviewees displayed at least some degree of 
episteraological pluralism, including sympathies for post-objectivist- 
empiricist accounts in some contexts, as I hope to have made clear in 
section 8.8. ‘
In partial elaboration of the last paragraph, however, some educands
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indicated that they had availed themselves of a number of informal or non- 
compulsory sources of education in philosophy of science. These consisted 
mainly of television documentaries on topics such as the so-called 
'Creation Controversy' (at the tertiary level, this was also mediated by 
the Christian Union) and large particle accelerator experiments, on the 
one hand, and television dramatisations of the lives of great scientists ; 
such as Pasteur and Oppenheimer on the other hand. For some students at 
the university, one source of education in philosophy of science came from 
an optional but excellent, balanced, course with a large historical 
component devoted to exploring "principles and perspectives in science".
Amongst some of these educands, their experiences of these predominantly 
informal sources had clearly shaken their commitment in the objectivist 
image.of science - yet they still'ultimately retained it, perhaps seeing 
the only alternative as analogous to magic or alchemy. Many educands, 
indeed, many educators, with whom I talked displayed developed social 
consciences and sensibilities in connection with the conduct of science 
and this tended to come out when discussing their personal meanings for 
scientific progress (advancement in scientific knowledge). With such 
individuals, I found that there was often something rather poignant about 
their sense of sadness and hopelessness in the face of "bad" science (e.g. 
nuclear weapons) and in its continued inevitability, for this seemed to me 
to be consequential of their objectivist commitments. This, as I have 
argued in Chapter 4> is not to say that objectivist epistemology and 
science conducted according to its tenets, is inherently bad, but it is 
blind with respect to social or inter-personal considerations without 
being neutral.
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With interviews especially (as opposed to written exercises: Chapter 7) 
where trust and mutual respect could be engendered, educands demonstrated 
that they were both willing and able to accept personal responsibility in, 
a formal educational setting in that they expressed, developed and ,
critically defended their own ideas - qualities which bode well for a 
Personal Construct Pedagogy. Educands were often vociferous in their 
criticism of the existing science education system. They expressed 
desires for activities complementary to Thomas and Harri-Augstein's (1985) 
principles and themes of 'Self Organised Learning' (see section 8.8., 
above; section 10.3, below). Thus educands complained, for example, that 
science lessons were unscientific because they only did writing, whereas a 
scientific science lesson would involve argument and discussion; that 
existing science lessons were pointless by virtue of educand experiments, 
merely replication experiments, whereas novel, self-devised, experiments 
would be genuinely interesting; and so on.
Notwithstanding the potentialities implied by these recent comments, I 
conclude that, generally speaking, and at the present time, the curricular 
response to the pluralism of substantial rival traditions in philosophy of 
science established over the last three decades has been confused and half 
hearted. I contend that a comment by Schwab is sadly as pertinent today 
as it was when he uttered it, nearly 25 years ago:
'Our teaching laboratories invite students to discover 
the satisfaction of techniques mastered. They 
emphasise the desirability of patience, accuracy, and 
precision. They testify to the soundness of existing 
knowledge. But rarely indeed do they invite students
to discover the limitations of present knowledge or ,y
identify unsolved problems and areas of present
ignorance. Much less do they invite students to
invent, to devise and explore possibilities
alternative to current formulationsf.
(Schwab, 1962, p.39).
My research suggests that curriculum planners have yet to come to terms 
with the lack of orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of science: the 
image of science projected overall is not only an empiricist-inductivist 
one, it is also a less sophisticated version than would be achieved by a 
conscious and conscientious articulation of, say, Bacon's epistemology.
Now, my earlier remarks concerning educators' low or ambivalent valuation 
of philosophy of science in the curriculum and their lack of expertise in 
the subject should not be taken to imply indifference to it on their 
part. On the contrary, whilst the educators whose classes or tutorial 
groups I had observed as part of my main study immediately granted me an 
interview (indeed, this had been negotiated even before I had conducted my 
observations), I found it significant that teachers often seemed to me to 
be very nervous about being interviewed by me - some to the extent of 
avoiding me - once they knew, presumably from discussions with earlier 
interviewees, some details about the questions that I would be asking.
(I had characterised my interview as an "inquiry into teachers' personal 
meanings of some words used in and about science". Upon completing each 
interview I had also requested each interviewee not to discus3 the content 
of the interview with others whom I had not interviewed). Such 
nervousness was most noticeable amongst the very young, inexperienced, 
teachers (as might be expected) and older teachers some of whom were 
candid enough to admit (in informal interviews) that this was because they
- 10.7 -
were frightened that they would somehow be "out of date". Yet all were 
happy to talk and to share time with me in the staffroom.
Perhaps the idea of "nervousness" might be extended to curriculum planners 
by way of an explanation for their present practice of placing teachers in 
a "double bind", viz. on the one hand including curriculum objectives 
concerning "the processes and reasoning involved in scientific method", by 
yet, on the other hand, not reflecting this in a coherent or whole 
hearted manner in the course examinations and meanwhile increasing 
course content as well.
In elaboration of the above, I suggest that few pedagogues would now 
disagree with Driver and Erickson who argue that 1[w]hat is called for is 
a clarification and redefinition of what is taken to be school science* 
(Driver and Erickson, 1933, p.55). However, responding to this remark is 
complicated in its epistemological aspect by the prima facie case that 
there are at least three possible curricular responses to contemporary 
philosophy of science, namely, (1) monistic, (2) pluralistic,
(3) eclectic. Each option would seem to have its own strengths and 
weaknesses.
Thus the monistic option, whereby a single tradition is chosen from 
philosophy of science offers the possibility of coherency but raises the 
question of who in principle could have the competence to make such a 
choice? Moreover, assuming that such a choice was somehow made and 
reflected the prevailing preference for constructivist epistemology, 
certain topics in science (i.e. quantum mechanics) have successfully
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defied widespread acceptance by philosophers and scientists of 
ontologically realist interpretation.
The pluralistic option, in which a variety of influential epistemologies 
are taught lessens the problem of competency of choice and overcomes the , 
last problem of the first option. This, however, would seem to undermine 
any coherency in the underlying pedagogy. Moreover, it would be a 
travesty of epistemological sophistication if pupils had to answer 
questions in examinations along the lines of "compare and contrast Kuhn’s 
incommensurability thesis with that of Feyerabend. Illustrate your answer 
with an example from nineteenth century science" for reasons explained by 
Nietzsche:
’Imagine a young head, without much experience of life, 
being stuffed with fifty -systems ..• and fifty 
criticisms of them, all jumbled up together - what an 
overgrown wilderness it will come to be! What a 
mocking of a philosophical education! It is, in fact, 
avowedly an education, not for philosophy but for an 
examination in philosophy’.
(Nietzsche, quoted by Passmore, 1980, p.5)*
Finally, the eclectic option, in which an attempt is made to combine the 
best elements from a number of influential epistemologies would seem to be 
impossible in principle due to the fundamental and irreconcilable 
differences (incommensurabilities?) between them.
Thus each option has been presented and rejected. I contend that 
curricular science currently suffers from an "identity crisis". It is the 
purpose of my next section to show that a Personal Construct Pedagogy may 
help to break this impasse.
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10.3. Towards a Personal Construct Pedagogy.
I have already mentioned the links perceived by Kelly himself between 
psychotherapy and learning (Chapter 5). Karst, in commenting upon Kelly’s 
theory in its clinical role, argues that
’It is my opinion that PCT is one of a small set of 
theories which can afford to be technically eclectic, 
is technically fertile, and still remains rationally 
integrated’.
(Karst, 1980, p.167: my emphasis).
He goes on to demonstrate some of the (psychotherapeutic) ’technical 
variety' that PCP can generate and the 'technical eclecticism' it can 
incorporate. In extension of Karst's paper, Winter argues that
'The technical eclecticism of personal construct theory 
reflects its central philosophical assumption of 
constructive alternatism; and that a treatment 
service organised in accordance with this assumption 
could accommodate therapists of different theoretical 
persuasions« matching clients and therapeutic 
conditions in terms of dimensions by the 'personal 
styles' research’.
(Winter, 1985, p.129: my emphasis).
Now, I contend that PCP offers the same advantages of tolerance of 
'technical eclecticism' within a 'rationally integrated' framework with 
respect to rival epistemologies of, and theories in, science, and, 
thence, to inform a science pedagogy which is appropriate both to the 
present lack of orthodoxy in philosophy of science and to the tenets of 
the ACM.
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These points may be justified and given a preliminary plausibility by 
reference to certain of my earlier arguments in Chapters 3 and 4> namely, 
that the construct articulates a general meta-theory which is capable of 
tolerating ’methodological pluralism’ (embracing a 'pluralistic 
methodology' in its 'elaborative' aspect); that the relationship of 
'opposite contrast' constitutes a relation of 'incommensurability', and 
that by invoking the 'arrow of time thesis' and the 'assumption of 
epistemological realism', this relationship may be demonstrated to afford 
a 'transformational theory of reference' (a "subjectivist theory of 
objective reference") in which empirical evidence ('crucial experiments') 
functions in a manner analogous to icons in traditions of religion.
By means of these and other arguments I claimed that the formal content of 
PCP may be construed epistemologically as a species of 'relativist- 
methodological-constructivism' in. which the constructive structure of 
Kelly's notion of a construction system (whether personal or "communal") 
is congruent with Feyerabend's conception of knowledge as 'an ever 
increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps even 
incommensurable) alternatives'
(Feyerabend, 1975, p.30: original emphasis).
Whilst such a conception of knowledge is perfectly able to accommodate 
rival theories and meta-theories, it underwrites a thesis of radical 
relativity: more than mere fallibility is implied here for objectivity of 
knowledge claims are ruled out completely. Clearly, this must have 
radical consequences for theories of teaching, learning and the growth of
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knowledge; as I put it (adapting Kelly's idiom):
"There could be no fairer destiny for any personal 
construct than that it should make an impact upon a 
larger construction system, in which it lives on as a 
relevant contrast".
So much for the epistemological aspect of PCP. How, then, might we 
proceed to articulate, in outline, a "Personal Construct Pedagogy"?
I believe that the most fruitful way to start is to consider the following 
question: 'What is education for?' Indeed, I believe that this question 
is of pre-eminent fundamental!ty and that every person who considers their 
activities to be connected in some way with "education" is obliged to 
provide at least a provisional or general answer to it. Furthermore, such 
persons should strive to ensure that their activities do not undermine
their notions as to what education is for; at the very least, they should,
at all times, strive to apprehend a relationship between the two.
Mindful though I have been of Kelly's cautions concerning the "over 
extension" of a theory, such as his own, beyond its original 'range of • 
convenience', I suggest that teachers and educationalists may yet agree 
with Kelly's view that
'We are concerned with finding better ways to help a
person reconstrue his life so that he need not be a
victim of his past'.
(Kelly, 1955, p.23).
This statement constitutes the cornerstone of my "Personal Construct
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Philosophy of Education", in light of which I attempt to outline a 
"Personal Construct Pedagogy". I argue that this basic statement of 
intent "cuts both ways", viz. a compatible theory of teaching must somehow 
give due recognition to the importance of both the consensual knowledge 
of society and the personal, possibly idiosyncratic, knowledge of the 
learner. At the same time, the reflexivity of Kelly's theory demands that 
similar recognition be afforded to the personal knowledge of the 
teacher. Thus, a truly compatible, responsible, pedagogy would 
celebrate all 3 parts of the triadic relationship long accepted to 
characterise formal teaching, viz.
"A teaches B to C"
(Where 'A' = Teacher, 'B' = a subject or discipline, and 'C' = a pupil).
I believe that these basic commitments may best initially be elucidated by 
reference to the following three principles for 'Self Organised Learning' 
articulated by the personal construct psychologists Thomas and 
Harri-Augstein:
' 1 Real personal learning depends upon an ability to use 
oneself as a test-bed for personal validity and 
viability. The construction of internal referents is 
primary. External criteria, normative standards, and 
assessment by others are secondary. Thus the quality 
of learning becomes defined within the person's own 
evaluative systems rather than judged against the 
criteria arrived at by 'experts'.
2 The dynamics of self-organised learning depends upon an 
ability to monitor the construction and reconstruction
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of personal meaning over time. The development, 
expansion, modification and refinement of our personal 
models of the world can thus be systematically 
regulated and appreciated. Inadequate monitoring leads 
to inappropriate models and this can be viewed as 
disruptions to personal growth.
3 Shared meaning as against public knowledge must be 
truly negotiated. Individuals, pairs, groups and 
institutions can each become conversational entities 
capable of adaptive, organised learning. Such 
conversational networks construct their own viability 
and validity and thus exhibit a capacity for creative 
and flexible growth1.
(Thomas and Harri-Augstein, 1985, pp. xxix-xxx).
With these principles in mind, I believe that a Personal Construct 
Pedagogy would begin with a requirement that educators assume a 1 credulous 
attitude1 (Kelly, 1955, p.174) with respect to the personal conceptions of 
their educands together with a desire to promote the same in the latter in 
vice versa. Teaching and learning in formal settings would thus be 
construed as a form of collaborative research, albeit, skewed because 
(most often) initiated by educators.
The rejection in PCP of the notion of relative levels of truth in 
favour of relative degrees of personal utility would rule out the use of 
normative assessment procedures, indeed, all genuinely alternative 
conceptions (unlike trivially different conceptions) would be seen as 
being worthy of being rewarded in some way. In a Personal Construct 
Pedagogy, as in Personal Construct Psychology, the construction 
characteristic of all individuals is held to be the same; differences 
being only in degree, not in kind. Whilst we continue to allow persons 
to be penalised by the State for maintaining and expressing such 
alternative conceptual frameworks as they might hold, we endorse (tacitly
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or explicitly) an education system that coerces, rather than invites, 
persons to "reject" (alternative conceptions as "stumbling blocks"), 
"transcend" (alternative conceptions as "building blocks") or otherwise 
alter their idiosyncratic views. Accordingly, educands' genuinely 
alternative conceptions would be "integrated" rather than "assimilated" 
within the education system and society in a manner analogous to that 
suggested by Jenkins for 'racial equality':
'I define integration [ ] not as a flattening process
of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied 
by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual 
tolerance'. (Jenkins, 1967, p.267).
The scope for "successful educational outcomes" would thus be extended 
beyond that of only the 'Unified Scientific Outcome' (Gilbert, Osborne and 
Fensham, 1982).
This raises important issues and problems to do with assessment procedures 
and which I shall not attempt to discuss here. Moreover, their resolution 
is not helped by the fact that Kelly adopted an ambiguous stance with 
respect to normativism within his psychotherapeutic application of PCP 
(Warren, 1985). Against such difficulties, however, I suggest that one of 
the most radical and desirable possibilities that a Personal Construct 
Pedagogy might extend is that student scientists might become a valuable 
research resource for science itself. By this I mean that students, once 
enjoined in the enterprise, might provide a huge supply of fruitful 
constructive principles - thereby rehabilitating the notion of "little 
physicist". For this to be achieved, however, closer links between 
working scientists and science education would have to be developed (see
- 10.15 -
section 10.3.2., below).
Feyerabend embraces complementary views to those which I have recently 
quoted from Kelly and he relates them explicitly to education:
'General education should prepare a citizen to choose 
between the standards ['which define special subjects 
and special professions'], or to find his way in a 
society that contains groups committed to various 
standards but it must under no condition bend his 
mind so that it conforms to the standards of one 
particular group'.
(Feyerabend, 1975a, p.218: original emphasis).
And elsewhere he argues that
'[ ] it is of paramount importance to strengthen the
minds of the young and 'strengthening the minds of the 
young' means strengthening them against any easy 
acceptance of comprehensive views. What we need here 
is an education that makes people contrary, 
counter-suggestive, without making them incapable 
of devoting themselves td the elaboration of any single 
view. How can this aim be achieved?
It can be achieved by protecting the tremendous 
imagination which children possess and by developing to 
the full the spirit of contradiction that exists in 
them'.
(Feyerabend, 1975b, p.7: original emphasis).
Such protection and facilitation of the 'tremendous imagination which 
children possess would, however, require special teaching and learning 
techniques. Luckily, these may be inferred in a more direct and 
elaborated way from Kelly's writings than from Feyerabend's - I am 
referring to Kelly(an)'s battery of psychotherapeutic techniques: see 
Swift, 1985c, and Pope 1985, for discussions of Fixed Role Therapy in a 
formal educational context.
My incommensurability criterion for alternative-hood of a conception may 
likewise be used to guide, non-preemptively, classroom teaching tactics 
intended to engender 'cognitive conflict': for purposes of group
discussion, the most fruitful learner conception is the incommensurable 
one. This, I believe, would be an improvement upon the tendency in the 
literature to give vague (though not worthless) advice to be guided by 
'experience' (see, e.g.Nussbaum and Novick, 1981a,b).
In light of my earlier discussion (section 8.2.2.1), I suggest that the 
principal utility of 'elicited metaphors' lies not in their ability to 
elicit pre-existing personal meanings but as a device for promoting 
learning. As I understand it, the reason for this is that a metaphor -
understood in Schoen's (e.g. 1979) 'generative' sense - embraces a
relation of incommensurability. The elicitation of metaphors would thus
become one means of how to help educands create and articulate
incommensurable alternatives - thereby learning something of the 'process 
of scientific investigation and reasoning'.
Since teaching and learning is construed as collaborative research, many 
of the investigative techniques used and developed in this thesis (such as 
RWP) might also be used for teaching purposes.
In Kellyan terms it is inappropriate to apply the definite article to any 
particular construct. Contrast poles for a construct of, say, "oxygen"
(to take a conceptiom which is introduced early in most science curricula) 
shall vary according to the purposes to which they are put. I believe,
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for example, that I could make quite a convincing historiographic case for
the view that in 1774 Lavoisier construed colourless gases obtained under
certain specified conditions in terms of the construct "This is oxygen, it
is not phlogiston", (and Priestley in terms of "This is 'dephlogisticated
air', it is not phlogiston). In the 20th. century, by contrast, we are
perhaps more likely to construe such gases in terms of constructs such as
"This is oxygen, it is not nitrogen", or more subtly, "This is oxygen, it
is not carbon dioxide". The (Kellyan) fact that contrast poles may be
left implicit (and given the chimera of objectivism they usually have
been), then, does not mean that they are not there. Nor do contrast poles
have to remain the same even though we might use the same label for an
emergent pole in different contexts (purposes), i.e. contrast poles may be
iterative. This is as true in science, philosophy of science, and the
science classroom as it is in life in general. An individual may help
«
themselves to find better ways of construing a particular aspect of the 
world by identifying which contrast pole they have hitherto been 
employing. But an individual attempting to criticise or understand 
another person's construct must personally identify their contrast pole 
- or risk arguing or understanding at crossed purposes. Of course, this 
is only a risk, not a certainty: much, for example, has been achieved due 
to commonality of construction. The point I am making, however, is both 
that much may not have been achieved and much may have been achieved 
wrongly (i.e. undesiredly) through leaving contrast poles implicit, 
especially in social contexts. The (Kellyan) fact that the label of an 
emergent pole (e.g. oxygen) may endure through time and may be applicable 
in a variety of contexts does not allow us to assume that it has been or 
is the same construct (or ontological commitment/constructive principle)
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throughout. Nor may we simply "translate" the terms of earlier or rival 
constructs into those of our later or preferred constructs until there is 
mutual satisfaction that the purposes for which they were intended and the 
criteria by which they are judged are the same. This betokens (amongst 
other things) a need to negotiate the context of the conceptions) under 
consideration; and as Kelly urges: '.[ ] We insist on demonstrating 
relevance before we lose any sleep over a proposition* (Kelly, 1969> p. 
72), a Personal Construct Pedagogy would endorse Bruner's view that
'The fact of individual differences argues for pluralism 
and for an enlightened opportunism in the materials and 
methods of instruction. Earlier we asserted [..] that 
no ideal sequence exists for any group of children'.
(Bruner, 1968, p.71).
In summary of these recent views, the following two classroom principles 
or slogans of a Personal Construct Pedagogy may be proposed:
Be aware that there is dimensionality in all knowledge
claims - and negotiate for it!
Be aware that we can only ever aspire to
inter-subjective similarity of knowledge claims - never
objectivity, still less absolute truth!
The overall character of a Personal Construct Pedagogy, and its 
relationship to previously influential perspectives or traditions, may be 
elucidated by reference to a four part distinction proposed by Pope and 
Keen (1981) and which has elsewhere been summarised by Pope and Gilbert:
'The first of these is the 'cultural transmission' 
view. In this perspective, the teacher is mainly a 
transmitter of information, rules or values which have 
been collected in the past. The learner can acquire
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absolute truth by a process of iterative accumulation.
The epistemological underpinning for this approach is 
'realism'. An appropriate metaphor for the view of the 
learner put forward by cultural transmission ideology 
is that of 'the machine'* with the teacher being 'the 
engineer'.
The second of these is the 'romanticist' view, which 
stresses that what comes from within the individual is 
the most important part of development - the 
pedagogical environment should be permissive enough to 
allow 'inner good' to unfold and 'inner bad' to come 
under control. The emphasis is placed on health and 
growth and working through aspects of emotional 
development. This stress on emotion is consistent with 
an epistemology which involves the discovery of the 
natural and inner self. An appropriate metaphor for 
such an approach would be that of 'organic growth', the 
learner being 'the plant' and the teacher 'the 
horticulturalist'.
The third of these is the '.progressivist' view 
according to which the student should be provided with 
an environment which encourages active thinking. The 
acquisition of knowledge is seen as an act of change in 
the pattern of thinking brought about by experiential 
problem-solving situations. Reality is the interaction 
of human beings with their environment - the emphasis 
is on an active person reaching out to make sense of a 
universe by engaging in the reconstruction and 
interpretation of experiences. The didactic nature of 
'conversation' could be taken as the appropriate 
metaphor here.
The fourth view is the 'deschooling' view, which 
argues that knowledge should not be seen as a purely 
intellectual concern. What is relevant to the learner 
is an essential concern of the teacher, and thus the 
emotional as well as the intellectual life of the 
student are paramount issues'.
(Pope and Gilbert, 1983, p.250: my emphasis).
I believe that a Personal Construct Pedagogy would combine characteristics 
from both 'progressivist' (as articulated by Dewey) and 'de-schooling'
(as articulated by Illich) perspectives.
An education "system" conducted along the lines I propose would be "open
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education" in the sense that it would be community based. This feature 
might even be reflected in the architecture of school buildings, viz. they 
would be designed to facilitate cross-disciplinary study and resource 
access, rather along the lines of Countesthorpe College (described and 
discussed by, e.g., Watts, J, 1977).
The emphasis would be upon 'process1 rather than 'content': after decades 
of a mainly Piagetian inspired "cult of action" in classroom teaching 
tactics and activities, a Personal Construct Pedagogy would re-habilitate 
the 'thought experiment' in formal educational settings (see Helm and 
Gilbert, 1985; Helm, Gilbert and Watts, 1985).
Relevance of the content chosen, and 'ontological responsibility' for it 
on the parts of both educands and educators, would be achieved through 
'conflictual collaboration' (to use the Bishop of Durham's excellent 
phrase: see Chapter 4> n.30) and guaranteed by the social negotiation of 
personal constructs. The emphasis upon 'process' would not necessarily 
result in a reduction of course content but its composition could no 
longer be pre-determined. This would be because an unspecifiable 
proportion of that content would be introduced by educands (including 
their parents) according to their locally perceived interests and needs.
'Philosophy of education' would cease to be a 'second-order pursuit1 
engaged in by professional philosophers (as influentially construed in 
recent decades by, e.g., R.S. Peters and his school: for a critique and a 
discussion, see Haack, 1976). Rather, educands, their parents, educators 
and educationalists (including philosophers of education) would all
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contribute to an ongoing (re)appraisal of the educational values 
informing teaching policy (primarily of their local school).
It would be anticipated that there would be difficulties in realising such
t
a pedagogy. I suggest that chief amongst these, would be the loss of 
status which many educators would perceive due to the radical relativity 
of knowledge which is intrinsic to its epistemology (cf. Feyerabend!s 
comments on the ’spectre of relativism1 - quoted in section -4*4)•
In addition, Ph.D research by Scott (personal communication) suggests that 
there is fragmentation between construals of teaching and construals of 
learning on the part of some educators and educationalists. As Thomas 
comments
’Education, training and therapy are all concerned with learning 
but theories of learning as they appear in the psychological 
literature would realistically more often be named theories of 
teaching. They are concerned with how the teachers’ (or 
experimenters') strategies and actions influence the learner. A 
personal construct theory approach to learning would 
treat it from the learner’s point of viewj as the 
construction of new meanings or the reconstruction of 
existing meanings in directions which are valued by the 
learner' (Thomas, 1978, p.47: my emphasis).
This view complements Kelly's exhortation that teachers should construe
their role as helping
'[ ] to design and implement each child’s own 
undertakings, as well as to assist in interpreting the 
outcomes and in devising more cogent behavioural 
inquiries. [ ]. To be a fully accredited participant 
in the experimental enterprise she must gain some sense 
of what is being seen through the child’s eyes'.
(Kelly, 1970b, p.262: my emphasis).
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Again, many educators and educationalists baulk at the quality of 
dimensionality in constructs and, hence, in all knowledge claims. Whilst 
I have tried to elucidate what may actually be involved in construing, 
say, a scientific theory (Chapter 4)> I believe that some of the perceived 
difficulties may be reduced or removed by relinquishing Kelly’s original 
strict adherence to universal bi-polarity of constructs and embracing 
instead a less constrained notion of ’conception* in which a commitment 
to the notion of dimensionality would be preserved, but it would allow for 
it to be one of relevant contrasts,.
Finally, there is the issue of the social construction of knowledge and, 
here, criticism has come from both within and without the ACM, with 
stances tending to polarise between advocates of personal construction and 
those of social construction. 1
There is a prima facie case to be made against extending Kelly's ideas 
to pedagogy because of the resoluteness of their emphasis upon the 
’perspective of the personal”: as Kelly remarked about his theory
'We start with a person. Organisms, lower animals and 
societies can wait'. (Kelly, 1970a, p.9).
Manifestly, ’societies' and social construction of knowledge cannot 'wait* 
in pedagogy.
Now, although Kelly does not ignore within the formal content of PCP the 
issue of social construction of knowledge altogether, viz. his 'social
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corollary’ which states that 'to the extent that one person construes the 
construction process of another they may play a role in a social process 
involving the other person’ (Kelly, 1955> P»95)> it has been roundly 
criticised for (amongst other things) its tautological character (Holland, 
1970).
Now, I have already argued (in Chapter 4)> that I consider Kelly's 
Commonality Corollary to enable researchers and teachers usefully and 
adequately to construe processes which might otherwise be termed 'social'. 
In elaboration of this, however, I contend that if we implement Kelly's 
injunction that we think in opposites, then we may argue that his meaning 
of 'person' is predicated upon some counterpart for 'society'. In other 
words, they are dichotomous poles in a construct for construing. Further, 
if my earlier suggestion that dimensionality is a fundamental orientating 
manoeuvre by which object relations, including other minds, are 
established is recalled, then I think that we may plausibly imagine 
situations - "social" situations - in which a construct may only be said 
fully to exist (in an abstract sense) between two minds. Processes of 
social constructions serve to articulate a contrast pole: such a pole may 
initially be perceived by a person in loose terms but to "reside" in 
another person's mind and dialogue serves to check that a relation of 
opposite contrast does, indeed, obtain between them. Alternatively, two 
or more persons sharing a commitment to one pole may work together in 
eliciting and articulating opposite contrasts from others. I find Ph.D 
research by Watson (personal communication) into social processes of 
construction corroborative of these tentative speculations, viz. Watson 
uses the biological idea of an 'ecosystem' as a metaphor informing his own
meta-theoretical notion of a ’conceptual ecosystem': in his account of the 
constructive dynamics of such systems he talks of 'coactive conceptions'• 
(Gf. also Thomas and Harri-Augstein's notion of a 'community of selves', 
quotation above).
Whatever the formal and philosophical difficulties involved in trying to 
relate personal and social construction of knowledge within a Personal 
Construct Pedagogy, personal constructivists whose interests lie within a 
formal educational context have placed increasing emphasis upon social 
issues. For example, in an attempt tentatively to articulate a 
constructivist theory of teaching practice, Novak explores similarities 
and contrasts between Dewey's and Kelly's ideas and argues that
'Regardless of the similarities, however, Kelly left 
out two important elements of Dewey's notion of 
science: (1) its embeddedness in the qualitative 
immediacy of experience and (2) its connection to 
democratic living. Without these connections, science 
is abstracted from its roots and consequences'.
(Novak, 1985, p.5).
Novak endorses Gowin's (1981) view that education should be studied as an 
event which involves the blending of 'four irreducible commonplaces' 
(Novak, 198$, p.3), namely, teaching, learning, curriculum, and 
governance. Novak summarises his discussion of the interrelationships 
between these 'educative events' with the help of the following diagram:
- 10.2$ -
'(10)
Sfc
T * Teacher
Sa, Sb * Students
C » Curriculum « Relationships
G - Governance
S.W. - Social World
Figure 10.1. Diagram Shoving Inter-relationships Between Educative 
Events (after Novak, 1985* P . 7)
Now, at the risk of ending this section upon a negative note, I contend 
that some educational researchers display an unfortunate tendency to 
promulgate their commitment to the social construction of knowledge in a 
manner which suggests that it is forever incompatible with approaches 
which emphasise the contribution and characteristics of the personal.
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For reasons which I hope are now apparent, I regard this as a false 
antithesis (by contrast with a fruitful dichotomy). Moreover, certain 
influential social theorists demonstrate little understanding in their 
written works of the constructivist epistemology underlying personal 
approaches within the ACM. Solomon, for example, argues that
’Perhaps it was because educational researchers in this 
field had often themselves received a scientific training 
that many began by attributing a naive scientific method 
to the children. Each child had sense perceptions and 
experiences from which, it was assumed, a series of 
hypotheses about the world were built up. The child then 
compared further experiences with the outcomes they had 
expected. Daily life provided plenty of opportunities to 
check predictions against the results of mini-experiments 
or unplanned happenings. In this way, such theorists 
argued, the child’s notions were adapted and refined so 
that they could be reliably used to explain the common 
events of the physical world.
Do the empirical ground rules really support such an 
individual constructivist position? If informal 
knowledge has been personally assembled in such a 
rational way why is it then inconsistently applied? When 
the history of science itself has thrown up so many 
different theories in mechanics, light, heat and 
respiration, to explain the simple happenings of our 
world, how is it that our young children hold so many 
ideas in common? If our pupils have such a valuable 
intuitive grasp of the hypothetico-deductive method, why 
do they then have such difficulty understanding the 
method of school science?’.
(Solomon, 1984, p*1)«
I suggest that the epistemology informing the position which she labels 
and describes as ’individual constructivist’ would only pass muster as a 
caricature of empirical-inductivism. Her criticism thus completely 
misses its intellectual target. This is a pity because it cannot help but 
undermine, at least to some extent, the possibility of fruitful dialogue 
with personal constructivists.
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Similarly, in a later paper, Solomon reviews the emergence of the ACM and 
identifies within it what she terms a 'strong theoretical position' in 
which 'children were [construed] like scientists and [ ] their personal 
ideas were [understood to be] constructed in the same way as scientific 
theories'. (Solomon, 1986, pp. 5-6),
Solomon includes Kellyan educational research within such a position and 
singles it out for criticism:
'Two important points should be noted about this strong 
position. In the first place, Kelly's philosophy is 
unashamedly personal and, indeed, isolated. He assumes 
that each person makes up hypotheses, and then rejects 
or refines them as a result of his own private 
experience, much as a very naive philosophy of science 
might propose. But he also holds that no one person 
can construe the stream of events in the same way as 
another. The second point concerns the misfit between 
this theory and the growing body of empirical data.
Many researchers, [ ], had shown clearly that the 
students did not apply their ideas consistently, even 
when the scientific problems involved were very 
similar. Neither could careful refutation of 
children's misconceptions by experiment or argument be 
relied upon to produce lasting change. The rationality 
that [ ] Kelly so insisted upon, was contrary to 
observation'. (Solomon, 1986, p.6).
In light of all my earlier arguments and discussion, I would dispute every 
one of these criticisms.
10.3.1. Recommendations for Teaching and Curricular Reform
As I shall briefly summarise them below, many of my recommendations for 
teaching and curricular reform shall appear to be in agreement with those
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made by many other educationalists - and so they are. Since, however, one 
of the main purposes of this thesis was to develop a meta-theory for a 
pedagogy which is appropriate in light of the present lack of orthodoxy in 
philosophy of science and compatible with the ethos and epistemological 
commitments of the ACM, I shall rely upon the reader to elaborate more 
detailed inferences and distinctions concerning ways and means.
10.3.1.1. History and Philosophy of Science Education for Science Teachers
I concur with the growing number of authors (e.g. Rowell and Cawthron, 
1982, Rogers, 1982) who argue that teachers (and teacher trainers) should 
receive education in the history and philosophy of science. I suggest 
that this could begin on a large scale very soon since it would be 
anticipated and desired that both student teachers and working teachers 
would contribute to the orientation and composition of such education.
With respect to the latter, I envisage in-service history and philosophy 
of science workshops.
10.3.1.2. Reduction in Subject Autonomy
Teachers would be encouraged to blur the divisions between subjects (cf. 
Holton’s, 1973, notion of ’connective1 science teaching). They would do 
this by consciously and conscientiously plundering other subjects for 
materials which they might find useful. This would be facilitated by 
(e.g.) the following:
10.3.1.2.1. Historiographic History of Science
Resources would be developed which would help teachers to introduce 
curricular science historiographically, viz. episodes from the 
development of scientists’ science would not be divorced from their 
personal and social context. Consideration, for example, would be given 
to the metaphysical commitments (constructive principles) of scientists in 
specific historical debates over theory-choice. On occasion, classroom 
examination and discussion of primary texts might provide a useful
heuristic for science-teaching - see, e.g. Spray’s (1981) suggestions, for
the classroom use of Phillip Miller’s The Gardener’s Dictionary 
published in 1724.
10.3.1.2,2 Perception Psychology
Educands would be invited not only to confront the theory-ladenness of 
observations hiotoriographically viz. by examination of historical 
episodes in the history of science, see e.g. Ross' (1972) case history of
embryology, but also to experience it directly through some of the
experiments and materials of perception psychology, see e.g. 
Wood-Robinson’s (1982) suggestions for use of the Ponzo, and Ames' Room, 
illusions in science teaching.
10.3.1.3. Explicit Scientific Metaphysics in Classroom Activities 
Historiographic consideration of scientific metaphysics would be
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complemented by their explicit consideration within classroom activities. 
Thus I concur with Elkana who urges educators
1[ ] to let the student realise his own expectations as 
to the result of every experiment; to show him what his 
metaphysical presuppositions are , to show him how to 
interpret his experimental results in the framework of 
his own metaphysics, and thus to show him that the 
experiment served possibly as a 'crucial experiment1 
for deciding between two metaphysics (Agassi's 
formulation). If he succeeds in interpreting the 
result in the framework of his metaphysics (which can 
be far from our accepted presuppositions) let him 
continue to test critically the implications of his 
views1.
(Elkana, 1970, p.34).
10.3»1»4. Skill Sessions
'Skill sessions' (Ogborn, 1977), are a form of tutorial which are here 
described for U3e with physics undergraduates. In them ,emphasis is not 
placed on content, but on the development and practice of important skills 
such as estimating orders of magnitude and translating data from words 
into graphs and algebraic equations; in other words skills in qualitative 
reasoning. Suitably modified skill sessions have been used by Ogborn and 
others at levels from the sixth form to the final year at university, and 
in engineering, zoology, genetics and other subjects.
10.3.1.3. Realistic Images of Science as an Occupation
An attempt will be made to provide student scientists with a broad range 
of experiences of the conduct of science. Specific classroom activities
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would be designed to emphasise specific aspects of science as an 
occupation, e.g. quantitative accuracy, imagination. As a part of this, 
closer links between school science and working scientists would be 
developed, e.g. talks to pupils by a variety of working scientists and/or 
school visits to professional laboratories.
10.3.2 Recommendations for.Future Research
There have been many research interests within my outline of a Personal 
Construct Pedagogy and which I have left largely implicit. These include 
consideration of the political climate which would be compatible and I 
believe, necessary for a Personal Construct Pedagogy ever fully to be 
realised (I believe it would be along the lines of a 'free society' as 
described by Feyerabend cf. my discussion in Chapter 4) > the development 
of appropriate evaluating procedures for teaching outcomes (which carries 
the danger of an infinite regress) and the development of a formalisation 
of the relationship between personal and social construction of knowledge.
In addition, however, I make the following five recommendations for future 
research:
10.3.2.1. Do Personal Epistemologies Maintain Personal Conceptions?
In this thesis I have extended the ACM assumption that understanding 
educands' ideas in science is important in formal educational settings 
(Driver and Erickson, 1982: quoted in Chapter 5) to embrace educands' 
ideas of science since I have argued that the formal difference between
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them is one of degree, not of kind, and I have not tested this further, 
meta-theoretical, assumption in the field. For this to be done, I 
envisage case study investigations and demonstrations, dimensionality in 
the classroom.
10.3.2.2 A 'Z» Axis for ACM Research
In view of the importance I have argued should be placed upon 
'constructive principles' in construing the origination and maintenance of 
(alternative) conceptions, I recommend further research to elucidate their 
(possible) existence in educands.
Such a branch of research complements Holton's (1973) suggestion that a 
'Z axis' should be incorporated within history and philosophy of science 
- a suggestion which has been described concisely by Piatelli-Palmarini:
'From its inception, every scientific programme 
develops out of "themata" extremely general strategies 
of ordering reality expressed through "quasi-aesthetic 
judgements [ ] with deep psychological roots".
[Holton, 1973, p.26]. Gerald Holton suggests a 
discipline, called "thematic analysis of science", 
which adds a third dimension or a "Z axis" to the 
empirical and the heuristic-analytical axes heretofore 
established by historians and philosophers of science. 
"This third dimension is the dimension of fundamental 
presupposition, notions, terms, methodological 
judgements and decisions - in short, of themata or 
themes - which are themselves neither directly evolved 
from, nor resolvable into, objective observation on the 
one hand, or logical, mathematical, and other formal 
analytical ratiocination on the other hand". [Holton, 
1973; p.57]. (Piatelli-Palmarini, 1980, p.3).
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10.3.2.3* Is a Constructivist Theory of Mathematics Teaching Possible? /
Problems of defending the epistemological realism of ACM metatheory have 
been at their most acute when research conducted under its aegis has 
encompassed mathematics as well as science education. The ’technical 
eclecticism1 (epistemological pluralism) tolerated by POP and relativist- 
methodological-constructivism and, thence, by a Personal Construct 
Pedagogy is at its least satisfactory when applied to mathematical 
knowledge. Quite simply the 'objects' of mathematical knowledge have 
never been found: to what does a triangle refer, why does Pythagoras' 
theorem work?
This notwithstanding, I suggest that Lakatos' (1976) construal of the 
growth of mathematical knowledge as a series of 'proofs and refutations' 
(understood in specialised senses) represents the best attempt yet at a 
constructivist theory of mathematical knowledge. His (1976) work, already 
a classic amongst professional philosophers of mathematics, is written in 
a form which is particularly accessible to (would-be) constructivist 
mathematics educators, viz. a dialogue between a mathematics teacher and 
his sceptical pupils I
I would also strongly recommend Davis and Hersh's (1981) introductory text 
on the history and philosophy of mathematics.
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10.3.2.4* Epistemology is a Feminist Issue!
In Chapter 4 I argued that objectivist epistemology may be construed as a 
predominantly male pursuit, by appealing to Easlea's (1983) notion of 
’compulsive masculinity syndrome’. If this view is accepted, then ACM 
metatheory (incuding its emerging theory of teaching), in particular, and 
educational theories, in general, should also be construed in terms of 
sexual politics. I would particularly recommend Head’s (1985) work on 
this subject.
10.3.2.5. Functions of the Quotation
Assumptions concerning the relationship between oral comments and 
constructive structure are already made and explicitly recognised within 
ACM research (see, e.g. Bell, Brook and Driver, 1985). These assumptions 
should be examined further.
Complementing this, I have become interested in a slightly different 
issue, namely, the different functions quotations may serve within a 
(formal) argument. By way of a preliminary elaboration of this subject, I 
propose the following 8 roles for quotations which I have discerned in the 
literature
(1) 1 Summary',
(2) ’Debt1,
(3) 'Instantiation',
(4) 'Authority1,
(5) 'Analogy',
(6) 'Accountability',
(7) 'Ingratiation',
(8) 'Null Quotation',
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10.4. Retrospect and Prospect
The Alternative Conceptions Movement in educational research may be seen 
as just one contribution to, and reflection of, a profound incipient 
revolution in Western thought, offering unprecedented possibilities for 
wisdom in a social context.
Such a revolution would require only the existing institutions to bring it 
about: as such it would be a peaceful, and in all ways, desirable, 
revolution.
Whilst the ACM has many allies amongst 'citizens’ initiatives', there is 
nothing inevitable about this intellectual revolution: there are already 
powerful conservative forces at work to prevent or lessen its impact.
I conclude that within education what is urgently needed is an open but 
sophisticated debate on epistemological commitments informing approaches 
within educational research. It must be remembered, however, that 
epistemology cannot supply the key to resolving all differences and 
difficulties: it is not sufficient for a theory of teaching. So it is 
essential that the epistemological debate be conducted alongside a 
discussion of what we each think education is for. This returns us to 
'philosophy of education' in the good (i.e. non-analytical) old fashioned 
sense. Thus, whilst I concede that many working educators may perceive 
their personal interests and expertise to lie outside academic
epistemology, I suggest that there is no reason to suppose (as some have) 
that their contributions to the "philosophical debate" might not continue 
to be as committed and as valuable as those of educationalists.
I offer this thesis as my initial contribution to such a debate.
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Towards a Lakatosian Analysis 
the Piagetian and Alternative 
Conceptions Research Programs
JOHN K. GILBERT and DAVID J. SWIFT
Department o f  Educational Studies, University o f  Surrey, Surrey GU 2 5XH,  
United Kingdom
Introduction
A review of the recent literature o f science education is likely to lead the reader to 
conclude that the ideas about psychology o f Jean Piaget dominate that Field. His work, 
and that o f his immediate co-w orkers, apparently constitute the “ received view*’ for most 
teachers-educators and, consequently, studcnt-teachcrs. A high point o f acceptance was 
reached, for the UK, in the mid-1960s. It was then possible to open respected textbooks 
on educational psychology (e .g .. Stones, 1966) and Find the Piagetian “ stages”  listed, 
apparently as “ facts,”  without authorship being attributed in the index.
More recently, some books on classroom practice (e .g ., UNESCO, 1980) have still 
presented Piagetian psychology without question or alternative. We suggest that such 
practices tend more towards indoctrination than towards education. M oreover, as P iagetian 
tests are turned into a technology (e .g ., Shayer & Adey, 1981), the likelihood o f  their 
being used in classroom s increases enormously. These technologies are easy to apply. 
Their use can be so interpreted as to seem,to promise the production o f sim ple prescriptive 
answers to complex problem s in teaching and learning. Apparently derived from Piagetian 
theory, and in keeping with its ethos, their ready use sidesteps the burgeoning academ ic 
criticism o f Piagetian doctrines, which we discuss briefly later in this article.
Discussing one o f  P iaget’s central ideas, that o f equilibration, Richm ond (1970) has 
pointed out that
. . . .  the equilibrium  principle is closely related to the concept o f  readiness for learn ing. 
Readiness for this o r that educational experience is another way o f  saying that the eq u i­
librated structures can accom m odate to a given experience. . . .  if  intellectual activ ity  is 
not best described by m eans o f an equilibrium  model then this view o f readiness will not 
stand.
The uncritical use o f  Piagetian technologies may thus supply a scientistic rationale for a 
policy o f restricted access to science education on the basis o f “ readiness.”  In tim es o f  
resource scarcity, such as now , this possibility moves Piagetian technologies from  the 
academic into the general political arena.
Science Education 69(5): 681-6%  (1985)
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The consequences o f resource shortfalls extend into the educational research field. The 
climate o f opinion so created lends support to Kempa’s (1976) contention that
W hat is needed, it would appear, is m ore decision-orientated research, i.e. research which 
gives rise to findings on the basis o f  which positive decisions about instructional strategies, 
curricular content and other issues concerning the effectiveness o f science education can 
be taken.
The appearance o f  Piagetian technologies apparently meets this dem and, but one conse­
quence may be the suspension o f critical discourse about their underlying assum ptions. 
Innumerable papers on Piagetian themes have appeared in the literature. The outcom es 
o f such research is now almost com pletely predictable and, indeed, many theses appear 
to be based on the application o f algorithms. Funding agencies may be tempted to pour 
their scarce resources into activities with a guaranteed “ practical”  outcom e, even if the 
understanding o f  student learning is not thereby significantly advanced.
This is happening at a time when the validity and utility o f a technology based on 
Piaget’s ideas are com ing under increasingly severe attack (e .g .. Brown & Desforges. 
1979; Erikson, 1982a).
Sim ultaneously, a new and potentially fruitful approach to research is em erging, based 
on a range o f allied notions variously called "alternative fram ew orks" (Driver & Easley, 
1978); “ alternative conceptions" (Osborne & Gilbert, 1980), “ preconceptions”  (Ausubcl, 
1968), and “ m isconceptions”  (Helm, 1980). These are meanings for words used in science 
which differ from the standard interpretations. The present situation in which workers 
exploring this approach find themselves may be compared analogously to K uhn’s (1970) 
“ preparadigm atic”  phase in science, viz., so far the efforts of individuals have tended 
to be uncoordinated: terminology has not been agreed upon, a com mon m ethodology not 
shared, ultim ate aim s not stated, and classroom implications not explored. Despite this, 
such work is com m anding increasing attention from within the com m unity o f educational 
researchers. It contributes to the increasingly constructivist orientations o f educational 
research (M agoon, 1977), yet can be distinguished from work conducted under the aegis 
o f Piagetian doctrines. In short, an “ invisible college”  for what we have term ed the 
“ alternative conceptions m ovem ent”  (ACM) appears to be gradually em erging. The 
problems we address in this paper are how to identify and articulate what, if anything, 
is common within this “ invisible college”  and how it differs from the Piagetian School 
(PS).
In this approach we adopt a m odel, due to Lakatos (1970), for the developm ent and 
evaluation o f  research-program s, movements, or schools. Prior to describing this specific 
model and our reasons for choosing it from a range o f possible others, we shall consider 
the general case to be made for the use of models for science education research.
Doran (1978) has argued strongly in favor o f the use of such m odels, seeing each one 
as " a  conceptual framework describing the relationships am ongst key variables present 
in the field o f  enqu iry .”  He makes four main points. First, the use o f explicit models 
helps clarify the initial planning of research efforts. Thus a model o f the A lternative 
Conceptions M ovem ent (ACM) would focus attention on key researchable* features o f  its 
field. Second, m odels help organize data collection and assist in the form ulation o f 
variables and hypotheses. Thus researchable problems in ACM would be addressed and 
answered within a model o f it. Third, a model may help clarify the nature o f  individual
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research efforts. Thus a model o f ACM should help individuals to more readily relate 
their efforts to those o f other workers, while a model o f the Piagetian School (PS) would 
assist in identifying individual work in relation to both the ACM and the PS. Fourth, lack 
of models lim its the impact o f educational research on classroom practice, and permits, 
apsychological teaching programs to be implemented by default. Thus a model o f the 
ACM may show its classroom implications, and allow them to be compared to those 
derived from a model o f the PS.
We have therefore sought an overall, general model which would facilitate analysis 
and a com parative appraisal o f the two approaches. The principal appeal o f Lakatos’ 
m ethodology for us is that it promises to facilitate this in a way which avoids Kuhn’s 
(1970) problem  o f proponents o f rival approaches forever arguing at cross purposes. Our 
com ments below  are intended to substantiate this judgm ent.
Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Programs
Feyerabend (1974) has summarized Lakatos’ approach as follows:
The m ethodology o f  research programmes develops standards for the evaluation o f  (sci­
entific, o r. m ore generally, conceptual) change. The standards apply to research pro­
gram m es. not to individual theories; they judge the evolution o f  a program m e over a 
period o f  tim e, not its shape at a particular time; and they judge this evolution in com parison 
w ith the evolution  o f  rivals, not by itself.
Before discussing the com ponent parts of a Lakatosian research program we would First 
like to draw  attention to some features of his methodology which we found appealing to 
our present application. We shall do this by elaborating on Feyerabend’s com ments above. 
First, while Lakatos was a philosopher of science primarily concerned with the evaluation 
or research program s within the physical sciences, his m ethodology does not deny a more 
general application, e .g ., to the social sciences, as is the case with this study. Second, 
judgm ents about the worth o f any one program is always based upon a comparative 
evaluation  w ith another, rival, program. For Lakatos, the history o f science has rightly 
been a history o f  com peting research programs— the more the better. Com parative eval­
uation and theoretical pluralism are principles which we endorse for reasons which will 
become apparent following our elaboration o f the main tenets o f the ACM later. Third, 
Lakatos does not provide “ instant rationality.’’ Choice between rival research programs 
follows an appraisal o f their relative worth. The resultant “ breathing space”  is especially 
welcome to newly-em erging research programs— such as the ACM— which might be 
prem aturely rejected by other methodologies.
A Lakatosian research program has three component parts: the Negative Heuristic, the 
Protective Belt, and the Positive Heuristic.
The N egative H euristic, or “ hard core ,”  consists o f a set of fundamental assumptions 
judged irrefutable by all those who operate within a research program. The function o f 
the “ hard co re”  is, by sanctioning basic assumptions, to liberate workers for empirical 
enquiry without having to constantly question the assum ptions underlying their work. To 
abandon or alter any o f the assumptions comprising the hard core is to participate in a 
different research program: the hard core is the major consideration in establishing the 
identity o f  research programs. Programs which share a hard core but have differences in
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their remaining com ponent parts (described below) are different versions of a particular 
research program.
The Protective B elt consists o f a changing set o f "auxiliary hypotheses" which are 
philosophically com patible with the hard core. The auxiliary hypotheses are the "refu tab le  
variants" (Lakatos, 1970) o f a research program  and they serve the dual purpose o f 
"operationalizing" and "p ro tecting”  the hard core.
They operationalize the hard core by making specific predictions within the dom ain of 
enquiry. However, when an auxiliary hypothesis fails an empirical test, the resultant 
anomaly (initially) casts doubt only on that auxiliary hypothesis. Thus the auxiliary hypotheses 
"p ro tec t"  the hard core by distancing (or at least delaying) philosophical and experim ental 
attention from it. In this way the protective belt avoids the premature rejection o f  the hard 
core. The formulation and testing o f auxiliary hypotheses make up the bulk o f research 
effort in any program.
The Positive H euristic represents research policy with respect to the auxiliary hypotheses 
comprising the protective belt. It is evoked in order to provide guidance when an auxiliary 
hypothesis falters or fails. Lakatos (1970) has summarized its nature and purpose, as 
follows:
(The positive heuristic is) a partially articulated set o f suggestions or hints on how  to 
change, develop, the ‘refutable variants' o f  the research-program m e and how to m odify, 
sophisticate, the refutable ‘Protective B elt’ .
From the above, a Lakatosian research program  may be characterized overall as “ an 
evolving succession o f theories”  (Papineau, 1979). Continuity of research activity is 
preserved throughout this succession by the inviolability o f the Negative Heuristic.
Lakatos’ methodology cannot only be' applied between  two rival research program s, 
but also within a single research program. This latter, “ intra”  mode of application con­
siders two rival versions o f a single research program; that is, it enables a com parative 
evaluation o f two rival research programs which share the same negative heuristic.
The basis for the com parison o f research programs lies in their relative placem ent on 
an evaluative continuum  between progressive and degenerate:
A research program m e is said to be progressing as long as its theoretical growth anticipates 
its em pirical grow th, that is, as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with som e success 
( 'progressive problemshift’); it is stagnating if  its theoretical growth lags behind its em pir­
ical grow th, that is, as long as it gives only post-hoc explanations either o f chance 
discoveries o r o f facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival program m e ( ‘degenerating 
problemshift'). (L akatos, 1971a; original italics)
In this presentation o f  Lakatos’ ideas we have so far discussed the “ com parative 
evaluation”  of rival research programs only in broad term s. This is because there exists 
within Lakatos’ account(s) o f his methodology an ambiguity over who he was addressing 
and over the principal purpose intended. We shall discuss these issues, since they have 
a bearing on our present purpose for, and m anner of, em ploying his methodology.
On the one hand, Lakatos seems to be proposing a prescriptive account, addressed 
principally to the scientist and involving rules for rational (objective) theory-choice. We 
shall call this the “ prescriptive-elim inative”  interpretation. On the other hand, Lakatos 
seems to be proposing what might be called a "retro-scrip tive”  account, addressed p rin ­
cipally to the historian/philosopher o f science and involving rational (objective) standards
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for appraising theory-<.7t«ngt\ We shall call this the “ normative-appraisative”  interpre­
tation.
Lakatos’ methodology can be applied in either inter o r intra mode in each interpretation, 
thus giving rise to four possibilities of audience-and-purpose.
Since our use of Lakatos’ methodology is not a strict application on cither the pre­
scriptive-eliminative or the normative-appraisative interpretation, we shall, as a necessary 
prelude to elaborating and justifying our departure, consider them both.
Evidence for the prescriptive-eliminative interpretation arises from one o f Lakatos' 
m ajor claims:
. . . Ig iv e . . . rules for t h e ‘elim ination’ o f whole research program m es . . . If a research 
program m e progressively explains more than a rival it ‘‘supersedes’" it, and the rival can 
be elim inated (or, if you w ish, “ shelved’’). (L akatos, 1971a).
As we have already noted, one of the principal appeals o f Lakatos' methodology for us 
is that it does not impose instant rationality. This becom es clearer if we elaborate Lakatos’ 
criteria for a progressive problemshift.
A progressive problemshift must, in Lakatos’ idiom , exhibit a “ consistently progressive 
theoretical problem shift’’ ( i.e ., it must keep predicting novel facts) but need only display 
an “ intermittently progressive empirical problem sh ift’’ ( i.e ., at least some o f the predicted 
novel facts are empirically corroborated). This second requirement has the consequence 
that: “ One may rationally stick to a degenerating research programme until it is overtaken 
by a rival and even after’' (Lakatos, 1971a; original italics).
Critics have been quick to argue that this liberal proposal undermines a prescriptive- 
eliminative interpretation: “ (Lakatos) standards . . . have practical force only if they are 
com bined with a time lim it”  (Feyerabend, 1970; original italics); “ (Lakatos). . . must 
specify criteria which can be used at the time to distinguish a degenerating from a 
progressive research programme . . . O therwise, he has told us nothing at a ll"  (Kuhn, 
1970; original italics).
In his response to such criticism, Lakatos him self appears to endorse a rejection of a 
prescriptive-eliminative interpretation of his m ethodology:
The argum ents my critics produce have m ade me realise that 1 fail to stress sufficiently 
forcefully one crucial m essage o f my paper. This m essage is that my ‘m ethodology’, older 
connotations o f this term notwithstanding . . . p resum es to  give advice to the scientist 
neither about how to arrive at good theories nor even about w hich o f two rival program m es 
he should work on. (Lakatos. 1971b; original italics)
In its stead he appears to embrace a ‘norm ative-appraisative’ interpretation:
(M y m ethodology) only appraises fully articulated theories (or research pro­
gram m es) . . . .  w hatever they have done. I can judge: I can  say whether they have made 
progress or not. (Lakatos. 1971b; original italics)
Norm ative appraisals o f theory-change are carried out by reference to standards which are, 
o f course, identical to those earlier identified as criteria for theory-c/io/ce on the prescrip­
tive-eliminative interpretation, i.e ., progressive versus degenerating problemshift.
In developing his methodology, Lakatos observes that: •
W hile there has been little agreement concerning a universal criterion o f the scientific 
character o f theories, there has been considerable agreem ent over the last two centuries 
concerning single achievem ents. (Lakatos, 1971; original italics)
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An example, proposed and discussed by Lakatos (e .g ., 1971a), of considerable agreem ent 
over a specific achievement in science is the superiority o f Einstein’s theory over N ew ton’s 
anno 1916. Such examples represent; ” . . .  basic appraisals o f  the scientific elite. . . . ”  
(Lakatos, 1971a; original italics). Lakatos uses these “ basic normative judgem ents”  
(Lakatos, 1971a) both as the material to which he attempts to apply his methodology 
(provide a rational reconstruction for) and to test it. While Lakatos does not hold that 
basic normative judgm ents can falsify his methodology in any simple way. testing is 
effected by means o f his proposed me/a-methodological criterion for acceptability;
. . . .  progress in the theory o f  scientific rationality is marked by d iscoveries o f  novel 
historical fa c ts , by the reconstruction o f  a growing bulk o f  value-impregnated history as  
rational. (Lakatos, 1971a; original italics)
As we suggested earlier, Lakatos' methodology has received considerable interest and 
debate from within the community o f philosophers o f science. Zahar ( 1973a,b), for 
example, present an interprogram evaluation for “ Einstein vs. Lorentz”  and M usgrave 
(1976a) the same for “ Oxygen vs. Phlogiston.”  More recently. Michod (1981) has 
evaluated. "Evolutionary Biology" in what am ounts to an intraprogram mode.
Within these applications as well as in certain more abstract criticisms (e .g ., K oertge, 
1976; M usgrave, 1976b) there appears to be a general view that Lakatos' m ethodology 
can provide advice to scientists, albeit o f a primarily heuristic kind. A gain, am ong those 
authors already cited there appears to be a prevailing scepticism towards L akatos’ liber­
alism and some attempts are made to “ strengthen”  his critical standards.
It remains a question for debate whether Lakatos him self altered his interpretation o f 
his methodology (his meta-methodological criteria would allow, even encourage, rival 
versions o f his methodology!) or w hetherhe conflated theory-choice with theory-change 
as Berkson (1976) seems to argue.
We see our present application of Lakatos’ methodology as being founded upon what 
we perceive to be a basic normative judgm ent analogous to those employed by Lakatos, 
viz. that in recent years there has been a progressive and substantial reduction o f  interest 
in Piaget’s ideas within the community o f educational researchers. During this period, 
the ACM has em erged in such a way that might be tentatively described as a rival 
Lakatosian research program to that o f the PS.
In this paper we intend to follow neither a prescriptive-eliminative nor a normative- 
appraisative interpretation in a com parative appraisal o f PS and ACM. This is for two 
reasons. First, in our own view, the ACM can hardly be described as a “ fully articulated 
research program ” — and it was only to this sort o f program that, as we have seen. Lakatos 
intended his methodology to apply. Second, and far more important, Lakatos' conception 
of progress places more emphasis on em pirical criteria than we feel is com patible with 
the ACM.
We suspect that Lakatos' empiricism would sim ilarly conflict with the PS. In each case 
the conflict has to do with the chosen subject m atter, v iz ., persons, i .e . . cognizing system s. 
Lakatos’ preeminent interest, by contrast, was to rationally reconstruct judgm ents made 
by scientists concerning natural (i.e. inanimate) phenom ena— small areas' o f the "n e w  
physics”  notwithstanding. This does not mean that we shall ignore Lakatos’ em pirical 
conception of progress in our comparative appraisal o f the PS and ACM. On the contrary, 
empirical criticisms shall play an important role— as a means of drawing attention to  the
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different educational/(research) values and attitudes we perceive workers in the ACM to 
hold. We hope that these values and attitudes encourage a further shift of interest and 
support from the PS towards the ACM. T hus, by em ploying Lakatos methodology we 
are not attempting to appropriate a rationale for prescribing elimination of the PS, or for 
a normative appraisal against it. In this paper, the primary role we intend for Lakatos’ 
methodology might be described as facilitative-appraisative.
In our view, Lakatos' methodology facilitates appraisal by providing an excellent “ organ­
izing fram e”  for, say, complex or fragmented research activities (e .g ., the PS and ACM, 
respectively). In particular, we feel that Lakatos’ m ethodology might render visible the 
“ invisible college”  of the ACM and thereby help some educational researchers appraise 
the historical situation as we see it. Finally, we suggest that Lakatos’ methodology has 
great potential as a didactic instrument when used in this manner.
A Lakatosian Research Program for the Piagetian School
Negative Heuristic
Donaldson (1978) claims that, for Piaget,
the key question is: how do animals adapt to their environm ent? Human intelligence is
then considered as one means o f doing this.
Central to Piaget’s theory o f intelligence is that living organisms strive for equilibrium 
states o f adaptation: they autoregulate. This is achieved principally through the mechanism 
o f equilibration. Now Piaget (e .g ., 1970) views intellectual development as analogous to 
epigenesis: equilibration is mediated by a sequential unfolding o f organs o f regulation. 
We have taken Piaget’s hypothetical construct o f  equilibration and the few essential features 
of epigenesis to constitute the hard-core o f the PS research program. This is because we 
believe that alteration or rejection o f either o f these two notions would result in participation 
in a different research program.
Equilibration consists o f two com plem entary adaptive processes: “ assim ilation”  and 
“ accom m odation.”  They act on the symbolic representations o f events held within an 
individual (schemas) characteristic o f each stage. Assim ilation  is the process in which a 
cognitive encounter with an external event results in an active processing o f a representation 
o f the event and its absorption into existing schem as. W here an external event cannot be 
construed in such a way as to fit an internal schem a, the schema will be modified, by 
the process of accommodation, to accept the new representation. During an interaction 
with the environment, temporary dynamic balances, or equilibrium states, are found as 
a result o f the operation of assimilation and accom m odation. These equilibria are char­
acterized by varying degrees of application to objects o r events, their mobility or extent 
o f transferability across data types, and stability or inclination to cope with presented 
dem ands without change.
Epigenesis has four essential features (K itchener, 1978). First, the process o f psychological 
development involves a causal sequence o f events, with successive steps being dependent 
on those preceding. Second the sequence involves increased organization, differentiation 
and com plexity, there being a transformation from  homogeneous to heterogeneous states 
and from general to specific functions. Third, in the process towards com plexity, som e­
thing new emerges at each step: qualitatively different structures appear. Fourth, there is
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a stepwise growth through a series o f stages, each stage being marked by qualitatively 
different emergent structures. In short. Piaget sees psychological developm ent as pro­
ceeding through a series of stages, each qualitatively different, in an invariant order. It 
is important to differentiate this assumption o f stages from their theoretical manifestation 
in the Protective Belts.
Protective Belt
Piaget operationalizes his hard core by means of a specific set o f  em pirically testable, 
i.e ., potentially refutable, theories. These theories, which are normally considered without 
reference to the underlying biological model o f epigenesis from which they are derived, 
constitute his Stage Theory o f Intellectual Development.
There are four stages: sensori-m otor, said to be found in children 0 - 2  years: pre- 
operational, said to be found in children 2 -7  years; concrete, said to be found in children 
aged 7 - 1 1 years; formal, said to be found after age 11 years. The details o f these stages 
will not be presented here, but arc readily available elsewhere (Gruber & Voneche, 1977). 
M ovement between stages is effected by equilibration. We feel that the increasing sophis­
tication, i.e .. alteration of, and additions to, these stages, over the years in which Piaget’s 
theory has developed, supports our assertion that they represent the refutable variants o f 
his program.
Positive Heuristic
There are many anomalies to stage theory (sec Brown & Desforges, 1979). Attempts 
have been made to overcome some o f them. Arlin (1975), for exam ple, cites research 
evidence to suggest that ” . . .  progressive changes in thought structures may extend 
beyond the level o f formal operations.”  She postulates an additional “ fifth stage”  to 
further seek and account for these new structures. We view her paper as a positive heuristic, 
a conscious attempt to redirect research attention. Arlin proposes her fifth stage in order 
to help “ digest”  (Lakatos, 1970) the accumulating counter-evidence now threatening the 
fourth stage and to help Piagetians with the deepening “ ocean o f anom alies”  (Lakatos, 
1970) they appear to face.
A Lakatosian Research Program for the Alternative 
Conceptions Movement
Few, if any, research programs have only one version. In newly em erging programs, 
such as that o f the ACM. there may be little agreement about which is the “ standard" 
version; indeed, there may be alm ost as many versions as there are researchers! With this 
in mind, we urge the reader to consider our elaboration o f " th e ”  ACM research program, 
below, to be a very personal statement: we do not wish to distort or artificially constrain 
the development o f this new approach.
_A1.8
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Negative Heuristic 
The Hard Core may consist of the following assumptions:
(1) The world is real.
(2) All observations are theory-laden.
(3) Individuals use personally appealing explanatory hypotheses to cope with events in 
their environm ent.
(4) The individual tests these hypotheses through interaction with reality against personally 
appealing criteria.
(5) Reality provides guidance as to the adequacy o f  these hypotheses so tested.
(6) W hen hypotheses are judged inadequate by such testing, either the hypotheses or the 
test criteria by which they were judged are m odified or replaced.
The statements above establish that the A CM . like the PS, adopts a constructivistic 
orientation. The negative heuristic is com patible with the philosophical stance o f con- 
structive-altem ativism elaborated by George Kelly in his “ Personal Construct T heory”  
(Kelly, 1955).
Protective Belt
The ACM is only just beginning to develop refutable variants for its program . At their 
present stage o f development they are less suggestive o f  a pedagogy than those o f  the PS 
since their predictions are comparatively vague and general. The theories o f the ACM 
have fewer anomalies than those o f the PS.
G ilbert, Osborne, and Fensham (1982) have postulated a series of consequences o f 
children’s views of science for science teaching. They advance what amounts to a tax- 
onomy for altem ative-conceptions. Based on the notions o f “ children's science.”  “ teach­
e r’s science,”  and “ scientist’s science,” , the m eanings for words held by these respective 
groups, they are as depicted in Figures 1 to 5. O f particular note is the conjecture, expressed 
by Figure 1, that a child’s personal view o f science can persist unchanged by science 
teaching. This extreme position on a continuum  suggests that what the child already 
believes may be much more resistant to change and have a far larger influence on learning 
than has previously been supposed. Teacher’s beliefs and expectations with respect to 
both " th e  tcaching-and-leaming process”  and science have also been com mented on by 
G ilbert, Osborne, Fensham (1982). See Figures 6 to 9. We recognize that the predictions 
made by the elements in these taxonomies are closer to empirical generalizations than to 
explanatory hypotheses. This is due to the newly em ergent nature of the ACM research
The Undisturbed Children's Science Outcome
Teaching
Learning
Learner Teacher Learner
F ig u re  I .  A prclcam ing o r ch ild ren’s view  o f  science can  persist unchanged by science teaching.
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The Two Perspective Outcome:
Teaching
Learner Teacher Learner
F ig u re  2. Science teach ing  can  result in a second view  being acquired for use in school, but the orig inal 
ch ild ren 's  view  persists e lsew here .
program. We suggest that Hewson’s (1981) ideas on “ conceptual exchange”  may have 
great potential relevance to the ACM. M oreover, they represent a development that is 
consistent with the hard core and which is at least approaching testability.
Positive H euristic
As mentioned earlier. Lakatos specified that the Positive Heuristic should function to 
provide suggestions to change and/or develop the Protective Belt. With respect to ACM , 
the following statem ent may provide guidance on how to modify and sophisticate the 
protective belt: An individual will test the adequacy o f h is/her hypotheses against the 
criteria o f prediction  and control of events. Further guidance will likely be specified as 
the research program  evolves.
A Comparative Appraisal of the Piagetian and Alternative 
Conceptions Research Programs
There is no doubt that the ACM and'PS  are rival programs: educationalists working 
within either approach share a common background problem , v iz ., “ why do students fail 
to learn the things we want them to learn?”  Each program is founded upon a constructivist 
philosophy but their explications are different. That the ACM and PS em body different 
research programs is shown by the differences between their negative heuristics.
As an introduction to the differences we see between the work o f the ACM  and that 
o f  the PS, we shall sum m arize the diverse criticisms that the latter has attracted. This 
summary o f criticism s is not intended to be a scholarly review allowing evaluation o f the 
claim s to be made within the present paper— this has been done many tim es before. We 
shall primarily be describing only the conclusions o f such critical studies, conclusions 
that we (and, perhaps, ACM  workers generally) accept, having given the original studies 
a rigorous evaluation earlier. Where we advance a criticism o f the PS that is not self- 
contained, or where we do not cite a reference, the reader may refer to Brown and Desforges 
(1979) for a more detailed treatment.
F ig u re  3 . The orig inal c h ild ren 's  view  is strengthened by science teaching w hich now is m isapplied  to  support
it.
The Reinforced Outcome:
Teaching
Learning
Teacher Learner
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The Mixed Outcome:
Teaching
Learning
Learner Teacher Learner
F ig u re  4 . Science teaching resulting  in a m ixed outcom e w here ch ild ren 's  science and te ach er's  science now 
coexist.
Vast effort has been expended on successive elucidations o f the Piagetian Stages. This 
has usually been done by a structured interview technique focussed on provided tasks, 
normally having a physical science content. It can be argued that, inevitably, interviewers 
have so firmly cast their questions, and interpreted the answers, within the Piagetian 
framework that they have overlooked or ignored much other data. It might be enlightening 
to analyze a videotaped Piagetian interview with another model of man in mind, as a 
prelude to a dialectic discussion. P iaget’s demand for an invariant sequence  o f  development 
through his postulated intellectual stages is problematic. There is evidence o f very young 
children showing behavior anticipated in far older people without their having demon­
strated prerequisite stages o f intellectual development.
There is considerable ambiguity over Piaget’s notion of intellectual stage: should its 
characteristics be regarded as something that are acquired during it. so that they are 
attained by its end, or should they be present at its outset? This paradox may account for 
the wide divergence o f results.
There is also the question o f com petence and use: if a student can perform  in a given 
m anner, should it be expected that this performance will always be dem onstrated, i.e ., 
what predictive use have stage ascriptions? There is extensive evidence that competence 
and use diverge for a given child in different circumstances. P iaget’s stage ascriptions all 
assume a high degree o f correlation between thought and verbal expression— what is 
thought can be expressed. There seems no way, a priori, o f checking this. We would 
describe attem pts to “ de-verbalize”  elicitation techniques as “ Piagetian technology”  and 
express doubt on their fidelity to Piaget’s original ideas and intentions.
M any research studies in the Piagetian technology would overlook the fact that each 
stage and its subdivisions is only a theory, capable o f being refuted. Such studies render 
Piaget’s theory of stages irrefutable by methodological fiat. In Lakatosian terms this 
am ounts to committing auxiliary hypotheses to the hard core. The instruments developed 
are susceptible to many, if not all. the criticisms of intelligence tests. Alas Piagetian 
technologists currently appear to contribute the bulk o f the enquiry supposedly conducted 
within the ethos of the Piagetian program. When Piaget’s stage theory is treated in this 
way it is not possible to talk meaningfully o f there being a positive heuristic for it, since 
this cannot operate. Piagetian technologists thus preclude theoretical progress from their 
work.
F ig u re  5 . Science leaching w hich extends ch ild ren 's  science and teacher's  science to  a m ore unified science 
v iew .
The Unified Scientific Outcome;
Learner teacner
Teaching
Learning
Learner
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The "Blank-Minded" or "Tabula Rasa" Assumption:
O  * ©  KisSf—  ©
Learner Learner
F ig u re  6 . Science teaching in w hich it is assum ed that the learners have no theoretical view s o f  the topic o r 
phenom ena  under study.
W ithout theoretical progress there can be no empirical progress either. Lakatos em phat­
ically states that: "Em piricalness {or scientific character) and theoretical progress are 
inseparably connected"  (Lakatos, 1970; original italics). This requires that a research 
enterprise dem onstrates at least theoretical progress— or else it can be rejected as “ pseudo­
scientific”  (Lakatos, 1970). The work of the Piagetian technologists shows no “ problem 
sh ift”  (Lakatos, 1970, added em phasis) because their “ problem s”  can only remain the 
sam e. Lakatos would deny there is a research program in his sense because o f an effective 
lack o f its component parts, i.e ., testable theories. Such work is necessarily degenerate 
and pseudoscientific.
The concept o f equilibration has been heavily criticized. Bruner (1959), for exam ple, 
argued that the notion lacked sufficient precision to delineate the adaptations o f thinking 
to specific changes in the environm ent. There is also evidence, albeit am biguous in nature, 
concerning the effect o f training on Piagetian stage transitions, yet no explanation has 
been forthcom ing on the functioning, in these circum stances, o f assim ilation and accom ­
m odation.
W ith these criticisms o f the PS in mind, we shall now turn attention to the ACM. 
Researchers within the ACM are currently directing most o f their efforts to the identifi­
cation and elaboration of individuals’ altem ative-conceptions: the constructed realities of. 
and their personal meanings to, the observed individuals constitute the prim ary focus o f 
research attention. This might also be expected to loom large in the research priorities o f 
the PS due to its philosophical com mitm ent to constructivism. Yet somehow it seems to 
have been sidestepped. In the late 1960s Ausubel, asserted that: “ The most important 
single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and 
teach him accordingly”  (Ausubel, 1968). This assertion appeared to be generally accepted 
by the com m unity o f educational researchers. This acceptance was perhaps not surprising 
since, as we have already argued, Piaget’s theory appears to constitute the “ received 
view .”  Yet 10 years later, in a review article, Smith (1978) was able to conclude “ . . . .  the 
perspective o f  the pupil seems an unexploited stance.”
Individual research papers which convey this sentiment in their title and contents are 
increasingly prevalent, e .g ., Erikson’s (1982b) “ Students’ Beliefs About Science Con-
The “Teacher Dominance" Assumption;
©  * ©  gas?* ©
Learner Teacher Learner
F ig u re  7 . Science leaching in w hich it is assum ed that learners m ay have theoretical v iew s, but that these 
are easily  d isp laced  by the view s p resented  by teachers.
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The "Student Dominance'* Assumption: 
©  * ©
F ig u re  8 . Science leaching  w hich recognizes that learners often do  hold strong ly  entrenched theoretical view s 
that persist in the face o f  teaching.
cepts: A missing ingredient in the instructional p rocess.”  On re-reading the research 
literature on the PS, which makes up a considerable proportion o f  published educational 
research, it is apparent that individuals’ alternative conceptions have been subordinated  
to their ascribed (Piagetian) stage o f  intellectual development: it is the stage level o f  
intellectual development o f  individuals and populations which have been the prim ary fo cu s  
o f  attention. Put another way, altemative-conceptions appear to have been used diag- 
nostically— as merely a means of identifying or clarifying individuals’ stage level of 
intellectual developm ent. The existence of alternative conceptions have often served only 
to demonstrate “ stage (un) readiness”  for specific concept learning. For ACM  workers 
the existence o f altem ative-conceptions within individuals cannot be doubted, the existence 
of Piaget’s postulated mental structures can (for primarily form al, meta-theoretical argu­
ments against Piagetian structuralism— see Swift. 1984). Ironically, the work o f the ACM 
may be characterized as a return to an earlier age of theoretical innocence which recalls 
P iaget’s work o f  the 1920s.
Phillips (1974) suggests that educational research tends to fall into three categories: 
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive. He adds that these categories appear to be held 
in increasing esteem  (in the order listed, above) by educators. The burgeoning anom alies 
to stage- theory suggest that Piagetian theory has failed as a predictive enterprise— yet 
the work of the Piagetian technologists increasingly appear to be assuming prescriptive 
responsibility for educational policy. This, for ACM w orkers, is premature and is possibly 
why Piaget him self wrote so little and so late on the educational im plications o f his theory. 
Piaget was foremost an epistemologist, only reluctantly a pedagogue. The educational 
research of the ACM  is so far, and without apology, prim arily a descriptive enterprise. 
It is primarily devoted to identifying and em phasizing the existence o f altem ative-con­
ceptions. The im portance and role o f altemative-conceptions in personal intellectual devel­
opment is em phasized without reference to postulated m ental-structures. From an appraisal 
of the considerable academ ic criticism o f P iaget’s theory o f  stages (discussed earlier) 
ACM workers tend to agree with Brown and Desforges (1979) conclusion that “ the 
notion of ‘stage’ creates more conceptual problems than it so lv es .”  They have conse­
quently abandoned it. Herein lies the principle difference between the work o f the PS and 
the ACM.
Teachers' Views of Science:
Curricula
and
Materials © Lesson_______  f S  ^ orPreparation y  J  y  J
Teacher Teacher
F ig u re  9 . Strongly held teach ers ' views o f science m ay persist o r interact w ith the view s in science curricu la .
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Finally, let us review the PS and ACM with Lakatos’ notion of progress in m ind. For 
such a vast enterprise the research program of the PS appears to show little o f either 
theoretical progress o r em pirical progress. Indeed criticism s, such as those we have 
described above, are usually met with ad hoc explanations which do not advance its 
theoretical developm ent— a practice initiated in the mid-1950s by Piaget him self w ith his 
so-called “ theory”  o fdecalage (decalage is a “ content”  decreasing manoeuvre: it predicts 
no novel phenomena); the generalizability of the Program shows little sign o f im proving. 
The appearance o f the ACM  suggests that the PS is gradually being abandoned. The 
standing of the A CM , on L akatos’ progressive degenerate continuum  is not yet clear, but 
we have intimations that it will prove to be progressive. Certainly its overall coherence 
has advanced markedly from the atheoretical mid-1970s period o f “ m isconceptions.”  The 
theoretical problem shift seems consistent if unspectacular. The empirical problem shift has 
been better than interm ittent: new facts are being discovered daily, to judge from  the 
columns of this, and other, journals.
Concluding Remarks
We believe that the relationship o f the ACM to the PS shall remain problem atic for 
some time. The challenge for ACM and PS workers alike is to resist the tem ptation to 
merely “ translate”  into their own term s the findings o f the other research program . Instead* 
we urge workers to develop their ideas through use o f a “ pluralistic-M ethodology,”  i.e . ,  
“ . . . where one develops and evaluates one’s personal M ethodology through a dialetical 
consideration o f alternative Methodologies,”  (Swift, W atts, & Pope, 1983).
The authors are very grateful to their colleagues in the Personal Construction o f  K now l­
edge Group at the University o f  Surrey for their help in preparing this paper. An earlier 
version was presented to the ADEPT/UBET/AUCET Science Education Conference, U ni­
versity o f Oxford, Septem ber 1981.
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University  of East A nglia
Frc n G . Brown, M Ed, PhD, ABPsS School o f Education
Professor o f Education University o f East Anglia
Keswick Hall 
Norwich NR4 6T L
Telephone Norwich (0603) 56841 
Telegrams U E A N O R  N O R W IC H
12 July 1984
Dear Dr. Swift,
Thank you for your paper 'Towards a Lakatosian Analysis . . . ' which 
I read with great interest. I; will come as no surprise to you that 
I welcome your approach, particularly as within science education the 
Piagetian theme seems to be sustained unabated.
Your use of Lakatos' model is interesting, although I wonder whether it 
is perhaps slightly counter-productive in that a) it may frighten off 
those who need to think about it, and b) it presents a view of A.C.M. 
which implies greater coherence and theoretical integrity than it affords 
at the present time. As we have stated elsewhere, P.S. went too far in 
the search for universal cognitive structures and ignored organismic and 
situational variables. My feeling about the sources you cite for A.C.M. 
is that they have become somewhat repetitive in demonstrating that children's 
concepts are not always consonant with those of their teachers. Yet we 
still need to look for structures perhaps, not on the grand scale a la 
Piaget, but in the responses to individual curriculum content - across 
pupils and across situations.
Piaget argued that he was defining structure of cognition, but probably 
confounded structure of knowledge with structure of cognition. That 
doesn't mean there is no structure of cognition, and if there is, it may 
sometimes be at odds with structure of knowledge - hence the typical 
A.C.M. findings (such as those of Driver). So your signalling of A.C.M. 
as an alternative programme leading to a different theoretical interpretation 
may be premature, I hope it's also prophetic.
Good luck with the paper's publication.
Yours sincerely,
Dr. D. Swift,
Department of Educational Studi ;s, 
University of Surrey,
Guildford,
Surrey,
GU2 5XH.
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Appendix 3« Formal Aspects of Personal Construct Psychology
A. 3.1 Introduction
The terms and their meanings presented in tnis appendix are closely based 
on those articulated by Kelly (1955) and are grouped and labelled as by 
Bannister and Fransella (1980, pp. 192-195).
A.3.1 Formal content of personal construct theory
Fundamental postulate; A person's processes are psychologically 
channellised by the ways in which they anticipate events.
Construction corollary: A person anticipates events by construing their 
replications.
Individuality corollary: Persons differ from each other in their
construction of events
Organisation corollary: Each person characteristically evolves, for
their convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing 
ordinal relationships between constructs.
Dichotomy corollary: A person's construction system is composed of a
finite number of dichotomous constructs
Choice corollary: A person chooses for themselves that alternative in a
dichotomised construct through which they anticipate the greatest 
possibility for the elaboration of their system
Range corollary: A construct is convenient for the anticipation of a
finite range of events only
Experience corollary; A person's construction system varies as they 
successively construe the replication of events
Modulation corollary: The variation in a person's construction system
is limited by the permeability of the constructs within whose range of 
convenience the variants lie
Fragmentation corollary: A person may successively employ a variety of
construction systems which are inferentially incompatible with each other
Commonality corollary: To the extent that one person employs a
construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another, 
his or her processes are psychologically similar to those of the other 
person.
Sociality corollary: To the extent that one person construes the
construction process of another they may play a role in a social process 
involving the other person
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A. 3.2 Formal aspects of constructs
Range of convenience: A construct's range of convenience comprises all
those things to which the user would find its application useful
Focus of convenience: A construct's focus of convenience comprises
those particular things to which the user would find its application
maximally useful. These are the elements upon which the construct is 
likely to have been formed originally
Elements: The things or events which are abstracted by a person's use
of the construct are called elements. In some systems these are called 
objects
Context: The context of a construct comprises those elements among
which the user ordinarily discriminates by means of the construct. It is 
somewhat more restricted than the range of convenience, since it refers to 
the circumstances in which the construct emerges for practical use and not 
necessarily to all the circumstances in which a person might eventually
use the construct. It is somewhat more extensive than the focus of
convenience, since the construct may often appear in circumstances where
its application is not optimal
Pole: Each construct discriminates between two poles, one at each end
of its dichotomy. The elements abstracted are like each other at each 
pole with respect to the construct and are unlike the elements at the 
other pole
Contrast: The relationship between the two poles of a construct is one
of contrast
Likeness end: When referring specifically to elements at one pole of a
construct, one may use the term 'likeness end' to designate that pole
Contrast end: When referring specifically to elements at one pole of a
construct, one may use the term 'contrast end' to designate the opposite 
end
EEmergence: The emergent pole of a construct is that one which embraces
most of the immediately perceived context
Implicitness: The implicit pole of a construct is that one which
embraces contrasting context. It contrasts with the emergent pole. 
Frequently the person has no available symbol or name for it; it is 
symbolised only implicitly by the emergent term
Symbol: An element in the context of a construct which represents not
only itself but also the construct by which it is abstracted by the user 
is called the construct's symbol
Permeability: A construct is permeable if it admits newly perceived
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elements to its context. It is impermeable if it rejects elements on the 
basis of their newness
A.3.3 Constructs classified according to the nature of their control 
over their elements
Pre-emptive constructs; A construct which pre-empts its elements for 
membership in its own realm exclusively is called a pre-emptive construct. 
This is the 'nothing but' type of construction - 'if this is a ball it is 
nothing but a ball'
Constellatory construct: A construct which fixes the other realm
membership of its elements is called a constellatory construct. This is 
stereotyped or typological thinking
Propositional construct: A construct which carries no implications
regarding the other realm membership of its elements is a propositional 
construct. This is uncontaminated construction.
A.3.4-. General diagnostic constructs
Preverbal constructs* A preverbal construct is one which continues to 
be used, even though it has no consistent word symbol. It may or may not 
have been devised before the client had command of speech symbolism.
Submergence* The submerged pole of a construct is the one which is less 
available for application to events.
Suspension: A suspended element is one which is omitted from the
context of a construct as a result of revision of the client's construct 
system.
Level of cognitive awareness: The level of cognitive awareness ranges
from high to low. A high level construct is one which is readily 
expressed in socially effective symbols; whose alternatives are both 
readily accessible; which falls well within the range of convenience of' 
the client's major construction; and which is not suspended by its 
superordinating constructs.
Dilation: Dilation occurs when a person broadens their perceptual field
in order to reorganise it on a more comprehensive level. It does not, in 
itself, include the comprehensive reconstruction of those elements.
Constriction: Constriction occurs when a person narrows their
perceptual field in order to minimise apparent incompatibilities.
Comprehensive constructs: A comprehensive construct is one which
subsumes a wide variety of events.
Incidental constructs: An incidental construct is one which subsumes a
narrow variety of events.
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Superordinate constructs; A superordinate construct is one which 
includes another as one of the elements in its context.
Subordinate constructs: A subordinate construct is one which is
included as an element in the context of another.
Regnant constructs: A regnant construct is a kind of superordinate
construct which assigns each of its elements to a category on an 
all-or-none basis, as in classical logic. It tends to be non-abstractive.
Core constructs: A core construct is one which governs a person’s
maintenance processes
Peripheral constructs: A peripheral construct is one which can be
altered without serious modification of the core structure.
Tight constructs: A tight construct is one which leads to unvarying
predictions.
Loose constructs: A loose construct is one which leads to varying
predictions but which retains its identity.
A.3.5. Constructs relating to transition
Threat: Threat is the awareness of an imminent comprehensive change in
one’s core structures.
Fear; Fear is the awareness of an imminent incidental change in one’s 
core structures.
Anxiety: Anxiety is the awareness that the events with which one is
confronted lie mostly outside the range of convenience of one’s construct 
system.
Guilt: Guilt is the awareness of dislodgement of the self from one's
core role structure.
Aggressiveness: Aggressiveness is the active elaboration of one's 
perceptual field.
Hostility: Hostility is the continued effort to extort validational
evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has already been 
recognized as a failure.
GPG cycle: The CPC cycle is a sequence of construction involving in
succession, circumspection, pre-emption and control, leading to a choice 
precipitating the person into a particular situation.
Creativity Cycle: The Creativity Cycle is one which starts with
loosened construction and terminates with tightened and validation 
construction.
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Appendix 4-. Teaching and Curricular Materials Collected as Part of a
Lesson Observation
A4-(a). Second Year Lesson 'Handouts'
These handouts comprise the second year digestion syllabus. An 
overhead projector slide based on the second handout was used in 
the lesson previous to the lesson observed.
A4-(b). Textbook Reference used by Pupils in Le33on prior to L01
Pupils copied figures 18.6 and 18.7. Notes were dictated by the
teacher.
A4.(c). Textbook Reference used by Pupils
A4.(d). Textbook Reference upon which Pupils' only previous
Control Experiment was based
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ABSORPTION
When pepsinogen b  set free in the stomach the hydrochloric 
acid present converts it to active pepsin. This pepsin cannot now 
digest the stomach walb because o f their protective coating of 
mucus.
Absorption in the ileum
Nearly all the absorption of digested food takes place in the 
ileum, and certain o r its characteristics are important adapta- 
tions to its absorbing properties:
(a) it b  usually fairly long and presents a large absorbing 
surface to the digested food,
(b) its interna] surface is greatly increased by thousands of 
tiny, finger-like projections called villi (Fig. 18.6 and 
Plate 19).
(c) the lining epithelium Is very thin and the fluids can pass 
fairly rapidly through it,
e p ith e liu m
cap illary  
n e tw o rk
blood vessels 
supplying 
villus
villus
•niyme-secreting 
gland
circular'muscle longitudinal musda
Fig. 18.6 Stereogram to show structure o f ileum
vassal
I />
t
m u scu la r w all
(M. I. Walktr)
Plate 19. TRANSVERSE SECTION T H R O U G H  
ILEUM OF CAT. SH O W IN G  VILLI (M)
(d) there is a dense network of blood capillaries in each 
villus (Fig. 18.7).
The small molecules o f the digested food, principally amino 
acids and glucose, pass through the epithelium and the 
capillary walls and enter the blood plasma. They are then 
carried away in the capillaries which unite to form veins and 
eventually join up to form one large vein, the hepatic portal vein. 
This carries all the blood from the intestine to the liver, which 
may retain or alter any of the digestion products. The digested 
food then reaches the general circulation.
Some o f the fatty acids, and glycerol from the digestion o f 
fats, enter the blood capillaries of the villi but a large pro­
portion may be recombined in the intestinal lining to form fats 
once again and then these fats pass into the lacteals. It may be 
that some o f the finely emulsified fat b  absorbed directly, i.e. 
without digestion, as minute droplets which subsequently enter 
the lacteals. The fluid in the. lacteals enters the lymphatic 
system  which forms a network all over the body and eventually 
empties its contents into the blood stream (p. 100).
c p lth « llu n \
m ucus-
s e c re t in g
b lo o d
cap illa ry
lac tea l
V- -b lo o d  vesse l 
su p p ly in g  
v illus
Fig. 18.7 Villus structure
ly m p h a tic
system
The large intestine (colon and rectum)
The m aterial passing into the large intestine consists o f water 
with undigested matter, largely cellulose and vegetable fibres 
(the roughage), bacteria, mucus and dead cclb from the 
lining o f the alimentary canal. The large intestine secretes no 
enzymes and can absorb very little digested food. It does, 
however, absorb much of the water from the undigested 
residues. T h b  semi-solid waste, the faeces, b  passed into the 
rectum by peristalsb and b  expelled at intervab through the 
anus. The residues may spend from 12 to 24 hours in the intestine.
The caecum and appendix
These are relatively small, probably vestigial* structures in 
man. In herbivores like the rabbit and the horse they are much 
larger, and it b  here that most of the cellulose digestion takes 
place, largely as a result of bacterial activity.
* i.e. s tructu res which have become apparently  functionless th rough  
disuse in  the course o f  evolution.
- A4.3 -
l i l i i
Z *"*3:2 8
lltlllK
•i
m m
< $ >
- A4.4 -
y  *c s  g
•§ SL'S 8e
w> 5 E
U s
oj s 3 | 1  | 
£ s i i l S  §2. * 36 s -2 if
2 x: y i; w 2 ^
c.s jpg* a*n; u  p , b h w H
•o -a ;0 y c c *3 •»
“ ** JD O
i s ' i s
8|Ii
E ? “ S3 
s|JS“
■O u i3 «•* 2 *3 
& *?•§ o'*-8S..Q ^  'O ? m
■° 3 J . sfi *o §".SB » k -B
B K a
I  X °«
L§ "8 |  3  ( X ^  -  w  £  3
• tfll .8?13£? 
S’s.slaS 8.
‘s. E " H
i U i i
S-i &£‘S
SStSCSilSSSSSmll nranilff I -li.iHITi. tf If.d
- A4.5 “
IWHEH ■OFSSBS
fc S i ’S
2 ~  o*  k> C 
O
I s l:*
« d  «  s»
TJ ,'C  W
. 3  t“  'jc  
2  .  *  
V  j $ T J  
C 2 £ 
°  i  i l
3 S E
5 -S  a
•5 J v
S  . 5  A— O ~3 
«  - S  5S E c
Z  *- - o"3 p <*
S 5 -S ^
S ^  •£ a
.§ g  -  g  JBC £  o  
, S =  y O. P 3 5 jc >/i c ■£ #  o  a  
u  c  ^  E "o 
£ S >>« >C • =  T) k  t~
s y " n  •% 
° U  “  u o
jfl , to g -5 S’rp .5 E u- 
•8 £ G <5 ° i Mg c£
•S-s J °.g
™ n  "  3  '
i  E 32 c
m l  §M •£** L f
O  r  t i  p  f l  “  m £  T  -
Il-Sl-
c  t >  y  
u  «  >
V  ^  (1
JO « c  JC
t i v !  
g  c :  5?n  3  
•C  M p
5 0-0
to r* iJ 
O § «
. 5  - o  2
C 3  C 
p X) O
| 6 - S  
! ? *  
S  £ * l cCu >
.S c o
*-» !T2 »* tr
^  C c JC
2  2 - X  *  -  g  2  •£ ^  °
•£ 5 -  £ S'> .3 —
■£
3 1/1 G.
N -
f 3 5
2  « 2  ^3 rt »- w tfi
b* ri o
D . - S
c to-c
S a JStJJ-3 -C
»*x-c ~
3  O t i t  
*» £i tC
d “ E .
E r . i -  c
o 2
O  r  n  r  >  v  •  . r  . 7
■ 5  "  f !  m  O  ^  ^  O  X '^ .. ?r I9 “ 3 J  - O
C *c c c
o  >  u ;  u
,JK s  5r J5
VJ ~ V~ P C .* 3w w *5  ^2
y  c . i  O  . * 2  «is ■- E _e >*TJ 2 o
3 . s  r  « c c ra vc
a
§
XI
I*
J8JO
2
■8 7
S I  S__ S <xr
.& E E
o
to
o >
CO
’£. £ 'O3* C - 
a. ^  .. 
f*. •
I 11rj fc.
“ “ I  s  j<
o  4 ^  X_  ^  3  M
2- E I  Sj3  0 - 0 - 2
?r* v to > /•
^ « 3  2 h h
O o  
fcft
I
«
TJc y n t s «
b « £
I  c S j2
3 -n iT c
» 1 .3  53 “  n 3
m  H  c i  £
J8
T3
c ^
^ o
W V—«u o
*5 c
n v 
o  **3 
^  Co j;•cH <J
A 13
TJ ^
K.I
u C°c fl^ o 
. a
E y «*. JS•5 3
v  «  u  u
•2 T  J°  -5 
2c 3  g j .• M M  O  Cu  §  -c y  2i ^ -c
I l* J B -
tf u C c x y rt
2 S  T3  > ,^  .C  nU O 
* 2  j p x  - 3.5 .5 H J(
>* n • -2 o .2* *o 1 *« -o y
E-s
I f
J2 E y -  2
'a 2 a S--Sc C  “ 3  3
o c t»»2 ■“ b 2 s< i; so y "  x>~Z *~>.£ u. 3
S g 3" £ 
p *S *» ~ a— j: w o00=: x = 3 0 “
X 2 -“* x  ™-o " ■£ _
« ^  w ■? xa -c y »*2 M i
O ._
*5 o
3
bA
I £-5 t  X t f 3
i  ’A 
o ^13 >■ 
c  5 !
0 2“
■5 A 
S 2T3y 31 § * . 0
rt V
.0 A.
O  <J “xi to —
•5 x  G 
_  .3 602 > o
3 2 —2 t» "E x: « c •" 3 X 0 r ,t!
i: s ,
3 C *-
•r* 10 m
0  r c  r*y « §  ^c u P o r*
-  j c  . 5
.5 2 £ o
u  O  0
E 2■i i s j l
i
8 S 
8 r  s
# 2 - 3
c ! i
O  S» r-*
11H
'^11 
S xi 8 2 . •s • a « i > .
c  JC  c  3
M ill
- s i l ?3 > 5 o .5 
« 8 a | !
- o X -3 E 5
^ o s r
.£*,5 x  u “ E c 60 jj .E 2
5 3 ii -o fi C
•E I c g 8 5„ 0 U ?
l s | 2 l*■?«2 ^  -g -  S
? ii s  .! 8 8c ,«• .c y 2^ 23 0 . 0.
‘V-J
X S 2
S 5 8 
E f . E  
"5. TJ j|{c  c "
s - 1
2 £ 8 c
jmJin
.1
a
«■• ■■• I)
*s « I
i  E 
■5 Eblfl 5 w 
9 v
i i  h  "
»3s|
^  E Jf2 
c S.^1 s-i is «
&11 s. 11
o M 
_ o.
w ** 3
§ =  5-x  " ■=
"  g  E . E S S  
x  " J! o >. xe -c 75 c u >*c is '3
& 2 S  
u*s 2o jj *3
S vpf JC v»
•e : l
S 2 o
X 2-S
■§ T> O
!  S 2
S a |
o .= a
*£ «s "2 u  c  5
0 e -o
3 ^  1  
i n ?
3 60 
x  8 |
= c S ?•o 2 — -cs  5  3 “
P O  n  n
r ;f
~ A4*6 “*
0 0
j m
§•;
w S*
5.SS
fiq 1
•s.! a
.5 « 8
■ i i S
;?«-s
f i l l
*51
2 n  E.»i £ «. *~ 
s 2 5  cw X C no V -  ..
£.5 r N . *° c r*u  h  u 4
t.S F c^ tj C o
sr “ :
B t -S 5 •S -c 5 
Es°'
1 " Ss «£ J: .2 "o■£ o « w c x
•£ S «o — 
c a 2 -s
■SJJ.-E C
.2 x •« ^
S* ** c
«> 1 5 &*7 x o > » #* '> ve .5 x j* .0 -o o J
&!•: a
•c t  .2 c  
I -3 -5 <2 
£ 2 «*
i l l !  
o s c
'■’cl /.
«Tt/^ V7 ' jnT5n' | jlf h (ZL^i) Z e- -—
- A4*7 -
Appendix 5* Versions of Written Exercise (WE)
A5(a). WE.vl 
A5(b)« WE.v2 
A5(c). WE.v3
A5(d), WE.vA
WB • v1
Q1« List jobs which you would normally put under the headings of very
•scientific', or very 'non-scientific*, or definately 'both
scientific and non-scientific':
scientific non-scientific both
Q2. Why do you think that I have asked you to answer Q1?
Q3. Think of something that you have done which you think was scientific 
and do a sketch of it.
- what is happening in your sketch?
- why is it scientific?
Qk® Carefully observe, then write down what you have observed#
(Q4&* Does the difficulty that some of you have had answering Q4 
tell you anything about people who do experiments that have 
never been done before?).
~ A5.1~
w*. ♦ va
Q1« List jobs which you would normally put under the headings of very
‘scientific', or vey 'non-scientifio', or definately 'both
scientific and non-scientific':
scientific non-scientific both
Q2. Why do you think that I have asked you to answer Q1?
Q3« What is your most usual reason for putting a job in the scientific 
column?
Q4« Do a sketch of something that happened outside school in which you 
did something scientific.
 ^ - what is happening in your sketch?
- why is it scientific?
Q5« Carefully observe, then write down what you have observed.
(Q5&* Does the difficulty that some of you have had answering Q5 
tell you anything about people who do experiments that have 
never been done before?).
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WE .v3
Q1# List jobs which you would normally put under the headings of very
'scientific*, or very 'non-scientific*, or definately 'both
scientific and non-scientific':
scientific non-scientific both
Q2. Why do you think that I have asked you to answer Q1?
A <
Q3. What is your most usual reason for putting a job in the scientific 
column?
Q4« Have you found it useful to answer Q1?
If yes, why?
If no, why?
Q5« Do a sketch of something that happened outside school in which you 
did something scientific.
B V  What is happening in your sketch? 
Q7. Why is it scientific?
Q8. Carefully observe, then write down what you have observed.
(Q8a. What difficulty have you had in trying to answer Q8?)
(Q8b. Observations are often very important in experiments.
Does the difficulty that you had in trying to answer Q8 tell 
you anything about people doing experiments that have never 
been done before?)
- A5.3 -
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Degree Subject:______________________________ _
Please think of occupations which you would c lassify  as being very 
sc ien tific  or very non-scientific or both:
SCIENTIFIC NON-SCIENTIFIC BOTH
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Appendix 7. Example of Completed Raw Practice Grid: Heather, Class RG1
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Appendix8. Example of Completed Raw Grid; Heather. C1RG1, G1
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Appendix 9. Example of Grid Feedback Package: Heather, C1RG1, G1
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Name:_
1.
WHAT MAKES A JOB 'SCIENTIFIC', NON-SCIENTIFIC * OR 'BOTH SCIENTIFIC AND NON- 
-SCIENTIFIC*?
Last term you completed a special sort of questionnaire for me: a "Repertory 
Grid1’* I used it to gather information about your personal views on what made 
certain jobs very 'scientific*, or very * non-scientific*, or definately 'both 
scientific and non-scientific'# I also hope that your completion of the grid 
«ind reading of its analysis, which I am giving to you now, will help you to 
further explore your views and understanding of this subject#
I attach photocopies of both your grid and summaries of its analysis#
A computer program has "focussed" the information that you entered in the grid 
into clusters (see page 3)* This program has called each of the job titles I 
gave you in the grid "elements" and each of your personal views on what makes 
them 'scientific' etc "constructs"# To remind you what these were you will 
need to refer to page 4 or to the copy of your "raw", i#e# "unfocussed", grid#
When you filled in the grid I asked you to use a "splitting principle" to help 
you to form a number of personal constructs# The splitting principle required 
you to think of a way in which two jobs were alike and different from a third 
in terms of what made them 'scientific', *non-scientific* or 'both scientific 
and non-scientifLo*. I specified the 3 jobs you were to consider from the 9 in 
the liBt when forming each construct#
Every oonstruct has two "poles", each with the opposite meaning of the other# 
The poles correspond to the words or phrases that you wrote in the "alike" 
margin and the "different" margin of your grid# Each of your constructs 
consists of what you wrote for these poles separated by a dash: 
e#g "Skilled - Unskilled"
e#g "Original thought - Mundane and repetitative"
When you had formed a construct you rated the jobs you had used on a scale 1 
to 3» A rating of 1 was used to strongly indicate the presence of the "alike" 
quality or attribute you had identified. By opposite contrast, a rating of 5 
was used to strongly indicate the presence of the "different" quality or 
attribute you had identified# Rating scores of 2 and 4 were used for less 
extreme positions relative to their respective poles, with 3 as a mid-point#
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When you had rated the 3 jobs you had used to form a construct you then rated 
the remaining 6 jobs from the list using any score from 1 to 5.
On your analysis sheets you may see the expression "construct reversed". If 
this is the case it means that your original ratings for the construct(s) 
specified have been reversed, i.e. 1 is now 5 and 5 is now 1, a 4 becomes a 2
and a 2 is now emtered into the focussed grid as a 4; a 3 remains the same.
To preserve your original meaning of your ratings you must now reverse your 
poles for that particular construct. For example, the construct "Not meeting
young people - Meeting young people” must now be read as "Meeting young people
- Not meeting young people". The computer program reverses certain constructs 
to help it uncover relationships between your constructs.
To benefit from the analysis of your grid you should
(a). Note high relationships between pairs or groups of elements.
(b). Consider personal reasons w^y pairs or groups within the total set may be 
alike or dissimilar.
(c). Look at the clusters formed in order to try and work out if there are 
possible "superordinate" constructs.
Remember that your grid and its analysis only provide information on your views 
at the time you filled it in. Of course, your views may be the same now as they
were then, but, equally, they may be slightly or completely different. The
repertory grid should never be thought of as a test.
Thank-you for helping me,
David Swift
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BBEHTS CONSTRUCTS
10
RATINGS 
1 TO 5
FQCU5ED GRID 1
35
-p
CONSTRUCTS: % HATCH
4 4 8 6 1 3 9 5 2 7r
lllllt 44 tl444444l till  1414114114441414 It 14 
*34  4 1 2 4 3 4 5 5 5 4 3
•p
3 4 10
19
o
TQERAU Tl£ ELEMENT TREE*. NATCH TDIRfN THE CONSTRUCT TREE! MTCH
<XW2^«D7 
/. JOB 5 AND 10 
< JOIN 8 AND 6 
/  JDDf 1 AND 3 
/ m  4 AND 12 
y  JOIN 14 AND 13 
✓ JOIN 9 AND 11 
JOIN 15 AM) 16
INTO CLUSTER 10 
INTO aUSTER 11 
INTO CLUSTER 12 
INTO CLUSTER 13 
INTO CLUSTER 14 
INTO CLUSTER 15 
INTO CLUSTER 16 
INTO CLUSTER 17
951
92*51
92.51 
901 
901
87.51
82.51 
351
/JOIN 7 WD 8 
'JOIN 9 AND 1 
/JOIN 6 AND 12
•/join 13 m  U
/JOIN 14 AND 2 
/WIN 15 AND 10 
/BIN 5 AND 16 
/JOIN 3 AND 17 
JOIN IB AND 4
INTO CLUSTER 11 
INTO CLUSTER 12 
INTO CLUSTER 13 
INTO CLUSTER 14 
INTO CLUSTER 15 
INTO CLUSTER 16 
INTO CLUSTER 17 
INTO DUSTER 18 
INTO CLUSTER 19
1001
94.41
94.41
83.81
83.81 
72.21 
66.61 
55 .51
44.41
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Grid 1: Heather
Supplied Eleaents (job titles):
a
co
o
o
Eh
COM
OM
CO
a
CO
I
:*
oj
O
E-«
8
8M
pq
o
- K
Foraation of
Constructs:
C.1
C.2
C.3
C.4
C.5
C.6
C.7
C.8
C.9
E.1,2,3* » 
E.3,4,5*, 
E.7,8,9., 
E.1,5,9., 
E.if,8,3., 
E.7>2,6., 
E. 1 >4*7 • >
E«2j5»8*>
E.3*6*2•>
C.10:Full Context,
element 
number (E.)
Personal Constructs (personal views):
C.1 : Need some kind of science qualification 
vs.
Not necessary
C.2 : Would work in a lab 
vs.
Not likely to work in a lab
C.3 : Would need some knowledge of biology 
vs*
Not necessary
C.Jf : Maths is an essential qualification 
vs.
Not necessary
C.5 : Would have to be able to operate a computer 
vs.
Doesn't need aiy understanding of computers
C.6 : Would have to be able to convey scientific results to others 
vs.
Not necessary
C.7 : Ability to carry out scientific practicles [sic.] is essential 
vs.
Not necessary
C.8 : Understanding of chemistry essential 
vs.
Not necessary
C.9 * It is essential to have studied science at least to 'A1 level 
vs.
An *0* level, 'CSE* or no science qualification is necessary
C.10: Work involves handling dangerous chemical substances 
vs.
Never have to do so 
[Full oontext]
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Appendix 10. Summaries of Analyses of Individuals1 Grids (FOCUS-ed Grids)
- A10.0 -
8/
A
o
u
1
§» i
<S
>5
*
b
3
2
i f  = r r r * *
1 1 1  j |
S f Y '" * * !  g'  M *  *f* »> 2  C.S I *  a  ^
r j
2
a Ea£Sii£
in iii in in in in ;.ih w -*•
ir> ui in in tr* ui u*j -«*■ ro
tin in in bi m u”J in ut m
in in «*• m m  in m  «-•
<H H  CN C N C N  IN (N «~«
c>4 *-» *-« —* r>i rJ m <n ^
(N •-« — 4 * - t r4 ^  (N (N r4
11
85
•M
•|SJ
_ i l
ro —< 
ro *-<
\ 3
Si*
5 »~*y».o *>
--CO 3
m *o o*
I- *
- A10.1 -
< N' M OCO On in
*» L? 'Q J  S'X  F  at «  =► ^
cm u~a in m «*• ■ f-o
CM
fO in UT
%o<
in co ro «3*
CM CM CNI in
•<* -4 in in fo m
c*
C4%
fc*-
C.-3W 2
- A10.2 -
5(J
oz
-J
f j
.A-' *4 ’
tsi &
$ 3 6
~ A10.3 -
15
-1
6
(b
£
3
DC
-J
C ♦♦
-afrr.•*
i^s 1
i
.: -* ^  z j °5*S J ^ 4 Hi
. p i  £  *3 3 I
i w i * -V • j
I i ^  ^ v tJ W  ‘O *"5£
3 i H  cr^ ^
A10.4 -
JC.
-U
_0
H
~ A10.5 -
FOC
USE
D 
GRI
D 
6
- A10.6 -
O' liT M
o
oc
_i |
o  ;;
-3 ■> . 
S3 ?
i; ** =*.,f x
5s ^  £
1
e> e> *1
CMC.CN
a K £ S S3 18 85
“ 1 1 *■ i
~ A10.7 -
iT>
fS ■-*“<■ r
injjm to m
ro in
in
~ A10.8 -
mnttjftirn 
1
-0
8
*
1
0
 
3 
S334t< lira
FOC
USE
D 
GRI
D 
9
o,
co *o r^v ro
o
cc
c.
i f
st w s *4 3
^ ■ 2 &Z £
s  I  i
H
l'i *
131
f)r
* 5
| | ^
i t U
!  ?  I  i
J i  *  g  g  J j f i s t
5- 3 1 
1  4
r,1,j\
<» w 4!
rgar^
r
” ® s £ s? -r cw —< u*)
if
K f >
A10.9 -
2: fai ir>
•o£:*-4
CO CO
in
to
m
Irt
m
in
m
in
m
in
m
m
in
in
lrt
m
m
in
in
m
in —r-
oX
ur>
2
5
t
w
|
in in in in W in ID
CN
CN
& tfIIIX
**i” r> ro ro CN| ro
8 s tf
ro ro ro cn
i
s
IU
2
r-j fO ro <•■*4 cn
<sr •;
? 3>» 5 V“r
£ f  3
tO 3
*-4 t-l r>r *—4
ro
0
X
r 4 Oh r-w ro c>r<4 CO m r-4 «o
t * ^ 1
tt'u
n-
J.
l) 4 <rt 0 o-s
4- n4 »n<J o o o
4- In oo tr-
i*r Cr <JT or
\ ' h §  I  1  i  i l  ^
.. .. £
<r ~o <j u— — t»-
ij J". 4! c
cj U «j cj
f  ^  (r ^
«jr '«Jr tsr t*r
tc *■>
FOCUS-ed Mode Grid of C1RG1
FD
CU
SEP
 
GR
ID 
1
‘ ay
-30
•r I  
1 i y r
■1
1
4  - T
J(f tfC/i J.
- A10.10
ff.IL
 
r?J
r££
R 
1
vt
sx
tt
tm
tn
&>
Cl
CD
□:
..j 
(\
ft'ii«
'IL »►
o
3
JOa—l
1o
*>
5p 
J '
* 0
• 1
I jl/> 00
5jr
t *  *
! f e ' i
I  j l l i
- A10.11 -
A10.12 -
eg
iD
tr
^  1  <0 . L
i i .0-C—
*  'i
i  i
-a  •*
I i
.i
ir> ro  •*■
“8
8
p-
i-i
? * 1  i .  
** £  « 3 x
- A10.13 -
m m vo
ro
*
!
”<? J
 I I
M i *— i ! *
— U ]
 I
  _s
■te. * r v, y-3 *•
t ftQ
c
O f.
■C
ts
<3-
1 *•S> -C- q3 -j -v . n  _  rf
1 1- f  I  ^ ? 
1 - 1 1 1 - 3G* X
- A1U.14 ~
nu
iu
uu
ra
cc
£:c
L's
«jtll
- aio.15 -
ft
m —« cw to
ui o
■f I s I
- Aioa6 -
MI
' 
NU
rK
F:
 7
 
ux
nu
tu
m
i
U
a:
. . i
(•
CD
fisI f 
J .  Ttr.
i’l
ro rr
<
- A10.17 -
iu
uu
ti
iu
n
;5
ro
CM
iD
QC
c:
O'
$
&
ft X & ^
r--.-H.IT)
s< 2*• r^rTu-j
-I i >
■ *  i— <* I
no J•5 J
_ J  *■*. •*«* iu *» Ui I?
S 5
• .0 
■V> *
I I  a
5 o
|-tir j-
s ~3 o
<s 9
X  2
AlO.18 -
m
m
:
 i
: 
u
r
n
fi  tf5
i i
1 uQ*CU§2
ro
I *
4 f
— 2 a— f® *
fe .
Zx$
- h tu
OJ
c:.-
cr
w-<•jf±
>—i
3
j
Vi
i
I I  ? !2C _j —l o*
~ A10.19 -
im
is
iu
mu
V)
3
if?
S3
&
Uw
...J
t
Ci';: £
.i
.0
■it-
• .4
y 3
S'
13
un
CJ
ro **.cn
00
I
J(D
-I « J
.1 I
^ I  E
i |  S
“  1 f ‘J
m  - r
1 1  i
M l  
0 1 ?5
I “ — x 5 1
.5 5r ---*- 3 8t#
S 35-V-,* - Ul y
S
-A.10.20 -
tt 
vT^
r. i**» 
.»r
oh
c;
cr:
ro u'j r-4 va ^  r .^
YZ ■ &J &  85 £
«4J
1
t *
X b
.1 3
■I
ci
2
-J
uo in in
in U“> U“1
in -«**
in - ro
Tv1 ro
ro ro N
ra cw -
cn ra -
r«r —
in c*si *o
f* i 1 -I si] J
1 1  \
tz- \A
ro  c j ro
h n n
^  ro  ro
J
f
1
•5 
o
a ifl
i *
r t
3
jt r  ^
. i  IT  i 
i f .
I
S ’S
2 *e£ 3 «%
1
T O
)
~ A10.21.-
n
m
u
m
u
r
t
si M3an< ilia
•s
M
.! i  ( J , 
$  i  M  ii 1 x| i
.UO ui UO uo UO U”» U1 uo UO UO UO uo
V -<■ -*r M* uo in U1 U"J uo UO UO ut ir> UO
''O' to ro ro ro uo -4- UO UO UO UO U*J UO UO
10*4 c m CM Csl CM CM fO to ro CM ro •4* •4- ro
I CM C4 c m c m c m ro cm tN *4"' ro ro to to ro CM
1’4 ro c m •H «r*H •H rj r4 cm CM CM ro -
. ^ ♦H . c m - - *-4 C~4 ro CM CM C-4 *-« ro
I CM » "4 - - •-4 >4 **■4 «-4 «4 ■>■4
j - rH CM c m CM V '• t-1 - t-4 » ~4 fH
:ro Z3 o  *—• CO UO r^. to C4 O'
*o C 4 UO«H W-
*
3
1 <* 3“
* n  ?
- e 3 A(I w .
--- ^ 5 t
— *l
i
e
5r 5
^ St;
* 2 ' *.
o
— —  (A
r -s
f
-1
*  4
I -3 
1 *
-rr>
J
1 1 .1 
* ^ \ 4 
t  H  ji I *  
y f - I !■ j S ■ J i ji~jj -< ^  2^ c5* oo c2
•G .i -U0 -y
■f— *
1 1
*
I
J
V> fj -H o $ £> «$ \n >O O O  Jj >_i ^ 0 O O oU> to U tr H M (U *° nl l/> tU o
tJ tJ c"o o O
fr J*
cr o~ cr tsr cd~ trr ctr <3“ <ir car ttr csr* cir «Jr cir
FQCUS-ed Mode Grid of C1RG2
- A10.21a -
Appendix 11. Written Exercise, Q2: Categories and Interpretation of
Responses
A11(a)« WE, Q2: Categories of Response 
A11(b)» WE« Q2: Interpretation of Responses
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A1 ] (a) Mb, Q2: Categories oi Response
Q2. Why do you think 1 have asked you to answer Ql?
I have included this question in all three versions of the CE 
without altering its wording.
My purpose for this question was to elicit students' perceptions of 
my intervention. 1 was particularly interested to find out whether 
they accepted my introductory declaration that my investigation was 
exploratory and 'non-normative'. In an attempt to avoid 
'tantologous' responses (responses in which students 
straightforwardly repeated or paraphrased my declared intention to 
'find out what people in schools think') I stressed, in my verbal 
introduction to the question, that I wishes students to speculate as 
to why I was interested to explore their personal views on this 
subject, that I had not intentionally told them my tentative views 
on this matter and that, again, there were 'no right or wrong 
answers’.
I present a summary of the categories of responses to WEI, Q2 that 1 
created in the table below:
- All.l -
No Category of Response Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Freq
1 Talltologous 1,3,5,9 
10,13,14 
15,17,18 
23,26
2,3,9,11
13,14,15
16
6,7,8,17 27
2 Knowledge Test/ 
Measurement
7,21 2,11,22 4,8,10,
12
1,2,3,4,5
9,10,12,
13,15
19
3 Career Guidance 1,2,11 4,8,11,
16,18
5,7 16 11
4 Intelligence Test
•i
3,9,10,
16,17,18
10,11 8
5 Investigation of 
Cognition
7,20 10,12,21
23
U 7
6 Justification for 
School-Science
6,12,13
19
4
7 Raise Awareness 
Importance of Science
6,7 14 3
8 Contribution to 
Research
4,8 1 3
9
10
No Response 
Uncategorized Data 20
6 1
1
Table: Showing Categories of Response of WE,Q2
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1 present a rationale for each of these categories together with 
examples of responses, below:
Categories of Response:
Category 1: Tautologous (n ~ 27)
Responses in which pupils paraphrased my previous declared 
intentions Several pupils (7) perceived Q1 to be an ’opinion 
survey* and some of these even conjecturered that I was keen to 
'know the most popular answer* or 'make comparisons between 
schools'. None, however speculated as to why I might wish to do 
such things.
e.g. Class 1, r.22 We have been asked to do this because it is a
research and what we think what jobs are 
scientific etc.
e.g. Class 3, r.9 Because you want to find out what our opinions
are.
Category 2: Knowledge Test/Measurement (n - 17)
Responses in which a normative orientation was implied i.e. 
responses would, in some way, be judged against 'absolute* 
knowledge. These responses characteristically took one of two 
forms: (1) 'Test* (i.e. pass/fail), (2) Assessment.
Delineating these answers from the 'Tantalogous' category was often 
a subtle ans equivocal task. 1 was guided by my experience from 
LOs, and Sis and Ils and the use of expressions such as 'how much' 
'to see whether we knew the difference'.
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e.g. Class 3, r.21 You have asked us this because you want to know
how much we know about science and non-science.
e.g. Class 3, r.4 I think you have asked us that Q because to see
if we are right or rowng if they are scientific 
etc.
Category 3: Career Guidance (n = 10)
Responses in which pupils perceived my intention to be didactic with 
specific reference to vocational guidance.
e.g. Class 2, r.19 Because if we wanted a scientific job it would
show us which job we should choose, should not 
choose, and could choose.
e.g. Class 3, r,5 To try and see what you need for certain jobs.
Category 4: Intelligence Test (n - 9 )
Responses in which the pupil perceived the CE Q1 to be an 
intelligence test or assessment. Reference was not usually made to 
the subject matter.
e.g. Class 1, r.10 I think he asked us to do that because he wants
to put all our answers in a computer and see how 
intelligent we are. I also think it is a waste 
of paper.
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e.g. Class 2, r.ll Because you wanted to find out if we were
capable fo figuring out which kind of jobs are 
scientific and to show us what kind of jobs we 
need science in.
Category 5: Investigation of Cognition
Responses in which pupils perceived my intention to be to 
investigate pupils thought processes. In these responses reference 
was not made to subject matter.
e.g. Class 2, r,21 I think that you asked us to do this so that you
know how quickly (or slowly) we think and if we 
know how to classify things into different 
columns.
e.g. Class 4, r.ll I think he’s asked us to answer No. 1 to see how
our brain and thoughts work and to compare with 
other schools or classes.
Category 6: Justification for School-Science (n = 4)
Responses in which pupils perveived my intention to be didactic, 
viz. a justification for science in the school curriculum. Reasons 
were not elaborated in these responses but I suspect they constitute 
a sub-set of the ’Career Guidance’ category.
e.g. Class 1: r.6 Telling us the reasons we do science at school.
How many jobs need science qualifications.
e.g. Class 1, r.19 To tell us the reason why we do science at
school.
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Category 7: Raise Awareness of Importance, of Science (n ~ 3)
Responses in which the pupils perceived my intention to be didactic 
viz. enlightenment as to the importance and ubiquity of science.
e.g. Class 2, r.6 To be able to realize that a lot of jobs have
scientific connections.
e.g. Clas 4, r.14 To found out if we know how much science is
really involved in jobs today, even common jobs.
Category 8: Contribution to Regarch (n = 3)
Responses in which pupils perceived my intention to be that of 
eliciting their help to answer Q1 since I had failed to answer it 
myself. No reasons were advanced as to why I should want to answer 
the question.
e.g. Class 1, r.8 You asked us that question so that you could
find out what are scientific jobs there are.
e.g. Class 3, r.l You have asked question 1 because you dont no
the answer and you are putting the question 
among the population to maybe find the answer.
Category 9: No Response
Category 10: Uncategorized Data (n = 1)
This pupil perceived the question to have been an exercise in 
problem-solving, a heuristic, worthwhile for its own sake. Specific 
reference to the subject matter was not made.
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e.g. Class 2, r.20 To be able to put things into sets, groups etc,
to get your minds working.
All (b) VIE, Q2: Interpretation of Responses
WE Q2* 'Why do you think that I have asked you to 
answer Q1? *
Cat. Wo. Category of Response Freq of Resp
1 TavtOlogous 27
2 Knowledge Test/ Measurement 19
3 Career Guidance 11
4 Intelligence Test 9
5 Investigation of Cognition 7
6 Justification of School Science 4
7 Raise Awareness of Importance of 
Science
3
8 Contribution to Research 3
(9) No Response 1
(10) Uncategorized Date 1
Table: Showing Categories of Responses for WE, Q2
In their WE responses to Q2, no student considered Q1 to constitute 
an investigation of their views on the nature (character) of the 
conduct of science. In light of the inferences I have made with 
respect to other sources oi data, described both in this chapter and 
elsewhere, I suggest that this may be because many students 
considered this subject to be 'commonsensef and os unlikely to be 
the subject of my inquiry.
The largest single category of response that I created consisted of 
’tautologous1 responses (n = 27). I defined such responses in the 
following way:
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'Responses in which students paraphrased my previously declared 
research intentions'•
e.g. Class 1, r.22 'We have been asked to do this because it is a
research and what we think what jobs are 
scientific etc'.
This type of response occurred despite my attempts to avoid it 
through my verbal presentation of Q2 (cf. p.(4)-(5), above), and 
points, 1 believe, to a drawback to the method, viz., reduced 
opportunity for negotiation of purpose and for the development of 
mutual trust between the researcher and collaboratee (but cf. my 
remarks on my continuation of the investigation of this item in FIs, 
p. ( )-( )> below).
Within the remainder ot responses I discern two major clusters of 
categories of repsonse, viz. 'normative* and 'didactic':
(1) 'Normative' Responses (n = 38)
I judged all students in this category cluster, or 'superordinate' 
category, to view my intervention as an assessment of some kind. 1 
comprise this superordinate category of normative responses of two 
categories:
“ Category 2: 'Knowledge Test/Measurement' (n *= 19).
I defined such responses in the following way:
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'Responses in which the collaboratee implied a "normative 
orientation" would be adopted by the researcher, i.e., their 
responses to Q1 would, in some way, be judged against an "absolute" 
standard.1
Responses in this category themselves took one of two forms:
(a) 'Test' (i.e. pass/fail) (n = 9)
e.g. Class 3, r.4 ’I thick [sic.] you have asked us this Q becuase
to see if we are right or rowng [sic.] if they 
are scientific etc.'
(b) 'Measurement' (n = 8)
I found delineating responses from those which I categorized as 
'Tautologous' often to be a subtle and equivocal task. I was, 
however, guided by my experience from other aspects of my 
investigation (responses to other WE items, FIs, LOs etc) and the 
use such students made of expressions like 'how much’ and 'to see 
whether we knew the difference'.
e.g. Class 1, r.21 'You have asked us this because you wants [sic.]
to know how much we know about science and 
non-science.'
- Category 4: 'Intelligence Test' (n = 9)
I defined such responses thus:
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’Responses in which the student perceived Q1 to be an intelligence 
test or assessment. Specific reference to a subject matter was not 
made to a subject matter*.
e.g. Class 1, r.10 'I think he asked us to do that because he wants
to put all our answers in a computer and see how 
intelligent we are. I also think it is a waste 
of paper.'
(2) 'Didactic1 Responses (n = 18)
I judged all students in this superorindate category to perceive my 
intentions to be didactic in some way. I comprise this 
superordinate category of 3 categories:
- Category 3: 'Career Guidance' (n - 11)
My criterial definition for these responses was:
'Responses in which students perceived my intention to be didactic, 
with special reference to vocational guidance'.
e.g. Class 2, r.19 'Because if we wanted a scientific job it would
show us which job we should choose, should not 
choose and could choose.'
- Category 6: 'Justification for School-Science* (n = 4)
This category I defined in the following way:
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'Responses in which students perceived my intention to be didactic 
in the sense of justification for science in the school curriculum. 
Where reasons were given these appealed to notions similar to other 
categories, e.g. vocational guidance.'
e.g. Class 1, r.6 'Telling us the reason we do science at school
[i.e.?] How many jobs need science
qualifications.'
- Category 7: 'Raise Awareness of Importance of Science' (n - 3)
I admitted responses to this category according to the following 
criterial definition:
'Responses in which students perceived my intention to be didactic 
with special reference to raising awareness of the general 
importance of science to occupational life'.
e.g. Class 4, r.14 'To find out if we know how much science is
really involved in jobs today, even common 
jobs.'
Together the 'Normative' and 'Didactic' superordinate categories 
account for almost 70% of the responses and represent, in part, a 
rejection by the students of my earlier claimed 'exploratory' 
reearch intentions. Whilst most pupils appeared co-operative and 
relaxed during the CE, they still appeared to case me in the role of 
a teacher - at least, in this early stage of the CE. Indeed, one 
pupil even speculated this in his answer to Q2:
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Class 4, r.13 *1 think we had to answer Q1 because, you trying
to find out if we know what jobs involve science 
and what jobs dont. Perhaps you're a science 
teacher?...'
I was either assessing them for something or else teaching them 
something.
I conjecture that the high proportion of normative responses 
suggests that pupils are not used to having their own opinions 
regarded as valid in their own right and may disbelieve it when it 
is claimed. Some pupils, however, responded favourably to what was 
apparently a novel or unusual experience for them. This was 
particulary clear in some FIs. For example, one 14 year old pupil 
asserted:
FI.l (Marina)
278 M. ( ) what I mean is that at last someone decided
they want to find out what everyone else thinks 
instead of what they think... I was pleased 
about that.
In conjunction with her later comments, given below, I to this to 
embody an informally expressed recognition that eudcational research 
conducted within an experimental paradigm tend to be 
'conservative1. It is conservative through, being primarily an 
analytic activity. An important side effect of this sort of 
approach is that there is no chance of negotiation between 
researcher and "subject’* in either the initial formulation of the 
premises upon which the research is based or their later
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modification. Once 1 has convinced Marina in the interview that my
research was indeed exploratory she appeared to welcome her
increased responsibility. (In her WE response to Q2, Marina had 
construed the exercise as an intelligence assessment - her CE 
response is given as the example on p.9 above: "r.10").
In the discussion which followed directly from her comment above, 
Maria went on to criticize the neglect of individuals that often 
occurs through the use of quantitative methods by teachers and 
researchers.
283 I. (...) do you think that perhaps other people in
the class feel that teachers and researchers and 
government and so on dont ask children enough 
what they want then?
289 M. (•••) they.just take the average they dont go to
one extreme or the other they just take the
average I mean what about the other people who
arnt in the average category?...
292 1. so.... do you think that education does not take
account of the individual enough?
M. Yeah
I. ... people who are outside the average are
perhaps not given enough attention?
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296 M. Yeah... as the averege well thats most people
but there are people who. I men theyre still 
people and theyre not taken enough notice of...
I mean I know its difficult for them to do
things like that but I think you should take 
more notice of people outside the average.
Marina’s allusion to difficulties, at 296, suggests that her 
advocacy of qualitative research methods was not altogether naive.
In summary, I believe that the students responses to Q2 suggest that 
most regarded the exercise as ’normative-didactic'. I believe this 
points to aspects of both the method of investigation (i.e. the WE) 
and the present education system which 1 regard as undesirable.
In connection with my investigation of students’ personal meanings 
of a 'scientific job', 1 believe that the responses to Q2 give
indirect support for the inferences I made in the grid
investigation.
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Appendix 12. Written Exercise, Q3s Categories and Interpretation of
Responses
A12(a). WE, Q3: Categories of Response 
A12(b). WE« 03; Interpretation of Respomses
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Q3 What is yor most usual reason Lor putting a job 
scientific column?
in the
No. Category of Response Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Freq
1 Requires Qualifications/ 
Special Skills
6,18 1,3,4,5,7 
8,9,11,14 
15,16
2,6,12,13 17
2 Tautologous 5,7,11,14 1,5,7,8, 
15,16,17 11
3 Mere use of Sophisticated 
Lab. Equip.
3,9,15,20 6 9,10,11 8
4 Mere use of Heat etc. 10,19,23,
24
3,14,15 7
5 Is Complex or Difficult 3,6,12,18 16 1 6
6 Requires Mental Activity 2,20,21,
22
12 9 6
7 Related to School-Science 4,12,16,
19,21,24 6
8 No Response 17 3 2
9 Uncategorised Data 1,8,13 2,10 4 6
Table: Showing Categories of Response for WE , Q3 
Alt. (b): WE, Q2: Interpretation of Responses 
General Comments
1. Response categories are derived from only WEJL-4 (£ = 57) due 
to the omission of this item from WE.i..
2. Despite my verbal instructions, some pupils appeared to 
interpret "most usual reason" as 'justify your best example1.
1 believe such responses are equally instructive with regard to 
my research interest.
- A12.1 -
Categories of Response
Category 1: Requires Qualifications/Special Skills (n = 17)
Responses in which the possession of qualifications was the 
preeminent criterion. Some pupils specified 'qualifications in 
science1, others just 'qualifications' or 'more qualifications. 
Qualifications were often linked to the perceived "complexity" of 
the job or the "intelligence" required to do it. In this category I 
also included responses in which "special skills" were required but 
in which their nature was not elaborated.
e.g. Class 2, r.18 The most usual reasons for deciding why a job
is scientific rather than non-scientific is 
most of the scientific jobs need people with 
greater qualifications as the job seems more 
complicated.
e.g. Class 3, r.1 Because you have to have the qualifications
to have a scientific job so you could be 
classed as a scientist.
e.g. Class 4, r.2 The reason I put those jobs in the first
[= 'scientific'] column because you need 
science grades to get that sort of job.
Category 2: Tautologous (n = 11)
Responses in which a 'true definition' justification was advanced: 
e.g. Class 2, r.5 Wlierev or not science is yoused to do the job.
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e.g. Class 4, r.5 My most usual reason for putting a job in the
scientific column was because 1 though that 
the job was related to science in some ways.
Category 3: Mere Use of Sophisticated and/or Lab. Equipment (n = 8) 
Responses in whih the mere use of equipment was a criterion for 
classifying a job as 'scientific*. Responses in this category 
referred to sophisticated or complicated equipment (e.g. "high 
technology") or equipment which I judged to be normally - and 
stereotypically - associated with the conduct of science (e.g. 
"microscopes", "computers"). These responses discussed neither the 
way in which such equipment was used nor why it was required: mere 
involvement or use of it was enough.
e.g.Class 2, r.15 1 think the most usual reason for a scientifc
job is in my opinion is whether or not the job 
involves high technology or using scientific 
implements.
e.g. Class 4, r.ll My most usual reason was to think of first,
computers and technical equipment and think'of 
which jobs go with them.
Category 4: Mere Use of Heat, Light, Sound, Electricity, Chemicals 
or Organic-Tissue (n = 7)
Responses in which the mere use of materials or physical properties 
normally associated with school-science was the preeminent criterion 
for scientificness. In these responses little or no attempt was 
made to elaborate the way in which they were used.
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e.g. Class 2, r.10 My usual reason is when chemistry, gases or
electricity or biology are involved.
e.g. Class 3, r.15 My usual reason is because it deals with
electronics or needs special skills to do the 
job wich involves science.
Category 5: Complex or Difficult (n = 6)
Responses in whcih scientific jobs were perceived to be complicated 
and/or difficult. This attribute was usually given within a 
compound answer. 1 suspect that 'complex', 'difficult' and 
'requires mental activity' are used synonymously by most of these 
pupils. This category may therefore best be considered with 
category 6: 'Requires Mental Activity' (below). As with category 6, 
the opposite perceived characteristics (e.g. 'simple') were 
sometimes used by the pupil to charcterize non-scientific jobs. The 
majority did not however, and in discussing these responses 
(sections 7.5.3. and 7.5.4). I had to make some assumptions as to 
these pupils' opposite poles. I believe that the potential dangers 
of such a practice were offset by triangulating a variety of sources 
of data.
e.g. Class 2, r.6 1 usually think of a scientific job as one
needing more qualifications. The job always 
seem more complicated and usually the people 
in the scientific field become experts, like 
professors.
e.g. Class 4, r.1 Science teacher, because you have to know all
about science and its very complicated.
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Category 6: Requires Mental Activity (n =6)
Responses in which scientificness was ascribed on the basis of the 
perceived amount and/or quality of mental activity entailed by the 
job. Little or no attempt was mae to elaborate the nature of the 
mental activity stated. My general Impression was that 'thinking', 
'brainwork', etc, were used as synonyms for 'intelligence'.
e.g. Class 2, r.22 Scientific jobs need more brainwork than
non-scientific jobs.
e.g. Class 3, r.12 Because they all envolve brains and accurate
measurement and all of that sort of thing.
Category 7: Relatejto School-Science (n =6)
Responses in which scientificness was ascribed on the basis of a 
perceived similarity between, on the one hand, the job title and the 
activities perceived to be entailed by it, and, on the other hand, 
the same with respect to school-science subjects.
e.g. Class 2, r.4 If the job consists of a scientific subject
that you know or about or have covered in a 
science lesson you will think that it is 
either a completely or partially scientific 
job.
e.g. Class 2, r.12 My reason for classifying the jobs the way I
did was to see if we had done something 
similar in science lessons and what the job 
entails. Non scientific jobs are usually 
simple jobs or crafts.
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Category 8: No Response (n = 2)
Category 9: Uncategorized Data (n = 6)
In 3 of these responses (R) pupils proposed criteria which, taken at 
face value, would seem incidental or irrelevant from the standpoint 
of any formal philosophy of science I have yet encountered.
Rf 'Scientific = dependent upon practitioner appearance. Image 
mediated by mass-media
Class 2, r.l Newspapers, television and the media
influences us. When you hear the term 
physicist used. You immediately think of a 
scientist, with a white coat and glasses.
Where if you hear the term 'milkman' you think 
of a man in uniform delivering milk. A 
rubbish collector you expect to see a grubby 
man with a dustbin on his back.
R2 'Scientific' = extraordinary activity (see 3 below)
Class 2, r.8 It depends on doing things which aren't part
of everyday life.
R3 'Scientific' - a linguistic convention derived from similarities 
between ending of titles
Class 2, r.13 Most scientific jobs have a ending that is
usually the same whereas norma] jobs mostly 
sound different.
- A12.6 -
2 pupils claimed that scientific jobs were important:
e.g. Class 3, r.lO My usual one is a nurse. Because it is
important.
The remaining pupil expressed a 'mixed bag' of largely tantalogous 
descriptions:
Class 4, r.4 Science teacher teaches us biology and
chemistry physics they are scientific computer 
programmer has to know the machine operation 
and his numbers and things that are on the 
computer. Astronaut knows about space: we 
learn astrology in science lessons.
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Appendix 13. Written Exercise, 04: Categories and Interpretation of
Responses
A13(a). WE. 04: Categories of Response 
A13(b). WE. Q4: Interpretation of Responses
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A13 (a) WE, Q4: Categories of Response
Q4. Have you found it useful to answer Ql?
If 'yes1, why?
If ’no’, why?
I only included this question in the final version of the CE (n = 
33).
My purpose for this question was to find out what, if anything, the 
students perceived themselves to have learnt from having answered 
Ql. I was particularly interested to find out if students 
considered that answering Ql had helped them to clarify or to 
develop their thoughts concerning the conduct of science.
My reasons for including this item are intimately related to both my 
meta-methodological conviction (discussed in Ch. 5) that any 
investigation of a person’s ideational world necessarily constitutes 
an intervention of some sort and to my complementary pedagogical 
conviction that teaching and learning should be construed as 
collaborative research. This item, then, was included to help 
appraise the pedagogic utility of students answering Ql.
I verbally introduced this question by saying something similar to 
the following:
"I am very grateful to you for answering these questions but do 
you, personally feel that you benefitted in any way by 
answering Ql? If you feel that it was personally useful try ot 
say why. On the other had, you may have found it a waste of
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time answering Ql. If that was the case, feel free to say so 
and, if you can, also say why."
I grouped response categories under superordinate categories of 
either 'yes' (n = 12) or ’no' (n =20). There were no "compound" 
answers given to this item.
Table: Showing WE, Q4: Categories of Responses, the Frequency of 
Responses within them and their Distribution between WE 
Administrations
Category of Reponse Class 3 Class 4 Freq
"Yes"
Career Guidance 
Problem Solving 
Helps Researcher
3,5,14
6
4,15
4,5,15
10,11,14
6
4 12 
2
"No"
Common Sense 
Irrelevant 
Too Difficult
9,13
7,8,12,16
1,2,10
1,2,6,7,9,12
8,13,16,17
8
8 20 
3
Uncategorized Data 3 1
No Response 11 1
Categories of Response
A. "Yes"
Category 1: [Yes] Career Guidance (n =6)
Responses in which the pupil claimed that his experience of having 
answered Ql would inform his choice of job when he left school. I 
feel it is significant that no pupil claimed that answering Ql had 
helped raise his awareness of his views on the nature of science.
My impression, drawn from all sources of data in this study, is that 
each of these pupils assumed his conception of science to be the 
commonsense one. Working from that premise they them perceived the 
benefit of the exercise to have been autodidactic - it had 
facilitated raising their self-awareness of the scientific status of 
different jobs.
e.g. Class 3, r.3 Yes, because it helps you to see what certain
jobs are.
e.g. Class 4, r.4 I have found it useful because it can help me
decide what job I would like to have.
Category 2: [Yesl Problem-Solving (n = 4)
Responses in which pupils recognized that although in everyday life 
they may have unproblematically ascribed the labels ’scientific1 
etc, the degree of self-consciousness brought to this practice by 
the question made them question the adequacy of their demarcation 
criteria (conscious or unconscious). The benefit which these pupils 
thought they had gained is difficult to ascertain. I feel that most 
regarded it as an exercise in problem-solving, the benefits of which 
were independent of any subject such as 'the nature of scientific 
activity1.
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e.g. Class 3, r.6 It is useful to answer Ql because it is not as
easy as it sounds and makes you think.
e.g. Class 4, r.ll I have found it useful because when you look
at the question it looks easy but when you try 
to do it, it takes a lot more thinking. I 
think it must be useful for the examiner. 
[Examinations? Researcher?].
Category 3: [Yes] Helps Researcher (n = 2)
Responses in which the pupil saw their personal benefit from having
answered Ql purely in terms of having helped me (i.e. the
researcher).
Class 3, r.4 Yes because it helps you to see that we think
abouth the centrall thing.
Class 3, r.15 Yes, because it helps you to see what we think
about certain jobs.
B. "No"
Category 4: [No] Common-Sense (n = 8)
Responses in which the nature of science was assumed to be
commonsense and so the exercise was not perceived to be personally
useful. Several of these pupils added that the exercise was boring 
because of this. Responses in this, the largest of CE Q4 
categories, demonstrate the prevalence of the assumptions that the 
nature of science is not an issue. I believe that this assumption 
underlies responses in category 1 (]Yes] Career Guidance), above, 
and category 5 ([No] Irrelevant), below.
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e.g. Class 3, r.9 No, because I havent found anything out that I
didnt already know.
e.g. Class 4, r.12 Not really! I dont think that setting out jobs
on a table like that is any good. If the 
question was to find out if we knew what jobs 
involve science - well most people have a good 
idea anyway!!
Category 5: fNo] Irrelevant (n = 8)
Responses in which pupils caimed not to have derived any benefit 
from having answered Ql because it was irrelevant. I suspect that 
since the choice of occupations and the number of examples was left 
entirely to the individual pupil, each pupil in this category was 
able to draw unproblematically from his personal history and common 
lore. The perceived absence of any difficulty perhaps made the 
exercise seem futile.
No I think there's no point in this.
No I havent found it useful to answer question 
Ql cos it's not gonna help me for anything.
to view the exercise as a failed attempt at
No because you dont really need to know if a 
job scientific or not to applie for it.
e.g. Class 3, r.7 
e.g. Class 4, r.8
One pupil appeared 
career guidance:
Class 3, r.12
Category 6: [ No] Too Difficult (n = 3)
Responses in which pupils perceived Ql to be too difficult for them 
to gain any personal benefit from attempting to answer it. In my 
verbal introduction of the DCE to Class 3 I have claimed that 'some 
of the questions in the exercise that you are about to do have 
baffled philosophers and scientists for hundreds of years and they 
still disagree amongst themselves today.' I said this in an attempt 
to add further credibility to my other expressed, and genuinely 
felt, claims as to the non-normative, exploratory nature of the 
exercise. My additional remark to this class clearly 'backfired' 
with Class 3 r.l (below) and possibly with the others in this 
category. Pupils appear to be suspicious to the point of disbelief 
when a relativist approach is adopted. I see this as an indictment 
of our education system.
e.g. Class 3, r.l No because if you have intelligent people
working onthe question I cant see how I can 
help!
e.g. Class 3, r.10 No because it is hard to think what to put in
the scientific colm and even hard to put.
Category 7: [No] Uncategorized Date (n = 1)
This pupil claimed that answering Ql had not been personally useful 
but he failed to elaborate his answer in a way in which I could draw 
conclusions.
Class 4, r.3 No, because you might not what
Category 8: No Response (n = 1)
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A13 (b): WE, Q4: Interpretation of Responses
'Have you found*it useful to answer Ql?
If yes, why? If no, Why?'
The two most frequent types of answers in which pupils claimed not
to have derived any personal benefit from having answered WE Ql
apparently because it was either 'commonsense' or 'irrelevant':
Q4; Category (c)4: fNo] Commonsense
e.g. Class 4, r.12 Not Really!, I dont think that setting out
jobs on a table like that is any good. If the 
question was to find out if we knew what jobs 
involve science - well most people already 
have a good idea anyway!!
Q4; (c)5: [No] Irrelevant
e.g. Class 4, r.8 No I havent found it useful to answer question
Ql cos its not gonna help me for anything.
Amongst the minority that did claim benefit, the most frequent type
of benefit claimed was seen in terms of vocational guidance:
Q4; (c)l: [Yes] Career Guidance
e.g. Class 4, r.4 I have found it useful because it can help me
decide what job I would like to have.
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My impression, corroborated my many sources of data in this study, 
is that each of these pupils assumed his conception of ’scientific' 
to be the commonsense one. Working from that premise they then 
perceived the benefit of hte exercise to have been auto-didactic 
only in the sense that it had raised their self-awareness of hte 
presence or absence of science in different jobs.
The 'Career Guidance' category of response also featured prominently 
in answers to CE Q2. However, the most frequent non-tantalogical 
type of answer to Q2 suggested that pupils regarded Ql as some kind 
of assessment of their personal knowledge:
Q2; (c) 2: Knowledge Test/Measurement
e.g. Class 3, r.4 1 thick you have asked us this Q becuase to
see if we are rightr or rowng if they are 
scientific etc.
I suggest that this category of response indicates that pupils 
receive the meaning of 'scientific to be, in some way, know for 
sure.
All the categories of resonse I have cited so far sidestep a 
consideration of the maning of 'scientific'. I conjecture that this 
is because pupils did not regard the meaning of 'scientific' to be 
an issue. Each pupil appeared to assume that he not only personally 
understood the meaning of the term but also that his personal 
meaning matched the 'true' and accepted meaning. Consequently, for 
most pupils answering Ql was a simple exercise in cataloging 
personal benefits, if any, had to come from elsewhere
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(e.g. vocational guidance). In Q4, only 3 of the 33 pupils who 
answered the question claimed that they had not derived any personal 
benefit from having answered WE, Ql because it was "Too Difficult" 
(Q4, c. 6).
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Appendix Alphabetical List of Occupations depicted within an 
attempted Interview-about-Instances Card Deck for Scientific Occupationx
- A14-0 -
1 Accountant
2 Archeologist
3 Artist
4 Biologist
5 Biology teacher
6 Chemist
7 Chemistry teacher
8 Computer Operator
9 Computer Programmer
10 Doctor
11 Geologist
12 Historian
13 Laboratory Technician
14 Librarian
15 Machine Operator
16 Mathematician
17 Nurse
18 Ornithologist
19 Physicist
20 Physics Teacher
21 Pilot
22 Psychiatrist
23 Train Driver
24 Typist
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Appendix 15. WE, Q7: Categories of Response
WE Q7: 'Why do you thing it is scientific?1
No Category of Response Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Freq
1 Mere use of/Involvement 
with Physical Phenomena
6,14,20
21
15 9 
20,21
6,14,16 6,8,12,
13
16
2 Related to School-Science 3,4,6,8'
12,17,
19
4,6,16
18,24
7,13 14
3 Involved Principle 15 8,10,11
12,13 2,10 10,17 10
4 Mere use of Equip. 
Invented by Sc.ts
7,13,20
22
3,A 6
5 Complex/Inexpicable 7 1,4,5,11
15
6
6 Tantologous 1,7 1,8 14,15 6
7 Required Cognitive 
Skills
1,2,5 2 3 5
8 Required Personal 
Qualities
10 15 3,15 4
9 Involved Writing 8,18 2
10 No Response 17 2,3 3
11 Uncategorized Data 22,23 5,9,11
12,13 7
Table: Showing WE, Q7 Categories of Response, the Frequency of
Responses within them and their Distribution between WE 
Administrations
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Categories of Response
Category It Mere Use of/Involvement with Physical Phenomena (n * 16) 
Responses in which unelaborated involvement with physical 
properties, such as heat, light, sound, electricity chemicals, or 
organic tissue was the criterion by whch scientificness was ascribed 
to the incident* In these responses little or no attempt was made 
to elaborate the way in which they are used.
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Class 3, r.14
Category 2: Related to School-Science (n c 14)
Responses in which a claim was made that the scientific activity had 
either been conducted in a school science lesson or else bore a 
resemblance to a school science activity. It is likely that the 
frequency of responses in this category is slightly inflated due to 
my wording in the first version of WE.l: I did not specify that the 
scientific incident must have occurred outside school.
I regard these responses as a form of tantalogous response (see 
Category 5, below).
It must, however, also be noted that the activities described 
typically involved the "mere" use of physical properties or organic 
tissue as per category 1, above.
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Category 3: Involves Principle (n = 10)
Responses in which the scientific activity used or demonstrate a 
principle.
Three pupils described a physical law or effect such as might have 
been encountered in school-science e.g. Class 2, r.10 (see below). 
Another pupil, Class 2, r.ll (see below), drew a person falling from 
a tree and advanced the following common-lore principle by way of 
justification "Because I was demonstrating that what comes up must 
come down".
Two respondents justified the scientificness of their incidents by 
claiming that it showed how something worked e.g. Class 2, r.8 (see 
below). 2 more pupils identified finding out about something as 
their criterion.
One pupil claimed the principle of 'survival' to be his criterion,
4
another 'invention'.
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n n u T
ol' «*v
• ' •if" WPJ*
•(***»
• ^ -..i
v*: .w
• • TC'W '-r^ oy*.
...
f.
W , H ;
2 ■
I 4H*
V- . ..
it.
1 n.
■ •’£?• *r-* *
Jl'--* 1
il "fchdt U*njV" >
r  * i  • ’.
•*\?« • vr-.» • ' .• r"
... . ,Vf.
. J J-x /
•• i
. i
■r
•* *'x'V&£k
v y& m
<c./2‘Jn&
* ’ '*xt}\ £
<£v%‘3&2S
; I
CE.2» r#6
Gcfck^ a. Vttoujs 
fcacnu-ie \
i-uVtJc UjOA 
^  ft OJftd
cfc UtM-bflrt
Class 2, r.8
~ A15.6 -
Category A: Mere Use of Equipment Invented by Scientists (n c 6)
Incidents in which the demarcation criterion was that the equipment 
used had itself been invented or used by scientists. I included 
responses in which the criterion was use of a specific piece of 
apparatus without reference to science or scientists but in which 
the apparatus concerned was of the sort which I judged to be 
available in a school-science lab. (e.g. a microscope, see Class 2, 
r.14, below).
■mill . j" .    — . '. ...
• °1*1* r-,J
Class 1, r.13
CC.t.tHr
Class 1, r.22
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Category 5: Complicated/Inexplicable (n » 6)
Responses in which the criterion appeared to be activities which the 
pupil found complicated or difficult. I also included responses 
where I judged tha the pupil had included an incident because it was 
inexplicable for him e.g. Class 4, r. 15, below. Without exception 
the incidents cited by pupil responses in this category referred to 
physical events - affective issues were conspicuously absent.
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Class 4, r.ll
Class 4, r.15
Category 6: Tantalogous (N c 6)
Responses in which the incident was declared scientific by fiat. 
Most of these responses may be regarded as a sub-set within 
category 1 ('Mere use of/Involvement with Physical Phenomena',) 
since the incidents cited described the mere use of or involvement 
with heat, light etc. Within this category I also included 
responses in which an occuption e.g. meteorology was declared 
scientific without a rationale.
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Category 7: Required Cognitive Skills (n » 5)
Incidents which had required intelligence (e.g. "brains”) or mental 
operations (e.g. comparison, logic). Most of the incidents in which 
such cognitive skills were applied described involvement with heat, 
light etc.
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Category 8: Required Personal Qualities (n ■ A)
Incidents which required personal qualities such as endurance, 
patience or initiative. The incidents in which such qualities were 
applied all described involvement with heat, light etc.
* »--v
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Category 9; Involved Writing (n » 2)
Incidents in which the pupil was writing. Each pupil justified the 
scientificness of writing by reference to their perception that 
writing was the preeminent or sole activity within school-science 
lessons.
The responses within this category may be regarded as contributing a 
sub-category within category 2 ("Related to School-Science, see pp 
AO-41 above). This notwithstanding, it must be remembered that in 
the first version of WE I did not specify that the scientific 
activity had to have occurred outside school, (both responses in 
this category came from Class 1).
« »> •. . -r4'/ *
• *u *. •.s. i I ,
Class 1, r.9
Category 10: No Response (n g 3)
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Category 11; Uncategorized Data (n » 8)
Two pupils gave no incident but offered an "explanation".
Class 3, r. 11 Class 3, r.12
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I found these responses saddenning. Class 3, r. 11 offered no 
explanation except that he couldnt draw. Class 3, r.12 comment was 
written on a page full of a series of erased drawings of incidents 
which he had rejected.
A further five pupils described an incident (i.e. drawing and/or 
description) but were unable to explain why the incident was 
scientific. These incidents typically involved physical properties 
(i.e. as per category 1) or equivalent invented/used by scientists 
(i.e. as per category A). 1 felt, however, that my chain of
inference would be overstretched if 1 classified these responses
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under those categories unless 1 had supporting evidence from 
interviews with the individuals.
Finally, one pupil from the same WE class (i.e. Class 1) as those 
included in category 9 (“Involved Writing", above) and who shared 
the same science teacher, also perceived writing to be the dominant 
activity in her science lessons ("she just makes us copy from 
books"). However, the moral he drew from this perception was 
different from those of his class mates in his view writing was "not 
scientific" and os he "started talking". I was not able to find out 
whether this pupil regarded "talking" as a scientific activity. I 
take this illuminative incident as an indication that the advances 
in the practice of science-teaching since the 1960s have been more 
apparent than real - at least with respect to the class specified:
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Appendix 16. Written Exercise Q8, Q8(a) and Q8(b)t Categories of
Response and Interpretation of Responses
Al6(a). WE. Q8, Q8(a): Categories of Response
Al6(b)« WE. Q8, Q8(a); Interpretation of Responses
A16(c ). WE. Q8(b)s Categories of Response
Al6(d)« WE. Q8(b): Interpretation of Responses
A16 (a) K/E) Q8, 8(a): Categories of Response
No Category of Response Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Freq
1 Sophisticated I.2,4,5, 
6,7,8,9,
II,12,13 
14,15,18 
19,24
3,4,13
16,18,19
123,24
7,8,10,
14
3,5,12,
13,15
34
2 Naive 3,16,17,
22
1,2,6,7 
8,9,10, 
11 3
1,6,7,8 
9,10,11 
17
31
3 Sophisticated ? 12,15,21 1,3,15,
16
4,14 9
4 No Response 10,20 5,17,22 2 6
5 Uncategorized Data 0
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A16 (b) WE, Q8, 8(fljl nterpretation of Responses
Category 1: Sophisticated Responses - "What to Observe"? (n = 34) 
Responses in whcih 1 judged that the pupil had shown at least some 
recognition of the basic flow in the question viz. the unrestricted 
scope for observation rendered the question unanswerable in either 
practice or principle:
e.g. Class 2, r.18 1 think the question is silly becaue anyone
could observe hundreds of different things.
e.g. Class 4, r.12 The difficulty is that you have said Carefully
Observe, observe what?!! This is a badly laid 
out question no one could give you a decent 
answer!! You have not told us what to 
observe.
Category 2: Naive Responses (n = 31)
Responses in which pupils straightorwardly described 
ideosyncratically chosen phenomena:
e.g. Class 2, r.9 Chalk dust on board, people moving around,
Tony scratching his armpit.
e.g. Class 2, r.20 I have observed the fish swimming in the tank.
Category 3: Sophisticated? Responses
Responses which I felt unwilling to categorize as ’naive’ but whose 
’sophistication’, as earlier defined, was either in doubt or 
inapplicable. These responses were themselves of 3 types:
- A16.2 -
’Sophisticated (l)?1 (n = 4)
Responses in which the pupil claimed, without elaboration, to have 
been able to answer Q8 because he had not understood it:
e.g. Class 3, r.3 I have not been able to answer Q8 because I do
not understand it.
That pupils who gave such responses may yet have understood the flow 
in the question but may not have made their understanding clear in 
their written answer as supported by two of my structured interviews 
FI(p’)5, FI(p')6.
’Sophisticated (2)?’ (n =2)
Responses in which the pupil claimed to be unable to answer Q8 
because the question was, in some way which they did not elaborate, 
inadequately expressed.
Class 2, r.15 I have observed the chalk on a blackboard and
a thick question.
Class 2, r.21 1 have observed the question is not explained
properly.
'Sophisticated (3)?’ (n = 2)
Responses in which the pupil claimed Q8 to be a 'trick' question 
through being self-referential.
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Class 2, r.12 The blackboard with the writing, carefully
observe, and write down what you observe, 
writon on it, with Mr. Swift walking in front 
of it grinning and thinking that he’s got us 
all fooled!
Class 4, r.4 It is a trick question, you write down the
question.
Although only these two pupils expressed a belief that the question 
was self-referential, 17 others chose to observe the question (,) in 
soe way. With these, howevewr, I had felt obliged to classify them 
as 'naive' despite a possibility that some pupils may have privately 
regarded the question as a trick question in the sense elaborated 
above.
e.g. Class 2, r.10 I observed the question: carefully observe the
write down what you observed?
e.g. Class 4, r.8 1 have observed questions about scientific,
non-scientific and both jobs.
Category 4: No Response (n = 6)
Category 5: Uncategorized Data ( n = 0)
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Appendix 16 (c) WE, Q6 (b): Categories of Response
No Category of Response Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Freq
N
0
1
2
Unelaborated 
Irrelevant to Science
1,5,8,12
15,18,19
6,13
1,3,7,8 1,3,8,
16
10
15
3
Y
E
S
3
4
Need for Instructions 
Should Observe More
— -----—
14 4,5
15 12 2
5 No Response [ but 
answered 8a]
2,3,4,7, 
9,11,14, 
16,17,21 
22
2,4,6,9 
10,11,12 
13,15,16 
18,19,20 
-21,23,24
2,6,7,9, 
11,12,13 
14
1,3,4,5 
6,7,8,9 
10,11,13 
14,15,16 
17
49
6 No Response [ 8a & b 10,20 5,17,22 2 6
7 Uncategorized Data 16 1
Table: Showing WE, Q8 (b): Categories of Response, the Frequency of
Responses within them and their Distribution between WE 
Administration
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A16 (d) WE, Q8 (b): Interpretation of Responses
Q8 (b) Categories of Responses 
Category 1: fNo] Unelaborated (n = 15)
Unelaborated negative responses
e.g. Class 1, r.l No.
e.g. Class 3, r.l Nothing.
Category 2: [No] Irrelevant to Science (n = 3)
Elaborate negative responses. These pupils claimed that their 
experience with answering Q8 (A) told them nothing about novel 
experiments or science. It is not clear whether these pupils felt 
they had benefitted in any other way.
e.g Class 1, r. 13 No, its nothing to do with science.
e.g. Class 3, r.10 1 dont thing it tell you about experiments.
Category 3: Yes [ Need for Instructions] (n = 3)
Responses in which pupils drew attention to the need for clear 
instructions. I believe that the possibility implied by these 
responses i.e. instructions received rather than created, reflects 
an important aspect of the present nature of school science.
e.g. Class 3, r.14 Yes it tell me that when doing experiments you
should have full instructions.
[Answer to Q8 (a) = ’Sophisticated1].
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e.g. Class 4, r.4 lie might not be clear explaining what to be
done.
[Answer to Q8 (a) = ’Sophisticated (3)?’]. 
Category 4: Yes [Should Observe More] (n = 2)
Responses in which pupils concluded that experimentalist should 
observe more.
e.g. Class 3, r.15 Yes you should observe more and try to
understand.
[Answer to Q8 (a) = ’Sophisticatd'].
e.g. Class 4, r.12 Scientists have to be aware and observe
anything new all around.
If anything these responses tend to the opposite of the 
epistemological moral that I wished them to draw.
Category 5: No Response [ neither Q8 (a) nor Q8 (b) (n.= 6)
Category 7: Uncategorized Data (n = 1)
Class 4, r.16 In science you are looking for reactions that
are obvious, e.g. change of colour, chemical 
state, heat etc.
[Answer to Q8 (a) = 'Sophisticated'].
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The meaning of the pupils' meaning of the work "obvious" is not 
clear. On the one hand he could mean 'obvious' in Lhe sense ol 
'constrained by the experimnetal design'. On the other hand he 
could mean obvious in the sense of 'changes which are so apparent 
that they cannot be missed'.
I suspect the latter interpretation.
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Appendix 17. Sample from Example Transcript of Focussed Interview 
with Student: Andrew, FI(St)3
APPENDIX 17 SAMPLE FROM EXAMPLE OF TRANSCRIPT OF FOCUSSED INTERVIEW
I 001
A 003 
I 004 
A 004
I 009 
A 009 
I 010
A 011 
I 011
A 013 
I 013 
A 013
I 018
A 018
WITH STUDENT: ANDREW, FI(St)3
Right... well what I'd like to do Andrew to start off by asking 
you whether you've ever heard of the word unscientific
Yeah
Mm? i,
Er ... well you get things like . er . if your approach to sort 
of analysing something they can say you haven't done it right you 
say you haven't used scientific method its done in an 
unscientific manner .. its usually ..I heard it a lot about 
things like . er . sort of arty science type things where they 
come out with great fantastic results and the scientists say 
rubbish because you haven't ... its unscientific'the way you've 
done the experiment or unscientific viewpoint to take
hrnhtn
So you in that respect I've heard it a lot
So would I be right in saying from what you've said so far that 
you've heard this expression .. used mainly by scientists ..
hmhm
inverted-commas scientists your phrase scientists .. er .. applied 
to arts
well applied to - 
academics or whatever?
well applied to .. within .• to other scientists and .. and on a 
lot of occasions to the sort of .. er .• like the psychology 
people and things like that which is a sort of never-never land 
between science and art. It can't seem to make up its mind which 
its going to be and I think most scientists say its not a science 
and most artists say its not an art and .. it seems you know to
get done over by both of them really.
...I see .. hm .. what do you think they mean by unscientific?
...hm ... well I suppose its like any subject there are sort of
rules about how you're supposed to go about things and .. er ..
say for an experiment there are certain criteria you've got to 
have if you haven't got them then you may be using a correct 
method but a lot of people may consider it unscientific .. the 
way of going about things and .. er .. in that respect really ..
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I 023
A 026 
I 026 
A 027
I 033
A 034 
I 035 
A 035 
I 036
A 038
I 040 
A 040
I 044 
A 047
So .• I would be right in saying that in your view unscientific 
is used in a sort of a negative way •.. that they haven'1 used .■
er •• rules .• hm .. what was the other thing you said ...
correct method
hm
They haven't used these things rather that they have used some other •
Well I think unscientific I mean its either non-scientific which 
it describes things like don't even try to be scientific like 
approach things in a completely different way .. I mean .. you r 
either if you've got a thing you either approach it in a sort of
philosophical sort of manner or you try to approach it in a
scientific which is either non-scientific or its scientific and 
if its done not the way the institutions and everything would 
like to do it it'll be considered unscientific.
... I see. So ... so from what you've said so far .. er .. 
unscientific is like a failed attempt to be scientific
yes
Scientist's view usually
Yeah I'd say usually like that yeah.
And you went on to say that non-scientific is where the approach 
doesn't even pretend to be scientific and the non-scientific view 
you said tends to be philosophical?
Well .. as .. as a sort of example philosophical perhaps. You can 
I mean you can approach a problem from a number of angles ...
Yeah
and one you know its like ... if you see a flower then you can go 
and dissect it scientifically say exactly what it is or you can 
approach it from a philosophical point of view and say this 
flower is beautiful sort of thing and I mean both of you are just 
trying to describe a flower one's describing it scientifically 
and one's describing it from a more sort of philosophical sort of 
way it's two ways of approaching the same thing.
Ah ... Do you think, do you think Andrew you could sort of 
elaborate a bit more what you mean by scientific? You've just 
given an example of analysing a flower.
I think science tends to ... the whole basis of what it tries to 
do is ... you ... it sees a problem or .. or .. you know .. or a 
thing it wants to analyse and it sort of .. poses sort of 
different questions from the unscientific in that .. er ... I've
- A17.2 -
had this sort of talk before ... now which .. er .. was it .. er.
I 050
A 051
I 058 
A 061
I 073
A 078
Who did you have this talk with?
Er . well I've had these sort of talks with .. er .. religious 
people who're always going around saying because you're a 
scientist you're unreligious and .. er .. you see they say they 
don't coincide because religion, let's say religion and 
philosophy say it is there and you know why isn't it great you 
know why is it here and .„ er .. science will say you know how it 
happens so they'll see a problem they'll say this is how it 
occurs this is how we progress whereas philosophers and religion 
•. er •. from that sort of point of view will say why is it here 
and why does it do this. ,
I see • I see ... er .. you .•. you described the religious and > 
philosophical type of approach you described the scientific type 
of approach er ... I'm not clear whether that's ... which ... or 
both you align yourself with.
I align myself with both of them because as I say I consider it 
two different ways of viewing things. I think bcience tends to 
say how something is .. and break everything down into ... little 
chunks smaller and smaller blocks so that you give a ... a ... 
thorough view of it but still once you've actually got an answer 
you're not .. you can't really say that's the full answer in 
effect I suppose you've got to say why is it here and from a 
scientific point of view you can try and go so far as to say why 
its here but even then you'd have to sort of tend to a 
philosophical point of view .. I think in that way you can go 
farther because I think the scientific method restricts you in
that you've got to have proof for everything whereas
philosophically you can perhaps have just as much proof but in a
.. in a sort of philosophical sort of manner you can just argue 
things out with very little proof providing your arguing is 
correct then you've got a sort of conclusion ... with science I 
don't think you can do that you can argue through but even then 
its only a hypothesis till you've actually gone out and proved it, 
which in a lot of things perhaps you can't ... you can never do, 
so ...
hinhm (agreeing) so .. would I be correct in saying from what 
you've said so far that ... er ... that there are different ways 
of answering as it were the same question or the same problem ... 
there can be the philosophical way there can be the scientific 
way ... er ... both are different ways but ... and here's the bit 
I'm not quite sure about ... you're not saying one is in any 
absolute sense better than another.
no that's always the big thing the two are always sort of against 
each other ... I don't look at it from that point of view at all.
I would say that the two together you get a much fuller picture 
of the whole idea and that way they ... they do contradict in a
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way but thon providing you bring thorn both together and lhen look 
at it as an individual you can get a much fuller picture. People 
are always sort of saying •• you know .. always fighting against 
each other scientists against non-scientists I think that's where 
a lot of ... sort of problems come into being really, neither of 
them trusts each other and both consider each other idiots yet 
together they've probably got a great deal more knowledge if they 
worked together. One .. one of the things is experimental 
psychology ...
yeah
I mean that's one of the things where the psychologist's 
considered art and science, the pure scientist looking at the 
same problem and the psychologist looking at exactly the same 
problem and .. er .. by themselves none of them will sort of get 
anywhere really but together they can go an awfully long way 
which is I think they're trying to do it if .. in Sussex they're 
trying to do that ...
You think that they've actually set up certain departments —
—  yesyeah they do seem to have —
—  experimental psychology, cognitive studies ... so there's 
a few to start off which—
—  which brings the arts and the science together, and in that 
way •• sort of... perhaps because I'm looking at it from a 
different angle they'll get farther together.
and is there a sort of dialogue between the different departments 
or does the dialogue between the two approaches as it were get 
conducted within the particular departments we're talking about?
I don't know an awful lot about it but there seems to be a 
certain amount at least of .. er .. cooperation in jargon and 
everything where it3 now set as a subject which they're both 
approaching and you know they're now no longer a psychologist 
they're now experimental psychologist and you're no longer a 
biologist, you're now an experimental psychologist even though 
you may be looking at it from two different angles and you're 
then grouped as an experimental psychologist and it therefore has 
its own sort of jargon. It seems to me to be the way things are 
going. I  don't know a great deal about it but that's how it 
struck me.
right • hm . could I just pick you up on something you mentioned 
a little earlier .. scientific method • you .. you said something 
about scientific method ... could you elaborate and tell me a 
little more about ... what your personal meaning of scientific 
method is?
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hm ... I always get It the way there are certain ... if you’re 
going out to ... you decide what problem you’ve got and then 
you’re going to try and prove it and there always seems to there 
are certain rules and regulations that you've got to sort of go 
through •• you're experimenting in order to be proved 
scientifically —
—  aha —  j
—  and things like .. you know .. when you're in the fifth form 
and everything they always say you've got to use a control for 
your experiments and you may know what •.. you may have such a 
good idea that you may think its not worth having a control . 
because its going to happen anyway but you know if you don't use 
it then you've been unscientific because you haven't used the , 
scientific method. That's the way it's always struck me.
hm ... now when you say the scientific method .. hm.. do all 
scientific methods ... er ... does the scientific method always 
use a control ... hm ... in its research?
some of them ... of one sort or another ... yes hm ... you know 
its sort of scientific method the big thing .. it sort of has 
to evolve for each sort of specific ... as each subject becomes 
more specialised its sort of method has to evolve a little bit 
... I should have thought as a whole you know that applies to all 
of them
hm . and perhaps .. could you just tease out a few more details 
about this ••• what the characteristics of this method that 
applies to .. to all the approaches are? er •. I realise within 
physics chemistry and biology experimental psychology whatever 
there are specific techniques if you like -
hm • (agreeing)
—  that you know are very highly related to their .. er .. 
interests .. be they experimental psychology physics chemistry or 
biology ... but is there anything that's common in the scientific 
method ... er ... between all of those things?
(pause) there is ... er ... the way I mean the whole thing is 
you've got to prove something and therefore scientific method you 
have to prove something usually by actually going out and doing 
it say you know whereas ... er ... from an arts point of view you 
can prove it by writing a paper on it and not actually doing 
anything but by your thoughts sort of process your thoughts sort 
of saying this is what it is but in science you've got to go out 
and actually do it and then generally it it has to be sort of 
verified and be experimented .. and unless the experiment is 
performed in a sort of correct and proper manner as •• you know 
.. other people looking .... scientists looking at it saying this 
is ... this is done wrong or he should have put this in in order
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to be absolutely certain ... 
hmhm
and so you know that tends to be the sort of scientific point of 
view .. I suppose you've got to ... the experiment's got to be 
foolproof .. you've got to actually cover for every eventual 
possibility ... you've got to ... this is the thing ... that ... 
scientific method .. what its trying to do when you come up with 
a sort of hypothesis about why something happens you can be sort
of misled by ... because you're so sure that it is then you can
direct your experiment just to prove that you're right even 
though it might not actually prove that what you've actually 
proved may not be right ...
hmhm
A 148 and if the scientific method says O.K. you've got a 
hypothesis now ignore it test it ... also test it to see if 
you're wrong ... I think that should be the whole point of it 
really ... you can be led away by the fact that I am right and 
therefore this experiment is going to prove it one way or another 
and ... you ... sort of disregard certain results say or —
hmhm
—  you know this sort of thing ... I mean this happens quite a 
lot when scientists have disregarded a freak result which they 
regard as experimental error and gone on and in the end its been
repeated and it wasn't an experimental error at all ... but sort
of fault in his hypothesis ... the whole idea was wrong or 
slightly wrong but he refused it and I think this scientific 
method tries .. er •. tries to remove that sort of human error.
aha so scientific method is about trying to remove human error—
hm
- as in possibly ambition or whatever .. you gave the example of 
somebody ignoring a freak result .. now I'm just trying to again 
tease out things which are the characteristics of this method .. 
hm .. you said that you've got to try and prove it and that that 
was generally seen in terms of actually going out and doing it .
hm .. I think its got .. er .. that's .. er .. that's the sort of 
thing that scientists think that you've got to actually go out 
and do it
hmhm (encouraging)
.. because otherwise .. er ..
and what does actually going out and doing it ... er ...
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I think its one of those thimgs .. seeing is believing .. you’ve 
got to try and reconstruct ..• reconstruct .. I mean its like you 
know the big bang .. er ... how did the world begin and 
everything .. how did you get all those organic things —
—  yeah
well you can put as many hypotheses of it as you like but 
nobody’s going to believe it until you go out and try to 
reconstruct it .. reconstruct the conditions and then go out and 
once people see that then they tend to sort of take it a little 
bit more seriously your point of view •• it tends to be
scientists .. for scientists its seeing is believing ... you can
write down as much as you like but unless you actually go out and 
do it experimentally or s/t least set about proving it nobody'll 
beleive a word you say
I see .. er .. (pause) a couple of things .. er .. hm .. first of 
all would I be right in saying that .. er .• that .. you start 
with a hypothesis .. that's where you start ..
start with your problem heah ..
start with a problem —  ' . \
some form of hypothesis yeah -
—  form a hypothesis that .. how that relates to your problem .•
hm (agreeing) and then —
sorry .. how is it related to your problem? hypothesis?
well you've got the problem you know how does x go to y and your 
hypothesis is x goes to y via n .. and then the next stage is to 
go out and prove it ..
yeah
and then you .. if you prove it •• if you can't prove it 
coclusively then I suppose it becomes a theory because it hadn't 
actually been disproved but nobody's actually proved it 
conclusively . • and if its proved conclusively beyond a shadow of 
doubt the it becomes a law although even laws can in effect quite 
often just be theories .•.
well I was just going to ask you that •• er .. what actually 
constitutes conclusive proof?
er (pause) I think conclusive proof tends to .. I mean it should 
be without a shadow of a doubt in no possible way can this can it 
be anything else but this .• it tends to be a sort of •• if
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©roved enough for mo to believe that this is right and do it 
..the general populous of scientists to then believe that this is 
right ..
aha .. aha
—  and tends to go on like that but I mean I think there's been 
quite a few old laws that have been sort of changed and altered 
or sometimes perhaps turned round completely ..
yeah •. yeah
but they've been laws because everyone beleived them they'd then 
be proved in certain ways and you know there was perhaps a shadow 
of a doubt but everybody'd disregarded that and you know went on. 
this is now law because everyone believes it .. I think a theory 
is where .. er •. its open to a little bit of doubt but generally 
we think that the basics are right ••
aha .. aha ... so (pause) could I .. could I just tease out from 
what you've said that the difference between a theory and a law 
.. right? .. actually we've had three terms now haven't we .. 
we've had hypothesis theory and law and .. or perhaps it would be 
better if you could just recap on the differences or similarities 
between these three terms —
well all three terms are sort of trying to make a solution to 
the problem and I think a hypothesis tends to be .. you sit 
back and you think about what it is with nothing but just ;
pure thought and it tends to be more or less an individual sort 
of thing or perhaps just, a small group ..
hmhm
and then that is now the hypothesis of you or your small group 
and then the next step really is to then because you think you're 
right you've then got to prove it to everybody else and if they 
don't believe that you're right you go about proving it by 
experiment and all sorts of other things perhaps and —
proving it is .. is seeing is believing when you (pause)
yeah .. you've got to do experiments that you know you get a 
result which is tangible and therefore people will look at it 
and say "well look at the experiment" and say "yes" you know this 
.. this is .. er .. on words alone it won't carry through but if 
you prove it experimentally then you —
—  but .. but what is experimental proof? You've said .. you 
mentioned seeing is believing but what is it that you see?
well you see evidence for what .. for your theory there's 
evidence for it and if its say a biochemical pathway (coughs) ..
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er .. to .. er .. you know you've read your isotopes and carried 
it through and it goes the way you said and •. you have sort of 
radio-isotopes which are end pieces where you thought they would 
be ..
hrahm
and then .• this is your experiment .. people can see these 
isotopes and they can see the results of the experiment and you 
know this is now evidence for your hypothesis and —
— your hypothesis yeah —
and if some other groups people start beleiving it and start 
seeint the same things and then other groups usually go on and do 
more work on it trying to disprove or trying to prove it even 
more ..
yes
and then once .. or after say a number of years perhaps the 
evidence has accumulated or tends to point to this hypothesis 
then the hypothesis becomes a .• goes up in scale and becomes a 
theory .•
right .•
everybody believes it and then if it goes to the test of time 
then it eventually becomes a law because there hasn't been anyone
ever been able to cast any doubt on it perhaps so it becomes a
law .. but laws quite often say perhaps after a hundred two 
hundred years perhaps technology's improved that much that they 
can see where the faults are in this lot .. like Newton's Law 
really which was adapted by Einstein up to a sort of universal 
level while his was merely a global level ... nothing really 
changed it was just a technological step you know the 
farsightedness increased and (?) blew up
right .. now when you say nothing really .. nothing really 
changed er •. what .do you mean?
(pause) (inaudible/giggle)
er ..• well when you said Newton's Laws and .. er .. there were
sort of .. increased technology did you say?
hm (affirmative)
well •.. yes ... farsightedness you were no lnger looking at a 
globe «. you were looking at a universe .. when I say nothing's 
chamged I mean Newton's Law as regards the globe which he was 
actually applying it to remain the same but you know on a 
universal level errors crept in and sort of where he calculated
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and sort of gave: a rough estimate when there was a far more 
accurate way of doing it perhaps incomplete you know reversal 
this sort of thing but the essence of Newton's Laws are correct 3 
and you know people still use them •. but on a much larger level 
his laws fall to bits really because they weren't designed for 
that sort of thing so although it was a law it wasn't an 
infallible law because it was only applied to a certain 
restrictive sort of field and what Einstein and other people have 
done is sort of applied these laws to much greater fields 
therefore have changed the laws in effect
are .. now .. did they just say "are here are Newton's three laws 
of motion" or whatever and then they applied it to a larger 
application like the universe instead of just a global ... and 
... that's where Einstein's different from Newton ..or did 
Einstein actually ... you said in eaafect the laws changed •..
well .. er .. I mean —
—  a new application or has he actually rewritten the laws as it 
were?
well what Einstein did I think was .. he tends to be a little 
unusual anyway .•. was to just go out and figure out what he 
wanted to do on a •. on a .. he started off on a universal level 
.• I don't think he probably even started off thinking about what 
Newton said .. work through all this and when the theories came 
up it you know sort of showed up that Newton had been slightly 
wrong as regards universal theory and you know Einstein is not 
always correct .. I don't think he went out to alter or disprove 
Newton's theories in the first place I think .. having the whole 
idea . • the reason why he made the breakthrough was because he 
didn't start to look at the global theory he just looked at it as 
a big vast thing to start off with •• I think that's why in 
effect he made the breakthrough while everyone else didn't •• no 
one else did I think try to correct Newton's Law you'll never get 
any further because you've got to sort of look at it laterally .. 
you've got to think in a different way ... you've sort of got to 
open up and things like that ..
when you say "trying to correct Newton's Law" .. er .. in your 
view were there .. were there observable errors .. were there 
errors which were known in Newton's time?
well I don't think .. —
I .. I'm just trying to see how that fits with your other 
statement that .. er .. you said that you didn't think that 
Einstein really paid any attention to what Newton had said
I think looking at Newton's Laws and trying to 3ort of see if 
there are any errors from Newton's standpoint I don't think 
they're .. I don't think .. perhaps now with foresight .. you
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know looking back •. there are •. but I think the errors are so 
minute and because you .• I mean •. Newton managed to get those 
laws because he didn't look at the earth .. he looked at space .. 
and in that respect could then apply everything on to the .• what 
we would consider you know the sort of (?) big thrill at all *.. 
you sort of look out at space and say "well perhaps there's a 
dozen out there" and then sort of brought them in .. its the way 
you look .• you've got to think laterally .. get away from your 
surroundings and try and think clearly because so many things .. 
er • • influence you normally that er.. you've got to have a clear 
uncluttered brain if you go and actually do something positive 
and that's why Newton got his laws set out I think where 
Einstein's a step better is that he ... one step further ..is 
because he meant .. sort of .• took his uncluttered brain out 
from .. into space into the whole universe and tried to apply the 
whole thing to that .. and .. er .. I think that's where the 
difference is .. if you try and look at Newton's theory from 
Newton's point of view you can't really go any further but if you 
look at from Einstein's point of view then obviously the mistakes 
are from Newton when you try and scale them up in effect they 
become far more obvious
I see .. so .. looking at anything entirely through Newton's 
point of view .. through one person's point of view or another 
person's point of view is actually going to bring about ..would: 
this be correct to say .. er •. systematic mistakes that .. 
(pause) you'll find it actually difficult to break free of that 
way of looking ..
yeah —
—  because you're restricting yourself to —
well I mean that Einstein sort of proved that himself because of 
the way he actually .• er .• went about things .. I mean he 
refused to actually to put anything into memory .. everything 
every bit of information he got he just put in books .. you know 
he was always surrounded by books but he didn't actually know a 
thing .. so you know he wasn't restricted by all these points of 
views .. all these theories and everything .. he just looked at 
something from a sort of .. childlike sort of .. er .. naive 
point of view and figured out a theory and then went back to the 
books to actually then go through the calculations to see what it 
was and probably about nine times out of ten you know .. his 
thought was completely stupid because it was obvious that a 
couldn't go to b or something by doing that you know he actually 
managed to make some fantastic breakthroughs because he wasn't 
sort of .. er .. held down by all these points of view .. I mean 
once the big thing was that light travels through an aether .. I 
mean that went around for years .. and why was that .. because 
well its a wave and waves had to go through something .. you 
can't have it going through nothing and there was no actual proof 
so people actually made proof for it and because everybody you
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know was all talking together and all had those same theories 
inside their heads you know that they'd been taught at school to 
have these same theories in their heads .. that they actually 
grew to believe it although no actual proof ever showed up for it 
it became one of these enigmas where everybody else says "it is 
so let's go along with it •." and then someone came along and 
says "well this is absolutely stupid •. look at it I mean if it 
goes through an aether you travel through a plane you won't be 
able to see out of the windows" (laughs) and you know ...
well could I just put it to you Andrew .. just to be awkward as ; 
it were .. you were saying that the wave theory of light is an 
enigma because here people had quote 'made their own proof' and 
had come to believe it ... now if we go back a little bit and 
think about what you were saying about scientific method you were 
saying that there you need proof of the 'seeing is believing' 
sort
yes .. I think the thing is again what I said about theory •. 
theory is something generally believed by an awful lot of people 
•. and providing you can actually make them believe it then .. I 
mean .• seeing is believing - persuading is believing as well I , 
think to a certain degree if you can persuade people that you are 
.. that you are correct and they bring up an argument and you 
crush them with your conviction then eventually people will start 
to believe it .. I mean .. there was a guy - what was it —  I 
think it was Kelvin or something during the French Revolution you 
know when they first found dinosaurs and he said its a lizard .. 
you know -
yes
and you know everyone else said yeah its a lizard .. great .. you 
couldn't argue with the guy because he knew more about it than 
anyone else .. he was very good at it and as the others came up 
they weren't lizards but they didn't know as much about it as he 
.. he sort of got it up .. everybody because of his forceful 
personality they wouldn't argue with him because they knew damn 
well that he was better than them though he was wrong
so . • so . • perhaps from that example you are actually putting it 
a little bit more strongly .. you're actually saying that .. er 
•. personality is believing as it were -
hm (affirmative)
you said 'to some degree' .. in fact perhaps from that example of 
Kelvin and the lizard/dinosaur its really to quite a large degree 
• •
I think it tends to be .. I mean .. the big one was .. take the 
example of .. er •. Pauling when •. in the search for DNA .. well 
you know Pauling was really a big guy because he'd made so many
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big discoveries and been proved right .. and the same applied to 
Kelvin •• he had made so many discoveries and been proved right 
... and you know by this time he .. you know .. he was a big guy 
in the chemistry world and you didn't want to argue with him 
because he was considered you know second to God
yeah
so when he came up with this 3 ring structure for DNA at first 
people believed it and it was only afterwards when it sort of 
went to Crick and Watson and they were sort of looking at it and 
saw that some of the chemical bonds were sort of childishly 
inaccurate and I mean it just couldn't be and you know one puff 
and the whole thing would just fall down .. for a while it 
engaged an awful lot of popularity and people sort of (?) they 
didn't . • they didn't really go all out to try and crush it 
because it was Linus Pauling he was the big guy ...
so by force of personality —
hm and I think by reputation more than force of personality his 
reputation was such that you didn't want to make a fool of 
yourself and get proved wrong because its one of these things I 
think .. its like sort of human .. again human error that .. er 
•• if you're proved wrong once then people are going to take a 
slightly lesser view of you next time •. and ..
I see .. I see ... could I just tackle you now .. er •• on this 
seeing and believing thing versus the force of personality which 
by your example of the .. er .. electromagnetic wave and also .. 
er .. the DNA structure .. Pauling's theory and also Kelvin's 
dinosaur/lizard .. er .. now .. in your view .. er .. are the 
cases where the personality has actually ... the force of a 
strong view put forward by a strong personality I should say .. 
er .. has actually overidden what people have seen in an 
experiment?
ye3 certainly because I mean when you take seeing is believing 
you make an experiment and you've set it out and you get your 
result and the result goes with your hypothesis .. the next thing 
then is for people to disprove it .. to try and disprove your 
hypothesis .. well now if you're a big respectable man and you've 
got force of personality and everybody thinks .. you know 
you're a fantastic chemist or whatever then people are going to 
be more reluctant to actually prove your hypothesis is wrong 
because they're not going to want to lay themselves open for 
attack from you and if you're a big guy they know damn well they 
are very vulnerable for attack from you —
—  well —
I •• sort of .. credibility counts —
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but I think Andrew there are two things here ... on the one hand 
you can be intimidated into not doing an experiment because of 
the force of a personality .. you know .. the dominant 
personality that's putting forward a view which is against yours, 
and then there's another issue .. the one that I'm trying to now 
get at and that is where for some reason you're not intimidated 
.. you do the experiment you get something which you say I can 
see and if you do this experiment or read my report about it you 
can also see •.. and what you see is contrary to the belief put 
forward by this dominant personality ... now what happens then?
usually eventually your theory .. if your theory is right your 
theory will get through ..but quite often this has happened where 
people you know have tended to believe the big guy stuff and its 
taken an awful long time say if he dies and .. you know then 
people will start .. you know .. open up his theory without any 
fear of retribution —-
—  yes .. yes —
—  and at that point then the theory will collapse quite often 
because of that sort of thing you can in effect hold back a field 
.. I mean there's an awful lot of things where human nature sort 
of overshadows the sort of scientific method and everything —
—  aha •. aha —
—  there was that guy who (pause) .. I can't remember his damn 
name now .. that .. that .. priest guy who did all this thing 
with peas and ••
Mendel
Mendel .. yeah .. well he came up with this theory and everything 
and he .. I think he tried to get it published and everything but 
because he was a priest in a sort of little monastery miles away 
in nowhere nobody would ever you know listen to him ..I mean
(chuckles)
—  this guy who'se going to tell us all about peas and everything 
•. .. I mean wow .. and it took you know an awful lot longer 
before people actually rediscovered his work and it was only 
because these were the people who were credited scientists that 
people would listen to them ... so there's an awful lot of 
...situations where human nature is overidden by this whole sort 
of scientific ...
O.K. so .. it looks like these big guys that you're talking about 
.. er .. they're scientists but they're not using scientific 
method •. is that right?
well they think they're using scientific method .. I mean
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they try to go about things scientifically but perhaps they do 
make a mistake •. I mean •• life for them •• I mean there was a > 
big race for DNA .. the person who discovered that got you know 
rocketed you know headline job and everything Nobel prize here we 
come there was a big race for that and to a degree that Linus 
Pauling was ... did drastically make a stupid error in that .. he 
..he was convinced he got it right and he wanted to get it right 
as soon as possible so he just threw this thing together and then 
probably by force of reputation tried to get ... I mean 
everybody's out for the (*) really and if you got this you er you 
know you er set up for life really you know •• you're down in all 
the history books •.
I 459 I see .. but .. but you see .. now I'm a little bit confused
about something because on the one hand you .. you've just said 
that these big guys they all think that they're using the 
scientific method .• this seeing is believing approach ... on the 
other hand a little bit earlier you said .. er .. even if you're
a complete unknown with no sort of reputation •• providing you
use scientific method .. if I understood you correctly .. and you 
actually said providing Its right you will actually win through 
in the end .. be it in a hundred years or whatever if necessary 
but you will win through ... now •• I'm trying to •• to .. find 
out .. as it were .. .. where this third view has come from .. 
there's .. the scientific method and all the big guys think that 
they're using it ... and then there's you as a little guy that's 
also using scientific method but providing you're right you will 
win against the big guys .. now presumably you as the little guy 
who'se doing this experiment that's contrary to the big guys 
think that you are using the scientific method —
A 479 hm (affirmative)
I 479 —  so where does this ability to suddenly think he is, right
after all .. bear in mind that everybody •• thinks they're using 
scientific method ...
A 481 you use your scientific method which is your attempt to do things
properly .. to absolutely prove something properly . • will very 
rarely will one experiment prove to be absolutely correct beyond 
a shadow of a doubt .. I mean .. it usually takes a number of 
experiments .. now what happens is you make your hypothesis .. 
you (?) you've got to make your hypothesis .. let's say the 
little man is right but the big man is wrong but both think 
they're right and both do experiments to prove their hypotheses 
•• now one experiment could actually prove a wrong hypothesis to 
be .. to be .. say perhaps be right .. it may need further work 
on it to prove it wrong .. and the other one's only going to 
prove that it is .. you know .. from this experiment's point of
view then yes it does go along .. so both of them are going on ..
now who'se going to attack who? I mean you're the scientist in 
the middle .. the person who'se going to attack is the little one
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because he’s more open to attack while the big one .. if you .. 
you try to attack him then you’re open to an awful lot of 
heckling because I mean he's so big that if you try to attack him 
and fail you’ll look a right idiot .. and .. so •• for actual .. 
er .• because everybody I mean wants to go up in the world ..• 
then if you're going to attack a theory then you're going to 
attack the little guys first
so what you seem to be saying is that its a sort of self 
correcting system in a way —
hm (agreeing)
—  for all the wrong reasons you attack the little guy because 
he's easier to attack but by so doing you look at his seeing is 
believing evidence —
—  and eventually prove him right
—  and if he’s "right” .. if he is right then you'll actually
.. er .. your attempt to .. to .. discredit him will fail and as 
more and more of your attempts to discredit him fail so as it 
were the movement against the big guy will eventually gather 
steam
hm (agreeing)
I see now (pause) do you .. bearing in mind all you've been 
talking about .• strong personalities .• Pauling Kelvin .. er 
so on and so forth do you think that ..er .. that there is such a 
thing as objective scientific method?
(pause) I think everybody tries to be objective .. er .. but 
again .. I think its now impossible for .. if you think you're 
right to then .. er .. accept from an experiment that you're 
wrong .. I think its very difficult to do that .• it takes a 
peculiar personality to be able to do it .. I mean if its 50/50 
then you're going to accept that you're right and you need say to 
do another experiment or just sort of left it at that and let 
other people disprove it ... I think it takes a peculiar 
personality to let human nature overrule objectivity and sort of 
say I'm wrong ..• that's where a lot of the trouble runs in .. 
for as I say everything wins through in the end I think its just
- well that may or may not be my view .. that's just roughly how 
I was trying to .. that's the sort of sense I made of what you 
were saying I thought •. and is that what you are saying?
yeah that's the sort of thing ..
O.K. .. er .. I'd like to go back to your example of Einstein and 
Newton again •. er .. because I've now •• bearing in mind what
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you've said about seeing is believing and so on .. like to point 
out something which a lot of historians tend to agree on at any 
rate and that is that Einstein in his 1905 paper on (?) 
relativity finally put it forward and it started catching on .. 
it had quite a big influence people took it quite seriously .. er 
.. but he didn't actually get this seeing is believing bit until 
1919 when there was an expedition to the polar icecap and 
observed stars when there was an eclipse .. right .. and they 
found this bend that Einstein said would occur in the observation 
of the stars .. now .. from what you were saying er .. I find it 
a little bit difficult now to explain why anyone why anyone took 
Einstein seriously at all before —
well its the sort of thing really •. if someone is basically 
wrong and somebody else comes up with a new theory I think most 
people have inklings that perhaps there is something wrong here I 
mean •• I don't know about you but .. if I get the feeling that 
something is slightly skew-whiff .. perhaps I'm not going to say 
outright this is absolutely wrong but if somebody comes along 
with an alternative view then I'll look at it seriously and sort 
of go along with it •. then you sort of get the discussion bit 
and everything and everybody attacks it from a different angle 
and if it holds up although there hasn't been any actual proof 
for it yet .. I mean mathematics in a form is proof itself .. I 
mean O.K. seeing something bend round like that is actually 
seeing is believing proof but mathematics in itself can in a form 
be seeing is believing ..
I see .. I seel this seems to be a little bit of a departure from 
where we started •. the going out and doing phrase —
well in a formula there is an experiment .. if you've got your 
hypothesis and then you go out to prove it right or wrong •• now 
perhaps you don't go out and do an experiment .. you know —  the 
volume of equipment to the north pole and everything .• but you 
actually do all the mathematics for it and see whether your 
hypothesis is right .. and in effect seeing is believing is in 
inverted commas .. I mean you don't have to actually see I mean 
you can't see DNA but you know its there .. and so .. in effect 
.• maths can be a sort of proof all by itself .. people did 
actually have to go out .. just to prove to themselves because I 
mean math3 is notorious for you know .. a slight little error 
that nobody can see can let things happen you know .. typical 
ones the bumble bee that can't fly .. and the only thing you can 
take in is that in the summer warm air rises and that's why it 
flies (?) through it .. but ..
—  mathematically its a failure really in flight it isn't ••
yes . . so from a mathematics point of view you know everybody 
tried to attack it but found it was right and the maths seemed to 
go so people went along with it but they still •. I mean they 
still came through that seeing is believing they had to go out in
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the end and do it .. I mean everybody was just sort of saying to 
Einstein "are you worried about this? are you going to sleep at 
night?" and he said "I'm right.."
he was absolutely sure?
yeah
you said that .. as a way of explaining the sort of discussion 
and interest of Einstein's work prior to this 1919 expedition 
which a lot of people say "ah yes here was the seeing is 
believing proof .." now you're saying that it takes an inkling .. 
you have an inkling that something is not quite right like 
Newtonian mechanics .. it might have been an inkling that it 
wasn't quite right .. and then along came Einstein and that's why 
they took a big interest in him ..
I don't know if it was quite a few of the scientists who were 
working on the same sort of lines as Einstein because they had 
the same sort of .. perhaps things are'nt right .. I mean if they 
immediately went along .. I mean the same with Darwin •• when 
Darwin came up with his theory —
—  well if we could stick to Einstein .. but you are quite right
.. there were other people working on very similar .. er ••
mathematics as spatial relativity .. Henry (?) for example •• but 
I'm just wondering er .. as there wasn't the seeing is believing 
bit yet .. er .. where did this inkling that Einstein might be a 
little bit skew-whiff .. to use your phrase .. where did this 
inkling come from?
what .. that Newton was skew-whiff?
hm (affirmative)
er .. you said Einstein!
sorry!
er (pause) I don't know .. I mean .. where do people get
inklings from? er .. I suppose he was just •. I mean .. looked at
..I mean Einstein as a person .. as I said before .. I don't
think he really did look at it like that .• he was a very unusual
person •• I mean he .. er .. didn't really go to the proper 
channels to become a scientist .. I mean he didn't go to
university but did science straight away and everything like this
—  so he cheated in a way .. but successfully .. I mean not 
dishonestly but he cheated the system of scientific method if you 
like ...
well he didn't cheat the system of scientific method .. he just
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didn't look at everything the way scientists .. I don't think . 
he wasn't sort of bogged down by sort of the .. the tradition of 
the science of that time .. the physics of that time whereas you 
didn't argue with Newton because his laws had been standing for 
so long .. and .. because I don't think he probably .. you know 
.. disregarded this and sort of went off on his own track and he 
came out of it .. how the other people did it I don't know ..I 
mean that's a sign of a great scientist when you can disregard 
everything else and sort of try and see if there is any mistake
I 660 could I now ask you about your progressive distinction between
hypothesis .• theory .• and law .• now if I * ve understood you 
right there is only as it were a difference that's qualitative in 
terms of the amount of verification .• of seeing is believing •. 
not qualitative difference .. really a theory is no different 
from a hypothesis except its got more quantity of verification 
and then a law's got even more and its mixed up with things like 
•. how long its been accepted .. the force of personality 
etcetera —
A 675 it does tend to be altered slightly en route as well but in
essence I mean remains the same as you say there's just more 
evidence that accumulated ..
I 678 HM .• now given that •. er .• laws are overthrown and so on •.
er .. is there any problem do you think with this view that •• I 
mean do you feel that its right or wrong •. correct or incorrect 
that something can go from being a hypothesis to a law by 
increasing verification?
A 689 well I think its got to really because you've got to have laws ..
because although •• I mean •• you've got to accept .. I mean the 
difficulty is really you've got to accept that perhaps they're 
wrong but with so much evidence they are probably right •. 
because unless you actually go from laws I mean the whole thing
is like a building block •. I mean .• if you lose all the
backgroung •• if you lose all the knowledge of three centuries 
then you start slap bang right at the bottom again .. you've to 
build up from that .. so the whole idea I think you've got to do 
is that you say this is the law and its probably right except that
it may be wrong .. but work use it and see if you can develop
further and that's how it goes .. I mean you can't •• the problem
is that quite often after quite a while people say it is right it
is right don't argue with it • • it is right •• and it then ••
sort of .. the hiccups in the building sort of occur ...
END OF SIDE 1
Tape Side 2
I 2/000 hm •. the development from a theory .. from a hypothesis to a law 
being like building block .. er •. the blocks of which are like 
verification ...
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yeah ... I mean therefore science is the building block .. and 
you've got to use laws in order to do the building ... you've got 
to base —
Oh so the blocks are laws themselves?
yeah .•. well I was still looking at it from the point that • 
that you ... if you're going to develop things farther ... if 
you're going to develop science farther then you've got to have 
background knowledge in the first place to actually work from and 
that is a law which you've got to accept as being right —
ah that is a law that you must have background knowledge or •• 
the back ... you must have background knowledge which is a law 
... background knowledge ... you see the difference that I'm 
saying? if you're going to be a scientist as it were its a law 
for being a scientist that you have background knpwledge or were 
you saying that to be a scientist you must have background 
knowledge which is itself composed of laws?
(pause)
d'you see what I'm getting at? 
not particularly (giggles) no ..
yes well I think maybe I've .. er •• misunderstood you a little 
bit •• er .. I just want to be clear that what you're saying is 
to be a scientist you must have background knowledge —
hm (agreeing)
and that background kmowledge must be composed of things like 
laws to work on .. now that's the first understanding ..
yeah
and you agree with that? 
yeah
there was another way in which I perhaps misunderstood you .. er 
•• and that was that .. that .. as it were •. a law of being a 
scientist is that you must have background knowledge ..
well no not necessarily •. I mean the whole thing —
O.K. .. so I think that was what I was inferring from what you 
were saying
you can .. you can.. I mean you can start off . • if you start off 
with no background knowledge and you try to solve a problem then
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you've got to start from rock bottom and you've got to then build 
up .• half the time there are laws and formulations and theories 
have been bouncing around for a long time and if you start off 
using a few laws and everything that are already there then you 
can start half way up there .. so much to your problem and that 
is the whole way science develops otherwise nobody would get 
anywhere because everybody would be starting at rock bottom and 
only get so far up each time .. the whole idea everything goes 
shooting up is that you use the accumulation of knowledge by 
other people .. if you use laws .• I mean you use laws because 
they're accepted as knowledge that .. that knowledge is right . • 
there's a probability that its wrong but because its a law its 
probably right .. so you're using correct knowledge ... if you 
get knowledge from say a hypothesis which you then add to the 
theory •• to all these laws then you start going places •. then 
you start going up more so you use .. so your problem is •• you 
set up your hypothesis •• you use background laws which you 
accept as being probably right .. you add your hypothesis and see 
how far •• more .. higher up you can go • •
I see .. now just in case we haven't been talking about the same 
thing .• er •. could I now •. er •. ask you .. er •. what do you 
understand by the expression "advancement in scientific 
knowledge"?
well .. er •• more or less what I've just been saying just then 
.. pushing forwards —
ah .. that's why I wanted to be .. I've written down the phrase 
"advancement in scientific knowledge" •• I just wanted to be sure 
that we were talking •. I suspected that's what you meant by •.. 
when you were talking about •• er .. accumulation of •• er •• 
adding your hypothesis to previous laws .• things like that •. 
but I wasn't quite sure .. so could you just in a nutshell ..to 
be completely sure .• restate what you understand by "advancement 
in scientific knowledge
well .. as I said before .. you .. you've got the frontiers of 
knowledge •. frontiers of knowledge which is based on laws and 
everything (?) which are .. have been proved to be more or less 
.• probably right and your advancement is then when you use those 
laws at the frontiers and then you add your own theories and 
hypotheses ••. hypothesis on to it and therefore advance the 
frontiers of knowledge a little bit more and perhaps after a 
number of years your hypothesis gets proved •• more .. you know 
.. more and more verification for it ..it becomes a law and 
somebody else can use that to go even further ..
and what happens to .. er .. to these original laws you've built 
up from?
well .. either they can .. as .. as in Newton's case remain 
fundamentally correct but altered slightly as you .• as you
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advance further into a wider sphere or .. or •• as your 
hypothesis goes on you can see that the law that you've been 
using is perhaps totally wrong and that law crumbles •• or quite, 
often a hypothesis •. a number of hypotheses can be built on that 
law before it realises that the law itself is fundamentally wrong 
and then the whole thing tumbles down ..
ah .. I was just going to .• to ask you about that .. in your 
view •• er • • Einstein added some bits on to Newton •. right? .. 
but I was just going to say what about .. er .. other 
theory-stroke-laws like phlogiston for example •. instead of 
oxygen .. er ..no one accepts that .. that .. to use your 
expression has crumbled away now ..
yeah
hm .. now .. I want to know really what's happening to .. er .. . 
Newton's laws .. I mean .. as far as •• you were saying that 
Newton perhaps .. er .• restricted himself to looking at the 
global level .• I think most historians tend to disagree with 
that actually .. but that's .. you know .. let's for the sake of 
argument say that Newton looked at the global level .. er .. 
really .• what's •• what's going on when •• er •. Newton added 
his •• er .. his things •• er •• bearing in mind that you •• you 
could say well no Newton was trying to be as universal as 
possible and so was Einstein .. and Einstein's laws theory of 
relativety or whatever •• er •• are different to Newton's ••
hm .. (pause) I think what you can sort of say is that Newton 
used •• I mean the mass thing I mean that Newton looked at .. he 
did look at the universal level and that .. as the laws tended to 
be universal but he looked at it from a .. I mean his evidence •. 
all that he could use was the planets system and things like this 
and sort of .. and sort of .. older knowledge so his idea of the 
vast beyond was sort of limited in that respect that's what I 
mean by sort of Einstein pushing on further •• but er .. I mean 
his mass thing he didn't .. perhaps realise it as mass .. you 
know as speed increases mass increases—
—  yes .. yes —
—  and .. I mean .. once you realise that then of course his laws
are bound to be out slightly .•. but its only a very tiny thing
.• I mean .. if you live on this planet who'se going to believe
that things get heavier when mass .. as speed gets greater .•
I quite agree with you Andrew .. the only thing is .. and this is 
now going to seem a little bit like splitting hairs in this 
particular example of Einstein and Newton .. but that is .. 
that's O.K. .. for all practical purposes living on this earth 
there are . • for measuring ability of most of our instruments and 
most of our needs er .. Newton's work may be quite O.K. •• in 
fact I mean it was Newtonian mechanics that allowed us to send
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rockets to the moon and Voyager to Mars .. which wasn't r
relativity .• er •. we could have done it by relativity and this 
is .. this is the question that I'm putting to you .. er .. in 
terms of utility •. in terms of what we can actually do with them
• • er .• Newton is actually easier mathematically to apply if you 
want to calculate the tra j ectory of a ping pong ball .• much 
easier to work with Newtonian mechanics than relativistic 
mechanics .• but you can use relativistic mechanics .. now given 
that relativistic mechanics is actually different .. you remember 
we were talking about looking through different points of views 
•• Newton's and Einstein's and you were saying that Einstein was 
more child-like and so forth .. er .. well .. given that Newton's 
laws are actually incorrect as compared with Einstein's •• most 
people accept that Einstein is .. correct or more correct and 
that Newton is wrong or less correct • • now could you just tease 
out what actually happened to Newton's laws when Einstein became 
generally accepted?
well .. er —
did they become wrong or did they •. are they •. er
earlier I said that Newton's laws •. they didn't crumble but they 
were proved to be •• er .. had errors in them •• the reason they 
didn't crumble was the errors for every day use were so minute as 
to •. I mean not even for every day use •. as you said firing 
things to Mars and everything —
—  sure .. sure —
—  the errors inside them were so small .. that's what I meant by 
sort of global •• sort of solar system type of use .. if you want 
to send something to Andromeda say then you'd have to apply 
Einstein's thing because on a much larger scale the errors in 
Newton's are going to come out . • so .. er •• I think when 
Einstein's theories came out they took a fair while to actually 
get .• er .. to actually gain .• er •• belief .• in effect .. I 
mean .. the reason why they had to go out and do this star thing 
at all .. a lot of people couldn't really understand them because 
they were so complex and everything because •. I mean •• to say 
things like "time is relative" you know everybody relies on time 
and you've always thought that time is a nice stable thing and he 
comes along and says its all relative and I think .. there wasn't
• • an awful lot of people who perhaps still don't understand 
Einstein's theories . • they .. they now just accept them and in ; 
effect that would •. I mean his theory of general relativity 
stood for quite a while before it was proved wrong •. and I think 
one of the reasons for that was the same as for the special •• 
its so complicated that ....
—  ah .. wait a minute .. you said his general theory of relativity 
stood for quite a long time before it was proved wrong?
A 2/123 well .. before certain aspects of it were proved to be wrong ..
I 2/124- I see .. can you elaborate on that at all?
A 2/124. well .. he only used four dimensions I think it was for his
general theory when it was proved that now there were seven •• at 
the beginning there were twelve .• that the big bang .. if you 
accept the big bang theory there were twelve .• and that knocks a 
lot of his results out of it
(Continued ...)
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I 004 ...do you think we could start by you giving me just a very
rough . er • synopsis of your personal academic background 
before you came into teaching •. during .. whatever ..?
Dr.O 006 chemistry degree .. three years research .... two
and a half years working abroad for an American firm ....one 
year post-docking .... and then I came into teaching ..
I 008 which .. so ... you actually got a doctorate in chemistry? .
Dr.O 009 yeah
I 009 and then . worked in industry?
Dr.O 009 well yes ... um .. it was a support .. it was an applications
lab .. so I mean I was doing work very similar to the research 
work but .. as a support to a firm that sold spectrometers ..
I 012 uhuh ..
Dr.O 012 and and dealing with customers on a scientific basis rather
than on a sales basis (laughs)
I 013 ... I see .. er ... ch .. er chose to go into teaching?
Dr.O 014 I’d always intended to go into teaching from when I was about .
oh . I don't know 9 or 10 .. (laughs)
I 015 uhuh and so this research and so on was sort of a long
digression was it?
Dr.O 016 well I wanted to find out a bit more about chemistry. I
enjoyed what I was doing so I went on with it for a bit longer 
... I had the opportunity and it seemed silly to turn it down
I 018 yep ... so you always intended to go into teaching ... if you
always intended to go —
Dr.O 019 well no that sounds a bit strong. The idea had always been
there I mean I hadn't .. I'd considered other things when I was
in secondary school .. the idea of teaching had always been at 
the back of my mind ...
I 021 yeah
Dr.O 021 I wouldn’t say I went through secondary school I am going to 
be a teacher that wouldn't be true but .. the idea had been 
there from an early age .. as one of the probable things I 
would do ...
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I 022 yep .•.. can you remember what it was that attracted you to it .
I mean .. ?
Dr.O 024 initially no. But it was certainly when I was in secondary
school .. erm. I used to teach people in my own class I can
remember holding little maths lessons in the cloakrooms, and 
things like that .. I just enjoyed expl .. helping people to 
understand things ...
I 027 I see ... urn .. well going on from that ... can you tell what .
in broad terms .. youfre trying to achieve through your science 
teaching .. ?
Dr.O 029   I suppose in one sense to pass on sort of knowledge that
I’ve gained and pass on understanding of how the world is made 
and how atoms interact together and how that explains .. and an 
. explanation] an understanding to the things we observe 
normally •. um .... but in a broader sense I think science 
teaching is . teaching a particular type of .. way of thinking
I 0 3 3  a particular type of way of thinking?
Dr.O 0 3 3  yeah
I 034- err . do you think you could say roughly .. what in your view
that particular .. way of thinking is?
Dr.O 0 3 5  ..... well technical jargon particularly in this SCISP school
would be to say problem solving ... (laughs)
I 0 3 7  yeah
Dr.O 0 3 7  ... umm .... I think that was one of the things that attracted
me to . • to science is that you can ... you observe something 
... and then you try and find an explanation for why that 
happens ...
I 0 3 9  uhuh
Dr.O 0 3 9  and so this idea of sort of . deduction ... finding a possible
explanation for something and then testing out to see if that 
explanation is true .....
I 0 4 .1  I see so ... so .. is there a sort of a sequence here .. you’ve
mentioned err . observation .. deduction .. testing to see if 
its true?
Dr.O 0 4 - 2  I  think I think there is .. and I’m a bit surprised that the .
people that actually run SCISP don’t agree that this is the 
genuine scientific approach .. they ... they .. I . don’t know 
they have a slightly different philosophy which I .. I Don ’ t
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find true .. I mean I found even in research . that this was 
what you were doing . although they tell me it wasn’t ... umm 
.. where you where you came across your observation that sets 
you off can be by .. can be completely by accident or chance or 
anything but you’ve still got to observe that something happens 
and then and then try and explain it .... urn ... people say 
that the .. that science isn’t a logical sequence
I 050 uhuh
Dr.O 050 umm . in the sense that ... a lot of the great discoveries and
breakthroughs have apparently come from nowhere but they’ve 
come from somebody having their eyes open while they were doing 
their work and noticing something that was a bit odd .. and 
then looking for an explanation for it .. so . given that the 
original observation may not fit into a logical sequence I 
think that .. having noticed something then the sequence . 
follows ... that you look for an explanation *. and you test out 
your explanation •. and having got an explanation you make 
predictions on the basis of it and then test those predictions 
... I find that ...
I 058 and you found that even in your doctoral research? .. roughly
speaking?
Dr.O 058 yes .. I'm’., what I was doing .. fitted into that sort of
scheme .. I mean I wouldn’t say I was doing the whole lot .. 
but what I was doing fitted into that sort of scheme •..
I 060 yeah
Dr.O 060 given that the original .. observation didn’t necessarily
come out of a logical sequence ...
I 062 yeah ...... you’ve mentioned urn *. er .. having your eyes open
and making an initial observation ...
Dr.O 062 mm .
I O63 by chance did you say • at one point?
Dr.O 063 I said it . m .. this is me trying to .....
I O64. or . or it c...
Dr.O O64. trying to fit my ideas with the ideas of •• of other people •
who have a different approach to science theory than me .. and 
..I'm trying to say well mean you . we can't put .. I don't 
think they can be completely wrong • and I think possibly the 
point is that I just .. they’re asking where the original 
observation comes from .. and I'm just saying well that's O.K. 
just comes out of the air but there is then the logical 
sequence ... and that original observation might be part of a .
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logical •. or partly logical approach to looking at .• at a 
problem ... or it might be an accidental observation.
I 071 .... I see .... when you say accidental do you mean that you ..
that it just literally just .. er .. by accident .. hits you or
...?
Dr.O 072 well like urn ... like Becquerel discovering that the
photographic plate in the drawer had um . become marked ...
I 074- uhuh ... so you ...
Dr.O 074- he then followed that up ..(laughs)
I 074 les.
Dr.O 075 whyhad it become marked and therefore and discovered .. that
the rock was giving out radiation .....
I 075 yes .... do you .do you believe .. that um ... er .. I'm just 
trying to see . go through this sequence that you roughly 
described •. do you believe that er •. what wa3 his name 
Becquerel •• or whatever?
Dr.O 077 mm..
I 078 err ... do you believe that •.• that observation . that the
plate was fogged um ... was just a sort of a purely accidental 
thing that he thought . hm . that's odd and then went through 
this sequence •. of er .. of •. of deduction .. and testing and 
so on .. or do you believe that he .. that to have noticed .. 
er ... that it was fogged .. he must have had some sort of idea 
about it in the first place?
Dr.O 083 •••• I don't think he can . have done because I mean he thought
he was taking out a .. new plate out of the drawer which had .•
which was .. you know . completely new film which shouldn't 
have had anything on at all •. and was amazed to discover it • 
wasn't .. that there was in fact a fogging on the plate already
I 087 yyes ...
Dr.O 087 so that .. I mean that was completely accidental I suppose the 
diff ..I . he could have thrown it away and thought it was a 
mistake ...
I 087 uhuh
Dr.O 088 he followed it up .....
I 088 yess ... er .. that's an interesting point actually cos there
were plenty of people before him •. who had actually noticed .. 
that their plates were fogged but had just thrown
Dr.O 088 mm
I 088 them away •.. um .... why do you think that Becquerel didn’t
Dr.O 091 well suppose the scientific idea is that there is an
explanation for things (laughs) ..
I 092 hmmm ... but these other people who were .. sort of throwing
them away they ... they were • in inverted commas scientists 
..as far as I know ... um ... but they didn’t actually go 
through this sequence ...?
Dr.O 094- well they probably had got something else on their minds at the 
time ....
I 094- uhuh
Dr.O 094- or didn't even . or didn't trust themselves that they hadn't at 
some point let it get fogged or that somebody in their lab 
hadn't ... they were •. they were thinking too much upon that 
one particular problem that they were facing at that time ••••.
I 098 uhuh .... um .. is this this sequence that you've described
roughly speaking scientific method in your view —
Dr.O 098 yes.
I 098 ... to put a name as it were ...
Dr.O 101 I've never done any philosophy and theory of it I've just
developed it from doing science ...
I 101 well you .. I mean you've actually done .. research science err
•. so so you know .. there's no need to put er • fancy names 
on it ... I'm just interested in the sequence that you feel 
you've actually used yourself as a research scientist at one . 
point ... and also . • the sort of you that you're trying to put 
over through your teaching ...?
Dr.O 106 trying to put that sort of view through some of ray teaching but
I think . the practical limitations of the classroom and of the
courses that one runs •• don't allow one to put that over as 
much as I would like um ...
I 108 which roughly speaking that sequence that you've..
Dr.O 108 yes
I 108 yes
Dr.O 108 I am happiest when I am teaching along those lines and I .. I
don't always find that possible ...
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I 110 •. and you mentioned limitations of the classroom and also
the curricula materials ...?
Dr.O 111 yes
I 111 um .. could you elaborate a little bit on how they constrain?
Dr.O 111 well when you .. well when you go to a school you're given a
syllabus to teach ... um ... you've got exams that um . the 
kids are going to take ••
I 114 uhuh
Dr.O 114 um ... I find the .. internal exams are the most constraining 
ones .when I don't write them myself ...
I 116 uhuh
Dr.O 116 umm ... and most syllabuses ... tend .. well . not everybody 
would agree with me .. but I find that a syllabus tends to 
have an inbuilt constraint within it .as to ... something to 
do with the sort of philosophy of the people who have written 
the syllabus
I 121 uhuh ...
Dr.O 121 and if you've got a syllabus which is incredibly factually
based its not always easy to teach by discovery method
I 121 I see
Dr.O 121 and to teach the sort of deductive processes
I 122 ... I see .. so . could I make another sort of jump ... you've
given me this er . this sequence and you've said that roughly 
speaking what you view as scientific method?
Dr.O 124 mmm
I 124 is . is that in . in your view what you'd also call discovery
method of teaching ... like .. is that the sort of approach
to scientific method which is embodied in .... Dr.O 126 well
you see I'm not used ... I'm not used to all the sort of 
technical jargon ... certainly •• ]! am happiest when I can 
teach that type of ... that type of sequence
I 129 uhuh ...
Dr.O 129 um with um . and its possible particularly with the younger 
kids
I 129 yep ..
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Dr.O 129 um .. I find that when you get on with older ones . the . again 
the constraints of how much fact you have to get through 
don’t always let you take the sequence through
I 132 yes ...
Dr.O 132 and sometimes also the facts that you’re .. that you’re trying 
to teach .. um .. and the theories that you’re trying to teach 
it isn’t possible to actually .. do all the practical work or 
the experimental work and to follow that sequence through ... 
um ... for • example ... atomic theory
I 136 yeah
Dr.O 136 we can’t do any .. virtually any of the experiments in school
. we do a few . but . but very little ..
I 136 uhuh
Dr.O 137 but I enjoy that part of teaching because at least historically 
I take the kids through the sequence .. that people had 
discovered that these experiments had been done .. these 
observations had been made .. they couldn’t fit them together 
.. then something else happened and they gradually began to fit 
it together ...
I 14-0 uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 140 and I always teach the .. atomic theory section .. 
historically
X 14-0 I s e e
Dr.O 140 because I think you can show that development ....
I 140 I see so .-
Dr.O 142 a lot of sporadic .. a lot of um . various observations in
different parts of Europe
I 142 yes
Dr.O 143 which people gradually managed to ... link together and out of 
that came a theory which has since been tested and refined ....
I 143 uhuh .-
Dr.O 143 so I like doing that .... I find that with ... fourth year kids
if they have not been taught in this way .*. its very very 
difficult to get them thinking in that way if you ..if you 
start with them younger
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I 147 yes ...
Dr.O 147 then you can have a lot of fun because you've developed that
idea from 11 and 12 year olds and .. they will then come 
through with you ... some topics you can teach in that way . 
other topics you have to say well look .. other people have 
shown and this is how it works but ... we can't actually go 
through the full sequence ourselves .. but if you take over 
kids at 14 and 15 who've not been taught in that way ...
I 153 yes .
Dr.O 153 um ... its very very difficult to get them thinking like that
I 154 I see ... what er .. could you say what you find the main
problems with such kids are?
Dr.O 157  they're just-., completely unused to sort of
putting ideas together and looking for explanations ..
I 157 umm
Dr.O 159 because they've tended to have everything .. put to them on a 
plate in the past • • • •
I 159 uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 160 and that that type of deduction ... doesn't occur in many other
subj ects if any .•.
I 160 uhuh
Dr.O 160 I mean I believe that there are certain ... with, certain ways 
of teaching ... history and some sections of humanities which
can use that approach but of course it depends very much
whether that is done in the school where you are
I 164 I see ...
Dr.O 164 and also .. kids find .. sometimes find it difficult to
transfer a method from one subject to another ....
I 165 I see ...
Dr.O 165 but if they've not met that approach before .... um ....  it
takes umm ... a lot of time .. and by the time you've got to
fourth and fifth year you' ve got the CSE exams and you' ve the 0 
level exams .. the .. 12 plus has meant that for the weaker 
kids you're trying to take them through a five year what is 
effectively five years of education in four years ...
I 169 yes .•• yes
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Dr.O 169 so the time pressures are even greater ....
I 170 I see now ... you’ve mentioned the time pressures of courses
.... you also mentioned the factual content
Dr.O 170 mm
I 172 ..I think at one point you said that the amount of the factual
content • given the tine that you've got to get it in
Dr.O 172 mmra
I 172 actually .. goes against .. your sequence?
Dr.O 172 yes
I 174- as it were trying to teach that?
Dr.O 174 well it takes longer to actually let the kids •• take the kids
through that type of sequence
I 174 uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 174 Than it does just to present them with it has been shown that
... (laughs)
I 176 I see • I see • and again •. could I put it to you •.. would I
be right in saying .. er •. without getting too tied down in 
the actual jargon or whatever .. that that sequence that you’ve 
described is .. roughly speaking .. equivalent to discovery 
method of teaching?
Dr.O 179 I've always assumed that that was what was meant by these
terms but then .. sometimes you find that pe . people are using 
the same words and meaning different things ..
I 181 sure • sure yeh ... talking about •. using the same words and
using them in a different way ... er •. you mentioned that 
sometimes you find it difficult er . wh . when you’re teaching 
your kids in a certain way and then there are internal exams 
.. which .• I think you •• you may have suggested at one point 
that they . • they might have been written with a different sort 
of approach in mind
Dr.O 186 mm
I 186 and that that sort of . conflicts ... um .. could you say
what the different approach . if indeed there is one ... is ?
Dr.O 186 yes. I mean there . I mean I . I . have described to you the
way I am happiest teaching ...
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I 186 uhuh .. uhuh •.
Dr.O 189 which isn't the way in which I teach most of the time at the 
moment ....
I 189 yes ...
Dr.O 190 m m .there is always the way where you say that .. what
you've got to do is to teach the kids a whole lot of facts
I 190 uhuh
Dr.O 190 or explanations and things and if an exam is geared .. 
incredibly to very tight recall ...
I 194 yes .
Dr.O 194 um ... then ... it may not be possible to teach this other way
partly because of time
I yes
Dr.O mm ... if one goes to real extremes ...
I uhuh
Dr.O 197 you can get exams which are . virtually expecting the kids to
have heard . a particular form of words for a conclusion to an
experiment ...
I 199 uh ..
Dr.O 199 and if they haven't actually .. got that right sentence down in
their books and memorised that right sentence then they're
going to find the exam difficult ... and I find ... .. I find
those sorts of constraints unjustified .... but if they are
there they are there ...
I 203 uhuh ... and .. would I be right in saying that ... in your 
view if kids have been taught according to this sort of 
sequence of observation . deduction . testing .. um .. they're 
more able to cope with examinations ... they're less 
constrained by forms of words?
Dr.O 208 no not necessarily ... because it depends on the type of 
examination
I 208 uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 209 mm
I 209 ... well thinking about SCISP and er .. Nuffield that's taught
in this school ... do you feel that your sequence is in
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sympathy with those •. ram .• you know like the philosophies 
of those curriculum projects?
Dr.O 213 ..... - very much in with the •• the Nuffield yes ....
I 213 yes
Dr.O 213 ... umm ....  I'm trying to think of the actual form of the
SCISP exams um ... yyes I suppose it is I don't think quite
as noticably as with t h e .........   but yes I think it is a
better approach but its not always possible to teach that way |
I 219 uhuh ....... could I just dig a bit more with er . with .. you
were saying internal exams are sometimes sort of .. 
collide a bit with your approach .... roughly how do they
collide? ..... you mentioned examinations .. I wasn't sure
whether its in the internal semse or in an external sense of
requiring a form of words .. erm ... was that the sense in
which you ... Dr.O 22$
mm I perhaps meant that the internal exams .. collide with 
your approach?
Dr.O 226 .. yes
I 226 yes?
Dr.O 226 and .. its also one of the problems where you're •• urn .......
where you are teaching a course as opposed to a syllabus
I 229 uhuh ...
Dr.O 229 with a syllabus you've got the freedom to teach it in your own
way •.
I 229 sure •.
Dr.O 230 where you're given a course I'm probably .. I'm probably at the
moment tend to stick a little too much to the course because a 
course always has a philosophy inwritten into it I uhuh
Dr.O 233 and where it isn't .. [interruption] O.K. .. and where it isn't
your own philosophy ...
I yyes .?
Dr.O then it isn't always quite so easy whereas you could probably
teach the same material .. slightly different way ... um ...
I 236 I s ee could I just ask you about the last bit of your
sequence •. the testing bit?
Dr.O mm .
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I and just in general terms ... could you could you tell me what
constitutes a test?
Dr.O 239 •• well the sequence that I was using fair enough cannot be
applied be applied in every section of a syllabus
I sure
Dr.O um .. but it hopefully can be applied enough times that the
kids can see that the other bits are • sections of that
sequence ... u m  .. well the one obvious case that I quote
fairly often is when you're um ... is when the Nuffield 
handbook of chemistry at the very beginning
I uhuh
Dr.O 24.5 where they look at what happens when they heat substances w.
they find that you get a loss of weight or a gain of weight ..
I oh yes .. I remember ....
Dr.O or it can stay the same . all three things are possible ....
you don't look at the implications .. and you say well if its 
gaining weight it must have added particles to it somehow .. 
and you go on and investigate that
I uhuh ...
Dr.O 250 if its lost weight there must be a gas ..it must have given
off something .. so possibly something we can't see perhaps a 
gas .... you then check to see if a gas is given off
I yeah
Dr.O and you find out ... from there that you're both increasing
your knowledge ...
I uhuh
Dr.O 253 at the same time because they have then discovered thst when
you heat X Y and Z such and such happens but you've discovered 
it within a much better setting ....
I 254- I see
Dr.O and the kids can go on and .. and predict that certain things
will happen ... that they c... if something has lost weight 
then they can predict that a gas is given off they can then 
collect the gas ... find out if it is a gas .. discover 
something about what sort of gas it is
I uhuh uhuh I see so ...
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Dr.O its only a simple axample
I ... so in that example ... um ... I'm lucky actually
because I remember on my PGCE actually
Dr.O mmm
I had to teach that ... um ... the . the test is actually making
a prediction ..... and then .• and then what?
Dr.O 263 well finding out if the predictions true ....
I I see and if the prediction .. is true ..
Dr.O umm
I umm. what does that enable you to say?., just in general terms?
Dr.O 265 well you . well that is your sort of justification for the
theory that you've put forward ...
I uhuh uhuh
Dr.O and if you .. if if you've got a theory which .. er .. I'd
thought this was what science is about . if you've got a 
theory which enables you to predict what is going to happen 
in a situation .. um .. then your knowledge has increased ...
I uhuh so ...
Dr.O the theory which doesn't enable you to predict anything really
isn't a lot of use .. because it hasn't um ...
I . uhuh ...
Dr.O 271 so what ... its only any use as a stepping stone to something 
else ...
Dr.O so a theory ... but there again if you want a
more advanced example again if we go back to atomic theory
I uhuh
Dr.O um • I can't take the kids .. the A level chemists right
through it because they're not all physicists .. but you can 
get as far as the Bohr theory of the atom ....
I uhuh
Dr.O 273 and you then can actually say to them ... well if we've got
charged particles moving round .. physics has .. has discovered 
the way in which charged particles behave .. if we apply those 
laws .. if we apply those calculations
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1I 278 yes .. yes .
Dr.O 279 we find that there would be a force pulling the electron into
the nucleus ...
I yep ...
Dr.O therefore that particular theory of the atom ... isnft good
enough
I uhuh ...
Dr.O we've got a theory ...
I yes
Dr.O we've applied our knowledge to it we've predicted that the
electron would fall into the nucleus and we know that doesn't 
happen ... therefore . that theory needs to be refined ... I
I see Dr.O and I won't go through with them the detail but I'll
say that the modern . or One of the more modern theories is the 
quantum theory
I uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 286 er . and then talk a little bit about quantised energy ... in a
sense producing that theory out of a hat ...
I uhuh
Dr.O 287 but still fitting its bits to the logical sequence......
I see you mentioned er • the Bohr model of the atom needing
refinement .... erm ... is it refined in the sense as it were •
of ore being refined down to .. a precious metal or is it 
refined in the sense of being changed completely .. like the 
is there a sort of er •• a continuum between the Bohr 
model of the atom and the quantised model in your view or is 
there a ... change?
the the contin
• the continuum is in . the continuum is in the .. the sort of 
steps towards an understanding of the atom ...
I uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 296 umm . people have put forward an explanation which doesn't
actually quite fit the facts so you adjust it ... !
I uhuh
Dr.O er it may • it may eventually over two or three twists become
changed out of all recognition bub it doesn't necessary have to
I 288
Dr.O 294
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be •• but that . that’s surely the progression of knowledge?
I I see and do you feel that you could always follow the sequence
back .. if you're . • a historian or something ... that you 
could actually always follow ... as it were ...
Dr.O as its building you ought to be able to follow it through but
it might seem a rather twisted ....
I 304. but would it be .. but would it follow your logical sequence as
it were if you actually wanted to make the case from going from 
the Bohr model of the atom to the quantised you know cloud 
model or whatever? .... um .... could you actually fit it into 
your sequence do you think of sort of observation deduction 
testing you know new observation or whatever?
Dr.O 310 well I mean I think so yes but I mean its possible that other
people would say that um Planck had to produce something out of 
the air ... um ... but that was still ..that is still .. to 
my way of thinking all part of the search for the theory that 
explains the facts ....
I 314- the theory that explains the facts?
Dr.O um ..
I uhuh
Dr.O and enables you to go on and predict ...
I yep ... fresh .?
Dr.O 316 mm ..
I yep .... um ..... when we were talking about testing and er
... a prediction actually, you know sort of ..succeeding as 
it —
Dr.O mm .. mm
I —  were because the things it predicts .. if I've
understood you —
Dr.O umm
I —  correctly •. actually occur ••. and then you . you have er
.1 think you said support for your theory or something like 
that did you or ..? or that your theory is true I can't 
remember quite what you said ..... that you test ....
Dr.O 323 well you test and if the theory .. if the predictions or the
what you predict as measurable quantities from your theory fit
with the experimental values !
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I 326 uhuh
Dr.O 326 then O.K. ... you haven’t learnt anything but you’ve .. that 
theory still seems to be alright .. if it doesn't fit then 
you've learnt something and you go on and try and amend your • 
amend the theory •• and some
I thats .•
Dr.O its when the theory ... its when the theory and the practice
don't meet that you're making .. that science is making 
progress ....
I 331 ah ... its when they dom't meet that you're actually making
progress .?
Dr.O 332 yes ..
I I see so ... er ... if you make a prediction and it turns ou
alright .. you're not actually advancing knowledge?
Dr.O no
I I see .. its its when they don't meet .. is that ..?
Dr.O because that's when you have to adjust the theory
I uhuh
Dr.O and that's when .. the present explanations aren't good enough
and you're hopefully on the move to a better explanation ......
I 342 ... [interruption] well ... g . given what you've just said,
Janet,... do you think erm • that when you're testing a 
theory its more fruitful to set out to er .. to get a 
prediction which would agree with the theory or to actually set 
out to get a prediction which would actually ... conflict with 
the theory
Dr.O 347 ..... it depends how new the theory is .
I 347 uhuh •.. uhuh
Dr.O when the theory is very new •• then you .. you would obviously
test it in the simplest case where you expect to get agreement 
first of all ...
I uhuh
Dr.O because then that sort of says well yes you're on the right
lines
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I uhuh
Dr.O it will explain certain situations ...
I 351 yes
Dr.O and then you try and see whether it will ex . whether it will
fit slightly more difficult situations and you then push back 
...[interruption]
I 357 ... um . so initially you set out for prediction . to to seek
um . things which would actually agree with it .. whether they 
actually agree with it .. whether or not you can’t tell until 
you’ve done it ..
Dr.O no ..
I 360 but .. and once you’ve got some that have agreed with it.then.
you go on to actually ... developing its . its application is 
that right .. and seeing if theres places where it doesn’t er.
Dr.O you then look into some of the other .. the .. more interesting
areas where it .. may or may not fit and see ... to what 
extent .. good example • lattice energies ... whether they 
.. whether the so called experimental values fit the 
theoretical values .. and then the assumptions within the 
theory of .. calculating lattice energies are that you've got 
pure ionic bonding ...
I uhuh
Dr.O and so in the compounds where .. the theoretical values and the
experimental values give a good fit
I yep
Dr.O then you've got ... we would then say that your assumptions
within that theory of ionic bonding are very valid ...
I yes .. yes ...
Dr.O but if you look at another set of compounds you find that the
fit is not very good ...
I uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 374 and therefore the assumptions upon which the theory is based • 
are not valid in those cases .. and then you look at those 
particular conpounds . compare the two sets of compounds and 
say .. why have we got pure ionic bonding in this case .. or 
why does our model of pure ionic bonding .. give a good 
explanation . for these compounds and give a poor explanation 
for the other compounds ...
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I 377 I see .. and that’s how you • as it were • get a clue as to
where to direct your research is that right?
Dr.O you get a better under .. you get a better understanding of how
the . of bonding theory yes ....
I 382 I see ... could you . roughly speaking .. er there’s a number
of terms . hypothesis . law . theory ... do you think you could 
roughly tell me .. just roughly because I don’t want to keop 
you too much longer now ... because its getting on for time .. 
um ......
Dr.O 386 [laughs] I know it sounds ridiculous .. I used to enjoy that
question
I yes?I
Dr.O 388 um ... the problem with school teaching is that you get so
remote from real science and I’m not at all sure that I could 
define those quite so clearly now
I 390 uhuh
Dr.O umm ... in fact I’d be frightened to because I’m not completely
sure
I yyes ...
Dr.O 392 a law is usually an experimentally ... determined observation
which holds in most cases ...
I uhuh
Dr.O 393 I think almost all laws have got exceptions but ......
I yyes
Dr.O its an experimentally observed ..pattern or general rule ...
I uhuh
Dr.O 395 a hypothesis is . a theory which hasn’t been put to any form of
test or which it isn't possible to test ....
I uhuh
Dr.O 397 um . a theory ... is um .. again an explanation or an idea
which has been put forward and to which .. some level of 
testing or validity has been given to it ...
I I see •. now
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Dr.O 4-02 I think I'm not .. I'm not .. you look a bit surprised
perhaps I'm slightly wrong there certainly a hypothesis is one
that in theory ..., that you can't really put a test to... its 
been suggested . people will probably work on it but .. you 
can't put an easy test to ... a theory ... most obvious one is 
atomic theory •.. and some people would argue that its been so 
many ideas in science are based on it that in a sense that it 
has almost been proved by induction but um .....
I 4-13 um .... when you say that you feel that you might be slightly
wrong in your definitions ... do you feel that there are ... as
it were . right definitions .somewhere?
Dr.O 416 no but its . I'm just sort of out of touch with that sort of 
philosophical approach and . I mean that . that is in f. the 
question you've asked is in fact an A level exam question ...
I 418 Is it •• yes
Dr.O and I • I can remember when I saw it on the exam paper ...
thinking oh super • I remember having had lots of discussions 
and having .. discussed it a lot and •• en.1 oyed the 
discussions about it in the past ... now •• I feel I'm a bit
out of touch with that sort of thing ..... and I wouldn't trust
my judgement any more ...
I 423 O.K. .. um • could I ask er . er . a slightly different
question . and that is those three .. three terras ... um ... do 
they er .• have any place in your sequence of observation 
deduction ••. testing?
Dr.O 430 ... I suppose one could develop .. one could mesh them in ...
I uhuh
Dr.O um .......... I mean most of the time we're playing with words
I 432 yes ...
Dr.O and therefore different people will use different words in
different ways
I mm .. mm ...
Dr.O and even people I would appear to disagree with probably
largely a case of words and there would obviously be an awful 
lot we agree on even •. even . if we apparently disagree on 
words ...
I certainly .. certainly ...
Dr.O um ... yes . I suppose .. yes I suppose one can fit them in...
I don't think they're necessary ..... [laughs]
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I 439 I see .so ....
Dr.O I mean there is a tendency ... laws tended to be declared at a
time when people were’nt looking for explanations ...
I uhuh uhuh
Dr.O because if you go through historically the first sequence ..
the first ..great coming in of science was to sort of •• first 
of all discover how things worked ... so if they discovered 
that something always seemed to happen they declared a law ... 
whereas nowadays that doesn’t . that isn’t happen in the same 
sort of way because .. people are much more .. looking at .. 
for explanations as to how things work ....
I 447 I see .. so .. so .. would it be fair to say that .. that
initially people were rather er .. even ..• that they used to 
tend to say . O.K. we’ve tested you know our deduction . and 
we've got what we thought should happen ... and we declare it a 
law ... but you think people are less likely to do that ... 
nowadays .?
Dr.O 455 well if you look at most of the stated laws of science they’re
all well over 100 . mostly . near •• a lot of them nearer to 
200 years old
I 456 uhuh
Dr.O and I think it reflects . the . different state of the art ..
at that time there was •.• not even a belief that things were 
logic . things did not follow logical sequences and therefore 
if somebody ... found something that appeared to always happen 
..it was a great event and it was . declared as a law ....
I 463 I see .. what er .. would it be declared as now do you think?
Dr.O 464 well it would just be published as a . in scientific paper
somewhere and get lost in the morass of facts [laughs]
I 466 ... yeah .? would they actually call it a law or would they
call it something different do you think?
Dr.O 467 just depends on the egotism of the chap who writes the paper
[laughs]
I yeah ... so its an individual decision • do you think? .. is is
it an individual decision er . to call ... ? something a law .
Dr.O 471 I don't think many people call things laws nowadays but .. I
mean you get thing . jokingly somebody will refer to something 
as a law on the other hand if somebody puts forward an idea 
which is used an awful lot ..
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I 4-74 mm ..
Dr.O 474 even today people will use that chap's name as a shorthand ...
I mean in the calculations that I was using we used to refer to
the different sort of refinements and assumptions we used to 
refer to by the names of the chaps who'd put them forward even 
if it was only over the last four or five years
I 479 uhuh uhuh
Dr.O somebody had put forward a suggestion at a conference then if
it was a good suggestion and people started to use it they
would refer to it as his approximation ... or doing ... um ....
a something calculation *. well depending what it was or doing 
I and you call it an approximation? Dr.O or doing a such and 
such a calculation then would still refer to it by somebody's 
name ....
I 485 I see ... er .. would there be .. er .sometimes things are
called laws and that's in your view largely an individual 
matter as to how egotistical or whatever that person is
Dr.O 488 well nowadays yes ...
I nowadays
Dr.O um ..
I 489 would there be .. what . would they under any circumstances
call that thing um .. a theory or a hypothesis instead of a law 
do you think nowadays? or do you think that —
Dr.O no because laws ... laws are to do with observed fact —
I —  uhuh —
Dr.O —  theories are to do .. theories are much more .. sort of
explanations ... things that are curr .. current immediately • •
well for example the gas laws ... I mean you can actually
measure how a gas behaves under certain conditions ... laws 
tend to be to do with physically observable things whereas 
theories .... its the application of the theory which is um ... 
tests •• which gives you an experimental value which can be 
measured ....
I 502 well I just wondered is . there a different approach for
getting a law than there is for getting a theory or whatever 
... because you said that a law is a sort of observed fact ... 
um ... and • and at one point you said its sort of it could be
fitted into sort of the end of your sequence I think?
Dr.O 508 no no no
- A18.21 -
I no? .. sorry
Dr.O no I certainly didn't say that ... if anything the law would fit in at
in at the beginning .. that is .. that's your observation ..
... your experimental .... thing
I yep . I see so .. in your sequence of observation deduction ..
testing ... law would tend to come at the very beginning do you
think? is that what you said?
Dr.O 515 I would have thought so yes
I uhuh ... and ... the law would be ... how would that relate to
observation?
Dr.O 521     don't really see the point of the question ... I
mean if we take the gas laws for example ...
I mm • •
Dr.O somebody notices that the gas expands if you heat it ..
I 523 yes ...
Dr.O 525 so they test to see if that's always true
I uhuh uhuh
Dr.O 526 and if all the gases that can be tested or that they can find 
data about ...
I yyes
Dr.O expand when heated then that can be put down as a law
I ... yyes ...
Dr.O umm
I well I think I've got a bit confused over the difference
between a prediction and an explanation because in a way you
could say that the gas law um ... is an explanation .... but
you could also say its a prediction .. couldn't you • ? because 
it explains why . it explains observations
Dr.O 535 yes
I but its also a prediction?
Dr.O its no expl .. its no explanation at all
I no?
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Dr.O um ... its just an observable fact that gases expand when
heated •.••
I yes ... so ..?
Dr.O 54-0 there's no explanation in that as to why they expand ...
I 54-0 yes ...
Dr.O you've got to go on to kinetic theory ...
I uhuh
Dr.O in order to give a possible explanation as to why gases expand
when heated .. and your theory then is to do with the way the , 
moving particles behave and if you . •—
I 54-5 ah now I see the difference yes
Dr.O —  put the um . if you .. if you give them more energy you ..
if you've put more heat energy into the system .. the theory 
states that you then increase the kinetic energy of the 
particles ...
I 54-9 sure
Dr.O and therefore that they will be pushing back and will need more
space ...
I 550 I see ... now .. now I understand what you mean ... it was
just the relation .. as it were?
Dr.O mm
I mmm ... and that comes at the beginning of the sequence ... er
... even before observations or .. just after observations ... 
or is it actually part of the observation
Dr.O 555 its all part of the observation ..
I the , the gas law?
Dr.O 556 well the gas law is surely the observation
I 557 I see .. that's the observation . from which you get .. in your
sequence er .. deductions .. and then you . test those 
deductions
Dr.O 561 yyes •••
I 561 yeah ... um ..... if you get .. um ... a prediction ... if you
... sorry . were getting a bit .. must you be off?
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Dr.O I'm sorry .. well I've got to get to Lower School and back
before a quarter past
I 565 O.K. ... O.K. .. could I just ask you this last few minutes
... if you get an experimental result that agrees with um
with your prediction do you ... what do you end up with then?
Dr.O 572 why you've to some extent justified the assumptions and that 
that you've put into your calculation
I uhuh ...
Dr.O they were in that particular situation . the assumptions and
exp • the explanation that you put in were correct
I 577 uhuh
Dr.O or appear to be correct and you the test a more demanding
situation ....
I 579 right • um . when you say something's correct do you mean that
um . following this sequence you can never end up by saying
that anything is absolutely correct absolutely true or •.
do you feel its just something else?
Dr.O 587 ....its a working . you know its a working theory .. or a
working hypothesis ...'I mean heaven knows •• you know somebody 
can always come up .. can discover something later which 
doesn't quite explain it and then you have to .. build in some 
other assumptions or
I 592 O.K. could I ask if you think that scientific knowledge is
different from other forms of knowledge?
Dr.O 595 well I'm more aware of what you mean by scientific knowledge
.. I'm not quite so sure .. um historians and musicians would 
call knowledge •• I mean I think in any subject there is an • 
element of ... knowledge .. which is the same as scientific 
knowledge
I ... uhuh
Dr.O 601 but whether .. English and music would refer to other things as
knowledge which wouldn't be considered as knowledge in science 
I'm not sure
I 604. uhuh ... what er ... what sort of attributes ... do you think
scientific knowledge has ..? ... because some people make a 
distinction don't they between sort of general knowledge ... 
religious knowledge .. scientific knowledge ... and what is it 
.• roughly?
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Dr.O well sorry ... I don't think that there is a disctinction ...
I * uhuh ...
Dr.O 611 I . mean general knowledge is simply the knowledge which you
would expect somebody .. most people to have .. a background of 
knowledge
I uhuh
Dr.O 615 um .. I don't see that that is intrinsically different from
other forms of knowledge ....
I 617 I see so could I ask um • in your everyday life ... um ••• do
you feel that the way in which you acquire and justify 
knowledge in your everyday life'... um has a relationship to 
how .. scientists acquire and justify scientific knowledge?
Dr.O 626 it isn't tested as thoroughly as scientific knowledge ought to
be but that um ... I suppose there's more hearsay
knowledge but then there's lots of that in science anyway .... 
its something that I haven't really thought about ....
I 631 so its not tested so thoroughly but er .. the could be some
link in your view?
Dr.O um
I yeah ..O.K. thanks . 635
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What I'd like to actually ask you about today is in the 
general area of the conduct of science and of undergraduate 
science teaching, so .... the first thing I'd like to ask 
you is, just very briefly, do you think you could tell me 
a bit about your personal academic background and occupations 
up to and including your present academic duties and research 
duties, just very briefly.
mm .....  well between school and university I spent two years
doing National Service which I suppose was an education in 
some ways and I think probably its enabled me to reflect 
much more on what I wanted to do .. um then I spent three 
years at Durham um reading for a degree eventually in Zoology, 
on Zoology. I then did a years postgraduate course at 
Cambridge and I suppose the main reason for going there rather 
than going on to do research was that I was very interested 
in doing running at that time (laughs).
A years postgraduate course in?
In education.
In education.
At Cambridge, mainly running but I did do some education,
I did quite a lot of teaching and I quite enjoyed it. I think 
I had actually reflected sufficiently, that I didn't just 
sort of drift into teaching because that happened to be the easy 
way out, um basically I suppose I'm a person who enjoys contact 
with people and um, therefore a job either teaching or in 
some sort of relationship with people, doesn't matter what their 
age is but it happens to be now university students in the main. 
But in fact after Cambridge I then got a job as Head of Biology 
at Forest School which is in the outer part of London at r7 
and I was there for four years, enjoyed it enormously but I felt 
it was a bit limiting and at that point in time I used to go quite 
often up to University College in London and the University of 
London Library and I got involved in a little bit of research 
at school ... and I must admit that some of the things that had 
put to me .. I'd been actually asked to do research when I 
graduated . but there was nothing particularly at that stage that 
motivated me strongly enough to want to do research, because 
I think to take on three years research you need to want to do it. 
I mean its not just the degree, frankly, you've got to be 
interested and basically enjoy what you are doing for those three 
years otherwise it could be purgatory .. um but I got interested
in some problems ...... I thought about at one stage applying for
a Royal Society Grant which was given to school teachers ... 
but in the end I decided to make an absolutely clean break and
- A19.1 -
M 042
050
060
076
go back as a mature research student on very little money and 
subjected my wife and family at that time too ... um low income 
but um I don't think we really regretted it ... er eventually 
because of the costings and one thing and another I went back 
to Durham, I thought about London . but the trouble was London 
was very expensive to live and . funningly enough some of the 
people I'd been talking with in London had actually moved up to 
Durham again . a total coincidence, so I did a PhD at Durham 
into the sort of physiology and biochemistry of ageing which 
is something that still continues to interest me and something 
which . as a sort of outside the university I'm very keen on 
aspects of nutrition and ageing . I'm a great believer in 
preventative rather than curative medicine, we spend ridiculous 
sums on curative medicine and by the very nature of medical 
training we seem to focus on that rather than preventative 
medicine that would stop alot of people getting there in the 
first place. We even set about this in the right way and I 
believe in the right form of education, because diet and 
smoking habits and this sort of thing are all quite an exercise, 
are all quite fundamental to good health and unfortunately in this 
present society that we have, which is instant junk food, watching 
television and getting fat, possibly in some instances smoking 
too much and possibly drinking too much, not that I'm anti-drinking 
or anything . but again I think people do and so .... so its an 
issue that I have actually interested myself in, outside the 
university as well as partly inside it and it stems as I say from 
an interest in physiology and biochemistry of ageing and now I 
find myself within the School of Biological Sciences and I was 
appointed here as what was then called an E Tutor. This was an 
experimental thing that Sussex did in the early stages, Sussex 
was very full of experiments in the^early stages, which I think 
was rather good, and I regret to say that as time has gone on 
it has been less innovative. But at that time we make alot of 
mistakes but I think it was an innovative place, perhaps there was 
money also available at that time that allowed more innovation 
whereas today the lack of money has led it to stagnation 
unfortunately in my view. So I was appointed as an E Tutor, and 
that meant that I spent two thirds of my time approximately in the 
School of Biological Sciences.... and about a third of my time 
in education, at that time it was called the School of Education and 
Social Studies and then changed its name to Cultural and Community
Studies and Education actually detached off from Cultural and 
Community at a later stage. My prime . er involvement in Education 
at that time or Science Education was the PGCE course, and although 
I had a spell away from that during a time that I was directing 
one or two undergraduate teaching projects in the last two or three 
years I've come back into the PGCE work, which I enjoy because the um 
. its quite nice to be part of the formative stages of um .. 
potential teachers, so um .... in other respects I've not had a great 
deal to do with the education side, I have actually been involved 
in supervising one or two MPhil theses and I was involved with 
in-service BEd for a few years in the early '70s Which meant a
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certain quantity of science education teaching. But er most of 
the time I actually spend in undergraduate courses and from about 
1969/70 to about 1979/78 ... first of all was the Directorate 
at Sussex of the inter-university biology teaching project here 
and during that period as well I also took on a writing role 
with one of my colleagues, Sir Robert Whittle, in the joint 
universities genetic project which cuninulated in I think 
S299 genetics at the Open University. Again that was an 
interesting experience, partly for the political wranglings 
as well as the design and writing of courses, it was quite an 
eye opener I think, but er . primarily I think that takes us up 
to date.
Could I just ask you what your current research speciality is?
 .....Well I've been doing one or two things for um .. having
spent something like eight years on developing undergraduate 
teaching materials. I must admit it was a fair relief to doing 
more research on the purely biological side and I had a research 
student and recently I had a visiting Professor from the States 
.. and we've primarily been looking a,t^what's it called ... 
Biogensis Microchondrio, that's how Michondrian is made, but 
er I have recently been well over the last few years I have been 
involved with the Institute of Biology particularly with the 
Journal Biological Education, which I sit on the Board there . 
and the Education Division of the Institute um .. I'm also as 
it happens ... sitting for the Education Division on one of
the Nutritional Committees which does interest me. Um  ......
I am currently thinking as I recently talked to a man called 
Dr Roger Hammond, who with another colleague at Cardiff have 
developed a self-learning course for the first year, rather 
like we have in the Department of Zoology and er because 
I've always thought that this has been wrong . that we've each 
and everyone of us beaver away in our own little institutions 
primarily producing materials designed specifically for our 
institutions ... and . unfortunately despite our good intentions 
. that was the intentions of the Inter-university Biology 
Teaching Project, many of the materials produced did not get 
excessive use, in some cases didn't get any use at all in other 
institutions, despite all the efforts and time and money that had 
gone into it. Now, as it happens our materials, the basic biology 
course was used rather more extensively not only in the university 
but in some sixth forms um . so that pleased us a little bit, 
but it wasn't taken up in quite the same way that perhaps we had 
originally anticipated.
Are you referring to that set of books?
Yes, published by Cambridge. But the thing that I'm moving onto 
is that Roger Hammond and um . his colleagues also did a similar 
sort of thing. That was a first years Zoology course, but 
we've been talking about interactive video as a means of self­
learning and teaching in the first year.
- A19.3 -
M 146 That has the advantage that it is far more flexible plus the
fact that you can write the materials on the word processor 
and change it . indeed so much so that you could actually put
a framework out to any first year course and any first year
group of people could slightly modify that to their specific needs 
whereas if you write a book it unfortunately requires a number 
of years before the mistakes and other changes are made in it, 
and this is very attractive because interactive video is in its 
early stages of education, but I think it has quite alot of 
potential and it may well be that in the next year or so we 
shall be looking in that direction. And the other thing that 
156 interests me is um . a scheme that's been going in the States
for some time, I met the sort of co-founder of the idea, 
a man called um Professor Wales at the Engineering Institute 
at the University of er ... sorry I think they like to call 
it West Virginia University at Morgan town, and he's been looking 
into the problems of decision making .''that decision making 
is not a thing that is taught in many schools or universities, 
and they have a scheme that they have been developing over the 
last, I should think seven or eight years, called Guided 
Design Programme and essentially it involves groups of students 
in making decisions about a specific problem . in other words 
to come up with solutions not on a totally ad hoc basis, but 
actually to now be offered the refinement that they've recently 
made is to um .. offer guidance as to how to come up with 
suitable suggestions, given, of course that in a real situation, 
you've got to look at how practical your suggestions are, and 
what the cost is going to be and whose going to implement them 
um . how much flexibility are you going to allow and some idea 
of how effective it is going to be. And so they may come up 
with a number of alternative solutions and look at them more 
deeply .of course it demands in each case . a um . some 
knowledge, but its not essential that everyone has this knowledge 
locked up inside their brain, I mean one of the other things 
I'm very keen to promote and indeed do so in the first year 
is what I call a literature search, I have a number of these
little ....   well they're almost like treasure hunts or little
games that I present to students in which they have to go away 
and find out information from journals and other things in the 
library and it makes them use just about all the facilities of 
the library as well including the audio-visual, the inter-library 
189 loans um . reserves section, they are of course there on
computer search . actually its . the computer search, I think is 
complete from 1979 up to the present day, when it is incomplete 
prior to that, you have to go back to the card indexing. There's 
also a Microfiche that they can search and scan in on things 
so . I try and get them involved in just about everything and 
yet at the same time to the questions relate to a specific 
theme, the two themes, that I've developed with them so far . it 
takes a bit of time ... one is called um Haemoglobin and er
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disease factors . and of course . this gets them into er 
... studying the structure and the programme, genetic programme 
of haemoglobin and of course the various anaemias that are 
sickle cell and and so on, associated with a very
well research area of biochemistry and physiology um ... 
the other area, the other little literature research is called 
Nutrition and the Third World, and that actually . both of them 
start from very simple beginnings, basically let's find out 
some fairly straightforward facts and then they get them more 
involved in specific papers and um in the Nutrition and Third 
World actually it leads them into a paper which they have to look 
at somewhat more deeply than with some of the Haemoglobin, 
with Haemoglobin they go through more papers with more questions 
with the Nutrition they do some scanning and go to one, one specific 
paper . um ... which I've doctored slightly so that they have to 
come up with some ideas of their own ... and they probably have 
to go to consult some of the references given in that paper of their 
own accord, it uses a bit of initiative so those are some of the 
things that we've been interested in. The other things . two 
year ago I had a couple of visitors from Mexico, and er they 
were mathematical biologists but we did at that time was to look 
at some simulation exercises in mathemcatical ecology and er 
these are very simple well er ... perhaps not quite as simple 
that they might appear, they basically are simply, they use either 
a programmible caculator or some simple models and little bit 
later on, on a simple computer . um . they could be quite 
appropriate to slot in to a number of courses but that was a sort 
of a joint effort because that was their interests. I think that 
pretty well brings us up to date.
✓
Well thank you very much for that resume. Its quite interesting 
for me actually um I get the impression that your two themes 
of Nutrition in the Third World and Haemoglobin in related diseases, 
um you've developed that over the last couple of years as specific 
themes, but I can see a sort of precursos to those -. I remember 
Haemoglobin figuring quite prominently, I suppose inevitably in the 
first year of undergraduate tutorials and I certainly remember in 
week two that it was go and have a look at this, find your own 
references . er not quite so formalised as specific enzymes 
and similarly I remember there was a seminar paper on photosynthesis 
that I think they'd even doctored and we were asked to 
( )
( no I haven't actually doctored that paper)
( )
You haven't?
That was a classic paper in its own right and it was first 
published in Nature, in I think 1954 a fair old time ago, and it 
was one of the first classic papers on photosynthesis, what I 
actually did was to use that after a lecture period, to test their
comprehension and understanding because that paper . since that
paper was published alot of water had flown under the boat 
at photosynthesis bridge.
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And so its a reflective exercise as well as a comprehension 
exercise . but all that I've done I think is to set up either 
ten or twelve questions which tested their comprehension, which 
made them probably look up in other journals or other books. 
Relatively short, three page paper with . with some fairly 
interesting graphs and tables, ... its a very good paper,
I constantly look for papers like that ... and even the 
original Crick and Watson paper on DNA is quite an interesting 
one to get students to look at, and of course even going 
further back in the genetics course here we get them to look 
at the original Mendel paper as translated, it was originally
written in German, it was translated by um .......  by I
think it was Bateson, yes Bateson or Bateson and n '■ 
and um .. again . I think what it does is to .' when students 
come to us with an 'A' level background in genetics, very often 
the typical textbook approach, quite inevitably has to be 
to condense it and just take out perhaps two or possibly three 
experiments nearly always round or wrinkled peas, or yellow and 
green peas and then they can sling them together and . you get 
a sort of three page synopsis of the whole of Mendels life and 
basic experiments. What I think doesn't emerge from a lot of 
textbooks is um ... that Mendel . alot of people say that Mendel 
was very fortunate to get such good results, I don't think he was 
actually, I think he was a very clever man, I think he realised 
that um when to stop and er I think that from a statistical point 
of view . there's been lots of arguments as whether he doctored 
the results or not. That I think is immaterial, if you go back 
to the original papers you see that in the number of the basic 
crosses he go extaordinary ratios . I mean in one sort of cross 
one might have got to about twenty nine greens to thirty one 
yellows, which is not exactly a three to one ration on the 
other hand he could also have got and did in fact get something 
like thirty two yellows to one green which is not exactly a 
three to one ratio. Its when you scan through the whole set of 
data that you see he see he started to see this
So what was the point you were making about the ...
The paper .....
The textbook, you started off by saying there's a problem 
with this school text.
Well I think inevitably because they had to cover a whole 
curriculum and they had to put . that it has been traditional 
at least to put it within one cover . they can't make it too 
big or too bulky because it is not easy to carry around and if 
they make it too big anyway its frightfully expensive um ... 
either the students or the school can't afford it so of
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necessity I think they have to um, be fairly brief, but it 
tends at times, to take away some of the um . the really hard 
spade work which quite clearly emerges from Mendel's writings 
of his experiments.
Right.
I mean it was jolly hard work, sheer hard slog for many years 
because peas don't grow like bacteria or flys, I mean you don't 
knock up ten generations in e. year, you knock up one, then 
you've got to analyse them and replant them in the next year and 
so on, so it was a very painstaking piece of work and that 
often'is not appreciated I think in my students.
Do you feel this is an aspect of the conduct of science that 
you would like to bring over to undergraduates in your teaching?
Do you mean the history or the hard graph?
The hard graph at this stage um ..
I think elements of both, X quite like the historical aspect,
I'm not quite sure whether the students appreciate it or not 
because I think you've got to be a bit reflective and put 
yourself in the students' shoes at times, there's a marvelous 
saying, I don't know if I can actually quote it directly but,
"never judge someone until you've walked in their moccasins" 
its an old Indian saying.
That's a lovely saying, I might even use it myself if I may (laughs).
I 've only got part of it exactly right, I think its always a good 
thing from time to time particularly if things or if the responses 
or marks, marking of paper, marking exam, or marking an essay.
If the marks are uniformly rather low, the tendancy I think is 
to put the blame on students and say well they're a thick lot 
they just didn't understand and that may be true, on the other 
hand I think its not a bad thing to put yourself in their shoes 
and think, did the ideas that I was trying to convey were they 
put across quite as well as I could have done, were the basic 
principles brought out and so um . it may be that . I personally 
enjoy the historical background now from a retrospective view 
from the science, one enjoys it and sees that pleasure of those 
experience and in fact the hard work.
The pleasure of those experiments?
I don't think you can really ever quite portray to a student unless 
they've done some sort of research of their own or unless they've 
and MSc or PhD as to the amount of material that you tend to 
accumulate and have to analysis or even the routiness.
Could we put it a little more strongly, would you feel that er
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a knowledge of history of science is actually a necessary 
component of say an undergraduate degree in science.
.... well necessary is probably quite a strong work.
Only you've mentioned ........
Um I, I mean I take a personal view on this, not necessarily 
accepted by all my colleagues, or whether it would be accepted 
by the students, I think its not bad, and dome students I'm 
sure would appreciate it. To look back on how a particular 
subject area has grown because I think if you're not careful 
if you take it without the history, you tend to see the subject 
as being frightfully logical, this happened and then that 
happened and it developed be ciuti fully, frankly most science 
doesn't develop that way at all as far as I can see. Its a little 
happening that occurred in 1908 and then there was another 
piece of the jigsaw puzzle that happened in 1915, and at that 
time 1908 and 1915 seem poles apart, and then gradually you find 
bits more of information being brought up and then suddenly 
someone will come along and fit the pieces of the jigsaw
puzzle together um, I think for example a classic case of this
is in certain aspects of biochemical metabolism, certain 
biochemical pathways, um, in which little snippets of information 
from experimentation had been built up since the turn of the 
century, round about the 1900s and eventually culminated for 
example in quite a good knowledge of ' - and
fermentation and er also a pretty sound knowledge of the
triocolic  ^ acid cycle and the Creb cycle but if you
as you said look back into history it didn't all develop 
beautifully, logically, we got from this step to that step ..
Could I ask have you developed any personal policy towards 
considering controversies in science, past and present.
Oh yes I plenty of times, I think that .... I've done it a few 
times, I suppose ....
I'm remembering from my observations ....
Yes we did .....
Structure of cell membrane ^  and michochondria
and symbiosis.
Yes that's right, I think its not bad to sometimes shake the 
students a little bit, not too much because then they start 
to feel that nothing is sound.
Perhaps can I come in there with a question that I really meant 
to ask a little bit earlier . er are the any sort of patters that 
you've discerned in first year undergraduate students' understandings 
of the conduct of science which you would regard as unfortunate
- A19.8 -
I 410 mistaken?
M 412
I 430 
M 430
448
I 459
M 462 
I 462
M 467 
I 468 
M 468
... well „... I think they . I think there is a tendancy again 
by viirtue of the fact that ’A' level is what it is, you know 
there's alot of stuff crammed into a comparatively short space 
of time and it may also be true of university as well to some 
extent. What I slightly sad about is perhaps the students at 
times sufficiently reflective oh the evidence, experimental 
evidence that went to make up a particular
fact um the facts are only as good as the experiments behind 
them and sometimes the students will quite guillibly the 
textbook because it has to be fairly precise and simplistic 
DNA makes RNA makes Protein basic central dogma.
And it probably start .....
That's right, and in fact that is probably true now, but at 
one point I think there could have been some doubt um . over 
the past few years the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour 
of that central dogma. But if you challenge the students 
to substantiate that dogma even in outline through 
experiments many of them can't do so, they just say 
well that's in the textbook so it must be right and there 
is this feeling that not best amongst children er students 
but amongst adults as well that the printed word is somehow 
gospel, the printed word contains thousands of mistakes, I mean 
with the best will in the world most Newspapers which people 
as the sort of gospel, not only have quite often a very biassed 
view but because of a way that information is gleaned and • 
because its a very personal thing it can be very very inaccurate,
I mean I've known many examples both in and out of science 
reported in Newspapers which bear no relation to, its the man's 
personal or woman's personal view.
Could I just ask you on that choice of the Central Dogma on
biology, um Asez was the first thing that you tackled
week one.
Yes I think I did that ...
Now that . er there are many other things that you could have 
tackled and I just wondered whether you were influenced at all 
by um . this specimen question, which had come out in 1982 from the 
Oxford board called the Central Dogma of > • biology
I just wondered whether ....
No, not at all its ..
Pure coincidence?
Pure coincidence, absolute pure coincidence I had no connections 
with the Oxford board# no . none whatsoever, I have seen the 
question, I'd be interested to have a look at the question
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Well, I'll give you a copy.
Yeh, great, um
.... Could I just ask you what sort of qualities do you look for 
in prospective undergraduate biologist?
........  What when they come here ...
.. mm you mentioned you've a few problems er ...
Yes, I’m not sure if its always the students fault you see,
I think it may well be the very nature of teaching, and I'm 
not always sure that its necessarily always the teachers fault, 
both are under a certain amount of time pressure, time is 
a commodity that no one has more of in a week than anyone else 
you can only have seven days and twenty-four hours in a day
Nevertheless you have to make a decision.
yes .......  let me just reflect on this a little bit ...
I think ......  its an exercise ....... and I know that I've
been involved in it for quite a number of years now and 
recently has biology school selector .... we like to know first 
of all why our student chose Sussex I suppose, and whether they're 
the sort of person who's done their homework about the place which
might also imply that they will actually do their homework on
other problems, now some students come to us and quite clearly 
they really haven't read or certainly not studied the prospectus 
in biology, they glibly put us down probably amongst other 
people and its quite clear that they haven't really much idea 
why they wanted to cane to Sussex, now some students clearly 
do and they've either been advised to come here maybe other 
teachers or other students who had come here and enjoyed it and 
advised them to come here and that's generated an interest about 
the place. Others of course are interested in the type of course 
that we run, now I think that most universities in the last ten 
years have probably quite seriously relooked at their courses 
in the light of new universities who have I suppose the advantage 
of when they started up they didn't necessarily have to conform 
with any previous tradition and probably when you've been brought 
up in tradition its not easy to break that um .. but I think 
what the new universities probably did was by moving away from 
rather artificial boundaries of zoology and botany and biochemistry 
rather narrow in my veiw subjects . which are very difficult to 
define anyway without moving over into another area but when 
the new universities came along and set up, Sussex did a sort of 
schools of study and ... it is that sort of ... I mean this sort 
of um more broadly based course or course that's not divided 
into little compartments, certainly appeals to quite a number 
of the students that we eventually accept.
So what is it that you're actually looking for?
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I think we're looking for students who are interested in 
contemporary biology.
Contemporary biology?
Yes ... um but um ...
When you say Contemporary biology .....
Well I mean they're interested in the way in which 
not just science but particularly biological science is 
progressing. Every university has a certain research expertise 
and accordingly I suppose some students although relatively few 
choose a place because of its research record. If that were the 
case Sussex would be extremely high placed on the list because 
it has in terms of its biological research ....
I saw some things on the wall.
That's right, its been in the first two or three in the last ten 
years or so. But in fact students don't go . its interesting.
May I ask you at that point would you value that as a criterion 
in a prospective undergraduate, they say I want to come here because 
the research level is good.
Yes .... mm I think we would be quite pleased, yes, I'm not sure 
if its the absolute criterion for selection and I don't normally 
base it on that, I think we would be pleased because what we 
would I think we would have seen would be a student who had 
taken quite alot of trouble to find out about this place and 
who showed quite a strong ....
Had done their homework.
That's right, who showed quite a strong interest it not just . 
well a strong interest in his or her subject and in certain 
areas of that subject to which we perhaps had some research 
expertise .. but the things that tend to influence them are 
probably personalities, so that for example um John Maynard 
Smith who's on the television, they may know about Maynard 
Smith and they may know that Sussex is good from the point of 
view of evolution in biology# well that's what they see though 
nothing actually is quite correct but um ... likewise a number 
of people have heard of David Streeter because he's been on 
naturalist programmes and quite a well know figure in the South 
East of England, because of his knowledge on ecology and geology 
and this area. Those are the things that tend us.
The sort of things you've mentioned so far are ....
That's right see if I can just try and list them to make 
it easier, were the people that had done their homework and
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decided that they really want to come to Sussex because 
of all the things that Sussex offers the .. the type 
of course I guess the type of university that it is 
obviously the situation helps, in fact that can even 
be a negative thing towards some students who I think 
if you really delve deeply all they want is a sort of three 
years holiday camp by the sea um . if that's their only 
reason then I think well some are very honest and it may
be an additional attraction and I don't mind that at all.
What I like to do is in the very short interviews that we 
can offer them ... um I look at the reports that the 
headmasters or whoever it is makes and I try and judge 
whether that's a fair report on them, picking certain 
things out of that report and seeing whether the students 
in a very short space of time that we have them and we've 
got to bear in mind that some of them are very nervous 
whether they seem to be, whether they seem to live up to 
this sort of reference 1 may show them picture on
an electro micrograph, I may show them a file of......
I may show them a ... um plate with yeast cultures on 
or something, I may show them something quite simple and 
ask them some very sort of basic questions and then I might 
ask them how would you find out type question.
How would you find out question ....
Yes in other words, lbt's take a little culture of yeast 
and at some time I might show them a yeast plate which shows 
normal colonies and what is described as petite colonies 
and I might just simply say to them well you can see that 
those colonies are smaller than others and .... and why 
do you think .. you know how would you find some sort of 
cause for one set of colonies being somewhat smaller than 
the other and what initial punches would you play, hypothesis 
would you go for and then perhaps very briefly I might 
ask them well, what sort of experiments might you set up 
to try and find out whether was it just the fact that 
they were genetically ....
Well what sort of thing is it that you're trying to 
get at ...
Well they may suggest oh, there's a genetic difference,
OK well how are you going to sort of ....
But what is it that you're actually trying to,
is it their thinking?
Well I think its you know that they have . they're not
totally set in to a routine of facts, this is this, this
is that and when you actually ask them to actually think 
about a problem and even though it doesn't worry me
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that the approach that they use is either right or wrong, 
that doesn’t matter, but as long as they have some idea 
of the way they might approach the solution of the problem 
because basically although the whole of the course may not 
be problem solving there will be quite a lot of factual 
things .... we certainly will be presenting them with 
problems of one sort or the other.
Could I ask you a sort of global question then, in general 
terms roughly are you trying to achieve through 
your teaching of undergraduate science?
     um well
In general terms not in a sort of detail.
...... very very concisely I’d like to make, 'I’d like
to help people become self sufficient ... again I think 
there’s a marvellous quote somewhere and I think its 
actually Hearse in one of his books and I can’t remember 
which one, in that a good teacher, and it doesn't 
make much difference ’;o a teacher of science or something 
else is one who eventually moves the students on so that 
he makes himself or herself redundant in other words 
they don't need you because you've guided them and .. 
helped them to learn effectively for themselves .... um
they no longer need your ... well they need less and less 
of it as times goes on. Their dependence, I mean what 
one should see in the three years that they're here is. 
that they move on and that they become more mature in 
their outlook and thinking um that they .. consider 
scientific problems from perhaps a number of different 
view points, we're all very guilty at some point of 
this, even professional scientists and people that ought 
to know better, the are occasions, where I think we 
become very entrenched in our views and don't necessarily 
look at and accept too readily um that may be a good 
thing not to accept it too readily but to actually 
look at . I mean there have been some excellent examples 
over the last twenty or thirty years of um people coming 
up with really quite novel or new thoughts on a particular 
problem and for the established fraternity this has really 
brought them out with quite a shock and they don't want 
to accept and they don't want to believe that its right.
You mentioned .just now ....
Yes, I was talking about students you see ... now ... er 
... its all part of the ongoing process of their development in 
education, I want to try and wean them away from purely 
a regurgitator of factual information .. what has gone 
on in the past is important because that's the basis for
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What goes in the future, so in other words you're 
building current research in science upon what other people 
have done . so you're can't ignore what other people have 
done ...
Can you enlarge a bit on what you mean by building on
Yes, if you start in any field of research you always 
look at the background literature to that subject, to 
see what other people have done ... er, in relation to the 
problem that you actually have . it would be very foolish 
if you didn't do that because sometimes you might formulate 
a question to which there is already an answer or at least 
alot of work has been done and you just might sort of 
rather naively repeat someone else's sort of work and 
frankly it wasn't wortrh your time or effort to do so. 
However, what we're really looking at is how science 
continues to advance and we're looking I suppose for 
students who are . who show some sort of creativeness 
towards the progress of science ...
Creativeness?
Yes, they ... alot of students won’t have it, I'm not 
sure if research workers necessarily have it but some 
people have this facility to totally re .. er take 
a slant on something that is very fresh and new and 
that's what I think I mean by creative in this sense 
and that um .....
 ...... in one of the tutorials where Chan actually
talked about a Amoeba er thinking its something (laugh) 
of ^
Yes, Yes.
r'\
You know you you very taken with that idea
because he's so bongy, bongy like ducks.
I mean sometimes, Chan is a marvellous example of a chap 
who at times can be very sidetracked and perhaps on the 
face of it come up with ideas that are really nonsensical 
but such people can also come up with ideas that are very 
fresh and occasionally some of these ideas are very novel 
and actually would be worth testing and I think you've 
got a case in point with that particular student, I'm 
not sure how well he will do at this university er .. 
he has some disadvantages as English is not his native 
language and therefore he might find it difficult at times 
to express himself as well as he'd like to .. but he's 
an enthusiast and I chink we're looking for those sorts of 
people, not all our hundred odd students are, but yes we
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would like ideally to see people who were enthusiastic 
about their subject they have chosen, we're thinking 
about the subject all the time which I think is what
Chan does even if his ideas are a little bit way out
that doesn't matter . I mean I'd sooner have someone 
who was thinking even if at times in a rather obscure sort 
of Way or clearly at times would appear a nonsensical
way than somebody was really just a bit like porridge
and just sort of soaked up information handed to them 
but really didn't make too many constructive .. 
didn't take too many risks as to make up good ideas.
Do you think that taking risks is ....
Yes, I think that's part of life, I think well, risks
perhaps is a quite strong word, to take an opportunity 
or to take a chance, to do something slightly different 
or to come up with an idea slightly different the 
risk is that you could be wrong, but lets face it the 
chance is that you could also be right ... um if 
you take no chance, never seek to break out of the crowd 
and take a chance, well its unlikely that he's going 
to be chopped off but its unlikely that he's ever going 
to make much progress either because you're conforming 
and I think there are ocassions when I'm sure university 
life should at times encourage the non-conformist, I mean 
if.you can't be somewhat non-conformist as an undergraduate
then doesn't mean to say you've got to be an anarchist or
something and totally knock down the system um but .. 
it should provide three years in which you can be reflective 
you can ... and I think Sussex quite rightly has got 
quite a bad name at times because its done things and 
we've been equally fed up with some of the students antics 
but in sense I think that's part of the price you've got to 
pay if you're going to encourage radical thinking about 
problems and that doesn't mean radical in a political sense 
I mean it maybe, it may be radical in that its a very fresh, 
approach even though its not a viable approach as mainly 
it turns out to be.
If we could bring It: down in what you're trying to achieve 
in more global terms than now to the biology. May I ask 
you if you have a personal theory of scientific methods 
as part 1 and part 11 to what extent and do you try and put 
that over to your undergraduate students?
Yes this is a question asked of me quite a number of times. 
May I ask by whom?
Oh, in a number of different contexts, yes I, I once 
on more than once I think on a couple of occasions I
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when 1 was interviewed for a Chair of Scientific Education 
and someone had asked me this question, and er I think 
you1ve got to be a weany bit careful about it .. its the 
sort of question that instinctively you can rush into and 
say yes we do this, this this and this, um but I’m 
.. I've become less sure about the socalled scientific 
method .. I think there are a number of ways of solving
a problem although there is a u m ...e r ......... .
a pattern that has been established to some extent in 
science through the way in which science is reported 
in papers and in literature even though we hold an 
introduction and then we have er . which we generate 
perhaps an hypothesis and then we have a method and 
then we have the results and then we analyse the results 
and come to some sort of conclusions, we have a reference 
list and acknowledgements and God know what else and that's 
normal way our papers are presented . and if you know 
careful one could say that's well scientific methodology, 
but in a sense it is but it also doesn't totally reflect 
what really goes on in science .....
I think that's in inverted commas the socalled scientific 
method as you get it presented in a paper ...
Yes, I think that's some peoples concept of science, 
the scientific method is, I think it actually is ...
I not only think it is but I think it should be somewhat 
more flexible, I don't think that's the way in which science 
is generally done or as you commented earlier that I think 
alot of it is er ... somewhat randomized in the way that 
information pops up.
I think you mentioned bits of ...
Yeh, that's right, um .. I mean clearly it wouldn't ..
I mean in setting about a research task you have to narrow 
down what the problem usually is and then probably within 
your resources and one thing and another decide how you're 
going to tackle it um .. you probably do set up a hypothesis 
although probably you modify and refine that hypothesis 
in the course of doing your work but I think sometimes 
play hunches in science, I think they do.
So what is the difference .. is there a difference between 
hunches and an hypothesis?
 ....    If wo really looked at it there would probably
be not alot actually, probably not alot, I mean there are 
probably people who strongly disagree with what I'm saying, 
but I think that the more you look into the way in which 
science has developed um often I feel that the directions 
in which a particular subject have um .. changed partly
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individuals who take a totally ... I mean let me give 
you a .. what I think is one of the very good examples 
in recent years er because it happens to be in a subject 
area that perhaps I know something about but um .... 
up an till about 1960's people were interested in the 
problem of how ATP was made and um most people's views 
had been channelled for so long on a chemical hypothesis 
if you like but that's the way that most people were thinking 
then along comes a man called Peter Mitchell who says 
er no I don't think this is how .. we haven?t got any 
evidence at all, you're basing it on the fact that this 
is what you will expect, lets totally rethink that and 
let's base it on electrochemical grading across a membrane 
um .. rather than you know a reaction that only reacts 
with B to produce C and there’s a interaction with another 
183 substance D A ATP is formed and er the amount of ATP that's 
formed is to some extent independent of certain ideas .. 
and when ... I mean that was a very . at the time it was 
a very novel and totally different slant to the problem 
and people weren't prepared for it, weren't ready for it, 
they couldn't except if very easily and they said well 
what's the evidence on which you base this, you see, 
well Mitchell at that time didn't have that much evidence 
but quite rightly he said what's the evidence on which you 
base your thing, you see, and they said well there's been 
parallels in such and such situations X is the way in which 
ATP is made in gycolosis so um . what eventually happened 
was that Mitchell started to produce some experimental 
evidence and the people who were rather against this sort 
of radical idea decided that they would also do some 
200 experiments and prove that they were right and he was wrong 
there were others who I think rather admired him and then 
thought I think I'll go along and see whether he’s right 
or not, and there were others who were probably the fairest 
of all who said he could be right or he could be wrong 
we're not going to go and sort of immediately say because 
its such a radical idea you're wrong. What happened 
over the next ten year period I think that was the weight 
of evidence favoured Mitchell much more than the other 
alternatives, so much so that when another seven years 
lapsed the evidence, I think quite strongly no overwhelmingly 
it couldn't be conslusively said that this was it but the 
evidence was certainly very strongly weighted in Mitchell's 
favour and because of this very novel approach, totally 
different, I mean what Mitchell did was really to see what 
other people and seen before in a number of different contexts 
and put it into this context, I think basically you know 
80% or 90% he was right and I suppose the Nobel Committee 
also thought so as well because they awarded him the Nobel 
prize for Chemistry in 1978 so you know, which was quite 
a remarkable achievement for one person to achieve that.
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Yes X think quite often it is , there are some things 
that are very difficult to get conclusive evidence about
Ah, there’s conclusive evidence and there’s the weight 
of evidence.
Yes, that’s right, I think in these case we’re looking 
at weight of evidence and that weight of evidence is 
important in making a decision eventually whether this 
idea is funamentally right even though you haven’t got the 
details necessarily and something which is quite difficult 
to prove and he read in the areas of evolution and as 
you've probably read in the past three or four years 
all sorts of uprisals and confusions have occurred with 
 ^ . and neo Darwinists and God knows what else
and they've all got into the melting pot, the.creationists 
have had a great time as well because in the turmoil 
they picked on various things and said right support 
our view and
Well that perhaps is no different from Mitchell that he ...
NO NO NO, it isn't and I’m sure its very good to stir up 
the scientific fraternity from time to time, I know the 
arguments are very heated but what it tends to do is 
to make people clarify their positions and to try and 
do the experiments if that's possible to begin to build this 
weight of evidence in support of or again ...
May I ask you if that's a sort of personal criterion
that you would use for choosing between two rival theories..
weight of evidence?
Yes, I think in the main I would, yes I think that's the 
only thing I could really go on.
And when you say ....
Well when I say evidence we look at the range of quantitative
data u m ........ you've got to be a little bit careful
because occasionally you will find on certain issues a 
huge volume of published materials and you might think 
because that weighs more that its necessarily better and 
therefore weighs that tips the balance in favour, now I 
think you've got to look at the range as well as the sheer 
volume ...
The range?
Yeh, in other words what could happen, I mean I could give 
you one or two examples, what could happen is that one
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particular man really belts out the papers and you know 
they produce a particular view and on the face of 
the number of papers you might think well ...
the weight of evidence ....
Yes, the weight of evidence, but X think along with that 
you've got to look at the quality if the evidence there and 
that can be quite difficult, that mean at times if your'e 
really going to judge that you might have to be fairly 
knowledgeable in that area of research.
Well may I take it when you say the quality of evidence, 
you mean how much the evidence actually does provide 
evidence like for that point of view.
How good was the experimental set up, how many variables 
did they actually sort of ... iron out um what sort of 
procedure did they adopt in how many instances could that 
procedure have been somewhat suspect um ..how far did they 
budge the issue, now I think there is budging in science.
Could I just zero in on this evidence bit, if you've got a 
point of view called an hypothesis, what is evidence?
Well ...
You've got methodological problems etc etc.
Yes, that's right, evidence I think is is er ... um ...
the amount of data that emerges of  ....  in sufficient
variety that looks, it seems to match up from different 
quarters in support c-f or not in support of the particular 
idea principle or hypothesis which you try to formulate.
From other areas.
Yes, I think if you've got er a number ... a different 
sources these slightly different types of experimental 
set ups and they all tend to point favourably in the direction 
of say the Mitchell hypothesis.
So this is the range that you were sort of referring to ...
Yes a sort of range that I'm referring to I think um 
perhaps ... its difficult to try and find the right set of 
words if a number of laboratories.
You're talking about coherence perhaps, consistency?
Yes, basically they are coherent in that they add up to 
a majority of pluses lets say in favour of this idea um 
what could you do I think is to do, I mean in any specific
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pla.ce tcike a. table and you look at items A on that 
problem B, C and you can look at how the evidence 
cummulatively from a number of sources adds up either 
positively or negatively, you can actually do a table .. 
very crude and say Bloggs and Smith found that um from 
their experiments using such and such and this sort of 
method that this was bascially supporting Mitchell's 
hypothesis plus.
You said it was a crude method why crude?
No, I think .... actually it can be quite powerful 
in the sense that what you're doing is to add up the 
pluses and minuses from a whole range of experiments 
and you can say you know Bloggs and Smith yes this 
seems to support the idea and it maybe that Bloggs and 
Smith have a particular set of data which possibly I 
and another group of.scientists think particularly 
powerful.
Ah, now that's what I was getting at the weighting of 
each plus and each minues.
But, er how powerful maybe a consensus view
and it may not always, its quite a difficult area because 
I may think gosh that that's a .. I like this experiment 
you know and this looks good to me and I may take it along 
to my colleagues and they say yeh, that's really good, 
and we all agree, you know and then we take it outside 
and someone says yes this is really a sound bit of work 
and they've not got any really loose ends they've 
confined it they've got beautiful technique of showing 
this, I like it and in other instances and I think 
techniques are very important you see because alot of 
things have developed in you know various areas of science 
and certainly areas of biology because more improved 
techniques have come to light which twenty years ago were 
not available and therefore it was very difficult perhaps 
at that time to do the sorts of experiments which could 
provide much cleaner evidence.
Cleaner evidence?
Yes, in other words there weren't any fuzzy side issues, 
now I think with any sort of experiments its very difficult 
not to get any sort of side issues, I mean I can't think 
of anything immediately off-hand, I expect there might be
I'm sure there are.
Yes um .. nothing immediately springs to mind but I'm sure 
that there is ... that .....
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Yes, this is what I call the weighting aspect you see.
Weighting quantity perhaps we could call it.
Yes .... yes mm....
A paradox.
Yes, you see if I drew that table, it might, the weighting 
given to a particular sort of experiment might differ from 
my personal point of view as supposed to a colleagues point 
of view. Even though both of us might say yes this is a 
plus in favour of this idea I might think that's really 
terrific, I like this approach that's being conducted 
I'd give that a double plus, that's the sort of weighting 
I'd give it, someone else might not think like that 
at least they'd think yes that's a plus in favour of this 
particular idea ....
Could you speculate on what sort of criteria might 
bring that sort of difference out between you and others, 
what sort of fundamental ideas might be at work that make 
you think well, I give that a double plus but my friend 
only gives it a single plus?
.........   Yes I suppose   if I had been
... working myself on using a particular technique which I 
was very familiar with in terms of its sequences and what 
things could go wrong and I looked at this and I saw that
Bloggs and Smith had really um ... you k n o w .....  find
out what I would call some of the technical challenges, 
the technique they present and um they'd sort of for me 
in reading this they pinpointed this and said we managed 
to do that and we managed to get rid of that and pick up 
in the system etc etc, um
Doing their homework.
Now again because its unlikely that a colleague would have 
exactly, I mean occasionally he would find someone in the 
school, because you've probably both actually work side 
by side its likely that you both formulate a very similar 
opinion and if you both work collectively and collaboratively 
on a problem then its more likely that you know ... if it 
were someone who was basically in the same sort of area but 
whose interests was slightly different who had been researching 
using techniques which were somewhat different from yours
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they might also view it favourably but they may 
just feel that it wasn't perhaps, 1 think there is a 
certain amount of flexibility and freedom I can't quite 
point, I can't quite put it into words between different 
persons, I mean I said earlier on that if we asked 
four or five reporters to report on an event independantly 
inevitably a scientist has a certain amount of training 
as a journalist I suppose but are the way we see the 
problem, the same problem but we may actually see it in 
a slightly different way and we may also judge the importance
of certain items of evidence or words in the case of
the journalists certainly issues that have cropped up 
now sometimes we may even exaggerate . I think even at times 
people may even fudge issues a little.
Er, are you using the word fudge to mean sort of
concious or unconcious ...
Well some people ..... as it were intellectual negligence 
perhaps, I think there's a spectrum here, I think you can 
go from, I'm sure I mean that when I say that I know from 
Reports of New Scientists and even in some .... because 
of the sorts of pressures that are point on people'in 
science to get grants and one thing and another and to be 
first in bringing out a particular idea ....
Pressures put on them rather than they generating them 
to be first that is, what I really want to ....
Well, personalities vary enormously, if you're in a fresher 
situation that you're Postdoctoral Fellowship depends upon 
you getting money and how good the research you've done 
up to that point determines whether you get the money 
or not, I think the external pressures are put on you.
Now some people don't concede to those pressures, they know 
that they are there but they'll not in any way prostitute 
their science for the sake of just getting some money but 
clearly there are times when there are some unscruplous 
individuals or because they just push to far and they feel 
that they must take just a few short cuts, there have been 
some instances in science of that, that's the extreme 
at the other end of the spectrum there's the absolutely 
totally honest person reports everything, won't let anything 
go by even if he's only got er . thirty six results, 
thirty five out of thirty six results which all seem to point 
in one direction and you get one result which seems to 
be absolutely hay wire. I think probably alot of people 
presented with that perhaps rather odd sort of result and 
if they can't make sense of it may well sort of ignore it
um .. probably one spurious result in thirty six is not
going to make much difference even if you do some statistics
on it um .... I think .. you know it is very difficult to
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I think as far as on a personal concern ....... I would
say that there would be very few occasions that I have 
not put every piece of relevance into the melting pot, 
there might have been occasions at the beginning when I was 
trying to develop a technique and X was unhappy with 
whether I had got the technique right and X got some 
results and I probably wouldn’t have inluded those 
eventually, when I was happy with the technique I would 
have then started from there but you could argue about 
and say why didn’t you put in the four and five ...
I 485 Am I correct in saying that this was when you were developing
the technique, prior to publication.
M 487 That’s right, prior to publication, now I would imagine
that most people,are very honest and very straightforward 
I just don’t know the level, but clearly since there are 
dramatic misleadings and fudging of data X would imagine 
that there is a spectrum of fudging as opposed to downright 
dishonesty . urn . at the other end total and utter honesty, 
you know, so scientists like everyone else are individuals 
and subject to individual variation and all the vagaries 
of pressures and other events in their environment.
503 I think actually on the whole um science in this country 
is .. somewhat less pressurized financially than perhaps 
the States I mean we're under pressure because there ain’t
much money but I think there's not quite the um ...........
the same types of pressures which exist from what I understand
I 516 Can you elaborate a bit of difference and quality of the 
pressure?
M 517 • .....................well   that's very difficult
I mean I have my own idea.
Yes that’s right  ..........  I think most people would
like if they're in a sort of leaders in a field of research 
they like to be first and its pretty disappointing if 
somebody beats them to it. There is alot of work going on 
in the States and its funded from a whole range of people 
and what appear to be very odd sort of funding agencies, 
certain things that goes on, I mean even the military can 
fund certain sort of biological things, not related to 
biological warfare at all. Um .... I have seen the 
papers you know sort of the metabolism of moths sort of thing 
and you see the funding agency is the USA Army or something 
and you know I can't quite fathom this out but still. The
  but the way in which I think ... but I think rather
that money is somewhat more generously given in the States 
but the competition is fiercer and X think there is a much
I 519 
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firmer time constraint put on them and I think this 
is where the differences lie um and at times may lead to 
people being quite competitive and desperate to be there 
first um ., and it may tempt them at times anyone, in 
any walk of life to try and cut corners. I don’t think 
I can be more positive, you know more succinct than that. ,
Well I think. Its difficult actually.
A very difficult area.
If you could just . well you can’t get any more
succinct than that but if you could just draw out 
perhaps some evidence of things you are saying like 
there's hunches and hypotheses, there's weighing up of 
evidence in terms of both quantity and range or weight, 
sorry weight, and then there's a range of new view which 
you seemed to understand in terms of how sort of related 
to areas which it wasn't specifically desired to talk 
about was my impression so perhaps you could say that that 
sort of compatibility er .. or coherence with or consistency 
with, the surrounding matrix or that in terms of actually 
informing the rest of the matrix.
Yes.
At which both.
I think both possibly might be true actually .. you see I 
think ....... I mean science is a creation of man and
I mean man is a very complex ..... person I mean man
and woman, I don't just mean male, um therefore to think 
coming back to by earlier point, I mean the tendancy 
perhaps initially is to think of the various, the scientific 
method as reflected by published papers which tend to adopt 
a particular sort of format um .. but I'm sure the development 
of ideas and ... which is one thing, because I think you see 
there are people who very much ideas people and ....
When you talk about that chap Lawrence, a great experiment 
in science and it sounds like he was a great theorist 
perhaps ....
I suppose the socalled great experiments are a retrospetive 
judgement.
Ah, experimentalists, someones seems to be good Q. / 
very very good at handling
experimental situations, then there are other people who 
perhaps Eistein who perhaps wasn't a very good experimentalist 
but he was a great thinker, was that the sort of thing ...
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Yes that’s right, I think there are both sorts of people 
in science and I think there’s a need for both sorts of 
people in science um ...
Do you think you could perhaps just pinpoint if you can 
what you think is perhaps wrong with the journal type 
expedition .... they're saying that alot of people are 
tending to think that is the way things are written up in 
journals is their scientific method. You said that you think 
its unfortunate or words to that effect.
Well X don’t think it relfects really what's gone on . 
and it certainly doesn't reflect the way in which science 
is actually done.
It certainly doesn't, in what way does it certainly not?
Because I think that when he writes the paper you are much 
more in the picture from when you started, certainly in 
a sense when you started on a problem, you probably didn't 
know exactly where it was going to take you, and you didn't 
know what the results; were going to be or one shouldn' t 
have done or what was the point in doing it. You had done 
some previous reading, so that way would be the introduction. 
The likelihood is however in the course of doing your 
experiments you would come across some other things that 
you wouldn't of read and that would also colour later on 
the sort of introduction that your'e going to make to your 
paper . er . so I think that the end result of the paper 
has been your views sort of modified and retrospective 
in the light of that and you can see perhaps more clearly 
..I mean you're trying to make the thing clear to readers 
but from the point of view from the way its written up it 
should be clear and I mean it shouldn't have all the 
dilemmas and doubts and so on that probably were originally 
in your mind when you started on that piece of work, so in 
that sense in reports eventually what took place but what 
it didn't do was to show how the product really emerged from 
its origins... it does so in some degree but it does it in 
what appears to be a very logical format but quite often its 
not always like that. Now I'm saying this, and L'm saying 
it really irr the context of biological science . now ... I'm 
not sure if this would also be true of chemistry and physics 
or some other science, if human nature's the same then 
probably there are some parallels to be drawn on but ....
' with human nature than subject matter is that
what you're saying?
......  no I don't think so but the human element comes into
it so, it may make it easier, I gather, I'm not an expert
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Is the area but just looking at some of the papers that 
are published in chemistry for example and talking to my 
chemistry colleagues who are sometimes a little bit 
cynical about the volumes of chemical papers that come 
out even by standards of current publication in science 
that, um alot of these papers ... well I've even heard one 
of my colleagues saying not really worth the paper they're 
printed on um . in which they perhaps start with a 
molecule and modify it and there's you know a new sort of 
molecule emerges, I suppose it could advance scientific 
knowledge, I suppose it does and it may be that it will 
have more important repercussions, not immediately but 
later on and that has often been the case with scientific 
publications that seemingly on the face of it the 
publication isn't quite adequately and competently done 
that doesn't appear to advance the scientific world in 
any way.
Have you got any personal criteria for judging or 
weighting whether or not or to what extent advancement 
in scientific knowledge has been made?
  ........ ........ that's a very difficult question
actually........  there are times I'm sure that certain
papers come out which um appear to make really quite a 
major contribution to our understanding of the problem .. 
and yet there have been instances of papers which have 
seemingly been rather obscure or published in rather 
obscure journals which twenty, thirty years down the road 
have er really been very significant but perhaps people 
did not really appreciate them at the time um ..... for 
example I suppose as we were talking about Mendel's paper 
earlier on, I mean that was quite a remarkable ...
And a good case in point of it not really being ....
That's right.
recognized until about 1900.
That's right, it hadn't changed the paper but in a sense 
I suppose Mendel was rather ahead of his time.
He was a modest man, and the fact that he published in a 
rather an obscure journal didn't exactly .. and at that 
time communications were not as they are today um but if 
the um ...... if we can sort of believe the way in which
the scientific establishment reacted at the time and 
certainly when Mendel was doing his exams and um .. I think 
he failed his biology.
Did you see that recent documentary on him, very good?
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Yes, well if one can accept that as a reasonable um 
historical representation of events that took place 
then 1 think that you can begin to see what 1 mean by 
the scientific establishment not liking to suddenly 
see someone as a apparent student coming up with a novel
idea and it .... that’s why I come back to someone like
dear old Chan, who's a lovely chap and comes out with 
some total nonsense, what appears to be total nonsense 
but also its refreshing and one shouldn't sort of dismiss 
him and say Chan you know you're talking a load of nonsense 
why don't you stick to the facts man and don't rock the 
boat. I think it is at times good to rock the boat.
Are you saying really that there isn't, you haven't 
criterion judging whether somethings an advancement or not 
or is the a difference between an absolute decision or 
a decision between well there are difficulties and I might 
be wrong? Yes I do"have criterion myself as to whether 
I think there's an advancement....
Yes I think there are, there are times when certain 
experiments have been done that have really cracked a 
thorny problem, um oh yes, I'm sure of that.
So its cracking a thorny problem ...
Yes, it may not always be an experiment, sometimes its a 
series of experiments or experiment and sometimes its 
merely the putting together of some ideas in a totally 
fresh way, I've already sited Peter Mitchell, but you 
see basically what Crick and Watson did was to put together 
some ideas in a very different way. Now I know they 
had some experiment but primarily that paper was more a 
thinking ....
Right, it was exercise in model building.
It was an exercise in model building and theory but at that 
time they had some experimental data actually I think that 
they personally hadn't done, yes it was the King's College 
group that had really done most of the spade work 
experimentally, to xray ' um but bless them, they
came up with the ideas and then had advanced but I think 
anybody even then certainly can conceive that that was 
a major advancement in science. 1 think you can if you've 
been involved in science for a number of years you can 
begin to see papers that you know do
It sounds rather mysterious.
Yes I know I think there is alot of mystery to it to
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some extent, and this is a, very personal view and er
some people feel very much, and probably if I'd have
been asked this question twenty years a may have come
up with a much more boom, boom boom boom answer yes I can
see it, the more time goes on up not saying the more
cynical I become. I'm not a cynical person but the more
that I feel that it's not quite as cut and dry as one
would like to think .. um . yes I do look at the clarity
with which people have formulate their idea on that
hypotheses and do look at the cleaness they have
conducted their experiment, remember that 1 have already
indicated that I think that they've ironed out the
technical problems that they've done sufficient experimentation
which um produces results which you can quite clearly
subject to statistical analysis and they pretty clearly
show that more or less unequivocal support for the hypotheses
which was set up. There are some papers like that and
I think its not difficult to find them when they come
I think you can say that's a nice piece of science um ...
doesn't always necessarily at that moment in time advance
science that much.
I was just going to say that couldn't all those criterion 
that you sited be implied to the chemistry paper that's 
not worth the paper its written on.
Well that's not my quote.
That's your anonymous colleagues. Nevertheless that's 
a justification ....
Yes, I'm sure that's right, and that's why they're 
accepted for publication presumably because most papers 
nowadays um .. are not usually just accepted without some 
sort of referees comments um there are risky journals 
and there those regarded as more prestigious than others.
Very much so yes.
And probably there are some good cause for that to happen 
but if its going to be published usually there are people 
judging because quite alot of papers are totally rejected 
or are so much rejected that are asked to be rewritten
so __ you could send it to a different journal, but a
really bad paper is going to be clobbered by almost 
every journal and there are limits that even the worst 
journals will accept or not accept . um I ... yeh I think 
that um ... by the very nature of science and the way that 
its going and developing, its going in leaps and bounds
An actually assessing the weight of a paper is what you're 
saying is something that perhaps is intuitive really 
born of experience and hard to formulise in any kind of
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you know, simple way at least, seems to be what you're 
saying.
I personally would not like to formulise it in a very 
simple way, perhaps other people,! might have done 
possibly 'twenty years ago.
Getting to the point about perhaps other people . um 
I'd like to ask you a question that is actually related 
which is related absolutely to what we've been saying 
about your views on advancement of scientific method 
and advancement of scientific knowledge I should say 
and scientific method and er I mean you're something of 
a God-send to me because you're a professional scientist 
er you're a teachers of teachers on the PGCE to some 
extent, er what you're other occupation, you're a teacher 
of undergraduate scientists, so, on all these areas that 
I'm quite interested in you've done something or quite 
alot.
And yet come up with no hard and fast set of rules for 
you to er ...
Ah, that's an interesting finding in itself perhaps, um 
you mentioned that you were interviewed in a Chair 
Science Education and they asked ....
I think that there was something on scientific methodology 
then and I can't remember the answer I gave them, It 
probably wasn't the right one (laughs) that they were looking 
for anyway.
To some extent if you're a.^professional scientist 
its a nonimpeachable answer isn't it, perhaps maybe 
not if you're within education and you're applying ...
Yes, that's probably the reason why I'm somewhat more 
sceptical to er, er a hard set of rules, you know I guess 
that's probably that.
Well, I was just going to ask, I've got a list here of 
um
Have I heard of these people?
Well, I'm sure you have, five very influential philosophers 
of science, now . er I am asking those as though in three 
capacities as a scientist, as a teacher in undergraduate 
scientists, and as a teacher of teachers of secondary science 
um ... could you just give me some general ideas er on 
you sort of awareness of these names.
Yes, well what do you want me to say about them?
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Well, um . without actually s&ying what you know 
about each one just to say roughly how familiar 
with the ideas of each one that you feel that you 
are, for example.
Well I have some ideas about the Baconian philosophy 
of science which is a rather interesting one but um I 
think not strictly, it was more or less you know, let's 
strike a match, let's see what happens sort of thing.
Popper I think has been a very interesting person, um ... 
because not only has he ventured views on um science 
but obviously he's looked at this within a social and
political framework um .... I think .. although he ..
one of the, he's one of the clearer expandists of Marxism 
is that right ....
Well actually no, 1 would disagree with that ...
Well, he's been one of Marxisms greatest critics as well. 
Well, that's right certainly.
He has presented Marxists views, not from a personal 
Viewpoint, but he's studied Marxism.
He actually wrote two books criticising Marxism.
That's right, he was one of the arch critics of Marxism.
He was very influential I suppose with many of the 
wellknown figures currently in science, like Peter 
Edinburgh and so on. Um Koon, yes I suppose I've also 
come across on various .. he's been more involved I 
suppose in education and science in the context that 
I've come across him.
Do you mean him personally, or the use of people who made 
his ideas.
The use of people who made his ideas.
I see.
As far as I'm aware. Um but I'm not expert on any of these 
people, but you simply asked me had I come across them. Now 
with Lakatos, the name rings a bell but I have a feeling 
this is one of John Gilbert, I've seen this in John Gilbert 
copy.
Actually I see, 1 am an-author of that paper.
Yes, right, (laugh) now you've said that I can't remember
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exactly what I had tg say about, I had never heard of it 
until John I think, John showed.me a paper and probably 
you to had now shown ,. ♦ „,
Yes the paper is actually here.
Now 1 thought that Feyerabend, isn't he a sort of 
mathematical philosopher?
Well, actually, Lakatos was the mathematical one but um 
Feyerabend,.1'suppose he's got quite a facility in 
mathematics but he's not a philosopher in it.
Well the last two I would not have heard of, I think um 
or not gone out of my way to have heard of if we had not 
met and John Gilbert, I'm sure John Gilbert introduced 
me .... I haven't actually read anymore about those two 
but John obviously had been much more in the area of 
higher education and probably science ... science education 
um he's a much more widely read person than I am on that 
particular, on those particular folks. Yes I mean, the 
first three I have actually read articles and books on 
and I think that the only claim to knowing anything 
about the last two names, they register
Its from the science education.
That's right, but um frankly I wouldn't know what their 
basic philosophies are. So that is an awful omission to 
m a k e ....
But um the thing is you say that is an awful omission 
but maybe it isn't. You're a successful scientist 
after all.
... Well I think possibly looking at what's happened, 
successful, I don't know, I'm a jack of all trades with 
an interest in quite alot of things inevitably by spreading 
one's interests rather widely one can be open to 
criticisms for being extremely ignorant in some areas 
then that probably is true of everyone, but er yes they 
are people that I have, at least I have actually heard of 
all of them but I couldn't quote a chapter or verse from 
any of them.
Do you think these people have anything to say about the 
conduct of science.
I'm sure that they have been very, I'm sure that it is 
important that, I mean some scientists may feel that they 
are a pain or something like that, no but I think alot of 
people must feel that they have, yes I'm sure they have 
made quite important contributions, not just to science
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But to science i.n society in the broadest context, 
they've certainly been very Influential, certainly 
Popper and Kuhn, have been influential with er some 
very evident people in science um . influence their 
way of thinking and so on, so that er . and X think 
they've probably even influenced er as I understand it, 
of the limited books and so on that I've read of their 
work and of their thoughts, I'm sure they have 
influenced the way, some ways in which science education 
has developed in .... possibly secondary education 
in particular, I'm not sure about tertiary education 
and probably to some extent even there.
Do you feel that the ideas of such people should be 
aired in say in an undergraduate's science degree?
Oh yes I think they should, and indeed um at this 
University I believe some of them are because there is 
of course, it is an optional course, alot of students 
opted for it, called the principles and perspectives of 
science and I guess that you probably have contact with 
that area.
Yes I have, but it is an optional course.
It is an optional course.
It used to be compulsory at one stage, I think, it is 
now optional, so when I was asking do you think the 
views of such people should be um discussed or examined 
or whatever within an undergraduate science degree course 
I was actually putting it rather more strongly saying
Should it be compulsory.
Should it be compulsory.
....................  I suppose if I was speaking purely
personally, I'm not speaking collectively for the school, 
.... I would like to see it as an integral part of an 
undergraduate course.
And why would that be?
Partly because it comes back again to my comments earlier 
about fay feelings on history of how science developed, 
a university in my view is a place which should broaden 
one's knowledge on a subject, ... I understand why the 
situation is as it is at the moment because the very 
nature of the English degree course which is usually a 
three year course means there is an awful lot being put 
into three years, and I'm sure there wouldn't be unanimous 
agreement as to exactly what should form the three years
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and whether the weighting is indeed right or not, .. 
um ... anyone who Is certainly, thinking, of going into 
er . teaching, anyone who is interested in the way in 
which scientific ideas have developed as well as the 
history of science would do well to have studied
these people ....   its um, well that is my view um
............. you could .....  I suppose other people could
justify not putting them in or strongly feeling that 
they shouldn’t come in. Well they might say that the 
students don't know enough science er ... and I may 
even have some sympathy with that because it reflects 
on what I've said earlier on, I appreciate the history 
of science and possibly Peter Medawar and co who are very
much influenced by people like Popper, a n d ....... we
appreciate these views of science ... um .... with more 
experience of science, now that is not to say that students 
couldn't appreciate this I don't think, but some people 
might argue that they don't know enough about science 
before they can then put these views into perspectives 
of science.
What you're insinuating that in every secondary school 
science curriculum virtually you get as one of the top 
objectives that students should learn not only science 
but also about science, something about the approach, 
the scientific way of thinking.
That's right.
My view seems to have replaced the view that used to 
be attributed to classics as a training for the mind 
or whatever, now arguably people like Leeds have devoted 
their life to talking about science.
That's right.
Um and so what I'm really asking is er, do you feel though 
that as a practising scientist yourself, that in actual 
fact there's enough about science that comes through, 
perhaps not formulised, perhaps not within a sort of specific 
system but there's enough that comes through there's 
enough that's learnt about science for that as an objective 
to have been carried through into say tertiary education.
................................  Again from a purely
personal point of view, though I think the answer to the 
question simply would be yes. Um but I think that 
you could get a different answer from a number of different 
people. But as I've already said that I think that um 
in many ways I wish that looking back my undergraduate 
time was doing science had had the social and philosophical 
aspects of science included in the education urn ... rather
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than just, well I mean I could be quite critical of some 
aspects of it but um ... there were an awful lot of 
factual things I think um ... and alot of it did amount 
to rote learning, there wap almost zero philosophy 
er of science and scientific developments and scientific 
thinking, .... I’m not sure whether I would have, X mean 
looking back I think it would have been lovely to have 
had that in the course, whether I would have appreciated 
it at the time, I don’t know. This is the thing I find 
it quite difficult to know, and er as I say periodically 
one has to try and put oneself in the student's shoes..
I think the answer will be that there will be a body of 
students who are fascinated by the history, philosophy 
and the social impact of science and indeed the way in 
which science has changed sort of during their education.
Well, can I put it this way, if we consider an 
undergraduate ! > , perhaps in quite a narrow
way that is as some kind of pre-condition for becoming 
a professional scientist, do you feel that the history, 
the philosophy associated with names such as /\ -•
Do you feel that that's er .. actually necessary as part
of becoming a professional scientist or at least that it
should be a necessary part of the undergraduate degree? 
You said that it would have been lovely, but was it 
necessary?
  In retrospect I think it probably was even
necessary, I regret not perhaps having more opportunity 
to study these aspects than I have, I welcome it here
um .... the difficult one is should it be .. and I
think the answer again, I've already given is yes, um 
I can see that it might, in a sense the students should 
have some element of choice within the course that they 
do here for three years, and indeed they do have that, 
and part of the choice comes in the first year when they 
choose this course or not, a large proportion of them
do and in a sense when you opt to do something, probably
you're more motivated to do it. If you’re compelled to 
do something and you’re one of the I don’t know, 20% 
who really is not turned on at all it could probably be 
a real drag and actually may do quite the reverse of what 
you the organiser of the course had hoped to do and that 
was to stimulate thought and ideas in these areas and 
again a somewhat different perspective to science.
Could I just, now that we're very nearly the end, ask 
you a couple of more questions quite briefly, um firstly 
what contribution if any to the questions and ideas that 
your undergraduate students make with your own research 
interest?
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Into the um, research that I’ve.done in biology, where 
they have had probably had some impact, I’m not quite 
sure how great, but where they had had some impact
I think is in looking at ways o f ....... developing
teaching and learning situations for first year students. 
The development of sorts of materials that we had done 
and constantly on the look out for ways of improving 
themselves as self dependent persons. I've done a sort
of literature thing, a fairly trivial thing, you see
its where to know where to get the information not 
necessarily how much you’ve got stored up here and that's 
it sort of thing. Where to find information, and how 
to use it is very important.
I 017 So this has influenced you in the way that you influence
teachers which are training to become secondary science
teachers, is that what you're saying.
M 018 I think there must be some influence, I couldn't put a
finger on it, and I couldn’t say .....  I'm sure it
must have because obviously if you're interested in 
teaching, learning situation you're constantly reviewing 
what things seem to be good and what are right and what 
things need improvement and of course even your own 
personal ideas of science change as you go on, I mean 
I look back on some lectures or tutorials that I gave 
when I first came to this place and frankly I sooner 
forget them, at the time one did one's best but you know 
you think Oh my Lord they weren't good at all, they were 
for example, the lectures were probably too detailed um 
030 they assumed knowledge that the students didn't have
and all these sort of elementary things that um you would 
I mean what one did was to fall into the trap having 
spent sometime in secondary education and then realising 
you've got to know what your starting point is and what 
you can or cannot assume, if you're not careful you'll 
rush in the first couple of years here thinking ah yes 
these are all bright students, I can assume this, that 
and the other. Weil- frankly there are times when you 
couldn't assume those things are assume too much of them 
and this may have been reflected in the essays or the 
exam questions that they actually did. So rather than 
040 say oh well the students are think I just continue as
before and they just must get brighter, I think for 
anything in life if its not going exactly as you’d like 
it to be, the first person you look at is you, now if 
you can then eliminate .................
M 048 You look at yourself first.
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in life people always blame.someone else for theijr 
own misfortune, for their misdeeds.
X 051 And this perhaps ties up with what you were saying
about self sufficient.
M 052 Yes that's right.
I 052 So you apply it to yourself.
I 053 Um .... could 1 ask something . that perhaps we didn't
touch upon with the .....
You're a professional scientist as well as a teacher 
of teachers, what about the average um teacher, secondary 
science teacher who has perhaps done a degree at most 
in science and then becomes a teacher of pupils in science 
now bearing in mind my earlier remarks abbut the objectives 
of knowing something about science um .. have you any 
views whether or to what extent the ideas of philosophers 
like Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend ought to be 
061 included in a PGCE course for example.
M 062 Oh yes, I think they should and ideed I would think
that Sussex, I don't know whether its unusual, I don't 
know in many ways it is, Sussex very much looks at the 
development of self, self development and that the 
very nature of the course is one which includes within 
the /scientific context not necessarily me introducing 
it but there are a range of people whose interests are 
philosophy, although they may have actually trained in 
science, they may have actually trained in arts.
I 072 This is within the PGCE course at Surrey, er Sussex?
M 073 I think that certainly Kuhn and Popper, um .. to a little
extent Feyerabend but certainly Kuhn and Popper would 
haVe had, would have been introduced at some point or 
other by someone or other in the context and er advice 
perhaps reading some of the materials that these authors 
produced, as regards again the last two I don't know.
But I know that Kuhn and Popper have come up many-times.
I 08.1 They do actually as part of the .. I'm interested to hear
that, I tell you why because I did my own PGCE at Kiel
oh only two or three years ago 1979 and there was no
mention of them whatsoever, of philosophy of science or 
of Popper or Kuhn, or infact no mention whatever of the 
conduct of science. Specific method here and specific 
techniques there.
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Well, X um have thought, X mean I know that for example
Dick Wegt# you know'because .... and Michael Brown
for example, ,.... both very much fascinated by the 
history, philosophy and development of science and that 
is one of their areas, and certainly many of the. things 
that they do, . X can’t imagine that they don't 
mention some of the ideas of Popper and Kuhn at some 
stage ....
I must West and Brown bht I was thinking of
yourself .....  and things here at Sussex because my
only acquaintance in any detail with the PGCE is with 
and its a very good PGCE in many other 
respects in its rating and so on.
I have to admit I probably don't say a great deal about
those two people u m ....... I suppose again .... I mean
no excuses I mean one could take a different view but what 
um if anything I tend to look at perhaps a more sort of 
philosophy and look at how development of 
childs thought processes and the way in which they manage 
science um ... rather more than perhaps philosophy as 
such. I'm sure probably along the way I may vaguely 
come up in passing mention someone like Kuhn and 
possibly Popper but I don't make a big song and dance 
of it no.
Is this probably the case with your colleagues as well?
Do they mention them, would it be as it were to illustrate 
a point rather than ........
Or they might direct it in er .... you see alot of it 
is is a sort of tutorial discussion, a seminar workshop 
situation and they have once a week with me a curriculum 
workshop and they have then a workshop with the general
tutor ..... or might be someone like Mike Brown.
Within that context you see, it may be that the general 
tutor for example would look at the total curriculum 
and ask more general questions, and its more likely that 
those folks could come up within that context. Um ... 
in the early stages I suppose one would focus, not suppose 
one does tend to focus on fairly mundane things of just
simply coping in the first term, probably just coping
with sort of the classroom situation.
Perhaps that how its got to be.
Well it has to be that way, I think because those 
are where the students greatest concerns are, we hope 
that in the second term they are more reflective, it may 
well be that in the second term and possibly towards the
- Al9*37 -
M 138
I 145
M 148 
I 149
M 152 
I 152 
M 153
I 155 
M 158
174
end of the second term and thijrd term some of them may 
well get into these areas of their own choice and but I mean 
there is no sort of philosophy of science course in tbe.
PGCE in which there's various influential figures ... take 
quite a major role.
Could 1 just ask you one final thing now, have you any views 
concerning the role the general public should or does play 
in deciding science policy?
Mm
I can give you a sort of stimulus if you like, very recently 
on the back page of the THES there vras an article entitled 
Science and People and it was a discussion between James 
Watts and Steven Rhodes.
That’s right, I happened to read that one, that's right.
So.
Yes so they take, Steven believes that everyone should be 
involved  .....
James Watts .... at least said that research on the
should stop and now he believes it is wrong 
and scientists should keep guiet about it.
Well democracy, I suppose is people theoretically should 
have a say, um but er .... at times I think there are 
certain issues in which the public, actually even voting 
quite honestly I suppose they ought, obviously in 
democracy they ought to have a vote, but alot of people 
aren't terribly well informed, more often than not its a 
gut reaction, I mean the classic example I suppose is 
nuclear reactors, the word nuclear immediately conjures
up horrors of bombs and God knows what else and .......
actually the nuclear reactors are remarkably safe, the big 
challenge as far as 1 see it are the disposal of the waste 
material and I suppose in the first instance even the mining 
of radioactive material, because someones got to mine the 
stuff and transport it and one thing and another. Now those 
are probably where the greatest hazards occur and not so 
much in the nuclear power station itself. I’m sure its 
a frightfully safe place, its probably a damn site safer 
than going down a coal mine or on an oil well. Now has 
I said, the other issues are things like um, currently of 
course in biology the people who don’t want any sort of 
experimentation with animals, they confuse dissectionwith 
vivesection, and want all animal dissecti ons banned at school 
because they're hurting the animals, well they're not really 
because all dissections at school are done ... I mean I can
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understand this, passioned view um but I think its 
always very difficult, eventually the government decides 
on things whether you like it ox: not anyway. People, X 
suppose should have an opportunity to air their views, 
there should also be some pott of forum where at least
even i f   some people form very hard and fast view on
something on pure gut reaction, they don't actually have 
the evidence, they don't really check something out um 
and as a consequence they're really quite ignorant, now 
we're all if we're not careful tend to talk off the top 
of our heads on certain issues and ...
Well you see I put it to you that there might be a problem 
with them to become .....
A thing you've got to be very careful about and where 
scientists have a responsible I think is to try and 
inform the public as best they can, bearing in mind 
that many of the public are not trained scientists so it 
has to be point across in a language that is basically 
understood by them.
Now should this precede or for what experimentation you see, 
like er Watson seems to be arguing that in fact its a 
mistake to have public debates and things before the research 
goes ahead because you just get this uninformed ....
I have some sympathy with that view actually, I really have
some sympathy with that view u m ..... Steve Raders well
.... um ........ I have to be very careful that I'm not
coloured by, I like Steven alot but he, he er he does 
jump in at times, again its one of these, I think there is 
a distinct danger in sort of separating science and saying 
well the scientist know what they're talking about, you know 
you're the ignorant public, the scientist will decide what 
is best for you .. um that probably is not very wise 
people then start to be more suspicious of science then some-
of them are already .... u m .......... what probably needs
to be done is, as I say t o  provide with in any child's
education um ... a basis of science education.....  so that
at least , um the majority of the public do become somewhat 
informed about science. Inevitably whatever they do their 
lives are going to be affected by science, its impossible 
not to be, and so ideally I suppose it would be nice if they 
could be informed as much as possible.
Being informed or in on the decision making policy.
I don't know eventually, there are some decisions I don't 
know if the public have really the knowledge to make 
decisions on. And I know that can be a bit dangerous and I
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know, 1 realise that but um ,. you can pay that someones 
deciding for me on the other hand the are I think probably 
occasions ........ um ...... well let' s take something like
an :V'* policy, £ know most governments don’t have 
any on term and energy policy but still um its all very 
well perhaps on the one hand to say well you know we should 
abolish all, if you took a total gut reaction, and put it in 
a, put the emphasis on nuclear all the time, alot of people 
would say oh no steer clear of that at all costs, but 
what needs to be done is probably to weigh, given that there 
are certain risks what are the alternatives, what are the 
alternative risk.
Well maybe that can be publicly debated.
Yes, I think that that probably could, but again you see 
as with politics there are alot of people who um .... 
are basically disinterested in about everything, they 
go along and stick their vote in and they probably vote 
um according to what their parents voted, in alot of cases, 
my parents always voted Labour so I always vote Labour 
type thing, or my parents always voted Conservative
so I always vote Conservative and ....... occasionally
that way I don't get embarked on politics, that's not 
the point, but some people I just, whether you would 
really get a true cross section view because some people 
are just going to be basically disinterested and not take 
part in the debate anyway.
Well I just wonder whether there could be a thing like 
Jury service, where you could actually have, you go 
on the Jury to consider such and such aspect of science 
policy and you actually have like a court with scientists 
who if necessary would employ middle men to actually 
translate their ideas into sort of a language which is 
assesible and even to the extent of having a few, saying 
it was an aspect of biology you could actually have someone • 
to say right OK we're just going to have an introductory 
lesson on what a cell is, we can now consider this part and 
then we'll have morale arguments that the scientists view 
and then we going to have a counter argument from this 
conservationist and then we want you to make a vote, and 
your vote will be taken as a societal ... that sort of thing.
Well, I mean something along those lines wouldn't be a bad 
thing, at least, it may not necessarily reflect the whole 
of society.
X don't think it could possibly do that.
No, but on the other hand at least the issues in reasonable 
terms, in reasonable terms could be put and people
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And people could a,t least consider what the issues ate, 
rather than jugt have a vote on a. gut reaction, you know 
all nuclear power stations are that.
You could even have them televised on another channel 
purely for democrat, % always feel that television is very 
under^used medium for democracy.
That's right, that’s right.
Indeed interactive video would be a whole new ball 
game in democracy.
That's right, that's right, its very interesting,, its 
an interesting issue, they've actually taken
DNA and e r ...... for the majority of the public
I suppose they just don't know that they fear that 
we could be making clones of Hitler or something and 
they don't want anything to do with it. Or that some 
awful bug sort of got out of hand and just wiped us all out.
Does this .... worry one time ......
They should be concerned I suppose, but before any decisions 
were made I should have thought that it was important to 
put the major issues to the public as well as possible, 
well let's put it in a different way, a thing should not 
necessarily be voted out on a gut reaction if it has 
agree with that potential, um it should be thrown out simply 
because a majority lobby thought Oh God I don't really know 
about this, but it sounds awful, you know we'll either have 
a nuclear bomb or bug sort of thing. They'll say absolutely
no to this er ......  because I think people's natural
tendency is fear of the unknown and because we fear the 
unknown we must reject it rather than saying well we don't 
know alot about this, we have reservations about it but 
perhaps what we should do is to look at the facts as far 
as we're able to judge them and see what the issues are, 
see what the two opposing views, put them forward, given 
that there are certain facts, and those facts don't change 
its just the view you place, the bias or the emphasis or 
whatever that you place on those facts, ... its like er ... 
but of course the human element comes in time and time.again.
Well I think that's what we're talking about.
That's right you see if you take, in the world take a stupid 
example, someone, the optimist can see half of beer in a 
pint mug and say its half full and a pesimist can say its 
half empty, now it doesn't alter the situation because
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in any other situation, there are what I would call the 
moaners in society who see a situation and can only see 
what is bad in it and there are the optimistic or say that 
situation, the same situation well what could be good in it, 
its not saying that they don't realise that there isn't 
another point of view.
I 374 Its just that you use your own analogy to weigh up evidence
perhaps, pros and cons, pluses and minuses. Well we've 
gone on very much longer they I'd intended I'm really very 
grateful indeed.
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